

BS1225

.8. H513

v. 2

Wm B Scarborough



DISSERTATIONS  
ON THE  
GENUINENESS OF THE PENTATEUCH.



DISSERTATIONS

ON THE

GENUINENESS OF THE PENTATEUCH.

BY

DR E. W. HENGSTENBERG,

Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin

---

"Had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed me, for he wrote of me. But if ye believe not his writings how shall ye believe my words.—JESUS CHRIST. (John v. 46, 47.)

Πρὸς Μωϋσέα τὸν τῆς Θεολογίας ὠκεανὸν μεταβαίνομεν, ἐξ οὐπερ, ποιητικῶς εἰπεῖν, πάντες ποταμοὶ καὶ πᾶσα θάλαττα.—THEODORET. (Opp. iv. 742.)

---

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY

J. E. RYLAND,

Editor of the Life and Correspondence of John Foster

VOL. II.

EDINBURGH :

T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET,

LONDON: HAMILTON, ADAMS, & CO.; SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, & CO.

DUBLIN: JOHN ROBERTSON; CURRY & CO.

MDCCCXLVII.

PRINTED BY  
M'COSH, PARK, & DEWARS,  
DUNDEE.



## CONTENTS.

### DISSERTATION IV.—THE PENTATEUCH, AND THE TIME OF THE JUDGES.

	Page
Preliminary Remarks, . . . . .	1-10
The Book of Joshua, . . . . .	10-16
The Book of Judges, . . . . .	16-32
Sacred Places, . . . . .	32
Sacred Persons, . . . . .	46
Sacred Times, . . . . .	65
Sacred Rites, . . . . .	70
Relation of the time of the Judges to the Civil Legislation of the Pentateuch, . . . . .	82
State of Religion and Morals in the time of the Judges, . . . . .	91

### DISSERTATION V.—STATEMENTS OF THE PENTATEUCH RESPECTING ITS

AUTHOR, . . . . .	122-145
-------------------	---------

### DISSERTATION VI.—THE ALLEGED TRACES OF A LATER AGE IN THE PENTATEUCH.

Preliminary Remark, . . . . .	146
The Canaanites, . . . . .	150
Hebron, . . . . .	152
Dan, . . . . .	157
Moriah, . . . . .	159
Bethel, . . . . .	163
“Before there reigned any King over the Children of Israel,” . . . . .	165
“These are that Aaron and Moses,” . . . . .	167
Exodus xvi. 33-35, . . . . .	169
The Omer, . . . . .	172
Sin-Offerings and Trespass-Offerings, . . . . .	174
Hormah, . . . . .	179
The Book of the Wars of the Lord, . . . . .	182
Havoth-Jair, . . . . .	185
Hermon, . . . . .	193
The Bedstead of King Og, . . . . .	198
The Law of the King in Deut xvii., . . . . .	201

	Page
<i>Geographical Anachronisms,</i>	214
Numbers xx. v.,	215
Genesis xv. 18,	216
Exodus xxiii. 31,	217
Deuteronomy xi. 22-24,	218
Numbers xxi. 13,	220
Numbers xxxii.,	221
Edom,	222
<i>Historical Anachronisms—</i>	
Hadad,	235
“This was Esau,”	236
<i>Prophetical Anachronisms—</i>	
Numbers xxiv. 17, 18,	239
Genesis xxvii. 40,	241
Genesis xxv. 23,	243
Amalek,	247
“The other side Jordan,”	256
“Unto this day,”	264
The Threatening of Exile,	270
The Prophets,	274
The alleged Abstract Unhistorical character of the Mosaic Polity,	276
 <i>DISSERTATION VII.—THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE PENTATEUCH.</i>	
Preliminary Remarks,	283
Chronological Contradictions, Gen. xxxv. 26; Gen. xxix. 30; Gen. xxxiv. Gen. xxxviii. 46,	284
Contradictions in reference to the Passover,	294
The Time of the Passover,	295
Unleavened Bread and the Passover,	303
Deuteronomy xvi. 2,	309
Exodus xvii. 1; Numbers xx. 1, &c.,	310
Exodus xxiii. 16; and xxxiv. 22,	315
The two Tables of the Law,	317
The Levites' Age of Service,	321
Joshua—Hoshea,	323
Horeb and Sinai,	325
The Plains of Moab, and the Land of Moab,	327
Priests and Levites,	329
Judges,	340
The Spies,	344
The Amorites and Amalekites,	346
Sihon,	347
The Punishment of Moses,	349
Deuteronomy x. 6,	350

	Page
The Sabbatical and Jubilee Year, . . . . .	357
The Release of Bondsmen, . . . . .	360
Cities of Refuge, . . . . .	363
Administration of Justice, . . . . .	364

DISSERTATION VIII.—THE THEOLOGY OF THE PENTATEUCH IN RELATION TO  
ITS GENUINENESS,

Preliminary Remarks, . . . . .	365
The Anthropomorphisms of the Pentateuch, . . . . .	366
The Repentance of God, . . . . .	372
The Jealousy of God, . . . . .	373
The Wrath of God, . . . . .	375
The Vengeance of God, . . . . .	377
The Hardening of Pharaoh's heart, . . . . .	380
The Immutability of God, Numb. xxii. . . . .	385
The Right of the Israelites to Palestine, . . . . .	387
The Alleged Purloining of the Vessels of the Egyptians, . . . . .	417
The Unholiness of Sacred Persons, . . . . .	432
Visiting the Sins of the Fathers on the Children, . . . . .	446
The Partiality of the Pentateuch, . . . . .	452
The Silence of the Pentateuch respecting the Doctrine of Immortality, . . . . .	460
The Doctrine of Retribution, . . . . .	473
The Alleged Outwardness of the Mosaic Legislation, . . . . .	487
The Ceremonial Law, . . . . .	501
The Levitical Bias of the Pentateuch, . . . . .	534

## ERRATA.

### VOL. I.

- Page 61, line 20, *for* "scorn," *read* "terror."  
" 92, " 32, *for* "sources," *read* "source."  
" 92, " 33, *dele* mentioned.  
" 141, " 9, *for* "reduced," *read* "seduced."  
" 415, " 11, *for* "convir," *read* "conviv."

### VOL. II.

- Page 172, line 32, *for* "fous," *read* "fons."  
" 186, " 28, *for* "Anzeiger," *read* "Anzieger."  
" 187, " 6, *for* "dילו," *read* "ditto."  
" 256, last line, *for* "upon," *read* "to."  
" 257, " 11, *for* "terminater," *read* "terminatur."  
" 276, " 16, *for* "as the," *read* "as in the."  
" 308, " 31, *for* "deci," *read* "diei."  
" 325, " 29, *for* "accipicti," *read* "accipietis."  
" 328, last line, *for* "fruits," *read* "facts."  
" 329, last line, *for* "רִהֲלֵיִם," *read* "רִהֲלֵיִם."  
" 378, " 38, *for* "ποιῶν," *read* "ποιῶν."  
" 404, " 7, *for* "Geagr," *read* "Geogr."  
" 416, " 27, *for* "Polybus," *read* "Polybius."  
" 429, " 5, *for* "in," *read* "for."  
" 464, " 8, *for* "even," *read* "also."  
" —, " 12, *for* "affect," *read* "effect."

# THE PENTATEUCH

AND

## THE TIME OF THE JUDGES.

---

### PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

THE argument against the genuineness of the Pentateuch, that its admission renders the later development of the people inexplicable, was first broached by NACHTIGAL in an essay on the gradual formation of the sacred writings of the Israelites, in HENKE'S *Magazin*, ii. 446. "During a long period of many centuries after Moses," he remarks, "we find no trace that any one had read, in their present extent, the writings which we now call Mosaic, but numerous indications that the Israelites themselves were unacquainted with their most important parts." The facts to which he appeals are not numerous—the neglect of circumcision during the march through the wilderness—the idolatry of the Danites—Jephthah's human sacrifices—and Samson's marriage with an idolatress. VATER\* trod in NACHTIGAL'S footsteps. "Many, and precisely the most important laws of the Pentateuch," he remarks, "were either unknown, or at least not observed. Hence the conclusion may be drawn, that either the Pentateuch was not extant, or that it was not yet in its present extent that religious code of general obligation, which it must have been if we admit its Mosaic authorship." The number of facts on which this writer grounds his argument is also not very large. Of those adduced by Nachtigal, he considers two (in accordance with the counter-

---

\* *Abhandlung über der Pentateuch*, § 78.

statements of ECKERMANN, *Beitr.* v. p. 57)—Samson's marriage with an idolatress, and the idolatry of the Danites, as not to the purpose.

The investigation received quite a new form in DE WETTE's *Essay on the state of the ritual of the Israelites, in reference to the legislation of the Pentateuch*, in his *Beitr. zur Einl.* Th. i. 223, "Moses," he remarks, "would have been in a very unfortunate and singular position, if he had given all the laws that are recorded in the Pentateuch. Instead of the laws being at the time of their promulgation strictly and conscientiously observed, and not till a later period falling into oblivion, or becoming superseded by others, it would have been the reverse with the Mosaic legislation from the beginning. During the lifetime of the lawgiver, and just after his death, the most important laws were neglected, a total silence respecting his book of the law was succeeded after a thousand years by the most punctilious observance, the most conscientious, even superstitious adherence, and the most zealous study. The neglect of the religious laws is peculiarly suspicious, of which we find repeated and most striking instances." These examples are collected from the history, and the collective result given in p. 254. They are as follows:—Until the times of David and Solomon no national sanctuary was thought of, where alone Jehovah might be worshipped. An unrestrained license of worship prevailed. The sacrificial system was extremely simple. Under David, the worship first obtained a fixed priestly institution, and we then begin to find the Levites with the Ark of the Covenant. Not till the book of the Law was discovered in the reign of Josiah, was an end put to the state of unbridled freedom and excess. Accordingly the description of the Tabernacle as the national sanctuary in Exodus, is a mere sacred legend. The complicated system of sacrifices in Leviticus is to be rejected, as the invention and composition of later priests. The election of the tribe of Levi could not have happened in the time of Moses; the book of the law was not in existence before the time of Josiah.

DE WETTE's follower in the criticism of the Pentateuch, BERTHOLDT, rejected this argument. He remarks (*Einleitung*, p. 778), that the conclusion drawn from the non-observance of the law has no greater validity, than if from all those defects in the

administration of justice which prevailed in the middle ages, and still later at many epochs, in those countries where the codes of Theodosius and Justinian were received, any one should infer the non-existence of those collections of laws. This opposition certainly does honour to his freedom from prejudice, yet we cannot help perceiving that it was not well-founded. Let a person admit, as he does, the correctness of De Wette's alleged facts, and confront them with no others, then the force of the argument must be fully acknowledged. If Moses is the author of the Pentateuch, if it was produced as a sacred book at the beginning of the nation's existence, under so illustrious a sanction—abuses might arise, or rather this would needs be the case, considering the peculiar character of this book and its relation to human nature. But there must be at the same time palpable marks by which these abuses could be recognised; it could be proved that the pious in Israel at all times strictly adhered to the prescriptions of the book of the law; and, in reference to the whole nation, it might be shown, that along with partial violations of the law, traces existed of its being followed in important points; that the violations were only temporary, and checked from time to time by reformations. Only when these requisitions can be satisfied, can an appeal be made to the state of the Church in the middle ages as a historical parallel. As long as DE WETTE'S statement is accepted as correct, persons have no right to appeal to this parallel, nor to that adduced by BERTHOLDT.

The remaining opponents of the genuineness of the Pentateuch are all followers of DE WETTE, and lay great stress on this argument. They supply themselves very freely from his stores, and have made scarcely the least addition of any value to them. Compare GRAMBERG, i. 106, &c., BLEEK, *Beitr. zu der Forschungen über den Pentateuch, Stud. und Crit.* 1831, p. 501. VON BOHLEN, *Einleitung*, p. 91; VATKE, p. 254, &c,

The defenders of the genuineness cannot be said to have gone to the very bottom of the subject, and HITZIG'S assertion in the *Studien und Kritiken* is not altogether without reason, that DE WETTE'S treatise has not yet been refuted. That DE WETTE himself has still the feeling of victory, is shown by the confidence with which he not merely repeats this argument in his review of VATKE'S work in the *Studien und Kritiken*, but places it in the

fore-ground. "Moses," he remarks, "could not be the author of the Pentateuch. Had this been the case, the disordered state of things in the succeeding age would be an inexplicable enigma. An acquaintance with these laws, and a reverence for the authority of Moses would have rendered such a state of things impossible." See JAHN ii. 1, § 5; HERBST, § 9; and ROSENMÜLLER, *proll.* p. 10; but much more important matters will be found in MOVER'S *Über die Chronik*, and HÄVERNICH, *Einleit.* ii. 554.

It is our purpose, having entered on this investigation, not to act merely on the defensive; the facts of the post-Mosaic history will furnish us with positive evidence for the genuineness of the Pentateuch. It will appear, that the phenomena of the later history are only conceivable on the supposition of its Mosaic authorship.

It appears advisable to fix certain limits to the investigation, that we may execute the task, according to our ability, so as to leave no part unexplored. There is no room for hesitation as to what part we should select. *The time of the Judges* at once presents its claims on our attention. If we have this on our side, all is gained. That the age of Joshua, as it appears in the book of Joshua, is conformable to the Pentateuch, and presupposes its existence, is allowed. But it is asserted, that this age could not have been as there represented, because then the age of the Judges must have exhibited quite a different character. Now, if we can show that the character attributed to the age of the Judges is not that which actually belongs to it, then the age of Joshua is ours with that of the Judges. Further, if we can prove, that, in the age of the Judges, (some abuses excepted, which may be clearly shown to be such), the Mosaic institutions were in existence, that everything in it presupposes the existence of the Pentateuch, it will be settled henceforth, that all deviations from the Mosaic law which occur at a later period, must rest on other grounds than the non-existence of this law. The direct consideration of this later period we may sooner dispatch, since, in reference to our present undertaking, we have already treated, in the preceding volume, the most difficult part of it—the history of the kingdom of Israel.

But, before entering on the special investigation relating to the period of the Judges, we would premise a few general observations.

I. DE WETTE thinks that the propensity of the Israelites to the worship of foreign gods is not conceivable—if Moses had already



given to a people devoted to objects of sense, a ritual adapted to the senses—and if, from his time, a whole tribe had existed, that of Levi, whose entire interests were bound up with the Mosaic ritual. It is an easy matter to dazzle a sensual people by priestly authority, and to bend them under the yoke of a hierarchy. Priests of all nations have practised this with success. Why did it not succeed till so late a period with the Israelites, for whom the law-giver himself had built the steps of the hierarchical throne, and who, by their number and internal connection with one another, and separation from the other tribes as peculiarly holy, must have wielded a powerful influence over the nation? But as to the ritual, let it be recollected that the accommodation to the sensual tendencies of the people was solely in its *form*. In its *substance*, nothing was conceded to them. The principle of the Mosaic religion, “BE YE HOLY, FOR I AM HOLY,” pervaded the whole ritual. On every side, there were mementos of sin—exhortations to holiness—threatenings of judgment on the rebellious—promises of salvation only on the condition of holiness. A mere descent in form, which, on all occasions, was manifestly designed to raise the people to what was high and spiritual, would never satisfy a *sinful* sensuality. A very different satisfaction was offered by the religion of the nations by whom Israel was surrounded, the product of the spirit of the age, whose enormous power may be more vividly conceived than is commonly done, by comparing it with that which the spirit of the age *now* exercises. Israel, like the heathen, loved “wild grapes;” Hosea iii. 1; (*Christologie*, iii. 120), and these were not supplied, in the religion of JEHOVAH, with all the adaptation to the senses in its ritual. Joshua understood the subject better than our modern critics when he said to the people, “*Ye cannot serve the Lord; for he is a holy God; he is a jealous God; he will not forgive your transgressions, nor your sins.*” The tribe of Levi were unable completely to check the inclination to idolatry that was so deeply rooted in the people. Where priests have exercised such an absolute influence, the religion of which they were the representatives, had a character more suited to the condition of the natural man, which everywhere presents a bait by which it can allure the people. Besides, all the arts by which the priests of other nations aggrandize themselves and their divinities, were forbidden to the Israelites; there

was no hierarchy; the influence of the priestly order depended on the good will of the people. But, what is of the greatest moment, the temptations to apostasy to which the people were liable, were also powerfully felt by the priests. Daily experience shows, that even personal advantage and important interests cannot withstand the spirit of the age. *Only he who is of the truth, can powerfully advocate the truth.* To account, therefore, for the propensity of the people to idolatry, we do not require the admission of the non-existence of certain Mosaic institutions. We must rather protest against such an explanation as crude and superficial. Whoever has gained a knowledge of man by means of self-knowledge, and, at the same time, understands the nature of the Israelitish religion, will anticipate that the history of that religion would present a succession of apostasies on the part of the people, and he will smile at such assertions as those of VATKE, p. 260: "The principle of the Old Testament has evinced its weakness, since it could not overpower the forces opposed to it in the course of many centuries; but this weakness would be unintelligible if the principle had been fully formed ever since the time of Moses." As if the Saviour had never spoken of "the servant who knew his Lord's will, and did it not!" Yet VATKE had said but a little before, "Moreover, the worship of Baal and Astarte, the productive and receptive powers of nature, was connected with the immediate enjoyment of sensual existence, and with sensual excesses, while JEHOVAH displayed a more severe character." But this heartless philosophy thinks it must look for the chief cause of moral phenomena not in the heart, but in the head. Yet DE WETTE appears more recently to have acknowledged the nullity of all such superficial explanations of the propensity of the Israelites to idolatry. He remarks, at the close of the notice of VATKE'S work, (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1837, p. 1003), that a sense of guilt, consciousness of departure from the known will of God, was a distinguishing peculiarity of the Hebrew nation, which is overlooked by VATKE. "But, if we place at the head of their whole history a great positive act of the will, a legislation by which the natural development is forestalled, and its course prescribed, we account for the rise of that discrepancy and the peculiar tone and movement of the national character among the Hebrews."

II. It cannot be denied that the religious state of the Israelites

was more conformable to the literal prescriptions of the Pentateuch *after* the captivity, than *before* it. This circumstance our opponents have turned to their own advantage. They maintain that an end being put to the deviations from the Mosaic legislation in an age when the Pentateuch was certainly in existence, proves that before that time it was not in existence. Compare VATER, § 78; DE WETTE, *Beitrag*e, i. p. 258; *Einleitung*, § 162.

Our opponents proceed on the supposition that the problem in question can be solved in no other way than in the one which they prefer; if we can solve the problem in another way their argument loses all its force.

The change in the Hebrew nation was effected by a concurrence of a variety of causes. (i). The proportion of the priests to the people among those who returned from the captivity is very remarkable; of 42,360 persons who returned under Zerubbabel, not less than 4,289 were priests. (See HESS *on the governors of Judah after the captivity*, i. p. 243). The priests therefore formed a tenth part of the whole. This proportion can hardly be accounted for by supposing that those who were indisposed to the theocracy remained in a heathen land, but that among the priests the theocratic disposition was in proportion much stronger. The contrary is indicated by the numerical proportion of those who returned to those who were carried captive, which does not allow us to suppose that in the captivity a large remnant were left behind. The number of those who returned is greater than of those who were carried away. (See HESS, p. 242). The preponderance of the priests must rather have existed among those who were carried away. It also shews that the heathen conquerors acknowledged in the theocratic principle the peculiar constitution and permanence of the nation, and hence took special care to remove the priests as the chief representatives of this principle. If they took away the priests for this reason, (that they were designedly taken out of the mass of the population appears also from the otherwise inexplicable proportion of the Levites to the priests, the priests were more than twelve times as many as the Levites, of whom there were only 341), we cannot but think that, in the selection of the rest, they directed their attention peculiarly to the theocratic principle on which the nationality of Israel rested. Hence we are not at liberty to compare the religious tendency among those who returned with

that of the whole people before the captivity, but only with the tendency of the better disposed part; and hence it will not answer the purpose of indicating an essential difference in their position relative to the legislation of the Pentateuch. (ii). The priests in the new state must, by their very numbers, have obtained an important preponderance. But their influence must have been rendered still greater from the circumstance that the civil power was in the hands of their heathen oppressors. The Greeks here furnish a remarkable parallel. How among them the authority of religion and of the priesthood gained the ascendancy during the rule of the Osmons has been pointed out by RANKE, (*Fürsten und Völker von Südeuropa*, i. p. 27). "The state," he remarks, "to which the people wished to belong was another than theirs—it was the hierarchy." To the power of the priests may be ascribed the rescue of the nationality. Under their guardianship the Greeks have cherished and ripened their hatred of the Turks, and that peculiar character which now belongs to them. While before the captivity the theocracy existed among the Israelites without a hierarchy, after the captivity, for the reasons we have assigned, the hierarchy continually struck its roots deeper among them, and in doing so promoted an outward establishment of the legislation of the Pentateuch. The alteration was so much the more important, since, before the captivity, especially in the times immediately preceding it, the temporal power of idolatry had mightily increased, (See VERSCHUIR, *De origine et causis idolatrie amoris in gente Isr*, in his *Dissert. ed. Lotze*, p. 172). (iii). On those who were more or less susceptible, (and only with these we have any concern), the national catastrophe which had been repeatedly foretold in the law must, at first, have made an impression, (See Deut. iv. 30, "When thou art in tribulation, and all these things are come upon thee, if thou turn to the Lord thy God and shalt be obedient unto his voice"), and especially since, by the ministry of the prophets, it was brought home to their consciences as a punishment for the violation of the covenant. With the fear of the Lord thus awakened, there was connected the hope that by returning to him their vanished prosperity would be restored, and this hope would be nourished by the promises of the same prophets whose threatenings had been so exactly fulfilled. It increased by the proofs of their continued election, which the people retained through the capti-

vity, and by the beginning of its fulfilment in their freedom from exile. The sufferings which, through irreligion, had been brought upon the people, awakened an abhorrence of it; hatred against the heathen, as its natural consequence, produced hatred against heathenism—just as among ourselves, in the time of the war of freedom, hatred of the French called forth a hatred of French infidelity and French immorality. The crowd of heathen nations and religions with which the Israelites had hitherto been in connexion had made them mistrustful in general of worldly power and worldly religions. (iv). That the deep impression thus made at least so far maintained itself that the people never returned again to gross idolatry; that, in general, of the two forms of ungodliness which before the captivity were associated, *idolatry* and *hypocrisy*, (*Christologie*, iii. 376), only the latter was cultivated, though the great exception in the time of ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES must not be passed over unnoticed, in which even the priests served the heathen idols, (on this subject see SURINGAR, *de causis mutati Hebr. ingenii post reditum e captivitate Bab.*, Leyden, 1829), may be accounted for from the gradual decline of heathenism. The leaning of the heathen, after the captivity, to Judaism, was closely connected with the aversion of the Jews from heathenism. (v). Some weight, perhaps, is also due to the circumstance that heathenism had become divided against itself; that the Persians were hostile to the gross Canaanitish and Babylonish idolatry which had hitherto been such a source of temptation to the Israelites. By this opposition the power of the spirit of the age was broken. Still the admission of *such* an effect of Parseism rests only on probability. But, at all events, we cannot go so far as to suppose that the Jews, by the reception of Persian notions of religion, were freed from gross idolatry, which VATKE, (p. 557) maintains. On the contrary JAHN remarks, (*Arch.* iii. 158), “Also after Alexander, when idolatry and gross superstition formed again the religion of the rulers of Asia, they persisted steadfastly in their religion.” That Parseism produced no effect on the religious practice of the Jews has been already pointed out in the *Introduction to Daniel*; and since then the subject has been more clearly understood; for, by the investigations of STUHR, Zerdusht, and the religious system promulgated by him, have been brought down to the age of Darius Hystaspes—the

antiquity and genuineness of the written monuments of this religion have been called in question, and it has been made probable that the doctrines common to the Persians and the Jews passed over to the former from the latter.

We believe that our task is now performed, that we have shewn that the alteration in the national mind of the Israelites after the captivity may be satisfactorily accounted for without making use of the method of explanation preferred by our opponents. Where, moreover, we may ask, in all history has an alteration of the national mind been brought about by a literary forgery? Does the relation of the times of the Reformation to the middle ages rest upon such outward accidents?

III. Although, as has been already remarked, we do not propose to present the evidence *for* the existence of the Mosaic legislation in the time of Joshua, which the book of Joshua furnishes, yet it appears necessary to examine the evidence which has been brought *against* it from that book as witnesses against itself, which might have escaped the author.

There are two statements in the book of Joshua which it has been thought cannot harmonize with the existence and authority of the legislation of the Pentateuch—the account of the last assembling of the people under Joshua at the “sanctuary of the Lord” at Shechem, and the notice respecting the neglect of circumcision during the march through the wilderness.

i. “Already under Joshua,” BLEEK remarks (*Stud. u. Crit.* 1831, p. 503. Compare DE WETTE p. 228), “who had indicated the site of the Ark of the Covenant to be Shiloh, we find the city of Shechem treated by Joshua himself as a place of the sanctuary of Jehovah,” xxiv. 1, 26. The difficulty occasioned by this passage is of ancient date. The LXX. have in Josh. xxiv. 1, “And Joshua gathered all the tribes of Israel”—instead of “to Shechem,” εἰς Σηλώ. The difficulty lies not in the expression “they presented themselves *before God*,” for we shall show in the section on the holy places in the period of the Judges, that “*before God*” contained in itself no reference to an outward sanctuary; it marks only the religious character of the act or transaction. The difficulty is simply in the mention of the sanctuary שְׁכֵם, in ver. 26. “And Joshua wrote these words in the book of the law of God, and took a great stone, and set it up there under

an oak, that was by the sanctuary of Jehovah." Jewish expositors have endeavoured to solve it by supposing, that by the sanctuary is to be understood the Ark of the Covenant, or even the whole tabernacle brought from Shiloh to Shechem; and to this supposition MAURER has given his assent (p. 179). But it appears altogether inadmissible. It is very suspicious that nothing is said of a temporary transfer of the Ark of the Covenant, or the tabernacle to Shechem, which must have taken place if the author meant to refer to it under the term "sanctuary." But, what is still more decisive, the author means to give the exact locality of the memorial. But how could the Ark of the Tabernacle serve to indicate this, which perhaps on the next day might be taken away? How also, if we understand by  $\text{מִקְדָּשׁ}$  the ark or the tabernacle, could the oak be *in* the sanctuary of Jehovah? But this circumstance that the oak was *in* the sanctuary is decisive against those who by  $\text{מִקְדָּשׁ}$  understand a sanctuary which stood near the tabernacle; it does not allow us to take  $\text{מִקְדָּשׁ}$  for a building, and thus leads us to a solution of the difficulty, which is principally occasioned by associating the idea of a building with  $\text{מִקְדָּשׁ}$ , an error from which MASIUS kept himself free, who remarks, "*Ego vero auguror sacrarium Domini eum dici locum, quem Abraham, posita apud istam arborem ara, et facta re divina, primum in omnia Cananea consecraverat, cum illic laetissimum illum a Deo nuntium accepisset, prorsus similiter atque a Jacobo locus ille est Bethel, domus Dei nuncupatus in quo ipse primum divina visa vidisset.*" On a nearer examination the matter stands thus. The place of the *first* assembling which Joshua convened in the prospect of his death, is not specified. For that reason it must have been Shiloh. For this place which first came into notice, owing to the sanctuary (compare BACHIENE ii. 3, p. 408), appears from that time (Josh, xviii. 1), to the death of Joshua as the central point of the nation (compare the passages in BACHIENE, p. 412). Moreover, there is probably an allusion to the name Shiloh in Joshua xxiii. 1, compared with xviii. 1. That a second gathering should be called, can hardly be explained on any other than a local ground, that the locality of the second gathering being sanctified by recollections of the past, would excite an interest in the people which would be wanting at Shiloh, a place destitute of such associations. How slight a reason

there was in the matter itself, appears from the effort of many expositors (to whom a local reason never occurred), out of two gatherings to make only one, an effort so strong, that they have not hesitated to do manifest violence to the text. Now why Shechem was chosen for this purpose, is evident from the undeniable reference in Joshua xxiv. 23, ("Now therefore put away the strange gods that are among you;" and ver. 26, "And he took a great stone and set it up there, under an oak which was in the sanctuary of the Lord") to Gen. xxxv. 2-4. "Then Jacob said unto his household, and to all that were with him, put away the strange gods that are among you, and be clean, and change your garments. . . . And they gave unto Jacob all the strange gods, and Jacob hid them under the oak which was by Shechem." The exhortation to fidelity towards the Lord, to purification from all idolatrous practices, must have made a peculiarly deep impression in the place where their venerated progenitor had *done*, what is here *enjoined* upon his descendants; the remembrance of that event addressed them here in more impressive tones than it could on any other spot. Jacob chose the neighbourhood of the oak at Shechem for the solemn act, because it had been rendered sacred by Abraham. The passage in Gen. xxxv. 4, points to Gen. xii. 6, 7, according to which Abraham under this oak was honoured with the first appearance of God on his arrival in Canaan, and here he erected his first altar. Joshua chose the same place, particularly on account of its consecration by what Jacob had there performed, but perhaps equally with a reference to its first consecration by Abraham; in the time of the Judges we find the celebrity of the place heightened by an association connected with the memorial of this solemn gathering under Joshua (Judges ix. to be noticed in the sequel). The sanctuary is no other than the open space under this memorable oak. There were in Canaan as many sanctuaries of God in this sense as there were places, with which recollections of the patriarchal age were associated. How little the existence of sanctuaries in this sense, infringed on the law respecting the unity of the national sanctuary, we shall shew more fully in the section *on the holy places in the time of the Judges*. A violation of that law would have been committed only by the offering of sacrifices at Shechem, but nothing of the kind is here mentioned.



ii. But again ; one of the principal laws, that of circumcision, it is said, was not enforced during the march through the wilderness, according to Joshua v. 2-7. The uncircumcision of *some* would occasion no difficulty ; but since, in Joshua v. 5, it is said, “ *all* the people that were born in the wilderness by the way, as they came forth out of Egypt, them they had not circumcised”—this is, indeed, a plain proof, that, in the second year of the Exodus, all the laws could not have been so given and written down as they are represented in Exodus and Leviticus. Thus VATER remarks, following NACHTIGAL, § 78. This objection, like so many others, has already been suggested by the older theologians. (See BUDDEUS, *Hist. Eccles.* i. p. 806.) Most of them (CALVIN had in vain not only stated but proved the correct view), sought for the ground of the omission of the rite in the inconveniences and dangers which must have attended circumcision in the march through the wilderness. If Gen. xvii. was in existence—had the view of circumcision, which is there presented, taken root among the people, circumcision could not have been omitted on so slender a ground, which is more plainly such, because the Israelites were by no means always marching, but frequently remained for a long time at one place. If the law was in existence, and promulged, in which the punishment of excommunication was annexed for the neglect of circumcision, then certainly CALVIN’S remark would hold good, “ *Obsignatio foederis, qua recipiebantur in ecclesiam, centum vitis erat pretiosior.*” The inability of those who proceeded on the supposition of the genuineness of the Pentateuch, to explain the facts under consideration, have occasioned others to accept this inability as one of the proofs against the genuineness of the Pentateuch. But, by admitting that the obligation of circumcision had, at that time, taken no firm root among the Israelites, we are only involved in fresh and inextricable difficulties. For, (i.) it is said, in Joshua v. 2, “ Circumcise again the children of Israel the *second time,*” which implies, that, at an earlier period, all the people had been circumcised. This is also expressly said in ver. 5, “ All the people that came out were circumcised.” (ii.) That the circumcision was performed with *stone* knives shows the high antiquity of the practice. (See MAURER.) (iii.) But what is the main point, the circumstances under which Joshua undertook the performance of circumcision,

show how vivid, at that time, was the sense of its sacredness, how nugatory that explanation which seeks the ground of omission in its non-sacred character. Yet BAUER (*Geschichte der Heb.* ii. 10) makes the excessive opinion of its sacredness a reproach to Joshua, "One might have expected, that he would have at once attacked the terrified inhabitants of Canaan; instead of that, he occupied his host with religious ceremonies, with circumcision. All this time the whole army were incapable of using their weapons, and warding off the attacks of their enemies. To such danger Joshua exposed himself and his people from his sacred zeal!"

We now present our own view. Circumcision was not omitted throughout the *whole* of the march, but only from the time when the exclusion of the existing generation from the promised land was declared. It was the external manifestation of the curse. Where the covenant was suspended, there also the signs and sacrament of the covenant could no longer be administered.

The objections to this view may be easily disposed of, (i.) It is expressly said, that circumcision was omitted during the whole forty years' march through the wilderness. But "*forty years*" are elsewhere used as a round number instead of the thirty-eight which, it is generally reckoned, passed from the rejection of the children of Israel to their entrance into Canaan. (ii.) Other marks of the Divine favour were left to the people, such as the presence of the pillar of cloud and of fire, the manna, &c. To this objection, CALVIN has admirably replied: *Ita in una parte excommunicatus fuit populus; adminiculis tamen idoneis interea sublevatus est, ne desperaret. Quem ad modum si pater filio infensus pugnam attollat, acsi vellet procul abigere, et tamen altera manu domi eum retineat; minis terreat ac verberibus, nolet tamen a se discedere.* (iii.) This punishment would not affect the fathers, whom God sentenced to perish, but the sons to whom he had promised his favour. But every thing depended on this, that the administration of the sacrament of the covenant ceased among the people. By this means, those who outwardly professed the sign were reminded that their *περιτομή*, on which they might otherwise pride themselves, was become *ἄκροβυστία*. Could the outward sign of the covenant have been taken away from the fathers, this also would have been done. We say, this *also*; for then also, the sons probably would not have been cir-

eumcised. God would not allow any thing of covenant-relation to be enjoyed by them, since he had excluded the fathers from it, but he promises his return for the future. As long as the new generation were yet outwardly connected with the old, they were also inwardly connected with it; they were not yet fitted and ripe for the covenant, therefore not fitted and ripe to receive the sign of the covenant.

On the other hand there are very weighty reasons in favour of our view. (i.) The reason why Joshua now undertook the circumcision is expressly given in ver. 4-7; the rebellious and rejected generation, during whose continuance circumcision could not be practised, were dead, so that now the Lord could enter into a new covenant-relation with the new generation. Herein we have at the same time the ground of the omission of the rite hitherto. But as such, it reaches not as far back as the departure from Egypt, but only to the Divine decree of rejection. (ii.) Only by this view can we explain the parallel omission of the Feast of the Passover, which equally lasted from the second year of their march till the entrance into Canaan. (iii.) Only by this view can the language of Jehovah in Josh. v. 9, be explained, "This day have I rolled away the reproach of Egypt from off you." What we are to understand by the reproach of Egypt, חַרְפֵּי מִצְרַיִם is clear from such passages as Exod. xxxii. 12, "Wherefore should the Egyptians speak and say, for mischief did he bring them out, to slay them in the mountains, and to consume them from the face of the earth." Num. xiv. 13; ix. 28. Accordingly, the reproach of Egypt is tantamount to, the reproach which is cast upon you by the Egyptians; חַרְפָּה with a genitive following of the persons from whom the reproach proceeds, is found in Zeph. ii. 8, חַרְפֵּי מִצְרַיִם; Neh. v. 9, חַרְפֵּי הַגּוֹיִם; Is. li. 7; Lam. iii. 61, &c. Compare the circumlocution of the *Stat. constr.* in Ps. lxxiv. 22, חַרְפֵּי מִצְרַיִם נִכְלָה. The matter of their scoffing is the rejection which is indicated by God's command to omit the circumcision. The renewed practice of circumcision is regarded as a practical declaration of the restoration of the covenant, and thus putting a stop to the scoffing of the heathen which was based on its cessation. If the circumcision had been omitted for merely external and circumstantial reasons, and because much stress was not laid upon it, it could not have been חַרְפֵּי מִצְרַיִם.

From the preceding reasoning, it appears that the omission of circumcision during the march through the wilderness, so far from being an evidence against the existence of the view presented of it in the Pentateuch, rather necessarily presupposes it. It shows that circumcision was already, at that time, the highest dignity; that it had from the first, theocratically, the meaning given it in the law, not some kind of use belonging to natural religion, but was the sign and seal of the covenant. But with circumcision, the history also ceases of which Israel was the subject; not as a people generally, but only as the people of God; a dignity of which the loss was signified by the cessation of circumcision. Thus as according to Gen. xvii. 14, the cutting off from the covenant was a consequence of the omission of circumcision, so was the omission of circumcision a necessary consequence of being cut off from the covenant, or of the Divine sentence of rejection.

After these preliminary observations, we turn to our special task, namely, to determine the relation of the time of the Judges to the legislation of the Pentateuch.

It is here, above all things, necessary that we should clearly discriminate the general character of the chief historical authority for the period in question—the Book of Judges; more especially since, in this respect, our opponents have shown themselves very negligent; even at an earlier period, when this book was treated with external respect, the character of the period of the Judges was, in a religious point of view, partly falsified; and thus a foundation was laid for the attacks on the Pentateuch from this quarter.

The Book of Judges is not a complete representation of the history of the times with which it is occupied. Such a representation would not find a place in the collection of sacred writings. The times of the Judges formed no new era in the development of the people of God\*—at their close a new one did appear un-

---

\* It presents, in many respects, a similarity to the forty years' march through the wilderness. It also is to be considered as a time of trial. The evident signs of the Divine favour, such as were shown in Joshua's time, were gradually withdrawn—the people were left more to their own natural development, that they might learn to know themselves more thoroughly.

under David and Solomon. We have here merely to do with an interval, which is only of importance for sacred history considered under one certain aspect. This aspect the author steadily contemplates, and communicates only those facts which serve to illustrate it. As to whatever does not strictly belong to it, we must not desire or expect from him more than incidental disclosures; and so the *argumentum a silentio* is bereft of all its value. The most important lesson, ever present to the Author's mind, is one which makes this period peculiarly instructive to all succeeding ages—the intimate connection between departure from the Lord and misery, and between return to the Lord and well-being. What ROTHE says of the history of Christianity applies also to the Israelitish history. "In the course of history, we observe Christianity in a twofold form; as a principle belonging to the general history of the world, and as an ecclesiastical, religious principle; and hence, in the history after Christ, a twofold course of development arises—one of general history, and another of the Church as a religious community. Both courses run parallel to one another, so that history divides itself into two branches—the history of the world as affected by Christianity, and the history of the Christian Church." Of these two streams, the author of the Book of Judges traces in preference the national history of Israel, as the author of the Chronicles, who, in this respect, forms a direct contrast to him, traces the religious or Church history. The position of the Israelitish State to the Lord, and of the Lord to the State, is the object on which his attention is fixed.

That this is really the character and tendency of the Book of Judges, may be argued on the following grounds. (1.) The author himself, in the Introduction (ch. i. and ii.), professes to describe the history of the times of the Judges only from one point of view. He aims to point out the working of the law of retribution during this period. The poles on which his narrative turns are, *apostacy and punishment, repentance and deliverance*—the same on which prophecy revolves. With this announcement, the sequel in the main body of the work agrees, ch. iii. 16. The same circle regularly returns, and in part with the same phraseology. Here and there only the representation widens, and the main object is rendered less prominent; as, for instance, in

ch. ix. and the history of Samson. But there, also, the prophetic tendency is always discernible; there, likewise, the attention of the writer is chiefly directed to the operation of the law of retribution, though not as elsewhere in the general history of the people, but as exemplified in remarkable individuals. (2.) The size of the Book of Judges, in relation to the time it occupies, and compared, for instance, with the Books of Samuel, shows how little it was the author's design to write a complete history of the times. (3.) That the author only intended to illustrate a historical principle, appears from a comparison of the two Appendices with the main substance of the book. If the author pursued in this a general historical object, why did he not insert the Appendices where the events they narrated would chronologically belong? The Appendices, at the same time, show that the scantiness of the narrative in the other portions proceeded, not from want of materials, but from an intentional self-limitation on the part of the historian. Here, where that intention does not interfere, we find events which belong to the first period of the Judges, the recollection of which would therefore be the first to decay, with a fulness, an exactness, that descends to the minutest details; this proves what the author could have done for the whole period, if he had been disposed to have communicated more than he has; and in applying to him the *argumentum a silentio*, the greatest circumspection is requisite. This argument, drawn from the Appendices, will indeed lose something of its weight, if, according to the opinion of some modern critics, the Appendices did not proceed from the author of the book itself. But here the passion for fragment-making has done violence to the manifest connexion of the parts. The Appendices are joined to the body of the work by an "*And it came to pass,*" and the identity of the author is indicated by the almost verbal agreement of ch. xx. 18 ("And the children of Israel arose and went up to the house of God, and asked counsel of God, and said, which of us shall go up first to the battle against the children of Benjamin? And the Lord said, Judah shall go up first") with ch. i. 1, 2 ("And the children of Israel asked the Lord, saying, who shall go up for us against the Canaanites first, to fight against them? And the Lord said, Judah shall go up"); the word *וַיָּקָם* is common to both (that is, to the Appendices and to the work

itself) in the sense of *gathering together*; also the phrase ירימיה (xi. 40, xxi. 19), on which we shall remark in the sequel; and which only occurs, besides, once in Exodus (xiii. 10), and twice in 1 Samuel (i. 3, ii. 19). As to the internal peculiarities, we find in the Appendices the same tendency to refer to the operation of the Divine retribution—a similar turning to the dark side—the same indifference to chronological exactness.

4. An instance of a very important fact, which the author must necessarily mention, if he designed to give a general history, meets us in 1 Sam. ii. 30, where, in the address of the man of God to Eli, the transference of the high-priesthood from the family of Eleazar to that of Ithamar is touched upon, which, according to that passage, would take place under very remarkable circumstances, and is moreover supposed to be universally known; yet of all this not a word is said in the Book of Judges.

5. Great light is thrown on the character of the Book of Judges, by the correct determination of the chronology of this period, as KEIL has laid it down, after earlier labourers (among whom VITRINGA, in his *hypotyposis hist. sacrae*, p. 29, sqq., is the most distinguished), in his Essay, *Chronologische Untersuchung über die Jahre, welche vom Auszuge de Israeliten aus Ägypten bis zur Erbauung des Tempels verflossen sind*, in the Dorpat *Beitrügen zu d. theolog. Wiss.* ii. Hamburg, 1843, p. 303. The results obtained are the following. The oppression of the Philistines, spoken of in the Book of Judges, was contemporary with that of the Ammonites. Its duration is limited to forty years in the Book of Judges. But these forty years must extend beyond the events which are recorded in this book. For Samson, with whose death the book closes, could only have *begun* to redeem Israel, ch. xiii. 5 (“And he shall *begin* to deliver Israel out of the hand of the Philistines”), compared with 1 Sam. iv. 3, “he judged Israel, in the days of the Philistines, twenty years,” Judges xv. 20. When he died, the power of the Philistines was still unbroken; his deeds were rather proofs that God was able to redeem his people Israel—prophecies of future salvation—than the means of actually effecting this deliverance. In the Books of Samuel we find ourselves again on the same ground where we were left by the author of the Book of Judges. In ch. iv. we find the Philistines at war with the Israelites, and the misfortunes of

the latter reached their extreme point, by the capture of the Ark of the Covenant—a catastrophe that caused the death of Eli. That the oppressions of the Philistines, of which this conflict made a part, was the same that is noticed in the Book of Judges, there can be no doubt. If it were not so, in the one case the end, in the other the beginning, would be wanting. But the oppression of the Philistines, mentioned in the Book of Samuel, continued about twenty years after that catastrophe. It was brought to a close by that great victory which the Lord granted to Israel, after the nation, under the influence of Samuel, had returned to him in sincerity, 1 Sam. vii. 14. According to this calculation, of the forty years of Eli's priesthood, the last twenty fell within the period of the Philistines' oppression. The last twenty years of the Philistines' oppression, of which no particulars are given in the Books of Samuel, were occupied by Samson's achievements, as recorded in the Book of Judges. According to ch. xiii. 5, the Philistines domineered over Israel at the time of Samson's birth. While yet a youth, according to ch. xiv. 4, he began his heroic career. Assuming him to have been at this time twenty years old, the end of his judgeship bordered on the beginning of Samuel's judgeship, which was founded on the decisive victory over the Philistines. Thus all the events are harmoniously arranged. Through the space of twenty years, the second half of Eli's pontificate, Israel was oppressed; at the end of this period, their fortunes were sunk to the lowest ebb, by the capture of the Ark of the Covenant. From that point they began to rise again. For twenty years Samson caused the Philistines to feel the superior power of the God of Israel; this was closely followed by the reforming ministry of Samuel, as the precursor of a lasting and complete victory, which took place soon after Samson's death. The hope of Israel, which seemed entombed at Samson's decease, gloriously revived with Samuel. The First Book of Samuel resumes the narrative where the author of the Book of Judges had dropped it, towards the end of the forty years of the Philistines' oppression in 1 Sam. vii. But the author could not attain his object—to describe the new state of things as brought about by Samuel's agency—without narrating certain preparatory facts which the author of the Book of Judges had passed over. Before he gave an account of Samuel's entrance on public life, it seemed proper



to mention some particulars of his personal character, and the circumstances under which he made his appearance. That the author speaks of Eli only in reference to Samuel, results evidently from the general plan of his representation. He passes over in complete silence most important facts; for example, in what manner the transference of the high-priesthood from the family of Eleazar to that of Ithamar took place. These fixed points are connected with the most important results for the problem we have undertaken to solve. If Eli's priesthood fell entirely within the time of the Judges, the period which the Book of Judges embraces, the silence of that book respecting it can only be explained on the ground that the author followed solely the current of political affairs—occupied himself with the deeds of the Judges in a narrower sense—those individuals whose authority among the people had its foundation in the outward deliverances which the Lord, through their agency, had vouchsafed to his people. In this sense Eli was not a judge. If the first chapters of 1 Sam. relate to nearly the same period as Judges xi.–xvi., it will appear that the want of references to the ritual commanded in the Pentateuch is not owing to the non-existence of the ritual at that time, but because the special design of the author of the Book of Judges did not admit of his taking notice of it.

To assist us making use of the Book of Judges as a source of historical information, the following remarks may be useful. (i). The author assumes throughout a prophetic position. He makes high requirements of the people of God; present good does not satisfy his expectations; and on evil he passes a very severe judgment. Since he considers the good as a matter of course, as that which Israel was bound to do, and for which no praise can be awarded, he specially directs his scrutiny to deviations from it, which he depicts in the darkest colours. If for want of close attention this peculiar position of the author is unobserved, gross misunderstandings of the character of this period will arise—as in general the judgment formed of the history of Israel is erroneous, when the prophetic point of view is neglected. Analogous to this is the current error in judging of the religious characters of the seventeenth century, arising from the meaning affixed without hesitation to the language of such men as ANDREA, ARDNT, MÜLLER, and SPENER, which can be correctly understood only from

their own point-of-view. (ii.) The author of the Book of Judges wrote at the beginning of the regal period; this is evident from the remark often repeated in the Appendices—“*In those days there was no king in Israel; every man did that which was right in his own eyes,*” and which is made especially in reference to religious abuses; compare xvii. 6. In the later regal period this remark would not have been suitable. The author could not have witnessed the degeneracy of the kingdom. If he wrote during the period when the theocracy was in a flourishing state, it was natural that in his joy for what the Lord had then granted to his people, he should allow the dark parts of the preceding period to stand forth somewhat prominently. The superiority of the present to the past, in his judgment, is strikingly shown in that formula just quoted, with which he closes the whole book. The narrative of the Book of Judges is similar to the description of the corruption of the Church in the middle ages, which are given in histories of the Reformation. (iii.) We must also guard against supposing that the author of the Book of Judges approved of what he does not expressly disapprove—an assumption which has frequently led our opponents astray. The author so closely studied objectivity, that, in only very rare instances, he indulges in the avowal of his own judgments and reflexions; as in ch. ix. 24, where he remarks that God sent an evil spirit between Abimelech and the men of Shechem, “that the cruelty done to the threescore and ten sons of Jeroboam might come, and their blood be laid upon Abimelech their brother, which slew them, and upon the men of Shechem, which aided him in the killing of his brethren;” also in ch. viii. 27, the שִׁמְרָאֵל, and the formula, “In those days,” &c. In general he intimates his opinion in a delicate and ingenious manner, as by the arrangement of the facts, or by a verbal reference to expressions in the Pentateuch. If these indications are properly understood, it will appear that the assertion of BLEEK and others, that the author regarded the deviations from the law not in the most distant manner as displeasing to Jehovah, is totally unfounded.

After these remarks on the character of the Book of Judges in general, it remains that we examine it on particular points.

As to the relation which the Book of Judges bears to the Pen-

tateuch, a difference of opinion exists among the opponents of the genuineness of the latter. DE WETTE (*Beiträge* i. 152), BERTHOLDT (p. 762), and VON BOHLEN (p. 150), deny every, even the least reference to the Pentateuch in the Book of Judges. On the other hand VATER remarks (p. 579), that in Judges xi. 16, there is certainly a special reference to Num. xx. 21, and (p. 582) that in Judges ii. 2, the reference to Deut. vii. 2, 5, 10, is tolerably plain, and even an agreement in some expressions may be noticed. HARTMANN expresses himself still more decidedly (p. 559). In the Book of Judges "we find indeed Moses' book of the law and a written Torah not expressly mentioned, but we cannot deny allusions to the narratives and commands of Moses; we must candidly allow *that the compiler of the Book of Judges must have been acquainted with the Pentateuch in all its extent*, of which any one may satisfy himself who will compare ch. i. 20, with Num. xiv. 30; v. 4, with Deut. xxxii. 2; v. 14-18, with Gen. xlix. 13; vi. 37-39 with Gen. xviii. 18; vi. 23, with Gen. xxxii. 31; and x. 4, with Num. xxxii. 41."

In this section we have only to do with the relation of the *time* of the Judges to the Pentateuch; the enquiry respecting the *Book* of Judges belongs elsewhere. Yet the latter is of great importance for ascertaining the former, so that we cannot attain our object without touching upon it. Let it, on the other hand, appear that the author knew the Pentateuch, and that it was a work of Moses, it will be equally certain that, according to *his own* conviction, the time of the Judges stood in a certain relation to the Pentateuch. Those who deny this, have then *his* authority (acknowledged by themselves to be of weight) against them; we are then justified in availing ourselves of the *slighter* practical references to the Pentateuch.

We consider it unnecessary to go through the whole Book of Judges with this reference. The careful examination of a limited number of passages will ensure for us a firm and incontrovertible result. We shall attempt to find, what has been commonly neglected (for instance by HARTMANN and VON BOHLEN), the references of the *Book* of Judges to the Pentateuch, from which the time of the Judges may, as much as possible, be separated; so that in doubtful cases we would rather assign too much to the former than to the latter.

The introduction\* in ch. i. ii. presents us with considerable materials; ch. i. 20, "And they gave Hebron unto Caleb, as Moses said," alludes to Num. xiv. 24, "But my servant Caleb, because he had another spirit with him, and hath followed me fully, him will I bring unto the land whereunto he went, and his seed shall possess it." These last words shew that by the *land* not merely Canaan but a particular district is to be understood; compare Josh. xiv. 9, ("And Moses sware on that day, saying, surely the land whereon thy feet have trodden shall be thine inheritance and thy children's for ever, because thou hast wholly followed the Lord my God.") Also the יהויה in Judges i. 20, is taken from the Pentateuch; compare Joshua xiv. 12, "Then I shall be able to drive them out יהויה־שָׁרִים as Jehovah said."

The address of the angel of the Lord in ch. ii. 1, &c., is altogether composed of passages from the Pentateuch. The two clauses in ver. 2, "And ye shall make no league with the inhabitants of the land, you shall throw down their altars," are found separately, one in Exod. xxiii. 32, "Thou shalt make no covenant with them," לָהֶם, the other in Deut. xii. 3, "And you shall overthrow their altars," נִהַרְץ as here; indeed both may be found together in Exod. xxxiv. 12, 13, "Take heed to thyself lest thou make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land. . . but ye shall destroy their altars," and Deut. vii. 2, 5. The reference to the Pentateuch is so much more undeniable since the angel only refers to what he had said in past time. So the following words of the same verse, "but ye have *not obeyed my voice*," allude to Exod. xxiii. 21, where it is said, in reference to the angel of the

---

\* Ch. i. contains a review of the events as they occurred from the division of the land to the death of Joshua. Ch. ii. 1 3, 6, a review of what happened afterwards; from 1-5 contains the prelude, ver. 6, &c. the completion. That the contents of ch. i. belong still to the times of Joshua, and that the words "after the death of Joshua it came to pass," by which this book is connected with the Book of Joshua, refers not to what immediately follows, but to the principal contents of the whole book, is evident not only from comparing it with the Book of Joshua, but from the Book of Judges itself. Ch. ii. 21, "I will also not henceforth drive out any from before them, of the nations which Joshua left when he died," shows plainly that, in the author's opinion, the expeditions in ch. i. happened before the death of Joshua. Also ver. 23, "Therefore the Lord left those nations, without driving them out hastily, neither delivered he them into the hand of Joshua," implies that the conquests ceased with the death of Joshua.

Lord who is here speaking, "beware of him and *obey his voice*, provoke him not, for he will not pardon your transgressions, for my name is in him." In ver. 3 it is said, "Wherefore I also said I will not drive them out from before you, but they shall be unto you for sides, לְצַדִּים, and their gods shall be a snare unto you, לְמִלְקָשׁ." The latter words allude to Exod xxiii. 33, "if thou serve their gods it will surely be a snare unto thee," compare x. 7, Deut. vii. 10. The expression, "they shall be to you for sides," is equivalent to saying, ye shall have to do with their *sides* (so that they shall press and push you), not as in the event of keeping the Covenant, with their *backs*, (compare Exod. xxiii. 27, "I will make all thy enemies turn their backs unto thee"), and by its singularity points to the original passage from which this abrupt and in itself difficult expression must receive elucidation. Another similar expression occurs in Numb. xxxiii. 55, "But if ye will not drive out the inhabitants of the land from before you, then it shall come to pass that those which ye let remain of them shall be pricks in your eyes, and thorns on your sides," לְצַדִּימֵיכֶם בְּצַדֵּיכֶם. How indispensable the elucidation afforded by the original passage is, which is confirmed by Joshua xxiii. 13, is shown by the unfortunate efforts of those who do not perceive this reference. Generally, according to the example of SCHULTENS, צַדִּים is taken in the sense of *enemies*. But this sense is opposed by the frequent recurrence of צַד uniformly in the sense of *a side*. STUDER proposes to change צַדִּים into צַדִּים. But against this there are several reasons. 1. The formation of the more difficult reading in צַדִּים from the very easy צַדִּים is against all probability. 2. In connection with מִלְקָשׁ a figurative expression must be excepted. 3. The whole address of the angel of the Lord has a verbal reference to the Pentateuch. 4. It would be a singular coincidence if the passage, by a mere mistake of the transcriber, contained a reference to the original and parallel passage, without any intention on the part of the author.

Ch. ii. 10, "And there arose another generation after them which knew not the Lord," compare with Exod. i. 8, "There arose up a new king over Egypt which knew not Joseph." How could the ingratitude of Israel be more vividly depicted than by this slight and yet evident allusion? With ver. 11 compare Deut. vi. 18; with ver. 15 compare Lev xxvi. 15, Deut. xxviii. 25;

with ver. 17, Exod. xxxvi. 15. The second part, "They turned quickly out of the way which their fathers walked in, obeying the commandments of the Lord," exactly accords with Exod. xxxii. 8, "They have turned aside quickly out of the way which I commanded them." That the language is borrowed from this passage is very apparent from the word *יָרַח* *quickly*, which better suits the worship of the calf that immediately followed the giving of the law, to which the words refer in the Pentateuch, than to the new outbreak of the same sinful corruption to which the words are here transferred in order to indicate that the source was an ancient one. In ch. iv. 15 we read, "And the Lord discomfitted (*יָרַח*) Sisera, and all his chariots, and all his host, with an evident reference to Exod. xiv. 24, "And the Lord *troubled* (*יָרַח*) the host of the Egyptians." The author, by the use of this word, plainly indicates that this discomfiture, which was accomplished by the sword of the Israelites, had its origin no less in God than when he more visibly interposed. He points to the common source of both events, to show that God, by the second, fulfilled the practical promise which he had given by the first for the future. The expression, if the reference to the Pentateuch is not perceived, where it appears to be perfectly suitable, would strike as rather awkward, particularly on account of the addition *לְיָרַח*. This is shown by the attempts of several critics who have not perceived the reference, to impose a different meaning on the words. See for instance *STUDER* on the passage. Likewise in other places where *יָרַח* occurs, the reference to the Pentateuch is undeniable; compare 1 Sam. vii. 10; 2 Sam. xxii. 15; Josh. x. 10; Ps cxliv. 6.

The address of the *יָרַח* in ch. vi. 8, is based throughout on the Pentateuch. He begins at once with the introduction to the Decalogue.

When Gideon wished, by an appeal to his weakness, to decline the commission to rescue Israel, the angel of the Lord repeated to him, in ch. vi. 16, the great promise uttered to Moses, *יָרַח אִתִּי* "certainly I will be with thee," Exod. iii. 12, a coincidence which, on account of the peculiar use of *יָרַח* could not be accidental, and thus points to the earlier, glorious fulfilment of this promise, to the great practical contradiction of the prejudice, that a man must be of an illustrious origin in order to do great things. In ver. 39, "Let not thy anger be hot against me, and I will speak

but this once," Gideon borrows the literal expression from Gen. xviii. 32, and excuses his boldness in the same terms as those used by Abraham, which were graciously received by God.

But of peculiar importance is the message of Jephthah to the king of the Ammonites in ch. xi. 15. That either Jephthah himself, or the author of this book, had access to the Pentateuch, may be proved with overpowering evidence, and if only the latter be admitted, yet it will be equally certain that the author proceeded on the supposition that Jephthah obeyed the laws of the Pentateuch. Let the three following points be considered. (i). The historical abstract given in Jephthah's message is, with the exception of a single particular, entirely, and almost word for word, taken from the narrative in the Book of Numbers. (ii). He makes use of everything in the relation given in the Pentateuch which may be of service to his object. (iii). He follows this relation step by step. If ever an extract was made, bearing evident marks of the source from which it was taken, it is this; and assertions like those of GRAMBERG, ii. 131, that the relation in the Pentateuch was taken from this abstract, are self-condemned; compare ver. 16, the arrival at Kadesh, with Num. xx. 1-13; ver. 17 (the fruitless embassy to the king of Edom) is almost a literal quotation from Num. v. 14-21, with an addition of a notice indifferent for the object of the Pentateuch, but important for Jephthah—"in like manner they sent unto the king of Moab, but he would not consent." Compare ver. 18 (the march through the wilderness by the borders of Moab) with Num. xx. 21; xxi. 20, particularly xxi. 4, 11, 13, from which the passage before us is almost literally collected. Compare ver. 19 (the embassy to Sihon, king of the Amorites) with Num. xxi. 21, 22, of which this verse is almost a verbal extract. Ver. 20 (Sihon's refusal and battle with Israel) is a literal quotation from Num. xxi. 23, only that for one expression an equivalent phrase is given. Compare ver. 20, 21 (the conquest of Sihon's territories) with Num. xxi. 24, 25. In ver. 25, the conduct of Balak the son of Zippor is recorded. His relations to Israel are described exactly as in the Book of Numbers xxii. 2. In ver. 26, Jephthah speaks of Heshbon and *her daughters*, בְּנֵי־חֶשְׁבֹן (towns, Eng. Vers.), as in Num. xxi. 20 (*villages*, Eng. Vers.) Let it be observed, that the abstract at first contains, in a single verse, the contents

of a whole section in the narrative of Numbers, but afterwards, when it comes to the matter in hand, it is more copious, and corresponds almost verse for verse; and let it be attempted to explain this on GRAMBERG'S hypothesis. STUDER is quite at fault in the business. The "almost literal agreement" with the relation of the Pentateuch occasions him great perplexity. He tries to throw suspicion on Jephthah's message in a different way, in order to get rid of all conclusions that might be drawn from it in favour of the Pentateuch. He thinks it strange (p. 288) that in the greater part of this address, regard is had merely to the Moabites, and especially that Jephthah's answer is so framed, as if he negotiated in person with the king of the Moabites, and not merely with a partizan of his. He is disposed, therefore, to admit, that either the compiler of the book himself, or a later reader of it, had collected from the Pentateuch this juridical argument on the lawfulness of Israel's claims to the possession of Gilead. We have already remarked, that our object at present is to determine from the address, only the relation in which, not Jephthah, but the author of the Book of Judges, stands to the Pentateuch—it must be regarded only as sheer wilfulness, proceeding from despair, if, for the author of the book, is substituted a mere compiler, of whose existence the book wears not the slightest trace—or a later reader. The reason alleged is not suited to throw any suspicion on the narrative; the fact on which it supports itself presents no obstacle to our believing that the address proceeded from Jephthah literally as it stands. STUDER'S suspicion proceeds on the assumption that the Israelites gained possession of the Ammonitish territory at an earlier period. He is surprised "that in ver. 18, mention is merely made of no injury being done to the Moabitish country by the Israelites, while not a word is said, with a similar reference, of the Ammonitish country, which, at least equally, if not first of all, deserved to be noticed." It was his first business to have examined whether this assumption was correct. The result would have been, that there is nothing in its favour. In the Pentateuch, it is expressly said that the Israelites took nothing *directly* of the Ammonites; it is also expressly said in the narrative itself, and in the ancient song, that only the Amorites had to do with the Moabites, so that even *indirectly* no part of the Ammonitish country came into the possession of the Israelites.



The apparent transfer of the Ammonitish possessions, which is presented in Joshua xiii. 25, where, along with all the cities of Gilead, half the land of the children of Ammon appears to be allotted to the tribe of Gad, has been well explained by MASIUS: *Quia omnes urbes Galaaditidis non pertinent ad istam tribum (dabitur enim mox dimidiata Gal. tribui Manassitarum): illico praeciditur illa universitas. His additis verbis: dimidiaque terra Ammon. Est enim istorum sensus: eatenus modo sursum in Gal. exporrectam jacuisse Gaditarum haereditatem, quatenus dimidia Amm. ditio Gal. ab oriente ambiebat.* See also RELAND, p. 105. A second false assumption on which the suspicion rests is, that the king of the Ammonites was the mere advocate of the king of the Moabites, and stood in no nearer relation to him. The correct statement would be, that the Ammonites and Moabites were outwardly one, as closely connected with one another, as the Twelve Tribes of Israel. As Jephthah presented himself as the representative of Israel, so the king of the Ammonites was the representative of the children of Lot. It consisted entirely with his own interest to assert their unity, and to keep their duality in the back-ground.

In ch. xiii. 5 (compare ver. 7), the angel of the Lord said to Manoah's wife בְּיָד הַיְהוָה יִלְדָהּ יִלְדָהּ; the exact words of the angel of the Lord to Hagar in Gen. xvi. 11. This coincidence cannot be accidental, on account of the unusual form יִלְדָהּ for יִלְדָהּ.\* The existence of an original passage is rendered also probable from the fact, that a third passage, almost literally the same, is found in Is. vii. 14, which agrees with Gen. xvi. 11, as follows: "Behold, thou art with child, and shalt bare a son, and shall call his name Ishmael."—*Gen.* "Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and thou shalt call his name Immanuel."—*Is.* If now we ask which of the three passages is the original one, that in Judges cannot be thought of, because it wants the clause on the giving of the name,

---

\* EWALD, *Sm. Grammar*, § 389, (NICHOLSON'S *Transl.* p. 249), thinks, "that as this form is only found where the second person is spoken of, the Masoretes pointed it in that manner probably, merely on account of its resemblance to the second person, *fem. sg.*" But that this form is only found where the second person is spoken of, may be simply explained from the dependence of one of the two passages, where it occurs, on the other; hence it is accidental, and does not authorize the conclusion that has been drawn from it.

in which the two others agree. Moreover, the general relation of the narrative in the Book of Judges to that in Genesis, is evidently throughout that of dependence on the latter. Compare with ver. 2, Gen. xi. 20; with ver. 8, Gen. xxv. 21; with ver. 15, compare Gen. xviii. 5; with ver. 17, 18, Gen. xxxii. 30. For the priority of Genesis in all these coincidences, the circumstance is decisive, that there the representations appear complete in themselves, while here separate features are taken from various parts and grouped together, exactly as in the New Testament in relation to the Old. The wife of Manoah, for instance, represents in general Sarah; compare ver. 2 with Gen. xi. 30; and yet, in ver. 5, we find transferred to her what belonged originally to Hagar. The meeting of Manoah and the angel of the Lord is in general a copy of Gen. xviii., and yet we find in the midst of it a reference to Jacob's conflict. HIRTZIG (who remarks "the phrase . . . occurs in the address, Judges xiii. 5, and increased with the addition of the name-giving in our passage, Gen. xvi. 11," *Jes.* p. 85), seems to give Is. vii. 14 the honour of being the original passage. But this is inadmissible, because the original passage must necessarily have the form יְהוָה יִלְדָּהּ, not, as Isaiah, the form יְהוָה יִלְדֶּהּ. For if the authors of the Book of Judges, and of Genesis, both copied from Isaiah, how came both of them to adopt an unusual form that occurs nowhere else? There is also another circumstance which, merely taking our passage into account (for we abstain from all general grounds; if we wished to avail ourselves of them, every notion of the possibility of Isaiah's being made use of by the author of Genesis would vanish, since there is not a chapter of Isaiah without verbal references to the Pentateuch), shows that Isaiah must have borrowed from Genesis; we mean, the use of the second person, *thou shalt call*, which is strange in Isaiah, since he had been speaking in the foregoing clause not *to*, but *of* a virgin; but, in the Pentateuch, quite in place, as it occurs in the address of the angel of the Lord to Hagar. How striking this reason is—how much the sudden transition to the second person in Isaiah needs an explanation—how it shows the endeavour to be conformed as nearly as possible to the original passage in Genesis exactly by what is foreign to itself—we see from the attempts of modern expositors down to HIRTZIG to set aside the second person, and to substitute the third—

attempts which are manifestly failures, since, in the undeniable dependence of one of the two passages on the other, it is unnatural to assume, that the fully written form at one time would denote the second, at another time, the third person, especially since  $\text{קָרָא}$  regularly belongs only to the second person.

Persons must be blind, indeed, who can fail to perceive that the author, in depicting the atrocious conduct of the men of Gibeah to the Levite's concubine, in Judges xix. 22, has borrowed the language from Gen. xix. 4. By this reference, he expresses his judgment on the transaction. *Adeo ut Gibeā, civitas Israelis, aequē sit facta abominabilis, ac Sodoma.* LIGHTFOOT.

The expression, "*that we may put away evil from Israel,*"  $\text{נִבְעֲרָה רָעָה מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל}$  used by the other tribes to the Benjamites, xx. 13, is a *phrasis deuteronomica*; compare Deut. xvii. 12.  $\text{וְבִעֲרִיתָ הָרָע}$   $\text{מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל}$  xiii. 6; xxvii. 7; xix. 19; xxi. 21; xxii. 21. They say, that they wish to obey the Lord's injunction. "*That we may put away evil,*" is the answer of the congregation to the Lord's command, "*Thou shalt put away the evil.*" By this verbal allusion to the law, the express quotation of it is rendered needless.

In ch. xx. 6, the Levite says to the assembled Israelites, "*for they have committed, זָמָה וְנִבְלָה (Zimmah and Nevalah) in Israel.*" Even STUDER remarks on ver. 13: "In ver. 6, we are reminded of the legislative language of the Pentateuch by the words,  $\text{זָמָה וְנִבְלָה בְיִשְׂרָאֵל}$ , which were used to denote a capital offence, especially unchastity." (On the peculiar use of  $\text{זָמָה}$ , which occur here, see vol. i. p. 110.) The phrase  $\text{עָשָׂה נִבְלָה בְיִשְׂרָאֵל}$  is used especially of acts of unchastity in Gen. xxxiv. 7, and Deut. xxii. 21, and in the latter passage with the clause, "so shalt thou put evil away from among you."

The unusual expression  $\text{עִיר מִיָּמִים}$  in ch. xx. 48, may be referred more confidently to Deut. ii. 34; iii. 6, because there, as well as here, it stands in connection with the  $\text{הָרָם}$ .

In ch. xxi. 17, the expression  $\text{וְלֹא־רָמְתָה שִׁבְטְ מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל}$  used by the elders is founded upon Deut. xxv. 6, where the reason given for the injunction, that the eldest son, under the Levirate law, should bear the name of the deceased husband, is  $\text{וְלֹא־רָמְתָה שִׁמְמוֹ מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל}$ . We have here a sample of a spiritual exposition of the law. The elders carried back the letter of the law to its idea, and then applied this to existing circumstances. They reasoned *a minori ad ma-*

*jus.* If the Lord cared for the individual, how much more should we be concerned for the preservation of a whole tribe to do all that may be required for it. As a proof that the author was acquainted with the Pentateuch, this passage must at all events be allowed to be in point. But if we notice how the proceedings of the persons in power were, in all other things relative to this affair, determined by the law (as for instance in denouncing the curse on the Benjamites and the inhabitants of Jabesh), there can scarcely remain a doubt that the language of the elders has been faithfully reported to us.

We believe that the preceding observations have been fully sufficient for the attainment of our object; that the use of the Pentateuch, in all its portions, by the author of the Book of Judges, has been fully proved. The positive proof to the contrary, or rather for the non-existence of the Pentateuch in the period of the Judges, which BOHLEN (p. 148) would infer from Judges vi. 13, where Gideon speaks of the miracles of the Lord which "our Fathers *told us* of," on closer consideration loses all its force. How little oral tradition excludes that which is written is shown by Exod. xviii. 14. (Compare vol. i. p. 435). And what is the principal point? The fathers here, as we shall prove in the sequel, are not ancestors, but fathers in the strict sense, and the words refer to the ceremony of enquiring and receiving answers at the celebration of the Passover, which cannot disprove the existence of the Pentateuch, since the custom itself originated with the Pentateuch.

After the inquiry respecting the nature of the sources for the history of the times of the Judges, we proceed to determine what relation the materials contained in these sources bear to the question respecting the genuineness of the Pentateuch.

In reference to no point is the opposition between the Pentateuch and the period of the Judges believed to be more certain than in reference to SACRED PLACES. In the Pentateuch, we are told, it is strictly enjoined, that only before the Tabernacle; and when the people came unto the land of Canaan, only in "that place which Jehovah had chosen from all the tribes, to place his name there," were sacrifices to be offered, and all acts of Divine worship to be performed, and even all the feasts to be celebrated. In palpable contradiction to all this, we find in the period of the

Judges a multitude of sacred places. DE WETTE, (*Beiträge*, i. 226); BLEEK, (*Stud. u. Crit.*, 1831, p. 501); VATKE, (p. 264); GRAMBERG, and others.

We shall first of all prove, that all the facts which are adduced to prove the non-observance of the law respecting the unity of the sanctuary, are incorrectly applied; we shall show positively that this law, during the whole period of the Judges, was in operation—that the people had then only one sanctuary.

The facts that are adduced against the view we have taken are the following: 1. According to Judges ii. 5, the people sacrificed at Bochim. But we maintain, that by this act the Mosaic ordinance respecting the unity of the sanctuary and the presentation of offerings at the door of the tabernacle was not violated. The key to the solution of the difficulty has been already pointed out by SERRARIUS, *eo ipso, quod ibi apparebat dominus,\* et populum ad deum propitiandum hortabatur videbatur locum sanctum indicare, simulque potestatem ibi sacrificia efferendi facere*. Sacrifices were to be ordinarily presented at the Ark of the Covenant, because there, and only there, was the ordinary seat of God. The rule was the basis of the exception; that sacrifices were offered to God, where he had manifested himself in an extraordinary manner, flowed from the same principle. To maintain that there could be no exception, that absolutely no sacrifices whatever were to be offered but at the Ark of the Covenant, would be to maintain, that, after the erection of the tabernacle, God would never manifest himself elsewhere. How little God's presence was restricted to the ark of the covenant appears from Jeremiah iii. 16:

“ In those days, saith the Lord,  
They shall say no more, The Ark of the Covenant of the Lord,

---

\* SCHMID (*Comm.* p. 164) has adduced evidence that the being who appeared was the angel of the Lord, not, as modern critics have decided, an angel, or perhaps a prophet. On grammatical grounds, it is certain that מלאך יהוה can only mean the angel of the Lord. Of the form of the appearance we know nothing, nor whether the words, which are attributed to the angel of the Lord, were outwardly uttered, or only the essence of his address interpreted by the servants of God. But thus much is certain (and this is all that concerns our object), the people were convinced of an extraordinary manifestation (*Nahen*) of God. This GRAMBERG considers to be the ground of the sacrifice without being aware what he admits in so doing. He remarks (i. 22) that there could be no hesitation about sacrificing at Bochim, “since the place had been consecrated by the appearance of an angel, or rather (since he ascribes to himself the leading out of Egypt) of Jehovah.”

Neither shall it come to mind ;  
 Neither shall they remember it ;  
 Neither shall they visit it ;  
 Neither shall that be done any more."

The *finite* form of God's manifestation cannot, even while it endures, be purely exclusive. Should it be said, that the account of the appearance of the angel of the Lord at Bochim was mythic, then we answer, that the sacrifice of Israel at Bochim must be taken mythically also ; for that the author only allowed Israel to sacrifice, because the Lord appeared there, is evident from his never mentioning a sacrifice by Israel at any other place than the Ark of the Covenant, except in the case of an extraordinary appearance of God. This explanation of the sacrifice at Bochim applies equally to the sacrifice of Gideon at Ophrah,\* for that also rests on the principle, that the place where God appears is, as long as that appearance lasts, a sanctuary, and the person to whom God appears is, *pro tempore*, a priest. It would only have been a violation of the Mosaic law had Gideon constituted a permanent ritual in his native place, Ophrah. This, indeed, is asserted by GRAMBERG. He remarks (i. p. 23) in reference to Judges vi. 24, (" Then Gideon built an altar there unto the Lord, and called it Jehovah-shalom : unto this day it is yet in Ophrah of the Abi-Ezrites"), " Here is a worship of Jehovah at Ophrah, the traces of which were not known to the narrator." But, in this instance, the correct view has been already given by the older expositors. Thus SCHMID observes, *Non aedificavit Gideon altare hoc, ut vel ipse, vel alii, sacrificia ibi efferrent potius, quam in loco, quem ad arcam foederis sibi elegerat Jehovah ; sed in gratam et aeternam memoriam beneficii et miraculi, sibi a Jehovah praestiti erexit illud. Estque illud in memoriam conservatum usque ad diem hunc, inquit historicus sacer : nec legimus ullum ibi tanquam sacrificium oblatum esse.* The altar had its name in Hebrew, זִבְחֵי יְהוָה, from sacrifices, but that the *usus loquendi* was of wider extent than the etymological meaning, is evident from the fact, that the altar of incense on which no זִבְחֵי יְהוָה were offered also bore the name זִבְחֵי יְהוָה. Instances of altars as memorials are

---

\* Let it be observed, that on every occasion mentioned in the Book of Judges of an extraordinary appearance of God, sacrifices were offered. This strengthens the force of the conclusion which has been drawn from the " never elsewhere."

found in Exod. xvii. 15, and Josh. xxii. 10, "Not for burnt-offerings nor for sacrifices, but it is a witness between us and you," *i.e.* that the tribes on the other side Jordan belonged to the people of Jehovah, ver. 28. That the altar erected by Gideon was not designed for sacrifices appears especially from ver. 26. Why otherwise should Gideon erect another altar? This second altar, likewise, and the sacrifice that Gideon offered upon it by night after the Lord had appeared to him, (in reference to which LIGHTFOOT justly remarks, "*Sacrificium hoc fuit mirae et variae dispensationis oblatum noctu, loco communi, a persona privata, adhibitis lignis a luco idololatrigo, ipsumque idolo fuerat destinatum*"), are only apparently in opposition to the Mosaic ordinance. This ordinance referred only to the common course of things; it established the rule to which exceptions could only be taken by express Divine command communicated either by acts or words. Such a command Gideon here received. The transaction was isolated. It had a symbolic meaning. It was a practical declaration of war on the part of God against idols—a prediction that their supremacy in Israel was now at an end—that God now demanded back what had been unlawfully withdrawn from him. These observations will also explain Manoah's sacrifice, of which God testified his approval. Judges xiii. 19.

2. It is said in Judges xi. 11, "And Jephthah uttered all his words before the Lord," לְפָנַי יְהוָה. This expression, it is asserted, commonly occurs, in reference to a sacred place, when a ceremony with religious rites is performed at an altar or sanctuary of Jehovah. Moreover, solemn contracts and oaths were always connected with sacrifices, and hence most naturally were performed on spots set apart for sacrifices. Probably there was such a spot at Mizpeh, on the other side Jordan, where the transaction narrated in the passage before us took place; yet possibly the sacrifice was offered on an altar suddenly erected for the occasion. (See STUDER on the passage.) But we deny that there is any trace of a sanctuary or of a sacrificial act. As to the latter, it is asserted, indeed, that oath-taking was always accompanied by sacrifice. But the contrary is evident from ver. 10, where, in the land of Tob, the elders of Gilead say to Jephthah, "The Lord be witness between us, if we do not so according to thy words." Was there any such thing as an altar to Jehovah in the heathen land

of Tob, or was one erected there by the Gileadites? Certainly oaths were often taken with sacrifices, (see MICHAELIS, *Mos. Rechte*, iv. § 189; vi. § 302); and even *here* sacrifices might have been offered, if circumstances had permitted to perform the act at the tabernacle. But that oaths were not always connected with sacrifices is shown by examples to the contrary in Gen. xiv. 22, 23, and Ruth i. 17, when Ruth, in the land of Moab, swore by Jehovah. Other instances may be found in JAHN, (*Archæologie*, iii. § 113). It is nowhere prescribed in the law, that sacrifices should be (as a general rule) connected with oath-taking. It is asserted, that the phrase לִפְנֵי יְהוָה alludes to a sanctuary. But we are by no means justified in putting such a material construction on these words, of which even MOVERS has not been able to keep clear, (who asserts, (*Ueber die Chronik*, p. 290), that, in all the passages where it is said that a religious act was performed “before the Lord,” לִפְנֵי יְהוָה, the presence of the Ark or the Tabernacle is always implied. The expression לִפְנֵי יְהוָה says no more than that Jephthah confirmed all his words by an oath. If it be maintained, that לִפְנֵי יְהוָה must refer to the sanctuary, it must be also maintained, that all oaths could only be taken at *one*, or *the* sanctuary of Jehovah, of which, neither in the law nor in the sacred history, is there any trace. We allow that the phrase לִפְנֵי יְהוָה is very frequently used in reference to transactions which were performed at the place of the sanctuary, but only on this account, that Jehovah had, in an especial manner, made himself known in the sanctuary. If the expression לִפְנֵי יְהוָה could only apply to transactions connected with a sanctuary, then Jehovah could only be present there—would be enclosed in his sanctuary; an absurd notion which nullifies the Divine omnipresence, and which no one can find in any part of the sacred Scriptures.

In like manner, in reference to Judges xx. 1, “Then all the children of Israel went out, and the congregation was gathered together as one man . . . unto the Lord in Mizpeh.” From this passage it has been inferred that in the period of the Judges there was a sanctuary of Jehovah at Mizpeh. The spiritual interpretation which is to be found in KIMCHI, *ubicunque locorum congregatur totus Israel, vel major pars ejus, ibi divina majestas habitat*; and in SCHMID, *ubi pius Dei populus congregatur, ibi sine dubio deus est in medio ipsorum*, is also here the



correct one; compare ver. 2, "in the assembly of the people of God." If the people were conscious of being the people of God, then their assembly, wherever it might be held, would be "*unto the Lord*," אֱלֹהֵי יְהוָה. *Ejusmodi congregatio non mere civilis seu politica fuit, sed simul ecclesiastica et sacra.* SCHMID. In general such assemblies were held at the place of the sanctuary, or even the Ark of the Covenant was brought there. Yet this was not indispensably necessary. In the present instance, it is not difficult to ascertain why the assembly was called not at Shiloh but at Mizpeh. Mizpeh was not only in itself admirably suited for a place of meeting, by its position in the midst of the Hebrew territory on this side Jordan, but was specially adapted by its being in the tribe of Benjamin. In the place where the offence had been committed, the judicial proceedings took place, so that if the accused tribe did not clear itself, execution might immediately follow.

3. Peculiar weight is attached to Judges xx. and xxi., from which it incontrovertibly appears that in the period of the Judges there was a place for offering sacrifices to the Lord at Bethel. But one place of sacrifice simply cannot be intended; it is said xx. 27, "the Ark of the Covenant of God was there in those days." This, however, is easily explained, if we admit that the Ark of the Covenant was brought during the Benjamitish war, from Shiloh to Bethel. For this supposition there are the following reasons, (i). The repeated statements (even in this very section) of the author of the Book of Judges, that the Ark of the Covenant, during the whole period of the Judges, and especially in the time of the Benjamitish war, had its abiding resting-place at Shiloh. Now, unless we are willing to involve the author in a gross self-contradiction, the explanation we have suggested must be admitted, in which there is no difficulty. (ii.) The author himself has plainly enough indicated that the stay of the ark at Bethel was only temporary. This may be gathered especially from xxi. 4, "And it came to pass on the morrow, that the people rose early and built there an altar, and offered burnt offerings and peace offerings." That an altar must first be built shows that Bethel was not the common place of the sanctuary, and in general not a place of sacrifice. Further, it is to be noticed that mention is made only of the Ark of the Covenant and not of the tabernacle; nor must we overlook the clause, "*in those days*," xx. 27. It

has been asserted, indeed, that the author must have expressed himself more distinctly, if he had meant to be understood, of a temporary removal of the ark. But this would erroneously imply that the author wrote for people who did not know what was the regular abiding-place of the Ark of the Covenant during the whole period of the Judges. But he everywhere assumes that Shiloh was known as such to his readers, and that they were sufficiently aware of the *terminus ad quem*, (compare xviii. 31, where he speaks of it as a well known fact). (iii.) The situation of Bethel makes it probable that the ark was brought there only *pro tempore*. That it lay exactly in the land of Benjamin, near Gibeah, which was not far from Jerusalem, would have been a singular coincidence if that had been the constant abode of the ark. On the other hand it has been remarked that one does not see why the ark was brought to Bethel and not into the camp before Gibeah, and this is an objection which must not be summarily dismissed. We must be able to give a reason why, of all places in the land of Benjamin and in the neighbourhood of the seat of war, Bethel was fixed upon for the temporary abode of the ark. Nor will it be difficult to satisfy this demand. It is necessary (though very often neglected), to distinguish between holy places in a strict sense, places for sacrificing, and holy places in a wider sense. In the land of Israel, the places rendered sacred by the memorials of past time were by no means few. But in the whole history of the period of the Judges not a single instance occurs of sacrifices being offered at any of these places unless the Ark of the Covenant was there. But these places were not holy by an abuse of the term, they were really intended to be so. The same book of the law which contains the ordinance enforcing the unity of the sanctuary in a stricter sense, records also, with evident design, those facts on which the holiness attributed to these places was founded. Everywhere objects were presented to the Israelites tending to cherish their piety; everywhere they were excited to walk in the steps of their pious ancestors. Of the holy places in this sense, Bethel stood in the first rank. For this reason, among the places which lay near the seat of the war, it was chosen for the temporary abode of the ark. The narrative itself seems to point to this reason for fixing on Bethel, and alludes to the events of former days, by which the place was rendered sacred. After the expedition was over, the people

assembled again at Bethel, xxi. 2, "And the people came to Bethel (*the house of God*, Eng. vers.) and abode there till even before God (לִפְנֵי הָאֱלֹהִים), and lifted up their voices and wept sore; and said, O Lord God of Israel, why is this come to pass in Israel, that there should be to-day one tribe lacking in Israel?" The use of ELOHIM in such a connection, where otherwise JEHOVAH would always stand, at once leads us back to Genesis. At Bethel—where God had blessed his descendants in Israel, where he had said to him, "And thy seed shall be as the dust of the earth, and thou shalt break forth to the west, and to the east, and to the north, and to the south," Gen. xxviii. 14—at Bethel, where God had said, "be fruitful and multiply, a nation and a company of nations shall be of thee," xxxv. 9, was the lamentation raised on the strange contrast between the matter of fact and the idea. (iv.) Immediately after the end of the war, all the people came back to Shiloh, Judges xxi. 19. There the Passover was celebrated at the Tabernacle. At Mizpeh and Bethel a reason might be given why the people should assemble there on extraordinary occasions; not so at Shiloh. Now, to this let it be added, that it was customary, and especially in the time of the Judges, for the ark to accompany the people on their expeditions, and then certainly no difficulty can remain in admitting that the Ark was merely for a season at Bethel, and that no violation of the law respecting the unity of the sanctuary was committed in the course of these transactions.

4. It has been thought that the facts which go to prove that in the time of Samuel, and by him, sacrifices were offered in several places, would justify certain conclusions respecting the times of the Judges. But this justification could only be valid, if it could not be shewn that the facts in the time of Samuel rested on special causes which were not in operation in the period of the Judges; if it could not be proved that the multiplication of places of sacrifice in Samuel's time rested on other grounds than on ignorance of the law respecting the unity of the sanctuary. But happily we are not left here to mere conjecture, but history affords us a certain solution. The capture of the Ark of the Covenant by the Philistines deprived Israel of the national sanctuary, for the sacred tabernacle that was only made a sanctuary by means of the ark, could no longer be considered as such, but was a body without a soul, a corpse. True, indeed, the ark was brought back

again, but the catastrophe which the men of Beth-Shemesh suffered on its arrival, shewed the people that the promise, "I will dwell in your midst," was not yet to be fulfilled by means of it. A state of things had arisen like that in the wilderness after the worship of the calf, or during the Babylonish Captivity. It was needful for the people to become inwardly a people of God, before the sanctuary could again be established among them. They beheld in their national affairs a practical declaration of God that he would no longer dwell in Shiloh.

The Israelites dared not, on their own responsibility, to select a new place for the sanctuary. They only endeavoured to find a shelter for the ark *in futuros usus*, and this was no easy task. The Bethshemites despaired of getting rid of it. Contrary to expectation, the inhabitants of Kirjath-Jearim were willing to receive it. No one envied them its possession; no one would deprive them of it. In a succession of occurrences its presence had been so disastrous, that they were glad to get rid of it. Even David, by whom the ark obtained, so to speak, a resurrection, was at first afraid to bring it to Jerusalem. "And David was afraid of the Lord that day, and said, how shall the Ark of the Lord come to me? So David would not remove the Ark of the Lord unto him into the city of David," 2 Sam. vi. 9, 10. We find no trace of sacrifices being offered at Kirjath-Jearim. And this shows that the state of things at that time was peculiar. For it is admitted that during the period of the Judges, the abode of the Ark of the Covenant was the chief place of sacrifice. A passage in Psalm lxxviii. leads us to a middle state, a time during which the Ark of the Covenant, though outwardly again in Israel, was inwardly in the land of the Philistines.

When God heard this, he was wroth,  
And greatly abhorred Israel;  
So that he forsook the tabernacle of Shiloh,  
The tent which he placed among men.

Ps. lxxviii. 59, 60.

On the return of his favour, the Lord chose, instead of Ephraim and Shiloh, Judah and Zion. Here, therefore, an empty interval lies between the time in which the Lord dwelt at Shiloh, and that in which he dwelt at Zion. Now, it was natural that with the depreciation of the sanctuary, the holy places should rise in im-

portance, up to the point of becoming places of sacrifice. This view which the present writer had reached independently, he afterwards found in the older expositors. It is ably developed by SCHMID, in *libr. Sam.* At p. 187, he says “*Altaria et sacrificia non tam ad arcam foederis Jehovae, quam ad locum quem Jehovah sibi et arcae suae electurus erat, alligata fuerunt. Quando ergo locus Jehovae electus nullus erat, altaria alibi locorum ex bona et justa saltem casu, quando ex. gr. comitia populi alicubi habebantur, aut praesens aliqua necessitas postulabat, erigi et sacrificia afferri poterant. Quando ipsa arca in privatis aedibus hospitabatur quomodo ibi totus populus sacrificare, et cultum divinum peragere potuit? . . . Arca nunquam in Noben translata est, propterea procul dubio, quod, quae tabernaculo et vasis tentorii supererant, ibi in urbe sacerdotum et apud pontificem maximum, et post percussum a Saule Noben, in Gibeone, non minus tantum hospitabantur, quam arca foederis in Kirjath-Jearim: atque sic omnia expectabant locum quem Jehovah repudiata Schilunte electurus erat.*” Yet, let it be observed, that in 1 Sam. ii. 35, the full restoration of the high priesthood, of which the temporary degradation, in connection with that of the sanctuary, began with the death of Eli, is placed parallel with the appointment of a king, “And I will raise me up a faithful priest, . . . and I will build him a sure house, and he shall walk before my Anointed for ever.”

MOVERS has attempted to remove the same difficulty in another way. He maintains (p. 290) that in all places where, according to the books of Samuel, sacrifices were offered, the ark was present. He prefers Gilgal, which is frequently mentioned in the Books of Samuel, as a place of sacrifice, where the ark remained for a long period. It was brought thither from Kirjath-Jearim where, according to 1 Sam. vii. 2, it had remained twenty years. But it must have been brought back afterwards to Kirjath-Jearim, for David fetched it thence. This hypothesis, however, rests on no certain grounds. For we have shown that the phrase לְעֵינֵי יְהוָה to which MOVERS appeals, by no means conveys the idea that the transaction to which it relates occurred where the Ark of the Covenant was kept. And the second reason, that the ark remained only twenty years at Kirjath-Jearim, rests on a false

interpretation of 1 Sam. vii. 2, arising from an arbitrary separation of the two parts. "And it came to pass, after the ark had been a long time, twenty years, at Kirjath-Jearim, the children of Israel lamented after the Lord." The ark is mentioned here only in order to determine the date of this event in relation to the preceding history. Not a word is said to the effect that the ark was removed from Kirjath-Jearim at the end of twenty years. In this instance persons have allowed themselves in an arbitrary interpolation, under the influence of a secret bias. Had the ark really been taken away from Kirjath-Jearim, it would hardly have been brought back again, since its being deposited there was accidental, and any other place would have been equally proper. But not only is this view destitute of all support; there are several weighty considerations against it. According to it the ark would have been, even under Samuel, the centre of the whole religious life of the Israelites. But how does it consist with its being so that it should remain at Kirjath-Jearim, in a private house, without priestly attendance? How does it consist with 1 Chron. xiii. 3, where it is said, that "the ark was not enquired at in the days of Saul?" Let it be also observed that only according to our view can the exercise of the priestly functions by Samuel be satisfactorily explained. Along with the sanctuary, the priesthood was also rejected by God, and in reference to both there was a provisional arrangement, till they were restored.

5. There is only *one* case remaining, in which a violation of the law respecting the unity of the sanctuary was committed, namely, the establishment of a private sanctuary by Micah, which was transferred by him to the colony of Danites. But in this isolated fact no one would detect a proof that at that time the law respecting the unity of the sanctuary was not known and acknowledged. BLEEK at least disclaims any violation of the law in the case, without any reference to the persons from whom the charge proceeds. He remarks (p. 562), "If the law in this form had existed and been acknowledged as Mosaic, one might expect that at least the pious part of the people, who adhered with zeal to the service of Jehovah, and laboured to uphold and promote it, would be held and constrained to the observance of that prescription." But it is clear as day that neither the knave Micah, nor the boorish Danites belonged to this class. The whole proceedings of

Micah and the Danites is decidedly regarded by the author of the Book of Judges as a criminal abuse. Compare the more copious investigation in the section on sacred persons.

It is therefore settled that in the whole period of the Judges, not a single instance can be adduced which will bear examination of that freedom of worship which it is said must have happened during that time. Let us now collect the evidences which prove that one national sanctuary—the Tabernacle with the Ark of the Covenant fixed by Joshua at Shiloh, was during the period of the Judges the religious centre of the nation, and the only place of sacrifice that was lawful and frequented by the godly.

1. That there was only one house of God, one sanctuary for all Israel, appears incontestably from Judges xix. 18, when shelter was refused the Levite in Gibeah, he said, "I am going to the house of the Lord, and there is no man that receiveth me to house." STUDER remarks (p. 393), "We may understand by this sanctuary Shiloh, or rather Bethel, or some other Ephraimitish sanctuary. But the place here specified is "the house of the Lord" (אֵת בַּיִת יְהוָה.) And how could the Levite found on his connection with a particular sanctuary a claim to be received hospitably in a Benjaminitish town? To find *where* the national sanctuary was, this passage gives us no clue.

2. Judges xviii. 31 is a very important passage. For we not only learn from it that *the* house of God was at a definite time in Shiloh, but it is expressly said that it was there from the time of the expedition of the Danites that took place at the beginning of the period of the Judges, to the capture of the ark by the Philistines towards the close of the same period.\*

3. That the great feasts were celebrated in Shiloh, and that the whole nation assembled there to attend them, appears from Judges xxi. 19 (compare the investigation of this passage in the section on sacred times).

4. The first chapters of the First Book of Samuel furnish important information. There also we find the sanctuary in Shiloh. That it was the sole and exclusive one, appears from the names בַּיִת יְהוָה, the house of JEHOVAH, i. 7, 24; iii. 15; and הַיְקָל יְהוָה i. 9; iii. 3. Besides the name בַּיִת יְהוָה, another also is used

\* Vol. i. p. 197, and the section on *sacred persons* in this vol.

which often occurs in the Pentateuch, אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד, *Tabernacle of the Congregation*, ii. 22. There, and only there, were the offerings of the whole nation presented, and there the feasts were celebrated. The Lord speaks in ii. 28, 33, of "his altar;" and the words in ver. 29, "Wherefore kick ye at my sacrifice, and at my offering which I have commanded *in the habitation*," מוֹעֵד, furnish evidence that besides the tabernacle, no other legitimate place of worship at that time existed. The tabernacle was absolutely the habitation of God, as exclusively as heaven, Deut. xxvi. 15. All offerings were presented there. That the sacred tabernacle at Shiloh was the national sanctuary ordained by Moses, is shown by i. 22, "But Hannah went not up; for she said unto her husband, I will not go up until the child be weaned, and then I will bring him that *he may appear before the Lord*." The expression אָרָא אֶת-יְהוָה יְהוָה refers to Deut. xvi. 16. Three times in a year shall all thy males *appear before the Lord thy God*, in the place which he shall choose." In the tabernacle was the lamp of God, and this, like the Mosaic, was kept burning till early in the morning. Compare iii. 3, "And ere the lamp of God went out," with Exod. xxvii. 20, 21, where the command is given to Aaron and his sons to "burn the lamp always in the Tabernacle of the Congregation without the veil, from evening to morning—a statute for ever." See Lev. xxiv. 3, and Exod. xxx. 7, 8, according to which the lamps were to be lighted בֵּין הָעֶרְבָיִם "between the two evens," and burn from even to morning. In the sanctuary, moreover, was the Ark of the Covenant. As to its form, there were on this as on the Mosaic, *Cherubim*. This appears from 1 Sam. iv. 4, "So the people sent to Shiloh, that they might bring from thence the Ark of the Covenant of the Lord of Hosts, which dwelleth between the cherubim," יָשָׁב הַכְּרֻבִים. Compare 2 Sam. vi. 2. GRAMBERG, indeed, maintains (p. 30), that the author does not mean to say, that the images of the cherubim were on the Ark of the Covenant, but only to mark Jehovah's elevation, and certainly this distinction is here signified more by the fact of God's elevation above all creatures than by the symbol; but if this latter had not been present, the former certainly would not have been here described in a simple narrative after this manner; the mere אָרָא would have been sufficient. As to the nature and importance of the Ark of the Co-



venant, it has already appeared, that it is generally spoken of as the Ark of the Covenant of the Lord, or the Ark of God—that it occupied essentially the same position as the Mosaic Ark of the Covenant; for this designation implies that it was the only place of the Lord's manifestation—the only foundation of his relation to Israel. That it occupied this position is shown, besides, in the most unequivocal manner. The ark and the Lord appear inseparably united in 1 Sam. iv. 3, where the Israelites say, "Let us fetch the Ark of the Covenant of the Lord out of Shiloh unto us, that, when it cometh among us, it may save us out of the hands of our enemies." All Israel receive the ark with loud shouts of joy, ver. 5; and the Philistines say, ver. 7, "God is come into the camp;" ver. 8, "Woe unto us, who shall deliver us out of the hand of these mighty gods?" The high priest Eli received all the other mournful tidings, Israel's overthrow, and the death of his sons, with patience. But when the messenger who had escaped added, "The Ark of God is taken," he fell from his seat, iv. 18. The ark bore the name of the glory of Israel, iv. 21, "And she named the child Ichabod, saying, The glory is departed from Israel." . . . Ver. 22, "And she said, the glory is departed from Israel, for the Ark of God is taken." The Bethshemites, referring to the ark, say (vi. 20), "Who is able to stand before this holy Lord God." This national view of the Ark of the Covenant, which lies at the basis of Judges xviii. 30, where the historian considers the whole land as carried into captivity, in this its sanctuary, which formed, as it were, its nucleus and essence (vol. i. p. 192), has the unity of the sanctuary as its necessary consequence, so that all the passages which express this view of the ark may be adduced equally as evidences for the unity of the sanctuary. The law of the Pentateuch respecting the unity of the sanctuary is, in truth, a simple corollary to the declaration of the Lord, that he was enthroned on the Ark of the Covenant as the God of Israel, and willed to be present among his people only through its medium. From the Ark of the Covenant, Samuel received his revelation in ch. iii. 3, as Moses did, Exod. xxv. 22; Num. vii. 89. It was carried along with their armies to battle for the reason given in Num. x. 35, "And it came to pass, when the ark set forward, that Moses said, Rise up, Lord, and let thine enemies be scattered, and let them that hate thee, flee before thee." Com-

pare 1 Sam. iii. 4. After all this, let our readers judge for themselves with what right DE WETTE remarks (*Beiträge*. i. 255), "Whether the sanctuary at Shiloh was the Mosaic *אהל מועד* cannot be determined, and, indeed, is very doubtful;" and, in his *Archæologie*, (2d ed. Leipz. 1830), § 222, he says, "The existence of the Mosaic tabernacle soon becomes uncertain in history. Except Joshua xviii. 1 (but compare ch. xxiv. 1, 26), no certain trace appears of this national sanctuary in the whole time from Joshua to David!"

5. In 2 Sam. vii. 6, it is said, "Whereas I have not dwelt in any house, since the time that I brought up the children of Israel out of Egypt, even to this day, *but have walked in a tent and a tabernacle*," *וְאֶהְיֶה מְתוֹכְלֵד בְּאֶהֱלֵי יְבִמְשָׁכָן*. According to this passage, one and the same portable sanctuary lasted from the march out of Egypt to the time of David, consequently it was the Mosaic tabernacle through the period of the Judges.

6. The 78th Psalm assumes, that, from the conquest of Canaan, only one national sanctuary existed, first at Shiloh, and afterwards at Zion.

7. Jeremiah says, in vii. 12, "But go ye now unto my place which was at Shiloh, where I set my name at the first, and see what I did to it for the wickedness of my people Israel." Here also only two sanctuaries are referred to—first, that at Shiloh *בְּיִשְׁכָּן*, which was already destroyed in Eli's time, in the war of the Philistines—the destruction refers not to the town, for this existed in later times (see BACHENE, ii. 3, p. 423), but to the sanctuary as such; then that at Jerusalem, which now was to be destroyed. We have here a verbal reference to Deut. xii. 11, "Then there shall be a place which the Lord your God shall choose, to cause his name to dwell there, thither shall ye bring all that I command you," &c. In this reference, the character of exclusiveness is evidently attributed to Shiloh, which, according to the law, it ought to possess. Also, in ch. xxvi. 6, the house of God at Shiloh is placed on a par with Jerusalem.

In relation to SACRED PERSONS, in order to prove the wide discrepancy between the period of the Judges and the supposed Mosaic institutions, great stress has been laid on the following circumstances: i. In the period of the Judges, every leader of the

people, nay, every father of a family, had a right to offer sacrifice, and nothing at all was known of the prerogative with which the priests were invested by the law. See DE WETTE, p. 255 ; GRAMBERG, p. 178 ; VON BOHLEN, p. 119 ; and VATKE, p. 273. We maintain, on the contrary, that, in the period of the Judges, the priests were exactly in this respect what they were required to be by the Pentateuch ; that not a single instance occurs in which the laity exercised those sacrificial functions which, according to the law, belonged to the priests. For the opposite opinion, an appeal is made to 1 Sam. ii. 15–17, according to which, the offerers performed the whole sacrifice, even to the burning of the fat. See GRAMBERG, p. 108. But the latter statement is decidedly incorrect. The burning of the fat, the *הַקֵּזֶבֶת*, was performed by persons who were as distinct from the offerers as the sons of Eli. This is intimated by the expression, “ before *they* burnt the fat,” *בְּקִרְבָּם יִקְטְרוּ* in ver. 15, but still more decidedly by ver. 16, where the offerer himself says, “ Let *them* not fail to burn the fat.” Compare Lev. iii. 3. Thus, if the latter part of the statement be false, the former cannot be correct. And how could the author think of sacrifices without priests, when, in ver. 28 of the same chapter, the presentation of sacrifices is reckoned among the prerogatives of the priests, the marks of distinction with which God had favoured them ? The only reason alleged is, that the person who brought the offering is called the “ *man that sacrificed*,” *הַזֹּבֵחַ הַזֶּה*. We need not confine ourselves with appealing to the maxim, *Quod quis per alios facit*. It must not be overlooked, that the persons who presented the offering had an important part in the sacrificial act. To them it belonged, according to the law, to lead the victim to the altar, and lay their hands upon its head. To them also belonged the *slaying* of it, as well as the taking out, dividing, and washing the entrails, so that the term *זָבַח* need not occasion us the least difficulty. Compare Lev. i. 4, 5, 11 ; iii. 2 ; iv. 24, &c. ; and OUTRAM, p. 148. Hence, even in the law, *sacrificing* is frequently attributed to the people, “ Thou shalt sacrifice the passover unto the Lord thy God,” Deut. xvi. 2, compared with Numb. xxviii., xxix., &c. In the law respecting sacrifices, Lev. xvii. 2, &c., where yet the greatest exactness is to be looked for, the *זָבַח זָבַח* is attributed to the laity, ver. 5, 7 ; and likewise the *הִקְלִיף עֲלֶיהָ* and *זָבַח* in ver. 8. LUND has

explained that passage in Joshua viii. 30, "Then Joshua built an altar . . . and they offered thereon burnt-offerings, and sacrificed peace-offerings," on the principle of that *usus loquendi*, "*quæ causæ principali omnia etiam ad ministerialem pertinentia tribuit.*" "*Quis credat,*" he remarks, "*manu id fecisse propria in ipsa legis Mosaicæ promulgatione, quæ ibi describitur, et adstante cum arca foederis toto sacerdotium et Levitarum concilio?*" The assertion we are combating proceeds, therefore, from pure ignorance. It is attempted, however, to support it by the cases of Gideon and Manoah, who sacrificed under circumstances which would not admit of any priestly co-operation. But let it be considered, that Gideon and Manoah instituted no constant ritual in which they might officiate as priests, but that they only once, under quite extraordinary circumstances, in consequence of an appearance of an angel of the Lord to them, exercised the priestly function. But that, under such circumstances, even according to the Mosaic law, the laity were permitted to present sacrifices, provided they did not go beyond the ground of the license, the immediate presence of the Lord, who can deny? The appearance itself was a practical declaration on the part of God, that, on such occasions, he dispensed with his wonted medium of communication. Let it be also considered, that, according to the law itself, the priestly dignity, peculiarly and originally, belonged to all individuals of the chosen people. "And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests," Exod. xix. 6. Accordingly, the Levitical priesthood possessed only transferred rights; the rights of the people were only suspended. That they might at some future time be imparted to them again, was implied in that fundamental passage of the law. For what is contained in the idea must one day be brought to pass in the reality. In Is. lxi. 6 it is said of *all* Israel, "But ye shall be named the priests of the Lord, men shall call you the ministers of our God." So that, at a future period, all Israel would be a priestly race. And, according to Jerem. xxxiii. 22, all Israel will be changed, not only into the race of David, but into the tribe of Levi. (See *Christologie*, iii. p. 613). Therefore the Levitical priesthood could not have the same importance as the priesthood belonging to other nations of antiquity, as for instance the Egyptians, where the priests and the people stood in direct contrast. What therefore was not ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, and would

cease in the future, we might presume would suffer interruptions in the intermediate period, under extraordinary circumstances. The hidden glory must at certain seasons gleam through the temporary veil. Still there remained to the people, in order to let it be known that it was essentially possessed of priestly dignity, even after the institution of the Levitical priesthood, that priestly function which formed the root and groundwork of all the rest, the presentation of the covenant-sacrifice, the Pascal-Lamb. (See *Christologie*, iii. p. 615). Lastly, it is urged that, according to 1 Sam. vi. 15, the inhabitants of Bethshemesh, when the Ark of the Covenant came to them, presented sacrifices alone for themselves. But even if we grant that the words "the men of Bethshemesh offered burnt offerings and sacrificed sacrifices the same day unto the Lord," really contain what is attributed to them (MICHAELIS remarks, *adhibitis sacerdotibus, quorum ibi copia fuit*), it ought not to be overlooked that here are circumstances quite out of the usual course which forbid the inference *a speciali ad generale*. If no priest were at hand when the ark arrived, the presentation of sacrifices by the laity was certainly in accordance with the *spirit* of the Mosaic legislation. But if they were present, (and that they were we cannot doubt, since Bethshemesh was one of the cities of the priests, and because it was so, the ark was sent there by the Philistines), then the laity would never have thought of violently appropriating a Levitical function, by taking down the ark, and still less of assuming the priestly office. Not the slightest scruple arose in the mind of an Israelite that the sacrifices were to be attributed without hesitation to those for whom they were presented. To mention expressly the co-operation of the priests never entered the thoughts of the historian, as he was not writing a ritual chronicle. We repeat it, let any one point out in the course of the whole period of the Judges a single example, where, under ordinary circumstances, those who professed to be the servants of Jehovah, and were acknowledged as such, offered sacrifices, unless they belonged to the priestly race.

2. It is asserted that, in direct opposition to the regulations of the Pentateuch, Samuel, without being of the tribe of Levi, performed service in the sanctuary, which legally belonged only to the Levites. Compare DE WETTE, p. 231, and *Archæologie*, p. 179; VON

BOHLEN, p. 121, and others. If Samuel were really not of Levitical descent, this reason would certainly be of importance. That Samuel at a later period, without being of the priestly race, exercised priestly functions, creates no difficulty. An explanation is found in the disordered relations of the times, and in the theoretical dictatorship with which he was invested by God on account of these disorders. But the case is very different in regard of his youthful engagements. Here nothing can be found on which to ground an exception to the rule. His parents had already dedicated him without hesitation to the temple-service. But the assertion that Samuel was no Levite is made quite at random. To set aside the argument which is drawn from the *אֶפְרַתִּי an Ephrathite* in 1 Sam. i. 1, nothing more is needed than the single expression in Judges xvii. 7, which has been adduced in support of the assertion, "a young man of the family of Judah," with the remark that immediately follows, "who was a Levite, and he sojourned there." From this it follows, that the Levites were reckoned as belonging to the tribes among whom they sojourned; that there were Levites of Judah, of Ephraim, and so, as may be understood at once, of other tribes. For how, indeed, could it be imagined that the Levites could live among the separate tribes without becoming in some measure intermixed with their common civil life? On the other hand, in favour of Samuel's Levitical descent, there are in the first place two independent genealogies in the Chronicles. In 1 Chron. vi. 7-13, Kohath's descendants are brought down to Samuel. They appear again in an ascending line in ver. 18-23, where the family is mixed with that of the chief singer Heman, who lived in David's time and was Samuel's uncle. A wilful fiction cannot be suspected in these genealogies, since the author, had he been disposed to forge a false succession, would, no doubt, have made Samuel a descendant of Aaron. Yet we have another ground besides, which, though hitherto not noticed, confirms, in a remarkable manner, the account in Chronicles. It lies in the name of Samuel's father Elkanah. All the

---

\* Perhaps it may be objected that if Samuel was a Levite, it was unnecessary to devote him to the sanctuary. But let it be observed that the Levites were not considered eligible for service till their 25th year, and that only the smallest part of them dwelt near the sanctuary.

numerous Elkanahs who appear in the history are Levites, (compare SIMONIS *Onomasticon*, p. 493), and particularly among the posterity of Korah, from whom Samuel was descended, this name is continually recurring. The equivalent name  $\text{קִנְיָהוּ}$  was also Levitical. The force of this argument increases, if we fix our attention on the meaning of the name. The appellation can then no longer be considered accidental. The name is, in its meaning, not less Levitical than in its use. The Levites were substitutes for the first-born whom the Lord purchased for himself when he slew the first-born in Egypt, Num. iii. 13-44, &c. The excess of the first-born were to be redeemed; compare Num. viii. 14; Deut. x. 8, 9. The name refers to this relation. Besides being a pledge of Samuel's Levitical descent, it renders us another service. Appearing in the Mosaic age, it serves to confirm the accounts of the Pentateuch respecting the choice of the Levites, and even their substitution for the first born. For  $\text{קִנְיָהוּ}$  implies that a price had been paid for them.

3. In 1 Sam. ii. 27, in the address of the man of God to Eli, the account of the institution of the priesthood is at variance with the Mosaic record in Egypt. Such is the statement of LEO in his *Jud. Gesch.* p. 66. This is certainly the case according to the common interpretation; but this interpretation is to be rejected on grammatical grounds. It has been assumed that the  $\text{הֲ$  interrogative stands for  $\text{הֲגִלֵּיתִי}$ , *Have I revealed myself?* for, *Have I not revealed myself?* But such a *quid pro quo* naturally never occurs. See EWALD'S *Gr.* p. 658; MAURER on Gen. xxvii. 36. It ought rather to be translated, "*Have I revealed myself (did I plainly appear, Eng. Auth. vers.) to thy father's house when they were in Egypt?*" Verse 28 forms a contrast to ver. 27, "In Egypt I had not yet made myself known to them, and yet I invested them with such honour in the wilderness, as if they had long stood in the nearest relation to me." Thus the passage has a directly contrary meaning.

4. It appears from the first chapters of the Books of Samuel, that the service of the sanctuary at Shiloh was conducted very unostentatiously. The only sacred persons who meet us here are Eli, his two sons, and Samuel. See DE WETTE, p. 234; BOHLEN, p. 120; and VATKE, p. 277, and others. But it is a strange conclusion to infer, that because only these persons are men

tioned, that no others were there. Do we find, in the first chapters of the Books of Samuel, a full representation of the state of religion at that time? Did the historian make it his object to give a kind of theocratic statistics? The *argumentum a silentio* can only rationally be applied, when it must evidently be within the plan of the author to mention the events in question, and even then the greatest caution is necessary. But still we are able to shew that the state of things was altogether different from that maintained by our opponents. In 1 Sam. i. 3, it is said, "And the two sons of Eli were there, Hophni and Phinehas, priests to the Lord," כֹּהֲנִים לַיהוָה, not "priests of the Lord, as would have been said if they had been the only ones. The historian therefore plainly intimates that there were others. We shall, moreover, point out in the section on sacred rites, that no sacrifice at that time was offered without the co-operation of the priests. Now, since *all* Israel at that time offered their sacrifices at the sanctuary in Shiloh (1 Sam. ii. 14), how was it possible for two or three priests to perform the requisite service? Besides, the burning of fat is attributed in ii. 14, 16, to persons not less distinct from the sons of Eli than from those who brought the victims. Let it also be observed, that according to ch. ii. 22, the female *militia sacra* was then in its most flourishing state, a circumstance of which we should not have been aware but for the scandalous behaviour of the sons of Eli to some individuals belonging to it. But how can we admit the existence of the ministration of females in the sanctuary, without that of the other sex?

5. "There seemed to be no peculiar recognition of the specific sacredness of the priesthood, since priests were consecrated and hired, when they were needed, without employing the assistance of other priests. Judges xvii. 5-12; 1 Sam. v. 1." Thus VATKE, p. 273; see also STUDER, p. 103. Judges xvii. claims our first attention. It is difficult to conceive how any stress can be laid on these transactions. Nothing can be plainer than that we have here the account of an *abuse*. We might as well conclude, that, because Micah committed a theft on his mother, that the commandments, "*Honour thy father and mother,*" and "*Thou shalt not steal,*" were not then in existence. Micah first consecrated one of his sons as a priest; that he did this against his better knowledge and conscience, his own words show, when he suc-



ceeded in gaining a Levite. xvii. 13, "Now know I that the Lord will do me good, seeing I have a Levite to my priest." "Apparet," SCHMID observes (*Comm.* p. 1364), "*quod Michas morsum conscientiae in corde suo senserit ob cultum idololatricum et filium sacerdotem constitutum. Noverat nimirum ex lege Mosaica, quod non liceret sacerdotæ fungi nisi Levitis; ideo maledictionem potius, quam benedictionem divinam sibi præsagiiit, quamdiu contra legem dei ex filiis suis sacerdotem habuit.*" But suppose that Micah had *not* found a Levite, what then? Would not our opponents have considered it an incontrovertible proof that nothing was then known of the Levites as a separate religious order? If Micah could have obtained an Aaronic priest on moderate terms, who either would have officiated for him, or consecrated his Levite, he would again have said, "Now I know that the Lord will do me good, seeing," &c. How can any one think of drawing a conclusion respecting the general state of religion in that age, from the doings and ways of a worthless fellow (*aus dem Thun und Treiben eines Nichtswürdigen*) like Micah, or the six hundred loose adventurers of the tribe of Dan? (*Judges* xvii. 11).\* But it is objected (see *STUDER*, p. 377), if Micah had repudiated the Mosaic law, supposing it to be in force in his time, why did not the historian censure his whole procedure? Does not his silence appear like a tacit approval of his priesthood and private ritual? We reply, that the historian's not passing his judgment on events *ex professo*, may be accounted for from the solicitude which he manifests throughout, not to get off the ground of objectivity. Does he express any direct disapprobation of Micah's theft? On all occasions, he leaves the facts to speak for themselves. He only indicates his own opinion by slight hints; but these are not wanting here; they are given, indeed, with no sparing hand. The historian directs his readers to the point of view from which *all* the events narrated in the Appendices are to be contemplated by the regular formula; "*In those days, there was no king in Israel; every man did that which was right in his own eyes.*" *STUDER* himself infers from this expression, that the author, "living in the times of the kings, wished,

---

\* Who would take the proceedings of the first Spanish conquerors of America as a criterion of the state of religion and morals at that time in Spain?

by some examples, to set the anarchy of earlier times in an appalling light." Therefore, by asserting that the historian favoured Micah's private worship, he directly contradicts his own decision as to the object of the narrative. Moreover, if any action whatever spoke for itself, and rendered an express opinion upon it unnecessary, it was so in the present case. Micah was a thief; the image and the rest of the apparatus were made of money that was accursed. What was to be expected from such a ritual? The historian's judgment is contained in the reference to Deut. xxvii. 15, "Cursed is the man that maketh any graven or molten image (פָּסֵל וּמִצְבֵּה), an abomination unto the Lord, the work of the hands of the craftsman, and putteth it in a secret place; and all the people shall answer and say, Amen." This reference is evidently made in xvii. 3, 4; xviii. 31. The historian signifies, that, by an accursed medium, the mother sought to save her son from the curse. A judgment is also indicated when the author, in ch. xviii. 31, speaks of *the* house of God in Shiloh. If there was only *one* house of God, then Micah's and the Danites' house of God must have been merely an imaginary one, a Devil's-chapel, (*eine Teufelscapell*). Lastly, the author points, at the close, to the extinction of that ritual by the reformation under Samuel. Had he regarded its institution as praiseworthy, he must have disapproved of its extinction. But that he has done this, no one will be very ready to maintain. His judgment unquestionably coincides with that of Samuel.—We now turn to the second passage, 1 Sam. vii. 1, on which DE WETTE has laid great stress. "The inhabitants of Kirjath-jearim received the Ark of the Covenant from Bethshemesh, and brought it to the house of Aminadab, and sanctified Eleazar his son to keep the ark of the Lord." Where, in all this, is a syllable about the consecration of Eleazar as a priest? He was appointed not to be a priest, but a watcher at the grave of the ark, by the side of its corpse, until its future joyful resurrection.\*

---

\* Calvin has taken a very correct view of the passage—"Non significatur eos illi officium Levitæ attribuisse. . . sed nihil etiam impedit, quominus illum custodem elegerint arcæ, ne quis nimirum proprius ad locum, in quo posita erat, accederet, et ne profana haberetur, non autem ut ad eam tractandam proprius accederet, quod solius sacerdotis erat officium. At quoniam in privatas aedes erat admissa, poterat ira Dei provocari atque omnis everti religio et sanctitas, si arca Dei privatis et domesticis rebus immixta fuisset sine discrimine; quare ut locus ille, in quo posita fuerat, sanctior

6. It has been asserted (DE WETTE, p. 263) that if the priestly and Levitical order in the period of the Judges had occupied the place assigned it in the Pentateuch, that state of freedom and license in worship could never have arisen which we find there. But that state of unrestrained license is arbitrarily imagined. The state of worship during the period of the Judges was more regular than that under the ungodly kings, among whom, in a considerable degree, the Levites and priests occupied their legal position. The remark of the author of the book of Judges, "*In those days, there was no king in Israel,*" &c. requires us to place the composition of the book in the time of a king, probably David. This period, indeed, has the preference before that of the Judges. The royal piety lent religion its arm, and this arm was felt throughout the whole land. Compare what has been already said, p. 4.

7. In reference to the attire of the priests, a remarkable deviation from the Pentateuch occurs in the period of the Judges. According to the former, the ephod belonged exclusively to the high priest; on the contrary, in the time of the Judges, and still later, the ephod is brought into very general use; the child Samuel wears an ephod—it appears as the common priestly dress—David himself was clothed with the ephod when he danced before the ark. Thus GRAMBERG, p. 31, compared with STUDER, p. 367. But on a closer inspection this argument is changed into its opposite. For, *first*, the author of the Book of Samuel knew the ephod as the exclusive property of the high priest. In 1 Sam. xiv. 3 (And Abiah . . . wearing the ephod  $\text{וְהַיְהוֹדָה בְּעֹפֹד}$ ) "*wearing the ephod,*" = to being the High Priest. In 1 Sam. xxiii. 9, David said to Abiathar the high priest, "bring hither *the ephod.*" So also in 1 Sam. xxx. 7. In 1 Sam. ii. 28, to wear the ephod is expressly named as the prerogative of the high priest. *Secondly*, in all the three places in the Books of Samuel to which an appeal is made, 1 Sam. ii. 18; xxii. 18 ("And he slew on that day fourscore and five persons that did wear a linen ephod"); 2 Sam. vi. 14, not an ephod simply is spoken of, but a *linen ephod*,  $\text{עֹפֹד לְבָנָיִם}$ . That  $\text{בָּר}$  is always and without exception added to it, indicates that there was an ephod, *simpliciter sic dictum*, of more

---

haberetur, atque illi debitus honor exhiberetur, dicitur electus communi totius populi consensu et suffragis Eleazar custos istius arcae."

costly materials, and is in admirable agreement with the passages where that is mentioned. Thus we arrive at a result exactly the opposite to GRAMBERG'S. The  $\text{עֵפֹד}$  shows, that the ephod of the high priest, as prescribed in the Pentateuch, was unique in its kind, and likewise that it consisted of costly materials. In all essential points the correct view may be found in WITSIUS, *Ægyptiaca*, p. 40; and in CARPZOV, *App.* p. 73. "It is necessary," the latter observes, "to distinguish the two ephods"—*alterum vulgare, quo intelligitur vestis e solo lino confecta, ordinaria sacerdotibus, tantum cum templi ministeriis vacarent induenda: alterum Pontificium, quod erat indumentum multae artis et ingenii, auro, gemmis et coloribus distinctum et variegatum, quod pontifici uni, cum sacra faceret, gestare concessum fuerat.* That the high priest's ephod in the time of the Judges retained all the dignity attributed to it in the Pentateuch, appears from the two examples of superstitious reverence for it which this period furnishes, in the cases of Micah and Gideon. The singularity of the high priest's ephod is also shown in its being the only one by which answers were sought and received from the Lord. The view taken of this particular by those who would identify the ephod of the high priest with the common one, may be gathered from STUDER'S remark—"Oracles might be communicated independently of the Ark of the Covenant, through any priest who wore the ephod with the Urim and Thummim." But with this inference from the identity of the ephods, the history does not agree; consequently this identity is to be rejected. The multiplicity of organs for obtaining answers from the Lord is very plainly excluded by Judges xx. 18, "And the children of Israel arose, and went up to the house of God, and asked counsel of God, and said, which of us shall go up first to the battle against the children of Benjamin?" compare ver. 23, and ch. i. 1. The organ by which they enquired of God was so fixed and determinate, that there was no occasion to designate it more exactly than merely "*they asked counsel of God.*" All these times the case is exactly that which is so particularly described in the law, Num. xxvii. 21, "And he shall stand before Eleazar the priest, who shall ask for him *by the method of lights* (after the judgment of Urim, *Eng. A. Vers.*); ( $\text{בְּתֵשֶׁבֶת הָאֲוִיִּים}$ ); at his word shall they go out, and at his word they shall come in." Let it be noticed that

at Bethel, whither the children of Israel resorted in order to enquire of the Lord, Phinehas the son of Eleazar, the son of Aaron, "stood before the ark in those days," as we are expressly told in ver. 28.

Even this refutation of our opponents contains important positive grounds for our assertion, that in essential points the state of religion in the period of the Judges, as far as it concerns sacred persons, was in unison with the regulations of the Pentateuch. We will here bring together what positive grounds still remain.

First of all, the passages which prove that the Levites, during the period of the Judges, occupied the places assigned them in the Pentateuch. To this class belongs the account of the Levite whom Micah obtained for his sanctuary. How decidedly must the tribe of Levi have been considered as the privileged order of the servants of God, when Micah, merely from obtaining an itinerant member of this tribe, who possessed no distinction but his birth, promised himself such prosperity and blessing; "Now know I that the Lord will do me good, seeing I have a Levite to my priest." The purpose of the Danites to rob Micah of his sanctuary was inseparably connected with that of obtaining his Levitical priest. The whole of the second appendix of the Book of Judges is occupied about a Levite. He is described in ch. xix. 1 as *a stranger*, sojourning on Mount Ephraim. This implies that the Levites, during the period of the Judges, had fixed and separate places of abode in Palestine, agreeable to the injunctions in the Pentateuch. For if they were all strangers, why should the fact be noticed respecting an individual? SCHMID correctly remarks, *Peregrinus fuit ratione habitationis, quod in urbe aliqua Levitis assignata non habitaverit.* We obtain the same result from ch. xvii. 7, where it is said of Micah's Levite, "And there was a young man out of Bethlehem Judah, of the family of Judah, who was a Levite, and *he sojourned there.*" Bethlehem was not a Levitical town. The passage in the second appendix, ch. xix. 18, is of special importance, where the Levite who could find no lodging in Gibeah complains, "*I have to do with the house of the Lord, and there is no man that receiveth me to house.*" That the words וְעָשָׂה אִתִּי בְּבֵית יְהוָה אֲשֶׁר הֵלַךְ must be so explained is very evident. וְעָשָׂה with אִתִּי or בְּ means *to have intercourse*, to have to do with persons or things; see GESENIUS, *Thesaurus*, p. 378. The older exposi-

tors (see SCHMID on the passage) rightly paraphrase the passage, "*Dominis me dignatur ut ipsi ministrem tanquam Levita in domo ipsius, et nemo de populo dei est, qui me dignetur, ut hospitio suo me excipiat.*" STUDER concurs in this explanation. The passage proves that the Levites, though their dwelling-places were scattered over the land, yet had to perform all the services at the sanctuary of the Lord, and were, so to speak, his domestics. The claims which the Levite made, the complaints which he uttered, show in what esteem the order was held, and lead us to consider the unfriendly conduct of the inhabitants of Gibeah towards one of its members as something strange and irregular. The third passage of importance is 1 Sam. vi. 13. How much weight is attached to it appears from the assertion of DE WETTE and others, that a Levite interpolator must have tampered with it. It is said in ver. 14, 15, "And the cart came into the field of Joshua, a Bethshemite, and stood there, where there was a great stone, and they clave the wood of the cart, and offered the kine a burnt offering unto the Lord. And the Levites took down the ark of the Lord and the coffer that was with it, wherein the jewels of gold were, and put them on the great stone; and the men of Bethshemesh offered burnt-offerings and sacrificed sacrifices the same day unto the Lord." The only plausible reason which DE WETTE can assign for a Levitical interpolation, rests upon a *hysteron proteron* which is supposed to be in the narrative as it now stands. "After the Bethshemites had cleaved the wood of the cart and offered the kine, the Levites come and take down the ark, and then the Bethshemites sacrifice again." But this difficulty is a self-made one. The first sacrifice was presented not on the part of the inhabitants of Bethshemesh but on the part of the Philistines, and *for* them if not *by* them. That this act *principaliter*, if not also *ministerialiter*, belonged to the Philistines, we infer not only on the grounds already adduced by SCHMID (*Putaverim sacrificium nomine principum Phil. pro ipsis et terra eorum expiandis oblatum fuisse ex vaccis et plaustro, qui ipsorum erant. Atque hinc esse existimo, quod hoc sacrificium seorsim refertur et Betsch. non hoc, sed alia mox holocausta et pacifica attribuntur*), but because the words, "and they clave the wood," &c., naturally can be referred only to the Philistines, because hitherto they had been the persons who had to do with the Ark

of the Covenant, since the taking it down by the Levites is not mentioned till ver. 15. As it is not allowable to have recourse to a corruption or interpolation unless every other mode of explanation fails, it must be admitted that the author follows, not a chronological order, but an arrangement founded on the different parties engaged in the transaction, and thus every thing will be in its proper place. He relates A. what the Philistines did—they sacrificed their kine. B. what the Israelites did, that is, (i.) the Levites, on whom, according to the law, the carrying of the ark devolved—they took it down and placed it on the great stone. (ii.) The inhabitants of Bethshemesh offered sacrifices. Thus everything is most suitably arranged. The author might more readily adopt this method since the chronological order, (i.) the taking down the ark, (ii.) the sacrifice of the Philistines, (iii.) the sacrifice of the inhabitants of Bethshemesh, is self-evident. Whatever besides is alleged by DE WETTE may be easily disposed of. He thinks that the Levites could not be there, for everything seems to have been done at haphazard; the Bethshemites even reaped the corn. If it be said the Bethshemites were Levites, since, according to Joshua xxi. 16, Bethshemesh was allotted to the Levites, this would certainly harmonize the statements, but the expression "*Levites*" would be unsuitable, as amounting to nothing; they were, as far as this act was concerned, not Levites, and what they did, they did not as Levites. These difficulties are disposed of by the following view of the proceeding. Bethshemesh, according to Josh. xxi. 16, 1 Chron. vi. 44, was a priest's town. The Philistines, by the advice of their priests, (ver. 2, 9), intentionally sent the ark to Bethshemesh as the nearest priest's town. The reapers were not priests or Levites, for only the pasturage, and not the arable land in the vicinage of their towns, belonged to them. See BACHIENE, I. ii., p. 401. But they sent to the town which was near at hand, and caused those who ministered at the sanctuary to be called, a circumstance which no one will maintain was needful to be expressly mentioned. Until they arrived, the cart stood still with the Ark of the Covenant. *Either* Levites dwelt with the priests at Bethshemesh, (the number of the priests who were assigned to each priest's town was very small, (see BACHIENE, I. ii. p. 395) and it was very natural that the Levites should resort to them by preference), *or* the

priests are introduced here in the quality of Levites, since they performed an office which by the law appertained to the Levites ; those in the higher station might, under certain circumstances, perform the functions of those in the lower, but the reverse was inadmissible. Thus the supposition of a Levitical interpolation is destitute of all foundation, and it is so much less probable, since a Levitical interpolator would, first of all, have taken care, in order to avoid the appearance of sacrifice having been performed by the laity, to use the term "priests," instead of "the men of Bethshemesh."

Passages containing a direct or indirect mention of priests have been already adduced in the part containing a reply to objections. Let it be considered, that an extensive supply of priests and sacrifices was required by the great reverence in which, according to 1 Sam. iv.—vii., the Ark of the Covenant was held at this period. The patriarchal age, which some persons might be disposed to regard as parallel to the period of the Judges, had no such sanctuary. In the address of the man of God to Eli (1 Sam. ii. 28), it is represented as a prerogative of the priesthood to place the sacrifices on the altar, to burn incense, and to receive all the offerings made by fire, of the children of Israel. In this passage, all the essential prerogatives are enumerated, which, in the Pentateuch, are secured to the priests. Compare, in reference to the share of the priests in the burnt-offerings of the children of Israel, Lev. vi. 7–11 ; vii. 28–35 ; x. 12. An order possessed of such prerogatives must be held in high esteem, and must contain a considerable number of members. For what could one or two isolated priests do with the sacrifices of all Israel ? This address alludes to only one priesthood for all Israel, that of Aaron's descendants. "And did I choose him," it is said in ver. 28, "out of all the tribes of Israel to be my priest?" and ver. 29, "honourest thy sons above me to make yourselves fat with the chiefest of all the offerings of Israel my people," confines our thoughts to one particular priesthood—one Israel, the people of God, and one priesthood for all Israel. From ver. 36, according to which, Eli's descendants would say to the new high priest, "Put me, I pray thee, into one of the priests' offices, that I may eat a piece of bread," it follows, that, besides the high priest and his sons, there would be a considerable number of other priests, that the family of Eli consisted of a consider-



able number of members. Moreover, it is evident, that, besides the family of Eli, there was still another priestly line into which the high priesthood was destined to pass. That the profligate conduct of Eli's sons was permitted to pass unpunished, is also another proof of the great and deeply-rooted regard in which the priesthood was held at this period. But the great authority of the priests is not conceivable apart from their forming a numerous body. Let it be also observed, that, at that time, the priestly order was held in high esteem among all the nations by whom the Israelites were surrounded. Compare, for instance, in reference to the Philistines, 1 Sam. v. 5 : vi. 2. The modern view of the period of the Judges forcibly takes the Israelites out of all connection with their neighbours. In the patriarchal times, it was also, in this respect, essentially different.

The continuance of the high priesthood during the period of the Judges is also attested by the two chief sources of information. Judges xx. 28 relates to the beginning of that period, "And Phinehas, the son of Eleazar, the son of Aaron, stood before him (the Lord) וַיִּזַד לַיהוָה in those days"—a passage which is illustrated by Deut. x. 6, 8. How troublesome it is to our opponents is shown by GRAMBERG'S attempt to prove its spuriousness. STUDER remarks (p. 405), "The account of the high priest . . . Phinehas presupposes a succession of this office in the elder line of Aaron's family, in unison with the Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua." Eleazar is named as Aaron's successor in Num. xx. 28, &c. ; Deut. x. 6. He was high priest in Joshua's time ; Josh. xiv. 1 ; xvii. 4. His death is mentioned Joshua xxiv. 33. The high priesthood was promised to his son Phinehas and his descendants in Num. xxv. 13. Towards the *end* of the period of the Judges, we obtain a fuller account respecting the high priesthood of Eli, who, to distinguish him from his sons, who were only כֹּהֲנֵימ לְיִהוָה is called *the* priest הַכֹּהֵן ; see 1 Sam. i. 9 ; ii. 11. If the beginning and end are ascertained, we need not be apprehensive about the middle. The *argumentum a silentio* which has been made use of against the continuance of the high priesthood during the intermediate period, is rather in its favour. Compare STUDER, p. 406. The interruption would be much more likely to be mentioned than the continuance. Yet for the middle we are not entirely confined to the inference drawn from the beginning

and end. There are special reasons for it within our reach. In the address of the man of God to Eli in 1 Sam. ii. 28, it is implied, that the high priesthood had continued uninterruptedly from its institution after the departure from Egypt to the times of Eli. Eli was not of the family of Phinehas, but the family of Ithamar attained with him the high priesthood. Now, if it be admitted, that, in the interval between him and Phinehas, the high priesthood was not continued, then the fulfilment of Num. xxv. 13 could not be proved, in which the high priesthood is granted to Phinehas for him and his posterity יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן-פִּינְחָס. This argument can only acquire importance if the spuriousness of the Pentateuch be maintained. In that case the promise would be nothing more than *history* in the garb of prophecy. The uninterrupted continuance of the high priesthood during the period of the Judges is also confirmed by Jewish tradition. JOSEPHUS gives us the succession of the high priests. Antiq. v. 11, § 5.\* “But Eli first obtained the high priesthood of the family of Ithamar, another of Aaron’s sons, (for the high priesthood was first in the family of Eleazar, the dignity being transmitted from father to son), and he delivered it to Phinehas, his son, after whom Abiezer, his son, having received that honour, left it to his son, named Buki, from whom Ozis his son received it, after whom Eli held the sacerdotal office.”

The Samaritans also have much to tell of Ozi as Eli’s predecessor in the high priesthood, which they have drawn from Jewish traditions. See RELAND, *Dissertatt.* i. 152. This tradition finds support in 1 Chron. v. 29; vi. 35; Ezra vii. 1, where Eleazar’s descendants are enumerated in agreement with JOSEPHUS, but without noticing that they were his successors in the high priesthood.

Thus it is settled that the three classes of sacred persons in a stricter sense, who are mentioned in the Pentateuch, existed in the period of the Judges, and occupied exactly the position that is assigned to them in the Pentateuch.

---

\* ἤρξε δὲ πρῶτος Ἡλεὶ Ἰθαμάρου τοῦ ἐτέρου τῶν Ααρῶνος υἱῶν οἰκίας ἡ γὰρ Ἐλεαζάρου οἰκία τὸ πρῶτον ἱεράτο, παῖς παρὰ πατρός ἐπιδεχόμενοι τὴν τιμὴν, ἐκεῖνος τε Φινεέση τῷ παιδὶ αὐτοῦ παραδίδωσι, μετ’ ὃν Ἀβιεζέρης υἱὸς ὢν αὐτοῦ τὴν τιμὴν παραλαβὼν, παιδὶ αὐτοῦ Βουκὶ τοῦνομα αὐτὸς αὐτὴν κατέλειπεν αὐτῷ, παρ’ οὗ διεδέξατο Ὀζις, υἱὸς ὢν, μετ’ ὃν Ἡλεὶ ἔσχε τὴν ἱερουσύνην.

But sacred persons in a wider sense, who are mentioned besides in the Pentateuch, also recur in the period of the Judges. These are

1. THE SACRED WOMEN. According to 1 Sam. ii. 22, the sons of Eli "lay with the women that assembled at the door of the Tabernacle," *הַנְּבִיאֹת פְּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד*. Here is a literal reference to Exod. xxxviii. 8, "And he made the laver of brass, and the feet of it of brass, of the mirrors of the (female) servants who served at the door of the Tabernacle," *הַנְּבִיאֹת אֲשֶׁר עָבְדוּ פְּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד*. No one will maintain that the verbal agreement in the only two passages which treat of this institute could be accidental. The author by this verbal reference pointed out in an indirect manner (as is customary with him) that the institute which Eli's sons profaned was no other than what existed in the times of the lawgiver, and was venerable from its antiquity. Further investigations respecting this institute we shall give in our enquiry on Jephthah's vow, whose daughter was received into the number of the women who ministered to the Lord.

2. THE NAZARITES. Samson and Samuel appear as such in this period. But it is asserted that the Nazarites' institute makes its appearance here, not as an enactment of the Mosaic law, but as a custom which existed anterior to it, and afterwards was legalized and modified by it. See *STUDER*, p. 486. This opinion is supported on the following grounds. i. There is no reference to the law delivered in the Pentateuch. *VON BOHLEN*, p. 148. It is true, this reference is only given in the usual delicate manner of the author, but yet so strongly and plainly, that even the most obtuse person, when the facts are laid before him, must allow that in the author's view the Nazariteship of Samson and Samuel was dependent on the Pentateuch. In Num. vi. 3, it is said, "He shall separate himself from wine and strong drink." In Judges xiii. 4, "Drink not wine nor strong drink;" in ver. 14, "Neither let her drink wine nor strong drink." In Num. vi. 5, "There shall no razor come upon his head," *חֵזֵר לֹא-תַעֲבִי עַל-רֹאשׁוֹ*. In Judges xiii. 5, *מִזְרָה לֹא-יַעֲלֶה עַל-רֹאשׁוֹ*. In ch. xvi. 17, *מִזְרָה לֹא-יַעֲלֶה עַל-רֹאשׁוֹ*; 1 Sam. i. 11, *מִזְרָה לֹא-יַעֲלֶה עַל-רֹאשׁוֹ*. The substitution of *חֵזֵר* in all the three passages, for the *חֵזֵר* of the law is not accidental. We perceive the reason from 1 Sam. xvii. 51; 2 Sam. xx. 8, where *חֵזֵר* is used in the sense of *sheath* or *scabbard*; in the sense of *a knife* it occurs in prose (besides the Pentateuch) only in Jer.

xxvi. 23. Probably during the intervening period it had disappeared in this sense from colloquial use. ii. To the Nazarite institute under the Judges, belonged abstinence from unclean meats, of which nothing is said in the law contained in Num. vi. But a dependance on the law of Moses—at least according to the view of the author of the Book of Judges—undeniably occurs in reference to this point. The expressions, “Beware, drink not wine nor strong drink, and eat not any unclean thing,” in Judges xiii. 4, compared with ver. 14 “nor eat any unclean thing,” refer to Lev. ch. xi., in which סֵּאֵי is constantly a technical term. To “thou shalt not eat” of the law, corresponds as in reference to drink, the “eat not” in Judges xiii. 14. As the ground of the law, the injunction is given, “Be ye holy for I am holy” This was in an especial manner binding on the Nazarite, of whom it is said, Num. vi. 8, “All the days of his separation he is holy unto the Lord.” iii. The prescription of the law that the Nazarite should abstain from touching the dead, was entirely neglected by Samson, who slew so many of his enemies. But this exception was occasioned by Samson’s vocation, which he did not assume himself, but received it from God. Moreover, even VATKE has observed, that Samson’s Nazariteship points to a higher antiquity, and a wider prevalence of this institute in his time; for he who did not live in the spirit of such an institute, could not have founded the custom.

3. THE PROPHETS. These occupy, in the period of the Judges, the position which is assigned to them in the Pentateuch. Compare Deut. xviii. 18. True, the word of the Lord was precious in those days, and prophecy was not widely spread, yet neither was it entirely wanting. In the Book of Judges, prophets make their appearance as heralds and interpreters of the Divine judgments and preachers of repentance; in 1 Sam. ii. 27, a man of God comes to Eli; and the great importance which the prophetic order suddenly acquired in Samuel’s time, can be explained only on the supposition that it had already taken root. Against those who deny the efficiency of this order before the time of Samuel, an appeal is sufficient to the song of Deborah. This song has throughout a prophetic character. If the author had not told us that Deborah was a prophetess, this song would be sufficient evidence of the fact.

## ON SACRED TIMES.

From SACRED PERSONS we now proceed to the consideration of SACRED TIMES, and especially of the PASSOVER.

I. In following the traces of this feast through the period of the Judges, we begin, in order to obtain a firm footing, with the principal passage in Judges xxi. 19, "And they said (the elders of all Israel after the victory over the Benjamites), behold there is a feast of the Lord in Shiloh from year to year." Let us first examine the reasons which have been urged against the application of this passage to the three great feasts of the Israelites. (i.) "The other tribes appear to have taken no part in this feast, at least not the Benjamites, who were to lie in ambush for the dancing virgins." Thus DE WETTE, after the example of several of the older expositors (SCHMID for instance), and following him GEORGE, *Die Jüd. Feste*, § p. 150. But it is difficult to conceive how this assertion could be made. The virgins from Jabesh were brought to Shiloh into the camp, xxi. 12. Thither the Benjamites were invited by the whole congregation  $\text{וְלֹאֵלֵהֶם}$ , ver. 13; they made their appearance there and received wives, ver. 14; and there a plan was contrived to obtain wives for those who remained; ver. 19. The elders in ver. 20, 21, advised them not to come to Shiloh, but to "go and lie in wait in the vineyards;" with that their address begins. But how could they, without further preface, speak to the children of Benjamin of *the* vineyards, unless they were already at Shiloh? In the narrative of the capture of the women in ver. 23, nothing is said about the coming of the Benjamites to Shiloh, but merely, "And the children of Benjamin did so, and took wives according to their number." If the Benjamites were attending the Passover at Shiloh, the stratagem could easily be executed. They could secrete themselves without exciting surprise by their disappearance, since it was allowable to return home on the morning after the feast. Deut. xvi. 7. MICHAELIS, *Mos. Recht.* iv. § 197. (ii.) "If one of the great feasts had been intended in this narrative, it would certainly have been distinguished by its appropriate name, and not merely styled in general terms, A Feast of Jehovah." This reason is peculiar to GEORGE. It will have no force until it can be shewn that  $\text{וְלֹאֵלֵהֶם}$ ,

not, perhaps must mean, but can only mean, a feast of Jehovah. Here is an offence against the first principles of grammar. A feast of Jehovah must be called *הַגַּד לַיהוָה*.

In favour of considering the feast in question as the Passover, we produce the following reasons. 1. As soon as it is settled that the feast was not a particular, but a national one, it would seem far-fetched to be imagining that it was some feast with which we were not familiar, since no trace whatever remains of any national feasts excepting those that are prescribed in the Pentateuch. 2. The mention made of the feast of the Lord leads our thoughts to the Passover, the *ἑορτή κατ'ἔξοχόν*. As the three principal feasts held a conspicuous place among the rest, so did the Passover among these. It was dedicated to the commemoration of a signal act of the Divine goodness, and was a pledge of its continuance. On the prerogatives of the Passover compare LUND, p. 974, *Christologie*, ii. 565. The dances in companies in which the daughters of Shiloh (that this designation must be regarded as one *a potiori*, and that many of the young women from other parts who came to the feast joined in the dances, may be inferred from the numbers) engaged, indicates that it was the Passover. For this practice stands in relation to Exodus xv. 20, the dances of the Israelitish women, under the direction of Miriam, which fell within the seven days of the Passover. The dances of the young men at Shiloh were probably performed on the same, and not on the principal day of the feast. The middle days would have some vacant intervals which they would attempt to fill up in this manner. 4. The expression *הַגַּד לַיהוָה* previously occurs in the Pentateuch respecting the feast of unleavened bread, and it appears that the reference to it was constant. At least, wherever we find *הַגַּד לַיהוָה*, the reference to the Passover is rendered probable on other grounds. 5. The Passover falls in admirably with the whole series of events. After the causes of offence were removed, the feast of the Covenant was celebrated, being at the same time a feast of reconciliation between brethren. Then they all returned to their respective homes.

If the passage under consideration refers to the Passover, it is so much more important, since it does not refer to a single celebration of it, but expressly says that it was regularly repeated, and returned yearly. As to the manner of the celebration, we learn

that the feast, in conformity with the prescriptions of the law, was held at the place of the national sanctuary, and that all the tribes assembled thither.

II. Slighter, but yet very remarkable traces of the Passover, are presented to us in Judges, ch. vi. The address of the prophet to the children of Israel in ver. 8 can only be considered as spoken at a feast of the assembled nation. For the expression, "to the children of Israel," is more probably to be taken literally, since the oppression of the Midianites (in ver. 4) was universal. The special reference to the departure from Egypt would best suit the Passover of all the national feasts; "Thus saith the Lord God of Israel, I brought you up from Egypt, and brought you forth out of the house of bondage." The whole address of the prophet has the air of a discourse at the Passover. The time also agrees with it. The coming of the angel of the Lord is immediately connected with the mission of the prophet, ver. 18. When he came, Gideon was threshing wheat. But the harvest began immediately after the feast, and, in part, during the feast. See MICHAELIS, iv. § 197. Still further, Gideon's answer in ver. 13 contains an allusion to what he had heard at the Passover, "where be all his miracles which our fathers told us, saying, Did not the Lord bring us up from Egypt?" The expression, "Did not the Lord?" implies a question, as if he had said, "What is this service to us, or what does it mean?" Founded on the passages in Exod. xii. 26, 27, "And it shall come to pass, when your children shall say unto you, What mean you by this service? that ye shall say, It is the sacrifice of the Lord's Passover, who passed over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt, when he smote the Egyptians." xiii. 8, "And thou shalt show thy son in that day; because of that which the Lord did unto me when I came forth out of Egypt." Ver. 14, 15, "And it shall be when he asketh thee in time to come, What is this? that thou shalt say unto him, By strength of hand the Lord brought us out of Egypt, from the house of bondage. And it came to pass, when Pharaoh would hardly let us go, that the Lord slew all the first-born in the land of Egypt"—founded on these passages were the questions from the Jewish youth to their fathers, which here were introduced as representatives of the past in relation to the present—they formed an integral part of the celebration of the feast, and we see

from this passage, that this practice existed in the time of the Judges.

III. In Judges xi. 40, it is said, "And it was a custom in Israel, from year to year, מִיָּמֵינוּ יָמֵינוּ that the daughters of Israel went to celebrate (לְתַנְיָה) the daughter of Jephthah the Gileadite four days in a year." The custom of celebrating the daughter of Jephthah is here expressly said to be constant, existing in the author's time, and in fact a national custom. Now it cannot be supposed, that a feast lasting four days throughout all Israel would be devoted to such an object. The most intelligible supposition is, that the celebration was held on one of the two seven-days feasts, when the people assembled at the sanctuary, and that it was held at the sanctuary is rendered more probable by the expression, "*they went*," and by the circumstance that the daughter of Jephthah ministered at the sanctuary. But of these two feasts, we shall be led to fix upon the Passover, for this reason, that, as appears from 1 Sam. i. 2, only at this, whole families were accustomed to visit the sanctuary. Moreover, we have another example of the connection of other festive celebrations with the Passover (p. 66); but the chief ground lies in the phrase מִיָּמֵינוּ יָמֵינוּ, which never demonstrably is used excepting for the Passover.

IV. 2 Kings xxiii. 22, it is said, "Surely there was not holden such a Passover (under Josiah) from the days of the Judges that judged Israel, nor in all the days of the kings of Israel, nor of the kings of Judah." 2 Chron. xxxv. 18, "And there was no Passover like to that kept in Israel from the days of Samuel the prophet, neither did all the kings of Israel keep such a Passover." From these passages, it follows, (i.) that the Passover was generally celebrated in the times of the Judges; and, (ii.) that it was attended by the whole nation. For it is exactly in this point that the Passover in Josiah's reign agreed with the celebration of that feast in the times of the Judges, (the short period under David and Solomon is not taken into account, or rather is reckoned with the period of the Judges as the time of the national unity), and differed from what it was under the kings. In the Chronicles, this is very evident; for, at the beginning and end of the account, it is expressly stated, that, besides Judah, the rest of Israel also took part in the Passover; and, in the book of Kings, the same fact appears on a closer examination. Immediately before, we are



informed that Josiah had extended his reformation over the whole land of Israel. For in 2 Kings xxiii. 21, it is said, "And the king commanded all the people;" and to this expression the subsequent clause refers, "such a Passover." Hence also we may perceive how far DE WETTE (p. 258), is justified in attempting to prove from this passage, that the Passover was celebrated for the first time, according to the law, under Josiah. The clause "from the days of the Judges," which he must, however unwillingly, admit, sufficiently shows that his interpretation cannot possibly be the correct one.

V. That towards the end of the time of the Judges, the Passover was regularly celebrated, and that even at the end, they assembled from all Israel at the sanctuary, we learn from 1 Sam. i. In ver. 3, it is said, "And this man (Elkanah) went up out of his city from year to year *בְּיָמָיו יְמִימָה*, to worship and to sacrifice unto the Lord of hosts in Shiloh;" compare with ver. 21, "And the man Elkanah and all his house went up to offer unto the Lord the yearly sacrifice *זֶבַח הַקָּדָשׁ*, and his vow." According to the three principal passages, Exod. xxiii. 15; xxxiv. 20; Deut. xvi. 16, 17, ("in the place which he shall choose; in the feast of unleavened bread, and in the feast of weeks, and in the feast of tabernacles; and they shall not appear before the Lord empty. Every man shall give as he is able, according to the blessing of the Lord thy God which he hath given thee,") besides the offerings prescribed by the law for the whole nation, free-will sacrifices and gifts were to be presented by individuals. We must consider one of these feasts to be referred to in 1 Sam. i., since Elkanah's journey to the sanctuary appears to have been fixed entirely by a particular period, and not dependent on personal preference. And of these three we shall be determined to fix upon the Passover by the circumstance, that this feast, in close connection with its meaning, was that which was attended by the Israelites at all times without exception, while their appearance at the sanctuary on the occasion of the other feasts was not so strictly observed. MICHÆLIS, *Mos. Recht.*, iv. § 197. As Elkanah visited the sanctuary regularly only once a year, we are led to believe, for the reasons assigned, that it was the Passover; but here also we are confirmed in our opinion by the phrase *בְּיָמָיו יְמִימָה*.

Thus it appears, that we possess more numerous and certain

grounds for the regular celebration of the Passover in the period of the Judges than we might expect from the nature of our sources of information. That the other sacred times are not mentioned appears to us, according to them, perfectly natural. We consider that HÄVERNICK (*Einleitung*, I. 2, p. 577) is too hasty in admitting, that the celebration of the feasts during the period of the Judges was very irregular, and far from being exactly conformed to the law. There is nothing in favour of such an opinion, for how little it came within the plan of the sacred history to give information respecting the celebration of the feasts is apparent, from our not finding a single direct notice of the Passover, though its regular celebration is demonstrable. Against HÄVERNICK'S opinion we have the analogy of the Passover. If, in reference to this, there was an exact adherence to the Mosaic law, it may be presumed that this was the case with the other feasts.

#### SACRED RITES.

From the investigation respecting the SACRED TIMES in the period of the Judges, we proceed to that relating to SACRED RITES.

From the nature of our materials, which, collectively, have a preponderating tendency to what is internal, (*eine vorwiegend innerliche Tendenz*),\* we cannot venture to expect to find proofs for the observance of the Mosaic sacrificial system in all its individual parts. We must be satisfied, if it can be proved, that nothing which occurs in reference to sacrifices is contradictory to the Pentateuch, but that everything, as far as it goes, is in close accordance with it.

Let us first obviate what has been adduced as contradictory to the Mosaic sacrificial system. The most plausible objections on this head relate to the character of the *Shelamim* in the book of Judges. What GRAMBERG (i. 107) and STUDER (in part, p. 405), have urged, that the *Shelamim*, according to Judges xx. 26, and xxi. 4, were presented with the *Oloth* on *mournful* occasions—the first time after the Israelites were conquered; the second time after the almost total extirpation of the tribe of Benjamin, though, according to the law, the *Shelamim* were offerings of gra-

---

\* *i. e.*, To illustrate, by historical details, the internal or spiritual character of the Theocracy as a *moral* government.

titude or joy—is of little weight. The assertion rests merely on confounding the genus with the species, שלם with זרה. For their adjustment, OUTRAM'S observation is sufficient. *Sacrificia salutaria, in sacris literis שלמים dicta, ut quae semper de rebus prosperis fieri solerent, impetratis utique aut impetrandis.* The *Shelamim* always had *prosperity, good*, for their object; but they were presented, under a variety of circumstances, either as embodying *thanks for good imparted*, or *petitions for good to be imparted*. The person of the offerer was first made acceptable by burnt-offerings and sin-offerings, and then the *Shelamim* were presented with a reference to his peculiar concerns and desires. But it is apparent, though overlooked by our opponents, that, in the period of the Judges, only two kinds of sacrifices were ever mentioned—the *Oloth* and the *Shelamim*. Hence it might be inferred, that that peculiar state of mind which expressed itself in the sin-offerings, the sense of guilt, was first recognised as a distinct element at a later period, and with so much greater probability, since the Pentateuch itself indicates the later institution of sin-offerings. They do not appear in Genesis, and belong, at the earliest, to the Mosaic age. But, on closer examination, we obtain a different result. *Olah*, in a wider sense, included the sin-offering. In this wider sense, it is always understood when connected with שלמים or זבחים, which is all the same, (“*quippe quae vox in sacris litteris, praesertim voci Olah addita, nulla designat sacrorum genera, nisi tantum sacra salutaria,*”) and, in a narrower sense, with להטאת. The burnt offerings, in a narrower sense, and the sin-offerings, formed a common contrast to the *Shelamim*, which, in essential points, was the same as that which the Jews make between קדשי קלים and קדשי קשים, *Sacra sacerrima*—OUTRAM remarks, p. 146—*Dici solent quibus vel nemini prorsus vesci, vel nemini nisi sacerdoti aut sacerdotis filio licuit, neque his nisi intra sanctuarium . . . . holocausta, omnia sacra piaculabilia. Sacra levia, quibus vesci aliis etiam licuit ubivis intra Hierosloymam . . . . salutaria sacra.* For a general designation of the first class, the term עֹלֹת is perfectly suited, both by its derivation and meaning, and, as such, often occurs in the Pentateuch. *Oloth* and *Zebachim* or *Shelamim* are not unfrequently so plainly connected as to indicate the collective sacrifices, including the sin-offering. Compare Exod. x. 25; xviii. 12; and es-

pecially Lev. xvii. 8; Num. xv. 3, 8. Olah undeniably occurs in the general meaning, tantamount to *קָרַב* in Deut. xxxiii. 10. In the Book of Joshua; which has been charged with so strong a Levitical bias (*Levitismus*), the designation of the totality of sacrifice by *Oloth* and *Shelamim*, occurs not less frequently than in the Book of Judges, ch. viii. 31. Thus also in the Chronicles, which are written in a Levitical spirit, 1 Chron. xvi. 1, 2; 2 Chron. vii. 1. In Ps. li. 18, 21, from which certainly no one would think of excluding sin-offerings, only *Oloth* and *Zebachim* are named. So in Is. lvi. 7. In Ezra viii. 35, sin-offerings are expressly numbered among the burnt-offerings. If now there is a general designation which includes sin-offerings and burnt offerings, and those persons frequently use it whose minds had a more outward direction, we are prepared to find it employed by the author of the Book of Judges.

GRAMBERG (p. 108) finds a contradiction to the Mosaic ritual in 1 Sam. ii. 15-17, where it would seem to be the custom to offer boiled flesh. But that the *Shelamim* alone are here spoken of, is evident. Only in reference to these, is the phrase *זָבַח זָבַח* used. In the case of the *Shelamim*, according to the law, no flesh was offered, either raw or dressed. *Sanguis et exta arae cedebant, pectus et armus sacerdotibus, pellis et caro offerentibus.* LEVI B. GERSOM on Lev. iii. 1; in CARPZOV, p. 706. Also here in ver. 15, where it is charged on the sons of Eli as impiety, that they demanded their portion before God had received his, the fat is described as constituting the latter. The passage shows, not that dressed flesh was offered, but only that it was eaten.

The most glaring departure from the Mosaic sacrificial system was the offering of Jephthah's daughter. But in the section *on the state of religion and morals in the period of the Judges*, we shall show that the admission of this sacrifice owes its origin to the arbitrary construction that has been put upon the narrative by expositors.

Having disposed of the objections, we now offer the positive proofs for the truths of our assertion, that the sacrificial system in the period of the Judges was conducted according to the prescriptions of the Pentateuch, though we must again remind our readers, that our sources of information are of such a nature, that it would be absurd to make large demands upon them.

1. The manner in which the author of the Books of Samuel describes the impiety of the sons of Levi, implies, that there was an absolute fixed regulation, by which it was determined what part of the offerings were to be retained by the priests, what were allotted to God, and what to the offerers. Apart from this, it would be no easy matter to decide in what the illegality of Eli's sons consisted. But the historian makes a special reference to this regulation, slight, after his usual manner, but yet sufficiently distinct. In ch. ii. 13, it is said, "And the priest's custom with the people was, when any man offered sacrifice, *כִּלְ-אִישׁ יָבִיחַ זֶבֶח*, the priest's servant came while the flesh was in seething with a flesh-hook of three teeth in his hand, &c. . . all that the flesh-hook brought up, the priest took for himself." These words contain an unquestionable reference to Deut. xviii. 3, and this reference contains the condemnation of the sons of Eli. It is there said, "And this shall be the priest's due from the people, from them that offer sacrifice, *וְהָיָה זֶבֶח זֶבֶחֹתָיִם*; and they shall give unto the priest the shoulder, and the two cheeks, and the maw." The perquisite which they took is set in contrast to the perquisite which was allowed them; compare in reference to the *מִשְׁפָּט* ch. viii. 11, with x. 25. Without this reference to the lawful perquisite, the author would not have designated the perquisite that was actually claimed *מִשְׁפָּט*. Instead of being satisfied with the portions assigned them by the law, they arbitrarily took whatever they pleased.

2. In accordance with the Mosaic ordinance respecting the Shelamim, only their fat was presented to the Lord. The arrangement of the sacrificial act, which Eli's sons attempted to pervert in contradiction to the offerers, agreed with that prescribed in the law. The offerers, according to 1 Sam. ii. 16, refused to give flesh to the priests before the fat was burnt. According to the law, the burning of the fat immediately followed the slaying of the animal. Compare Lev. iii. 1-5, where, and likewise in 1 Sam. ii. 11, the technical term *הִקְדִּישׁוּ* is used. Also according to Lev. vii. 20, &c. the priests did not receive their share till the Lord had received his own.

3. Elkanah went yearly to the sanctuary, in order to offer there the sacrifice of days, *זֶבֶח יָבִיחַ הַיָּמִים*, and his vow, 1 Sam. i. 21. Of the meals which he then prepared of the Shelamim, his whole family partook. 1 Samuel i. 4, "And when the time was that

Elkanah offered, he gave to Peninnah his wife, and to all her sons and her daughters portions." In acting thus he put into practice the injunction given in Deut. xii. 17, 18, "Thou mayst not eat within thy gates, the tittle of thy corn, or of thy wine, or of thy oil, or the firstlings of thy herds, or of thy flock, nor any of thy vows which thou vowest, nor thy free-will offerings, or heave-offerings of thy hand. But thou must eat them before the Lord thy God, in the place which the Lord thy God shall choose, thou, and thy son, and thy daughter, and thy man-servant, and thy maid-servant, and the Levite that is within thy gates, and thou shalt rejoice before the Lord thy God." The sacrifice of the days and the vow, briefly express what is described at length in the law. The first was, as it were, the yearly account with the Lord, the presentation of that portion of the property that fell to him in the course of the year.

It is of especial importance that, in agreement with the law, 4, all the offerings were presented at the sanctuary; and 5, every thing was performed with the concurrence of a priest. But these points have already been noticed in another connection.

That the sacrificial system during the period of the Judges was in a flourishing condition, is very evident from the first chapters of the Books of Samuel. According to ch. ii. 14, *all* Israel came to Shiloh in order to sacrifice; and GRAMBERG'S assertion (p. 280) that Elkanah's yearly sacrifice appears to have been only a voluntary result of his piety, is manifestly false. This is contradicted by the expression *גָּבַחַת הַזֵּבִיחַ*. Elkanah did not present some kind of offering every year, but *the* yearly sacrifice, the offering which every Israelite was bound and accustomed to present.

To the sacred rites which were performed during the period of the Judges, in accordance with the Mosaic law, belonged the *CHE-REM*, *הֶרֶם*, or compulsory devotement to the Lord, of those who would not voluntarily devote themselves to him.\*

The first mention of the *הֶרֶם* occurs in Judges i. 17. It is there carried into execution against the Canaanites. But there are two instances of it that are peculiarly striking, which are narrated in the appendix.

That the conduct of the other tribes towards the Benjamites is

\* v. KITTO'S Biblical Cyclopædia, Art. *Anathema*.—[TR.]

to be regarded as a CHEREM, is quite apparent. It was not called forth by a blind spirit of revenge; but the tribes performed with deepfelt pain what they considered was their duty. The question, "Shall I yet again go out to battle against the children of Benjamin my brother?" in ch. xx. 28, shews how far the people were from exasperation, even after they had suffered a most painful loss. They would gladly have been relieved from the service, but they believed it necessary to obey their Lord's call, lest the ban should be transferred from the guilty to themselves. This is evidently implied in the words which they uttered before the war with the Benjamites broke out, "that we may put away evil from Israel," Judges xx. 13. After the event, they expressed the deepest sorrow in the words, "O Lord God of Israel, why is this come to pass in Israel, that there should be to-day one tribe lacking in Israel?" They wept before the Lord. And how came it to pass, that, besides the men, they slew all the cattle, contrary to their own interest, if they merely acted from personal considerations, and with no reference to an inviolable law? But all doubt vanishes when we compare the second case, the perfectly analogous conduct of the tribes towards the inhabitants of Jabesh Gilead, which is expressly described as CHEREM. Compare ch. xxi. 11, "And this is the thing that ye shall do, ye shall utterly destroy every male and every married woman," הַיְהוֹרֵימִי.

But not only in general, the conduct of the Israelites in both cases was evidently regulated by the Mosaic injunctions respecting the CHEREM; we can point out specially that the tribes were guided by the *locus classicus* in Deut. xiii. 13, respecting the execution of the CHEREM on those who belonged to the people of the Covenant. This furnishes a key to the whole transaction. According to that passage an Israelitish city, which had been guilty of worshipping other gods (to bring the offence of the Benjamites and Jabesites under this denomination, requires a spiritual but not an arbitrary interpretation), was placed under the ban with all that was in it, the men and cattle were to be slain with the sword, the plunder was to be burnt, "that the Lord might turn from the fierceness of his anger, and show mercy and have compassion upon thee, as he hath sworn unto thy fathers." Between ver. 1, 5, containing the command, "thou shalt surely smite the inhabitants of that city with the edge of the sword," לְיָדֶיךָ.

. . . and the cattle thereof," and Judges xx. 48, there is a verbal coincidence, "and smote them with the *edge of the sword*, לָּיִר־חֶרֶב, as well the men of the city *as the beast*." Also the clause, "they set on fire all the cities that they came to," corresponds to Deut. xiii. 16, "thou shalt burn with fire the city." Also in Judges xxi. 10, there is an allusion to the words of the law, "Go, and smite the inhabitants of Jabesh-Gilead with the edge of the sword," לָּיִר־חֶרֶב,

Among the sacred acts performed according to the directions of the Pentateuch, must be reckoned THE BLOWING WITH TRUMPETS when preparing to attack their enemies. The injunction on this subject is given in Numb. x. 9, "And when ye go to war in your land against the enemy that oppresseth you, then ye shall blow an alarm with the trumpets, and ye shall be remembered before the Lord your God, and ye shall be saved from your enemies." Accordingly, blowing with the trumpet was a signal by which the people of the Lord signified to him their need of aid, and invoked him to bestow it. As he himself had ordered the signal, and had annexed a promise to its use, whenever they heard the sound of the trumpet, they might confidently believe that the Lord would assist them. The act, therefore, was a means of rousing the theocratic spirit. We meet with the first instance of compliance with this injunction in Joshua vi. 5. In the Book of Judges, the deliverers of Israel commonly begin their work with it. This ceremony has been very much misunderstood, when the object of blowing the trumpet has been considered to be that of calling the people together like an alarm-bell. Of such an object we nowhere find any trace, but the one assigned in the Pentateuch meets us everywhere. On all occasions the sounding of the trumpet stands in immediate connection with the consequence promised in the Pentateuch, so that only the fulfilment of this consequence can be considered as the object. In the passage just referred to, Josh. vi. 5, the calling together of the people cannot be considered as the object. So likewise in Judges iv., when Barak, at the command of the Lord, blew the trumpet in prolonged blasts on Tabor. How sadly those persons have lost their labour who have not perceived the reference to the Pentateuch, may be seen in STUDER. That the Mount Tabor where Barak blew the trumpet was not the place of the gathering is evident from ver. 10, where Kadesh is



described as such. From ver. 6, 10, 14, taken together, it follows, that Barak first assembled the host in Kadesh, then led it to Tabor, and thence to the field of battle, so that the blowing of the trumpet could only answer the purpose assigned to it in the Pentateuch. That this act referred only to the Lord appears also from the relation of  $\text{לְיְהוָה}$  in ver. 7, to  $\text{לְיְהוָה}$  in ver. 6, "Go and draw toward Mount Tabor," and "I will draw unto thee, to the river Kishon, Sisera the captain of Jabin's army;" which requires that the bare use of  $\text{לְיְהוָה}$  in ver. 6, without the words "with the trumpet," should be intentional, and that a double meaning should be affixed. If such be admitted in the words, "Go and draw toward Mount Tabor," and this is much more probable, since it is the language of a prophetess, the reference is clear. The long-drawn blast must draw the Lord; then the Lord draws Sisera the captain of Jabin's host. First, Barak draws the helper from heaven—then the Lord draws the enemy on earth. Also in ch. iii. 37, there is not the slightest evidence that blowing the trumpet was the means of gathering the people. After Ehud had sounded the trumpet on Mount Ephraim, he said to the children of Israel, at whose head he found himself, "Follow after me, for the Lord hath delivered your enemies into your hand." In reference to ch. xx. 37, even STUDER feels obliged to make the remark, "The idea of calling together a host to battle does not suit this passage."

The rite of CIRCUMCISION formed, during the period of the Judges, the distinguishing mark of Israel in relation to the surrounding nations; it was considered, in accordance with the Pentateuch, as a high prerogative. Compare Judges xiv. 3.

SWEARING BY JEHOVAH, according to Judges xxi. 1. 18, in accordance with Exod. xx. 8; Lev. xix. 2: Deut. v. 11, was esteemed very sacred. Vows were regarded as inviolable; compare Judges xi. 35, 36, with Deut. xxiii. 24. FASTING appears as in the law, Lev. xvi. 29, as an embodying of repentance, Judges xx. 26. The laws respecting UNCLEAN FOOD were known and observed, Judges xiii. 4, 14.

How firmly the Mosaic ritual had taken root in the period of the Judges, and how completely erroneous it is to attribute the priority to a ritual not according to the law, is evident from the remarkable

cases in which the latter is notoriously a mere corruption of the former.

One of these cases meets us at the very commencement of the period of the Judges. It is the account given us in the appendix to the Book of Judges of the image-worship of Micah, and afterwards of the Danites. A striking difference here is presented in reference to the sanctuaries. In some passages *four* objects are named, PESEL, MASEKA, EPHOD, and TERAPHIM. The two first were prepared by the mother, and handed over to her son. ch. xvii. 4. The two latter were made by the son, and when he had consecrated a priest, the whole apparatus was complete. In ch. xviii. 17 these objects are enumerated in a different order, image, ephod, teraphim, molten work. In ver. 20 of the same chapter only *three* are named, ephod, teraphim, and pesel; and in ver. 30, 31, only the pesel is spoken of. The singular verb יָרָא at the end of ch. xvii. 4 directs us to an individual object.

These discrepancies may be reconciled in the following manner. Evidently the four objects were such as, though connected, were yet separable, and, though separable, were yet connected. The molten work was the pedestal under the image, and included in that term, when used, *sensu latiori*—the image was clothed with an ephod. That the ephod was not the priest's dress is evident from the circumstance that *it was taken away when the priest went out of doors*; and is shown more distinctly from the phrase יָרָא לְפָסֵל *the ephod pesel*, in ch. xviii. 18, in which pesel and ephod are most closely connected. And *in* the ephod were the teraphim, from whom information and good counsel for the future were expected. For that this is the object of the whole contrivance is plain from ch. xviii. 5, 6, where the priests ask counsel of God for the Danites.

Taking this view we shall be able to explain all the facts before us. We can satisfactorily account for the change of designation in every passage. In ch. xviii. 14, the spies say to the Danites, "Do ye know that there is in these houses an ephod, and teraphim, and pesel, and masekah?" That which would excite their desire, which gave its worth to the whole, is first named. The masekah was only on account of the pesel, the pesel only on account of the ephod with the teraphim. Hence, in ver. 1, 8, we have the ephod-pesel. The same arrangement, according to their relative

value, is also observed in ver. 20, where masekah is regarded as an appendage of the pesel, and included under it. The teraphim are never named *primo loco*, because they are inseparable from the ephod. *Materially* the pesel was regarded as the principal object; hence in ver. 17 we have "the pesel, and the ephod, and the teraphim, and the molten work;" and in ver. 30 and 31, only "the pesel." Since the pesel was the material foundation, pesel is also at first placed next to masekah.

In all the varieties of collocation still, i. ephod and teraphim are never separated from each other; ii. neither of them is named alone; iii. teraphim is never placed before ephod; iv. masekah is never placed before pesel; v. masekah is never mentioned without pesel. Let any one try to explain these facts, of which, according to our view, the explanation is self-evident, by any other method.

If our view of the nature of sacred objects be correct, it must be acknowledged that the ephod of Micah with the teraphim, was an imitation of the ephod of the high priest with the Urim and Thummim—exactly as his priesthood evinced itself to be an imitation of the Levitical priesthood—and thus gives a pledge, not only of its existence, but of the high repute in which it was held. For the attempt to create a substitute for it can only be explained on the supposition of this repute. The teraphim were intended to serve instead of the twelve precious stones in the breastplate. תְּרָפִים, which formed the groundwork of the Urim and Thummim, a spiritual affair. What the high priest possessed for the whole people, Micah wished to possess for himself. For this purpose he arbitrarily took it out of its proper connection, and formed it differently according to circumstances. This disjointed and accidental character of his contrivance sufficiently shows that it was borrowed. The ephod originally was certainly, as it appears from the Pentateuch, the clothing of the servants of the sanctuary, and the purpose to which it is here assigned must have been forced upon it. And as the tunic originally belonged to persons and not to images, so also the connection of the holy oracle with the ephod did not proceed in Micah, as it did in the high priest, from an internal motive. We never find the ephod and teraphim elsewhere connected with one another, as must have been the case had they belonged to one another.

The history of Gideon presents us with a second instance.

That the ephod prepared by him was an imitation of the high priest's, is apparent for the simple reason, that without an external reason it would never enter any one's thoughts to prepare a heavy coat and set it up as an object of adoration. The perfectly inadmissible attempt of several critics (VATKE the latest, p. 267,) to change the coat into an image—a supposition which the whole character of Gideon forbids us to entertain, apart from all other considerations, (compare *Christologie* iii. p. 127, and the remarks on Judg. xvii. 18), his zeal for the true God was so great that idolatry could not find entrance till after his death, Judg. viii. 33—shows that it is impossible to explain the fact, except from one point of view. In Gideon's mind an anxious dread of violating the letter of the Mosaic law was mingled with an ardent desire to possess a sanctuary of his own. He therefore caused to be made a costly imitation of the high priest's ephod. This proceeding implies, as in the analogous case of Micah, that the ephod at that time was held in great honour, and this honour could not be paid to the ephod in and for itself, but depended on the Choshen connected with it, together with the Urim and Thummim. That Gideon's ephod was finished after the pattern of the Mosaic, is rendered more probable, since we find that Gideon, in one circumstance relative to its manufacture, was guided by an ancient model. Why did Gideon request the people to give up exactly their golden ear-rings for this object? He evidently imitates Aaron on this occasion; compare Exod. xxxii. 2, to which the historian seems to allude, if we compare the expression, "And Gideon made an ephod thereof," Judges viii. 27, with, "And he made it a molten calf," Exod. xxxii. 4. As Jeroboam followed Aaron's example as to the *form*, so did Gideon as to the *materials*, which he might believe himself more at liberty to do, since the blame that was attached to Aaron's conduct appeared to relate only to the form. It is further to be observed that the materials for the original ephod consisted also of freewill contributions. Exod. xxv. 7. Nor let it be objected, that if Gideon did nothing more, the severe judgment is inexplicable, which the author of the Book of Judges expresses on his conduct. In Gideon himself there was certainly not a little alloy of selfishness in action; his private sanctuary withdrew his heart more or less from the common sanctuary of the nation, and even if the proceeding had

not been injurious to himself, yet, from a regard to the weakness of the people, he ought to have abstained from the undertaking which would very shortly make the new self-chosen sanctuary an object of unholy attachment. Gideon's offence brought the Divine judgments on his family, who placed their honour in advancing the reputation of the new sanctuary, and this apparently slight deviation laid the foundation for a succession of Divine judgments which are described in ch. ix.

Also, in reference to what was strictly idolatry, we may point to a remarkable example of a later corruption which had its foundation in the pure worship of Jehovah. According to Judges ix., in the times after Gideon's death, there existed in Shechem, the chief place in the tribe of Ephraim, a sanctuary of BAAL-BERITH, בַּזְלֵי בְרִית. The origin and meaning of this name we learn from ver. 6. The inhabitants of Shechem, the adherents of Baal-berith, assembled to elect Abimelech king on the same spot where Joshua had held the last assembly of the people immediately before his death, Josh. xxiv. 1, 25, 26, where he erected a pillar as a memorial, a witness of the covenant which the people had made and sworn to Jehovah. As Joshua xxiv. 5, refers back to Gen. xxxv. 4—Joshua fixed upon the place, the tree which had been rendered sacred by Jacob, where he had buried the idols—so the transaction in the Book of Judges refers back to what is recorded in the Book of Joshua; down to Joshua's time the reference was to the oak, but from that period to the oak and the pillar אֲזָזֵי יָדָא, as it is called in the Book of Judges. In the same place stood also the temple of Baal-berith. This is evident from a comparison, ver. 46 with ver. 6, which shows that it was not in Shechem, but in the neighbourhood. If therefore it is certain that the name Baal-berith relates to the covenant concluded with the Lord under Joshua, it follows that the worship of Baal, which was not in direct opposition to the worship of Jehovah, but rested on syncretism, (Baal-berith in Judges ix. 46, is called El-Berith; if a direct opposition to the worship of Jehovah be assumed, the reference to the covenant under Joshua is inexplicable)—a mere corruption of the pure worship of Jehovah. For the idea of the covenant and that of Jehovah-Baal mutually exclude one another. If the covenant be old, then must Baal be new, an intruder. Therefore we have in the name of the Shechemite idol, a confirmation of the

express statement of the historian respecting the late origin of his worship, which, according to him, proceeded from a criminal apostacy, ch. viii. 33.

How deeply the Mosaic ritual had struck its roots, appears from the fact that the festivals which, according to the law, were to be held in honour of Jehovah, were transferred to Baal. An instance of this kind occurs in Judges ix. 27, "And they went out into the fields, and gathered their vineyards, and trod the grapes, and made merry וַיִּשְׂמְרוּ, and went into the house of their god, and did eat and drink, and cursed Abimelech." The reference of this festival to Lev. xix. 23-25 is undeniable: "And when ye shall come into the land, and shall have planted all manner of trees for food; then ye shall count the fruit thereof as uncircumcised; three years shall it be as uncircumcised unto you; it shall not be eaten of. But in the fourth year all the fruit thereof shall be holy to praise וְהִלֵּלְתֶם Jehovah withal. And in the fifth year shall ye eat of the fruit thereof; the HILLULIM which the Seventy have retained not without reason, since it is evidently a kind of *nomen proprium* occurs only in these two passages. The pseudo-Hillulim bore the same relation to the genuine as Baalberith to Jehovah.

We have hitherto been engaged in establishing the relation between the period of the Judges and the *ecclesiastical* regulations of the Pentateuch. Let us now turn to examine the relation in which the period of the Judges stands to the *civil* regulations of the Pentateuch.

Here our attention is first called to the relation of the Book of Ruth to the laws of the Pentateuch in the special instance of the *Levirate law*.

The Book of RUTH—BOHLEN maintains—in one of the established customs, the Levirate, knows nothing of the arrangements of the Pentateuch. We, on the contrary, maintain, that the juridical process in the Book of Ruth rests entirely on the legislation of the Pentateuch, and shows that it had taken deep root in the period of the Judges.

Two regulations of the Pentateuch are here to be considered. The first is that in Lev. xxv. 25, "If thy brother be waxen poor, and hath sold away some of his possession, and if any of his kin

come to redeem it, then shall he redeem that which his brother sold." An act of love is here spoken of, performed by a relation towards a relation. He was not allowed to purchase the land for himself, but in order to return it to his impoverished relation if still alive, or if he died childless, to keep up his name in his inheritance. For this object he retained the right of redemption against the purchaser. Neither was a legal obligation laid upon him, nor was an advantage promised him which he could derive from the unfortunate situation of his kinsman; but only the conditions were legally secured to him, on which he could perform this act of relative kindness. That the regulation is thus to be understood, appears (i.) from the name  $\text{גֹּאֵל}$ , which is here given to the relation. This is erroneously interpreted by GESENIUS as exactly equivalent to *cognatus*. But it denotes a kinsman only in one peculiar aspect, only as far as he redeems the person to whom he is related from distress, and takes care of his interests. (ii.) From ver. 26, which speaks of the case in which there is no Goel, and the person himself is in a condition to redeem his property. The connection of the two cases shows, that also in the first the redemption was effected for the advantage of the impoverished person. (iii.) From the analogy of ver. 48, 49. If an Israelite had sold himself, "after that he is sold he may be redeemed again; one of his brethren may redeem him; either his uncle, or his uncle's son may redeem him, or any that is nigh of kin unto him of his family may redeem him, or if he be able he may redeem himself." If the redemption which regards the *person* was an act of kindness, so also was that which regarded the *property*.

The second regulation of the Pentateuch which is here to be noticed, is that respecting the Levirate marriage, Deut. xxv. 5, of which the reason is ably explained by AFRICANUS in EUSEBIUS, *Hist. Eccles.* i. 7. τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν γενῶν ἠριθμεῖτο ἢ φύσει ἢ νόμῳ· φύσει μὲν, γνησίου σπερματος διαδοχῆ· νόμῳ δὲ, ἑτέρου παιδοποιουμένου εἰς ὄνομα τελευτήσαντος ἀδελφοῦ ἀτέκνον· ὅτι γὰρ οὐδέπω δέδοτο ἐλπίς ἀναστάσεως σαφῆς, τὴν μέλλουσαν επαγγελίαν ἀναστάσει ἐμμούντο θνητῇ, ἵνα ἀνέκλειπτον μένη τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ μετῆλλαχότος. This regulation refers literally indeed only to the unmarried brother-in-law, and not to the other relations. But if traced back to its idea, it also conveys an exhortation to them to care for the maintenance of their brother's

name in a wider sense, especially since among the Israelites, the ties of kindred, as the extensive use of the name  $\text{גֹּאֵל}$  shows, were closer than among us.

The second regulation, therefore, in its spirit, must be considered as connected with the first. The maintenance of the name by inheritance alone was an imperfect method. It was justly concluded that whoever made this an object when he came forward as *Goel*, must also, if opportunity offered, make use of the other effective means for keeping up the name, by marrying the widow of the deceased. Whoever declined doing that, showed that he was not disposed to fulfil Lev. xxv. 25, according to the intention of the lawgiver, that under the cloak of a kinsman's love he concealed a selfish regard to his own interests. The prerogative of the  $\text{בֵּן}$ , did not become him. If there was another kinsman who was willing to marry the widow, the right of redemption was also transferred to him.

From this view of the subject, the whole course of the transactions in the Book of Ruth, ch. iv., may be easily explained. Naomi had sold her land.\* Boaz, a wealthy and noble-minded man, had no avaricious motive for assuming the right of redemption, but he saw that he could not perfectly attain the object of his marriage with Ruth, if her land was not secured to the children that might be the issue of this connection. This right of redemption was at that time possessed by a nearer kinsman; as a means of withdrawing it and transferring it to himself, Boaz asked categorically whether, according to the unwritten law, which rested on the written, he was willing to comply with the obligation connected with the redemption of the property, of marrying the widow. As the kinsman declined doing this, the right of redemption was transferred to Boaz, and he could now raise up a name for the deceased on his own inheritance.

---

\* That the land, as Josephus also supposes, had been already sold, not, as is commonly supposed, was then to be sold, appears from (i.) The preterite  $\text{בִּיַּעַרָה}$ . (ii.) The term  $\text{בָּעָלָהּ}$  which implies that a sale had already taken place. (iii.) The comparison with Levit. xxv. according to which the right of redemption succeeded to the actual sale of the property, (ver. 29, 30). Naomi had not sold the land to Boaz, (for appearance) as REDSLOB, (*üb. d. Leviratsche*, p. 37), supposes, but to a third person. This plainly appears from ch. iv. 4, where Boaz says—If the *Goel* will not redeem it, *he* will, as the next after him. Compare also ver. 6.



None can be disposed to deny the reference of the Book of Ruth to the regulation in Lev. xxv. The expression in ver. 25, "And his *Goel* comes who is nigh to him," הַקְרִיב אֵלָיו, is alluded to in the expression of Boaz, "there is a kinsman nearer than I," וְיֵשׁ אֵילָן קְרִיב מִנִּי, ch. iii 12. According to the law, it was necessary to be not merely a גֹּאֵל but the *nearest* גֹּאֵל; compare ver. 49, where the various degrees of kindred are given. In ch. iv. 3, "And he said unto the *Goel*, Naomi *hath sold* a parcel of land which was *our brother* Elimelech's." אֶת־הַדָּבָר is used in allusion to the words of the law, "then shall he redeem that which *his brother* sold." Lev. xxv. 25.

The reference to Deut. xxv. has been more disputed. The following reasons have been alleged against it (compare among the older writers, CARPZOV on the Book of Ruth; among the moderns, REDSLOB, *die Leviratsehe*, Leipz. 1836.) (i.) According to Deut. xxv. 6, the first-born son of a Levirate marriage was to be regarded as the son of the deceased, and to bear his name. But here the first-born was not named Mahlon after the deceased, but Obed; also Obed was never reckoned to be Mahlon's son, but always the son of Boaz. The reason is completely disposed of by PERIZONIUS in his excellent dissertation, *Illustratur constitutio divina de ducenda defuncti fratris uxore*, the first of his *Dissertatt.* vii. Leiden 1740, whom BENARI, *De Leviratu*, has followed. He has shown what AUGUSTIN (*Quaest. ad Deut. h. l.*) had before perceived, that the maintenance of the name did not consist in the son's bearing the name of the deceased, but only in being "*ad ejus nomen referri ejusque censeri et dici filium;*" moreover, that the law of the relation to the natural father could not be altogether taken away, as among the Greeks the adopted sons were often called by the name of their natural father. (ii.) The technical term גֹּאֵל never occurs in the Book of Ruth. But this could not be used, because it only refers to the Levirate marriage strictly so called. (iii.) In reference to pulling off the shoe in ch. iv. 7, no appeal is made to the law, but it is only noticed as a custom. But this may be explained on the ground that here the Levirate marriage, in the strict sense, is not here spoken of, in connection with which the pulling off the shoe was legally prescribed.

On the other hand, in favour of the reference to Deut. xxv.,

the following reasons may be assigned. (i.) The analogy of the reference to Lev. xxv. makes it probable. There are besides some other references to the Pentateuch. Compare iv. 11, with Num. xxiv. 16; Deut. viii. 17, 18; iv. 12, with Gen. xxxviii. 29. (ii.) The actual relation of the *Goel* in the Book of Ruth to the *Jabam* of the law is undeniable. "*Uterque*," PERIZONIUS remarks, "*prolem defuncto generare ex ipso ejus uxore debuit. Utriusque rei eadem causa, ne deleatur nomen defuncti ex Isr. vel ex gentilibus ejus. Denique in utraque re, qui recusaret demortui uxorem ducere publice id testabatur exuendo calceo.*" (iii.) But equally undeniable and still more decided is the verbal reference to the law, which is fully equivalent to an express quotation. Only compare with Deut. xxv. 6, "And it shall be that the first-born which she beareth, shall succeed in the name of his brother which is dead, נָקִים עָלֶיֶם אָחִיו הַמֵּת"; Ruth iv. 6, "Ruth the Moabitess, the wife of Mahlon, have I purchased to be my wife, to raise up the name of the dead upon his inheritance, לִקְרֹם שָׁם-הַמֵּת עַל-יְהוּדָה. The name of the deceased, according to the law, could only be maintained by a son's being ascribed to him. This service of kindness Boaz was prepared to show; the *Goel* must either do what Boaz offered, or he must relinquish the right of redeeming the property which belonged to the nearest *Goel*. But the reference to Deut. xxv. 6 is still more express in Ruth iv. 10, "Moreover Ruth have I purchased to be my wife, to raise up the name of the dead upon his inheritance, that the name of the dead be not cut off from among his brethren, and from the gate of his place." According to Deut. xxv. 9, the transaction between the brother-in-law and sister-in-law was to take place, לִקְרֹם הַמֵּת; in Ruth iv. 2, it is said, "he took ten men of the elders of the city." In Deut. xxv. 9, it is said, "so shall it be done unto that man that will not build his brother's house;" with this compare Ruth iv. 11, "The Lord make the woman that is come into thine house, like Rachel, and like Leah, which two *did build the house* of Israel," as much as to say, "since thou, according to the injunction of the law, hast built thy brother's house, the Lord make," &c. (iv.) That Deuteronomy is more ancient than the Book of Ruth, appears from the circumstance that the author of the latter describes the symbolic action of taking off the shoe as one that had grown obsolete in his time, while in Deuteronomy it is spoken

of as in actual use, and requiring no explanation; compare BENARI, p. 28.

We must here examine REDSLOB'S view, according to which the Levirate marriage is to be deduced from the *Pflichte*, (*i. e.* the marriage obligatory on the next of kin who redeemed the inheritance), so that the dependence of *the obligatory marriage* on Deut. xxv. would cease. But besides the allusions in the Book of Ruth to Deut. xxv., which have already been pointed out, the following reasons may be urged against this view, (i.) That the extension of *the obligation to the nearest relatives* was solely in consequence of the Mosaic law, is rendered probable from our finding before the times of Moses only traces of the Levirate marriage. Tamar did not imagine that, besides Judah's sons, she had also a claim on their cousins. We must regard as arbitrary and unfounded such assertions as the following, (p. 6), "Long before Moses a custom existed in the land of Canaan that the widow of a person who died childless should claim marriage with his nearest relations, first of all with his brother;" and again, "the law implies *the obligatory marriage* in general as an established custom." (ii.) That *the obligatory marriage* arose out of the *Levirate*, and not inversely, appears from this, that only the latter has a peculiar name, the former must be satisfied with taken part in another. REDSLOB is evidently wrong in taking לָקַח without hesitation as the *terminus technicus* for the *obligatory marriage*. לָקַח to redeem must, according to its meaning, refer peculiarly and primarily to the inheritance, and can only be transferred to *the obligatory marriage*, because the onus of the latter rests upon the inheritance. That לָקַח in the Book of Ruth denotes primarily the redemption of the land, is plainly shown by the transaction in ch. iv. 3-4. Had there been no real estate, Ruth, in ch. iii. 9, could not have supported her request to Boaz with the words "for thou art GOEL," nor would לָקַח have been used as it is in v. 13.

That the prohibitions of the Pentateuch in reference to marriages with the Canaanites were in existence, appears from the second Appendix to the Book of Judges. The great perplexity into which the elders of the people were thrown when they were at a loss from what quarter to obtain wives for the Benjamites, after the children of Israel had sworn not to give them any of their daughters, could arise from no other source. It would have been only needful for

the Benjamites to take Canaanitish wives, but they never had a thought of such an expedient. If, moreover, in the period of the Judges, such marriages were not uncommon, judging from the facts relating to the Benjamites, it must have been an abuse, and is expressly noted as such in Judges iii. 6, ("And the children of Israel dwelt among the Canaanites, &c. . . and they took their daughters to be their wives, and gave their daughters to their sons, and served their gods.") VATKE'S assertion that the mixture and intermarrying of the Hebrews with the Canaanites was by no means considered as criminal and forbidden, is decidedly erroneous, if referred to the estimation in which such practices were held by the pious; and when he moreover maintains, that the Hebrews, by intermixing with the Canaanites, had become altogether a different people, he merely asserts, without reason or evidence, what suits his own favourite view. With much greater plausibility it might be inferred from Is. i. 21, that in the time of that prophet all the inhabitants of Jerusalem were murderers.

That to the close of the period of the Judges, there existed a strong disinclination on the part of the pious to connections, not merely with the Canaanites, but with heathen women in general, we see from the example of Samson's parents, who were not willing (ch. xiv. 3) that he should take a wife from the uncircumcised Philistines, but urged him to take a wife from his own people. Hence we also see that the separation between Israel and the heathen still continued to exist; that Israel was very far from being a mixed people, and that intermarriages with the heathen were not the rule, but the exception.

But it has been asked, if the strict prohibitions of the Pentateuch against marriages with strangers were in existence, how could it enter the thoughts of Samson the Nazarene to connect himself with a foreigner? how could his parents, although reluctantly, consent to such a union? how could the historian represent it as approved by the Lord?

It has been replied, that the prohibitions of the Pentateuch were directed merely against marriages with the Canaanitish women. But it is evident that they are only named as *species pro genere*, since the Israelites would be in the greatest proximity to the Canaanites; so that in forbidding connections with the Canaanitish women, connections with heathen women in general were forbid-

den. That this is the view taken in the Old Testament, appears from 1 Kings xi. 1, 2, where the passages relating to this subject in the Pentateuch are applied to Solomon, though his wives were not taken only from the Canaanites, but from the other surrounding nations. J. D. MICHAELIS (*Mos. Recht*, ii. § 100), is evidently mistaken in referring the words "of the nations concerning which the Lord said," &c., only to the Canaanites.

The following is the correct answer. Not marriages with the Canaanitish women and with the heathen in general, considered simply in themselves, were forbidden in the Pentateuch—but a particular kind of marriages, in which the persons with whom they became connected remained in other respects as they were before, on terms of exact parity—marriages such as those which the Shechemites proposed to Jacob's sons, Gen. xxxiv. 16, when Jacob's sons, accepting the proposal, say, "then we will give our daughters unto you, and we will take your daughters to us, and we will dwell with you, and we will become *one* people"—marriages in which those who were born heathens remained heathens.

That the prohibitions of the Pentateuch relate only to *mixed* marriages, such as those of Solomon, who allowed his wives to practise idolatry, may be at once inferred from an attentive consideration of these prohibitions. Such marriages only are expressly forbidden which resulted from making a covenant with the inhabitants of the land. In Exod. xxxiv. the prohibition, strictly speaking, is confined to ver. 15, "Lest thou make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land;" and what follows is merely an enumeration of the consequences that would ensue from the violation of the command. So in Deut. vii. 3, the words, "Neither shalt thou make marriages with them," &c., are preceded by the clause, "thou shalt make no covenant with them." And we are led to the same result by Deut. xxi. 10-14, which permits the Israelites to marry the heathen women that were taken captive in war. All depended on their being received into the national connection. That the prohibitions of the Pentateuch were always thus understood is shewn by the example of Rahab in the Book of Joshua, which breathes entirely the spirit of the Pentateuch.

But since those who were heathens by birth would probably retain some taint of heathenism, this prohibition of mixed marriages involved a dissuasive, which, being understood and received

into their hearts by the pious, created an aversion in their minds to such connections.

By these remarks everything is rendered clear. We cannot say that Samson *ipso facto* violated the Mosaic law. The essential point was the effect of the marriage on his own character, whether he was led by it into a civil and religious union with the Philistines. Of this his parents were apprehensive, and therefore were dissatisfied with the marriage, yet without decidedly opposing it, which would not have been justified by the law. But Samson was so far from loving his wife as a Philistine, that he rather sought for an opportunity of injuring the Philistines by means of this connection, and for this purpose it was favoured by the Lord.

That the right of inheritance in the time of the Judges was founded on the Pentateuch, we see from ch. xi. of the Book of Judges. Jephthah was the son of a harlot. "And Gilead's wife bare him sons, and his wife's sons grew up, and they thrust out, (אֲנָשֵׁי) Jephthah, and said unto him, Thou shalt not inherit in our father's house, for thou art the son of another woman." The allusion here is undeniably to Gen. xxi. 10, "And Sarah said to Abraham, cast out (אֲנָשֵׁי) this bondwoman and her son, for the son of this bondwoman shall not be heir with my son, with Isaac." The general term "another woman," is chosen in order to bring the mother of Jephthah into the same category with Hagar. As the son of a harlot, Jephthah would have still less right than "the son of a bondwoman." Yet the sons of Gilead choose the phrase "another woman," in order to justify the Subsumption.\* Those persons who do not perceive the allusion to the Pentateuch have been disposed to understand the words אֲנָשֵׁי אֲחֵרָה in part of a foreign woman; thus LE CLERC and even JOSEPHUS; but compare

---

\* "Subsumption." The sons of Gilead choose to say "another woman," in order to indicate the applicability of the passage in Gen. xxii. 10 to the mother of Jephthah, who was a harlot. The term "another woman" *subsumes*, (*i. e.* includes), both particulars, both bondwoman as in Genesis, and harlot as in Judges. If the sons of Gilead had repeated the word bondwoman, the reference to Genesis would not have been applicable to Jephthah's mother; therefore, departing from the letter of Genesis, they appeal to the *animus legis*, substituting the words "another woman" for "bondwoman." Thus they lay the foundation of a logical subsumption, or comprehension, or taking up together of the ideas "bondwoman" and "harlot," under the more general term under which both ideas are subordinated or subsumed as species under the genus. —[Tr.]

STUDER. We see from ver. 7 that Jephthah's banishment was not effected by the mere arbitrary conduct of his brethren, but by a judicial sentence. The law therefore was acknowledged *in foro*, and not only where it spoke decidedly, but also in merely analogical cases. It is said in ver. 7, "And Jephthah said unto the elders of Gilead, Did not ye hate me, and expel me out of my father's house?" These words are easily explained if we suppose an acquaintance with the contents of the Pentateuch. Besides the unfavourable analogy, there is a favourable one, that of Jacob, whose sons by his handmaids received their inheritance on equal terms with the rest, (see MICHAELIS, *Mos. Recht.*, ii. § 79) and the ground of Jephthah's complaint was, that the former was applied to his case.

The history proceeds on a threefold supposition, (i.) That there was no decisive law applicable to all cases on this subject; (ii.) that one ancient analogy was unfavourable; and (iii.) one other was favourable to those who were not born in lawful wedlock. All these three suppositions we find confirmed, if we regard the Pentateuch as the legal standard and source of information at that time.

#### ON THE STATE OF RELIGION AND MORALS IN THE TIME OF THE JUDGES.

It has been asserted that the state of morals and religion during the time of the Judges, even among the pious, who must be regarded as the representatives of Israelitish principles, was of a very imperfect and immature character, far below the standard of the Pentateuch. The exhibition of the theocracy existed then only in the germ, or as an abstract principle, and therefore in a form which scarcely deserved the name. These positions VATKE (p. 254) especially has attempted to establish, and with him DE WETTE agrees in the review before quoted, (p. 988.)

We, on the contrary, maintain, that, throughout the time of the Judges there was an *ἐκλογή*, whose subjective religion corresponds to the objective religion of the Pentateuch—that the general religious and moral state of the people, notwithstanding numerous melancholy appearances, presented much that was cheering—and that the exhibition of the theocracy in the time of the Judges,

among those in whom the better tendency predominated, was as fully developed as in the Pentateuch. The proofs that we offer for these assertions are the following :

I. The most complete delineation of the religious and civil state of this period is presented in the Book of Ruth ; though it must not be forgotten, that the events that are narrated in this book happened at a time when Israel had been purified in the furnace of affliction, and had been powerfully animated by the wonderful aid of the Lord,\* so that we have only the features of the better times in the period of the Judges ; yet we must also remember that *ex nihilo nihil fit*. If a good foundation had not still remained in degenerate times, both suffering and deliverance would have passed away without producing a deep effect. The impression which this delineation calls forth we cannot describe better than in the words of Roos : “ The little book of Ruth stands between the books which treat of wars and other matters, as a delicate and incomparable picture of honour, propriety, prudence, and rectitude, as exhibited in the domestic life of individuals. This lovely history includes a representation of all those virtues which are required in household and social life. It redounds to the eternal praise of the God of Israel, that, in the freedom which his people then enjoyed, there was such a prevalence of modesty, equity, kindness, and fairness. Who were Naomi, Boaz, and Ruth ? They were country people. How lovely is their simple eloquence ! how pleasing their kind-heartedness ! how delicate their manners ! what refined and intelligent persons ! ” In relation to the religious and theocratic position of that age, let any one compare ch. i. 15, 16, where the God of Israel is represented as unique in direct opposition to

---

\* The events of this book, in all probability, happened in the time soon after the deliverance from the Midianites. This appears from the coincidence of circumstances in the Book of Judges and those in the Book of Ruth. In both, there is a great famine, and in the Book of Ruth one which continued through several years, so that the Israelites felt obliged to move their residence entirely into a foreign land, to which therefore they could not have been induced by bad harvests, which must have affected the neighbouring land of Moab equally. Elimelech wandered on account of the famine from Bethlehem ; the ravages of the Midianites extended, according to Judges vi. 4, as far as Gaza ; therefore beyond the district in which Bethlehem was situated. After ten years, Naomi heard that the Lord had visited his people, and returned to her native land. The oppression of the Midianites lasted for seven years, and some years must necessarily have elapsed till the land could recover from its effects, and again present that flourishing state of cultivation in which Naomi found it on her return.



the gods of the neighbouring nations ; ch. ii. 4, where Boaz says to the reapers, " The Lord be with you," and they answer, " The Lord bless thee ; ver. 12, where Boaz says to Ruth, " The Lord recompense thy work," (in forgetting her parents and the land of her birth, and coming to a people of whom before she knew nothing), " and a full reward be given thee of the Lord God of Israel, under whose wings thou art come to trust ; ver. 20, where Naomi says to Ruth, in reference to Boaz, " Blessed be he of the Lord, who hath not left off his kindness to the living and to the dead," &c. Everywhere we meet with heartfelt piety, living devotion, the full and concrete theocratic sentiment. But Vatke here also remains faithful to his motto, *Philosophus nil curat*. In order to remove this stumbling-block out of the way, he attacks the credibility of the book. The idyllic colouring of its descriptions, he maintains, is in irreconcilable contradiction to the Book of Judges, and the preference must, without reservation, be given to the latter. We gratefully accept the open acknowledgment as irreconcilable with *his* representation of the religious state of the period of the Judges ; it may take upon itself the vindication against the attacks on its credibility in the opinion of all unprejudiced persons. Only come and see ! If ever a history was written which presents self-evidence of its credibility, it is this. What is to be thought of the alleged contradictions between this book and the book of Judges, may, in part, be gathered from the preceding observations. We have shown that the author of the Book of Judges does not profess to write a complete history, but only to notice particular portions ; moreover, that it was one main object to exhibit τὰ σκάνδαλα. Nothing can be more narrow and partial than to make a history of a nation's wars the standard of its collective religious and moral state, and to subject every thing to the pruning knife which will not agree with it. On the summit of the mountains, it often snows and freezes, while the vallies at their base enjoy the genial sunshine. From such a point of view, the four Gospels must be regarded as a series of pictures with an idyllic colouring, but destitute of all reality. Let any one read the *Jewish Wars* of JOSEPHUS ; quite a different image is presented to us. During such a period, it might seem, there was no room for a Simeon and a Hannah, for a John the Baptist, for the whole group of peaceful characters that meet us in the New Testament.

Let a person read a history of the Thirty Years' War with all its horrors, and he would hardly imagine that in the same age as TILLY, a PAUL GERHARD lived whose existence cannot be regarded as isolated, but is only conceivable as a member of a great company of kindred souls. What a difference exists between the altercations of the theologians of the seventeenth century and the hymns of that period, the most beautiful we possess. The same age which, according to one class of materials, appears the most mournful, according to another is the most glorious of the evangelical church. A full refutation of this argument against the credibility of the Book of Ruth will be given in the sequel. It will appear that the Book of Judges presents a succession of points of contact with it, so that in rejecting it, the essential constituents of the Book of Judges must be given up, as VATKE really admits that it is necessary, in order to carry out his views, to rescind certain religious elements in the Book of Judges as unhistorical.

II. The second principal source for ascertaining the religious condition of the period of the Judges, is the first chapters of the first Book of Samuel. A beautiful picture of Israelitish piety meets us here in Elkanah and Hannah. The song of the latter is a ripe fruit of the spirit of God. Eli appears in all his weakness, yet always as a proof that in the Israelitish devotion there was no deficiency of sincerity, depth, and fulness. Its most beautiful aspect is exhibited in Samuel. In relation to that blessed time in which the author of the Books of Samuel wrote, the extraordinary gifts of the Lord were indeed rare—the word of God, it is said in 1 Sam. iii. 2, was precious in those days. Prophecy was not extended, and since extraordinary gifts stand in close connection with ordinary ones, we must infer that the latter were also sparingly imparted, that amongst the mass there was much lukewarmness, that in some quarters a manifest apostacy had begun, and that the need of reformation was urgent. To this conclusion also we are led by the fact, that the people were at that time oppressed by the Philistines. From the effect we can draw our conclusions respecting the causes. Yet, that the extraordinary gifts of God were not entirely withdrawn, we learn not merely from Samuel's example, but from that of the man of God who came to Eli, in order to set before him his sins, and to announce the Divine judgments. And as to the ordinary gifts,

the custom of the Nazirate leads us to believe that a considerable *ἐκλογὴ* existed, and that the spirit of piety was by no means extinct, especially since an institution like that of the Nazirate was closely connected with the general state of religion, and could only be practised when more or less supported by it. VATKE here satisfies himself with attempting to set aside what in this chapter contradicts his representation of the period of the Judges most palpably—the prayer of Hannah—without considering, that as long as the circumstances remained the same to which such a prayer was so admirably fitted (for a person such as Hannah is described must have prayed in that manner), very little is to be gained. But of this he takes no account. “Hannah’s prayer,” he remarks (p. 287), “anticipates a later state of things, and is therefore unhistorical.” This objection is evidently founded on 1 Sam. ii. 10.

“The Lord shall judge the ends of the earth,  
And he shall give strength unto his king,  
And exalt the horn of his anointed.”

But this verse contains nothing which could not have been spoken by Hannah. She considered herself, as the authors of the Psalms usually did, as the representative of the suffering and oppressed. What fell to her lot was not something isolated, but an efflux of the idea, and hence a practical prophecy in reference to all who were in similar circumstances, and to the destinies of the whole nation. She saw them in herself; and their enemies in her own. She knew, from the traditions of a former age, that the nation was destined to a kingly government, to the realisation of which, as the events under Samuel show, it was impatiently tending towards the end of the period of the Judges. She had a presentiment that this change would soon be effected—that the people in and with the kingdom that would be established—the king and anointed one is an ideal person—would attain to an elevation, of which her elevation was a type.

III. Before we turn our attention to the Book of Judges in general, *the song of Deborah* in Judges v. is an object worthy of separate consideration. The genuineness of this song has been very decidedly vindicated by EWALD (*Hohesl.* p. 18), HOLLMANN (*Cantic. Deborahae*, p. 6), and STUDER (p. 112), and, after some passing attacks, is now acknowledged by the boldest critics,

even by VATKE. Hence that view of the religious state of the period of the Judges which cannot be brought into unison with the contents of this Song must be abandoned. Here the first thing that strikes us is that the theocratical point of view from which the author of the Book of Judges contemplates the history of this period, is not one arbitrarily selected and imposed by himself, belonging rather to later times, but the same from which those who lived in the midst of that time looked on the passing events. The Song breathes the most animated and enlarged theocraticism. The authoress begins with the covenant which the Lord had made with Israel; she then depicts the mournful condition of anarchy which ensued from the violation of the covenant by the worship of strange gods, and concludes with the deliverance which, by God's grace, had been in part accomplished for the people. Moreover, those persons who admit the genuineness of the Song, and yet maintain that the propensity of the Israelites to idolatry in the period of the Judges is not to be considered in accordance with the author of the Book of Judges, (who decides from his own later point of view,) as apostasy from acknowledged truth, a falling back into the ancient evil practices, but to be explained by the later separation of the religion of Jehovah from natural religion, are chargeable with a gross inconsequence. We here find the most direct opposition between Jehovah and the strange gods; the service of the latter is regarded as a criminal departure from plainly revealed and distinctly acknowledged truths. But more than this, the Song contains undeniable references to the Pentateuch, and shows likewise that the theocratic sentiments of the heroic personages in the period of the Judges were developed and sustained by it. The whole composition is evidently a counterpart to the song of the Israelites after the passage through the Red Sea. Verse 8 alludes to Deut. xxxii. 17; v. 16 to Gen. xlix. 14; v. 17 to Gen. xlix. 13. But these slighter allusions, which may be disputed, obtain their true meaning when taken in connection with the unquestionable references that are contained in ver. 4 and 5.

“JEHOVAH, when thou wentest out of Seir,  
 When thou marchest out of the field of Edom,  
 The earth trembled, and the heavens dropped;  
 The clouds also dropped water.  
 The mountains melted from before JEHOVAH,  
 Even that Sinai from before JEHOVAH, God of Israel.”

In this introduction of the Song, there is a double reference to the Pentateuch, first, to the Blessing of Moses in Deut. xxxiii. 2,

JEHOVAH came from Sinai,  
And rose up from Seir unto them ;  
He shined forth from Mount Paran ;

and then, to the account of the appearances at the giving of the Law, Exod. xix. 16—"And it came to pass on the third day in the morning, that there were thunders and lightnings, and a thick cloud upon the mount, and the voice of the trumpet exceeding loud ; so that all the people that were in the camp trembled," &c. That a reference to the first passage is intended, may be supported on the following grounds. (i.) If this reference be admitted, the sense is at once clear. From the primary passage light is shed upon the secondary. "And he was king in Jeshurun," is the leading idea of Deut. xxxiii. 2-5. The allusion to the Covenant, from which all blessings flowed, forms a preliminary to the blessings on the Tribes. The author represents Jehovah as coming to them from the land which he would give them for an inheritance. He comes to them, to ratify the Covenant, from the place whither he designed to lead them, and bring them to himself—from the land which, ever since the times of the Patriarchs, was sacred to Him, in which Bethel was situated. He takes his way over the highest mountains ; since God walks over the high places of the earth. He comes, first of all, from Sinai, and then from Seir and Paran. "*Sinai*" is placed at the head, because it was the place of God's public manifestation (the others were only points of transition) ; and, likewise, by way of contrast between the earthly places of departure and the heavenly. The clause, "*he rose from Sinai,*" and this, "*he came with ten thousands of saints,*" stand in close relation to one another. *Seir*, the mountain-range which lies on the southern border of Palestine, is named before *Paran*, the range between *Seir* and *Sinai*, because the author, after placing *Sinai* first, for the reason above-mentioned, returns to the geographical order, *Seir, Paran, Sinai*. After these explanations of the primary passage, we shall find no difficulty in Judges v. 4, 5. Affliction proceeded from the Covenant ; from the Covenant proceeded also salvation ; compare v. 11. On this foundation the authoress begins her Song, as Moses be-

gan his, to which it corresponds. She also brings the Lord out of Canaan to his people for the ratification of his Covenant. How indispensable the comparison with the primary passage is, appears from the fact, that those expositors who have neglected it are at a loss for the meaning. HOLLMANN and STUDER would refer the words to the presence of Jehovah, as the pledge of victory in the late conflict; heaven and earth, dropping clouds, and quaking mountains, announced the coming of their almighty Ruler, as he hastened from Sinai, his dwelling-place, over Edom, to the help of his people. But, on the other hand, (1.) It is not said that Jehovah came from Sinai. Sinai indeed was rather the spot where the mountains melted before Jehovah, the God of Israel. That Jehovah, as the Covenant-God of Israel, had his abode on Mount Sinai, never appears elsewhere. (2.) The representation that God came to his people out of Canaan, is so peculiar, that we cannot imagine one passage to be entirely independent of the other. (3.) The double reference to the Pentateuch (both to Deuteronomy and Exodus) forbids the supposition that the author of Deuteronomy had drawn his materials from the Song of Deborah. (4.) The dependance on Deuteronomy is also confirmed by the analogy of the parallel passage in Habakkuk iii. 3, which is likewise dependant on Deuteronomy.

“ God will come from Teman,  
And the Holy One from Mount Paran.”

The future יְבִיא stands here in manifest relation to the preterite יָבִיא and יָבִיאוּ of the Pentateuch. And previously in v. 2,

“ O Lord, I have heard thy speech, and was afraid :  
O Lord, revive thy work in the midst of the years ;  
In wrath remember mercy.”

A *decurtata comparatio* is implied. “ *Ut olim,*” says MICHAELIS, “ *Israelitis a Temane in occursum venit filius dei ad occupandam terram Canaan, sic iterum veniet ad haereditate occupandum mundum.*” Habakkuk’s expression can neither be the primary passage nor independent. The thought, as he presents it, is absolutely unintelligible, if not illustrated by the Pentateuch. To this we may add the numerous analogies of various references to the Pentateuch in Habakkuk; for example, ch. i. 3 and 13, compared with Num. xxiii. 31; ch. ii. 4, and Gen. xv. 6; ch. iii. 9,

and Exod. xvii. 6, Num. xx. 11 ; ch. iii. 19, and Deut. xxxii. 13, xxxiii. 29. If we compare the two passages, Judg. v. 4 and 5, and Hab. iii. 3, we find the three localities of the primary passage, of which Seir and Teman are common to both ; Paran is peculiar to Habakkuk, and Sinai to Deborah.

IV. We would now bring into one view every thing of importance in the Book of Judges (the Song of Deborah excepted) that bears a relation to our object, and would take the events in their chronological sequence. That the author of the Book of Judges always proceeds on the supposition that every thing which, in the times of the Judges, contradicted the pure and exclusive worship of JEHOVAH, was to be regarded as *Apostacy* and *Degeneracy*, and not, as VATKE imagines, *imperfect Development*, is clear as day. According to him, a more perfect state preceded the imperfect. (Comp. ch. ii. 7)—“ And the people served JEHOVAH all the days of Joshua, and all the days of the Elders that outlived Joshua, who had seen all the great works of the Lord ;” the children of Israel “ *forgot* JEHOVAH their God.” Judg. iii. 7, they *forsook* JEHOVAH the God of their Fathers. For the correctness of this view, those appearances testify which meet us, as it were, at the threshold of the times of the Judges,—a testimony which is so much the more important, since, according to VATKE’S view, it is precisely “ in the earlier times of the period, when there was a conflict of all the elements of religious knowledge” (p. 255), that the most direct opposition was to be expected to the religious and moral contents of the Pentateuch. In the time soon after Joshua’s death, the two events happened which are narrated in the Appendix to the Book of Judges. This date cannot be doubtful, since, according to ch. xx. 27, Phinehas, the contemporary of Joshua, was still high-priest ; and, indeed, it is generally allowed to be correct. The first event, that relating to Micah’s image, is peculiarly worthy of notice, since it indicates a state of transition between the pure worship of JEHOVAH, as it existed in the time of Joshua, and under Moses, and the idolatry to which that portion of the people who were in heart apostates surrendered themselves during the period of the Judges. We have not here to do with the *ἐκλογῆ*, but with those who represented the evil tendency. And yet in all these persons, Micah and his mother, the Levites, the Danites, we find JEHOVAH, and only JEHOVAH, and no trace

hitherto of idolatry. Had this been generally prevalent in Israel, the people, in such a state of mind, would have given themselves up to it, and not have been satisfied with a foolish imitation of the public worship of Jehovah. This shows very plainly that VATKE has inverted the natural order of things.

The second event, the war of extermination against the Benjamites, occasioned by the atrocious act of the inhabitants of Gibeah, shows us that in the times immediately succeeding Joshua, the people were imbued with a strong sense of moral and religious obligation and theocratic zeal. That the sensual propensities which, at a later period, Israel indulged to their ruin, were then in action, is proved by the instance of a whole city, which was sunk as low in vice as Sodom; and by the conduct of the Benjamites, whose aversion from sin was so weak, that it was overpowered by the feeling of wounded honour and of anger, which roused the whole nation to take arms against them, in a presumed private concern of their tribe. Yes, in the main body of the people, this aversion was vivid to an extraordinary degree. They feared lest they should call down God's judgments upon them if the crime went unpunished. They had the moral energy to amputate the diseased limb of the body politic. The soundness of the general organism so far preponderated, that it had strength to overpower and throw off the morbid elements. That before entering on the undertaking, counsel was asked of the Lord (Judg. xx. 18), shows the vigour of the theocratic principle, and how very far JEHOVAH was from being a mere abstraction. When the Deity is regarded as an abstraction, men act towards Him as if He were a nonentity. It is also a proof that their piety was not superficial; that their ill success, instead of driving them from God, led them to Him; that they sought for its cause in themselves, and endeavoured to remove it by unfeigned repentance. When God is treated as an abstraction, no such sense of the sanctity of an oath is felt as meets us here. These facts are so much the more important, since the credibility of the sources from which they are taken must force conviction on the most prejudiced minds. Thus GRAMBERG remarks (i. p. 20), "Scarcely any historical narration of the Old Testament, contemporary with its subject, can be preferred to it for genuine truth and distinctness." Compare p. 178.

Ch. iv. furnishes some important results. Deborah was a pro-



phetess, and, as such, judged Israel ; the children of Israel came to her for judgment. This implies, that even in that degenerate age the theocratic sentiment was not dead. But Deborah's conference with Barak is peculiarly worthy of attention. She called upon him in the name of *JEHOVAH*, the God of Israel, to come to their rescue. Barak answered (ver. 8), " If thou wilt go with me, then I will go ; but if thou wilt not go with me, then I will not go." Deborah rejoined, " I will surely go with thee : notwithstanding the journey that thou takest shall not be for thine honour ; for the Lord shall sell Sisera into the hand of a woman." This conversation is commonly misunderstood, as if Barak here disclosed his pusillanimity, and Deborah taunted him on account of it. *STUDER* does not hesitate to call Barak the representative of that faint-heartedness which at this time had seized the Hebrews. The *LXX.* have taken the correct point of view. To the words contained in the original text, they have made the following addition : *ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα τὴν ἡμέραν, ἐν ἣ εὐδοοῖ κύριος τὸν ἄγγελον μετ' ἐμοῦ.* Barak knew (and this is an evidence of the vigour and depth of his theocratic sentiment) that nothing was accomplished in the battles of the Lord's people by mere human power and courage ; he knew that for their success the higher consecration and calling were necessary. This he perceived existed in a higher degree in the prophetess Deborah than in himself ; hence it was humility (a feature in his character which shows with what little reason the Book of Judges has been treated as a history of heroes in the ordinary sense), and by no means defect of courage, which prompted him to urge her to accompany him. Her answer conveys no reproach. She only suggested to him not to think more highly of himself after the victory than before it ; not to ascribe to himself what would be the achievement of a woman, and therefore of God, and thus directed his attention to the reason why God compelled him, a man of might, to depend on a weak female. It was in order to impress the people powerfully with the sentiment *ποῦ οὐν ἡ καύχησις ; ἐξεκλείσθη*, Rom. iii. 27. To grant succour through a woman was calculated to raise heavenwards the thoughts of men, which are so prone to cleave to the earth. If the honour was due to God alone, they would be more disposed to show their gratitude by sincere conversion. That Barak was obliged to lean on Deborah, depended on the same

law by which Gideon was chosen to be the deliverer of Israel from the Midianites, though his family was the meanest in Manasseh, and himself the youngest in his father's house ; that law by which Gideon was divinely directed to take only 300 men for the whole assembled host ; the women Deborah and Jael stand in the same category with the ox-goad of Shamgar. In all ages God is pleased to choose for his service the inconsiderable and the despised. Where this truth is as clearly and deeply acknowledged as in the case of Deborah, there must be some thing more than a mere abstract theocratic sentiment, which adheres to the maxim *ex nihilo nihil fit*.

We would now direct the attention of our readers to a single particular in Gideon's history—the answer which he gave to the people when they wished to make him king. VATKE (p. 262) feels himself obliged “to regard this speech of Gideon as unhistorical, and to reject all the inferences which may be drawn from it.” The reasoning by which he attempts to justify this arbitrary procedure loses all its force as soon as it is recollected that Gideon did not decline royalty *in abstracto*, when he declared that the kingly dignity encroached on the prerogative of the Lord, who alone was king in Israel, but a *concrete* royalty in the sense in which it was offered him by the people. That in this sense, royalty was not a form of realizing the sovereignty of God in Israel, but the direct opposite, he felt deeply. The people, since they ascribed the victory over Midian not to God, but to Gideon, believed that by choosing him for a king, they might in future overpower their enemies without the Divine assistance. Gideon's heart must have revolted from the proposal ; so much the more since he was assured that God, if so important a change had been agreeable to his will, would have given a distinct intimation, which, on this occasion, was wanting. Had his religion been a mere abstraction, he would have eagerly closed with the offer. (Compare besides, the examination of Samuel's opposition to the introduction of the regal form of government in connection with the laws relating to kings in the Pentateuch, in the section on “*Anachronisms*.”)

In Samson, also, there was a higher element—a fund of powerful and living faith that was every where apparent, and was to be seen even in his falls. But it is needful to distinguish between

the first and the second Samson—the servant of the Lord, and the slave of sin. What the first Samson performed was, on the whole, not unworthy of a servant of a Lord, if we do not measure it by an erroneous spiritual standard, and compare him with Samuel, who received a very different call from God, or attempt a parallel between him and Luther, who, of all the reformers, seems most allied to him in mental qualities, or with Calvin; he is rather to be compared with Gustavus Adolphus, or with one of the Christian princes in the Crusades.

After having thus stated the positive grounds of our views respecting the period of the Judges, we must now examine the arguments that have been urged on the opposite side.

VATKE maintains, that in the period of the Judges, the necessary foundations were wanting of a developed theocratic sentiment. The people did not constitute one religious society; each individual tribe formed a separate whole.

If this position, to the extent in which it is laid down, were correct, then certainly the conclusion that has been drawn from it must be acknowledged to be well-founded. The theocracy necessarily supposes one order of religious sentiment to prevail throughout Israel; and where such an uniformity exists, it must, in some way or other, be outwardly represented.

But we can prove that at no time was the political unity altogether wanting during the period of the Judges. The narrative of the war against the Benjamites is here of peculiar importance. It shows that in the times immediately succeeding Joshua, the national unity was still preserved. The Levite divided the body of his concubine into twelve pieces, and sent them “into all the coasts of Israel,” ch. xix. 29, a proceeding which would be unaccountable unless a national unity existed. The people came forward with great energy as a whole. It is said in ch. xx. 1, “Then all the children of Israel went out, and *the congregation* was gathered together, *as one man*.” The assembly had nothing of a tumultuous character, but was perfectly regular, and we must therefore assume that they were summoned by theocratic authority. On this point SCHMID remarks: *Quis convocaverit non dicitur; neque quod sponte convenerit populus credibile est. Certe Levita licet causam comitionum agendorum omnibus tribus subministraverit, potestatem tamen convocandi non ha-*

*buit, cum itaque v. 2, angulorum populi h. e. principum populi tanquam qui proposuerint rem deliberandam et examinandam, fiat mentio procul dubio etiam iidem fuerunt qui populum convocarunt.* In ch. xxi. 16, the Elders of the  $\text{זִקְנֵי}$  are expressly mentioned, and we see that they resolved and acted with full authority respecting the national affairs. It also appears from v. 22, that the  $\text{זִקְנֵי}$  were the highest judicial authorities. This chapter, according to which the Elders alone brought the transaction respecting the wives for the Benjamites to a conclusion, shows that a general convocation of the people took place only on very extraordinary occasions, and that the authorities attended to general affairs. Such a general assembly of all the children of Israel we find also at Bochim. In later times, the political ties which bound all the tribes together appear to have become relaxed. This disunion was at once the necessary consequence, and the punishment of their departure from the *centrum unitatis*, the Lord. Yet it was acknowledged by the more pious part, that this state was irregular; compare Judg. v. 13, where the duty of all the tribes to fight against their heathen oppressors is acknowledged; and through the whole Song, Israel is regarded as one whole. And as the separation was irregular, the unity was always reasserting its claims. The dissatisfaction of the Ephraimites in ch. xii. shows that a separate war, like that of Jephthah's, was unusual. They regarded it as an insult, that they should not be called to assist; (the southern tribes had enough to do with the Philistines.) All the daughters of Israel, according to Judg. xi. 40, praised the daughter of Jephthah the Gileadite. After the close of the Ammonitish oppression, the war against the Philistines was carried on by all Israel, 1 Sam. iv. 1. All the Elders of Israel came together to Samuel, in order to obtain from him the appointment of a king, 1 Sam. viii. 4.

But the religious unity was much stronger than the political. We have shown, that through the whole period of the Judges, one sanctuary, the Mosaic Tabernacle, was the religious centre of the whole nation; that there, at the great feasts, the whole nation assembled. In a religious respect, Israel always remained a congregation (*eine Gemeinde*), although in a political sense it had more or less ceased to be such. Eli said to his sons, "Ye make the Lord's people to transgress;" 1 Sam. ii. 24. Besides the

priests, the prophets also contributed to maintain the religious unity. Compare 1 Sam. iii. 20, "And all Israel knew, from Dan even to Beersheba, that Samuel was established to be a prophet of the Lord." In the addresses of the prophets in the Book of Judges, Israel always appear as one man. Judges vi. 8.

A second main support for the assertion that the period of the Judges was an age of religious rudeness, is sought for in the history of Jephthah. We wish to close this dissertation with a full examination of this important point.

Two very different views are held respecting Jephthah's vow and his daughter's fate.\* According to one, Jephthah slew his

---

\* Besides these, there is a third which was first proposed by CAPPELLUS, then revived by DATHE (in GLASSIUS, p. 599, and in his notes on the passage), and lastly followed by HÄVERNICK (*Eint. in's A. Test.* 1. 2. Erlangen 1837, p. 562.) But this is not of equal value with the others, and may be disposed of in a note. It is evidently a product of the perplexity in which the vindicators of the originality of the Mosaic legislation were involved, who did not succeed in extricating themselves entirely and thoroughly from the first view. From the detestation with which the Law expresses itself against human sacrifices, it was difficult to imagine how a servant of Jehovah could present a human sacrifice with a clear conscience, without surmising that he was doing anything wrong, and without having his attention drawn to it by the appointed guardians of the law, during the two months that elapsed between his vow and its completion. The removal of this perplexity was attempted by a modification of the first view. Jephthah's vow, it was maintained, is to be understood with a restriction arising from the nature of the case. If he was met by an animal which, according to the law, was fit for sacrifice, then he would present it as a burnt-offering; but if this was not the case, if he was met by an animal legally unclean, or by a human being, then, instead of being sacrificed, the animal or person, in agreement with the Mosaic law respecting the *חַיִּים*, would be put to death. But this interpretation is to be rejected for two reasons. 1. It rests on a mistranslation equally untenable; "*what* cometh to meet me," instead of, "*who* cometh to me." If Jephthah thought from the first only of human beings, the supposed restriction falls to the ground at once. He could then only fulfil his vow by the actual presentation of the person as a burnt-offering. 2. It has an erroneous notion of the *חַיִּים* at its basis. If this were the proper idea of the *Cherem*, were every one at liberty to put to death his innocent children, without hesitation, for the honour of God, then the prescriptions on the subject of human sacrifices would be simply irreconcilable with the authority of Moses as a divine messenger. Human sacrifices might as well have been expressly sanctioned. The correct idea of the *Cherem* has been explained in an Essay on the right of the Israelites to Palestine in the *Ev. K. Z.* 1833, January and February, and in my *Christologie*, iii. 453—"The idea of the *Cherem* (*Verbannung*) is always that of a forced consecration of those persons to God who had obstinately refused to dedicate themselves to him—the manifestation of the Divine glory in the destruction of those who, during their life-time, would not serve as a mirror to reflect it, and therefore refused to realise the proper destiny of man, the great End of Creation. God sanctifies himself in his treatment of those by whom he is not sanctified." Thus on all accounts it appears that here there can be no reference to the *Cherem*, that no Israelite could think of ap-

daughter and presented her as a sacrifice; according to the other he devoted her to the service of the sanctuary.

The first interpretation is founded on the ancient translations (LXX. CHALD. VULG.), for only from this quarter can it have been suggested to substitute “*to lament*” for “*to praise*” in ver. 40. It is found in Josephus and the other ancient Jewish writers. No other explanation was known to the fathers; the exact references may be found in DRESDE, *Votum Jephth.* Leipz. 1767, particularly in p. 18, which furnishes valuable contributions to the history of the interpretation. At a later period, it is worthy of notice, during the first revival of correct grammatical and historical interpretation, the other (clogged, indeed, with much that was open to correction), came forth in opposition (it was first proposed by MOSES KIMCHI), and found means to maintain its ground, though oftentimes only within very confined limits.

That it had so tenacious a life, depended at first from a very important defect, with which its opponent had been hitherto burdened. The advocates of the second interpretation commonly explain Jephthah’s vow *thus*:—That which cometh forth, whatever shall come out of the doors of my house, meeting me, if I return in peace, shall be the Lord’s, and I will present it as a burnt-offering. Jephthah must have hoped that an animal would first meet him. Against this interpretation a multitude of difficulties arise. (i.) Jephthah vowed whatever should first meet him coming out of the doors of his house. If he meant any animal belonging to his herds, then the house of the Gileadite chieftain must have been a kind of Noah’s Ark—cattle and men in one room, going out and

---

plying the Mosaic directions respecting it to the case before us. 1. The *Cherem* necessarily supposes in its objects impiety, decided enmity against God, moral corruption; Jephthah’s daughter was a virtuous, pious young woman. 2. The fundamental idea of *Cherem* is that of forced, in opposition to voluntary consecration: a *free-will* offering and *Cherem* exclude one another. Jephthah’s daughter submitted to her lot with free consent. 3. *Sacrifice* and *Cherem* are in direct opposition. The vow of a *sacrifice* could never be fulfilled by the presentation of a *Cherem*. This would only happen if the difference was merely formal. 4. The *Cherem*, according to its idea, was a Divine prerogative, and appears as such everywhere, both in the Law and the History. Men are only instruments in performing it, to fulfil the mandates of the Divine will. The *Cherem* was never any thing devoted arbitrarily by man, or without express Divine direction. Otherwise every murderer might shelter himself under the injunctions respecting it.

in at the same door, stall-fed alike—a thing surely not to be seriously thought of. Every thing that we know of the arrangements in building their houses among the Hebrews is against it. See JAHN, *Archæol.* vol. i. 195.) (ii.) *The going out to meet him* is an expression not suitable in speaking of animals, but only of human beings; and what shews it still more to be so, is the language used respecting Jephthah's daughter, v. 34, “and behold his daughter came forth to meet him,” וַיֵּצֵא בָתּוּלָהּ לִקְרָאתוֹ (iii.) The vow to offer a single animal is far too insignificant for so signal a victory. PFEIFFER justly remarks (*Dub. vœx.* p. 356.) that the utterance of such a vow as—“O God, only grant me the victory, and I will sacrifice to thee the first calf that meets me on my return,” would forcibly remind any one of the

“Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.”

especially since Jephthah, without a vow, would have offered, not a solitary victim, but many sacrifices. (iv.) Jephthah's vow evidently stands in relation to an established Israelitish custom, according to which the women, and virgins particularly, received the victors on their return with singing, music, and dancing, Exod. xv. 20. The existence of this custom is proved, not only by the conduct of Jephthah's daughter, but from 1 Sam. xviii. 6, “And it came to pass as they came, when David was returned from the slaughter of the Philistines, that the women *came out* of all the cities of Israel, singing and dancing, *to meet* King Saul (exactly a similar phrase וַיֵּצֵא לִקְרָאתוֹ,) with tabrets and with joy, and with three-stringed instruments.” (v.) According to this interpretation, we cannot see how Jephthah adopted a vow of such a form. It seems perfectly arbitrary that he should resolve to offer the first object that met him. Why did he not vow, without any ambiguity of language, to offer the best of his herds? The outward circumstance must have had an inward foundation, and this would not be, unless וַיֵּצֵא be taken in a personal sense. “The disciple that Jesus loved” ran hastily before the other, and came first to the sepulchre, John xx. 4. Thus Jephthah attached an importance to the first that came out to meet him, since it was an expression of love, and since love is reciprocal, he declared himself ready to offer up what he loved most to the Lord.

We must, therefore, even though we decide against explaining the passage of Jephthah's devoting his daughter to death, understand  $\text{אִם־יֵצֵא}$  personally, "whoever cometh forth," &c., and admit that Jephthah thought of his daughter; and, indeed, that he considered it most probable that she who loved him most tenderly would be the first to meet him—herein lay the greatness of the vow—but he also indulged a hope, that perhaps God, satisfied with the offer of what it would cost him most to surrender, would not require the surrender, but so order circumstances as that the improbable might come to pass, and that not herself, but one of his favourite slaves might meet him. According to this necessary improvement of the second, the two declarations are to be taken differently in the words, "It shall surely be the Lord's, and I will offer it up for a burnt-offering." The first is to be taken quite literally, the second figuratively, by applying the maxim, *talia sunt praedicata, qualia permittuntur a suis subjectis*. The meaning is—I present him (or her) as a sacrifice, by such a kind of consecration to God in the case of persons as corresponds to sacrifices in the offering of animals, which in the Scriptures forms a regular contrast to the *Shelamim*, often also merely an offering in which, besides the Lord, the offerers also had a share. The words, "he shall be the Lord's, and I will offer him as a whole burnt-offering," are related to one another as genus and species; he was to be devoted to the Lord, and that wholly and exclusively: compare Hannah's vow, 1 Sam. i. 11, "then I will give him unto the Lord all the days of his life, and there shall no razor come upon his head," that is, he shall belong to the Lord, even as a Nazarite.

Besides the defect which till now has been left unsupplied, the figurative interpretation is still clogged with another, which must be removed before it can obtain our approval. Its ancient advocates have not rightly understood how to place the fact, which, according to it, is stated in this passage, in connection with Israelitish antiquity: the total and unreserved consecration of a person to the Lord, with a dissolution of all natural ties, appears as something perfectly irregular, which could never be brought into harmony or alliance with the other parts of the social system. As long as this is the case, the suspicion must be on this interpretation, that it is a kind of artificial refinement, by which a faulty subjectivity attempts to get rid of whatever in Holy Writ does



not suit its prejudices. We must therefore first of all endeavour to make good the ground and foundation of this interpretation, by showing that addiction to a monastic life was not unknown under the Old Covenant, that it was especially a custom for women to dedicate themselves, or to be dedicated, to the Lord.

That even in the times of Moses it was not unusual for persons to dedicate themselves or their relations to the Lord by a vow, we see from Lev. xxvii. 1-8. In this regulation there is indeed a certain price of redemption specified, by which the individual might be freed from the personal fulfilment of the vow; but it was in the nature of the thing, that many, in their pious zeal, would renounce their right to this privilege when they made their vow.

The Nazaritic Institution, of which the leading idea is, that the Nazarite must consider himself as dead to the world, and belonging to God alone, claims our notice here, because, according to the express statement in Numbers vi. 2, females might undertake this vow. In the law relating to it, it is true, only a limited time is mentioned, but for the simple reason that in the Mosaic age (the law was enacted, not for the purpose of calling the custom into existence, but only to regulate it as already existing) this vow was practised within very confined limits. There is not a syllable to forbid its wider extension, and that this would follow, lay in the nature of the institute. If a way be once consecrated, and distinguished as meritorious, pious zeal will pursue it without stopping to its utmost limit. That this natural development really ensued, we see in the instances of Samuel and Samson, who were Nazarites from the womb to the end of their lives. That a monastic element also existed among the prophetic order has been already pointed out in vol. i.

A passage in Exod. xxxviii. 8, is very pertinent to the present subject. "And he made the laver of brass, and the foot of it of brass, of the mirrors of the ministering women, who ministered at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation."\* This passing

---

\* BÄHR translates this somewhat differently. (*Symbolik des Mosaischen Cultus*, i. 486.) "He made the laver of brass, and its foot of brass, *with* the mirrors of the women, &c." According to him the mirrors were not the material of the laver, but were fastened as they were to the laver when finished. But this translation is not al-

notice is of great importance.\* That the institute here noticed was not one that came to an end with the Mosaic period, as it might be supposed would happen, since it was never prescribed or recommended by a law, but was left entirely to the free choice of individuals, if they wished to consecrate themselves or theirs to the Lord in this manner, but that it continued through the whole period of the Judges, we see from 1 Sam. ii. 22, a passage which relates to the same period within which Jephthah's vow falls. Among the grievous outrages of Eli's sons, it is here mentioned that they lay with the women who ministered at the door of the Tabernacle. The language is taken literally from Exod. xxxviii. 8, in order to point out that the institute which they thus profaned was one venerable for its antiquity, and that existed under the very eyes of the Lawgiver.

As to the duty and calling of these women, it is in both places called *ministering before the door of the Tabernacle*. The Hebrew term  $\text{עָבְדוּ}$  means *to serve* in a military sense; in a figura-

---

lowable on lingual grounds. In the original it is  $\text{עָבְדוּ}$  and  $\text{עָבְדוּ}$  can never mean *with*, in the sense of *along with*; on the other hand, the passages in which  $\text{עָבְדוּ}$  refers to the material of which any thing is made are very numerous. Compare 1 Kings vii. 14, "all works *in brass*"  $\text{עָבְדוּ}$  (EWALD'S *gr. Gr.* 606. *kl. Gr.* § 528.) Bähr's objections against our translation are easily answered. He thinks it doubtful whether brazen mirrors were in general use, and that they were in general of polished steel; but in the whole Old Testament we have no certain mention of steel. See BECKMANN'S *Gesch. der Erfindungen*, vol. i. 78. He remarks, that the mirrors, in case they formed the material of the laver, must have been melted, and that it could not be seen whether the vessels were made of common brass or of the mirrors of the women. But it was not necessary that this should be perceptible to the bodily eye; that the remembrance of it was retained by oral and written tradition would be sufficient. The golden calf did not show that it was made of the ear-rings of the wives, the sons, and the daughters of the Israelites, Exod. xxxii. 2, nor Gideon's ephod that it was made of the golden rings of the Ishmaelites, Judges viii. 24, the vessel of the Scythians that it was made out of darts, and the Crater of Apollo, from the ornaments of the Roman women. See Bähr, p. 495. Lastly, the objection that an immense number of mirrors would be necessary for the laver, is, apart from our not knowing either the number of the women or the size of the laver, not weighty, since it need not be admitted that the mirrors were the only materials. However, it was certainly not mere accident that mirrors were used for the laver. The washing of the priests in the laver had a symbolical meaning. (v. Bähr, p. 492.) What hitherto had served as an instrument for gaining approbation in the world, would now be a means of gaining the approbation of God.

\* It is to be taken in connection with Lev. xxvii. 4. The women who, according to that passage, were dedicated to the Lord and not redeemed, were reckoned in the number of those who served the Lord at the door of the Tabernacle.

tive sense it is used of the *militia sacra* of the Priests and Levites; compare Num. iv. 23, 35, 39, 43, viii. 25. The leader and captain of the host was the God of Israel. By the side of this sacred militia, a female band is placed; and the choice of the expressions shows that we have here to do with an extensive, important, formally organized institution. That the women had *outward* offices to perform at the Tabernacle is not expressly said, only by an misplaced reference to the German use of the term *service* or *ministry* (*Dienen*) has this been inferred, and is very doubtful. Neither the Law nor the History recognise any service of females at the sanctuary in this sense. That in ancient times the Jews interpreted the language of no such ministrations, but rather understood it to refer to spiritual service, is shown by the paraphrase of the LXX. which for *serv*ing substitutes *fasting*—*ἐκ τῶν κατόπτρων τῶν νηστευσασῶν ἀδ ἐνήστευσαν*—as well as by that of ONKELOS, who, with a remarkable coincidence, renders *serv*ing by *praying*. Thus also ABEN EZRA—“They came daily to the Tabernacle in order to pray and hear the words of the law.” But of especial importance for explaining the nature of this *serv*ing is the third passage, relating to this institution of sacred females, which certifies its continuance to the times of Christ. In Luke ii. 37, it is said of Anna, that “she departed not from the sanctuary, but served with fastings and prayers night and day.” The allusion in this passage to Exod. xxxviii. 7, is so much more apparent, if we compare it with the translation of the LXX. and of ONKELOS. Keeping this in view, we shall also find a reference to the Jewish institute in 1 Tim. v. 5, “She that is a widow indeed and desolate, trusteth in God, and continueth in supplications and prayers night and day;” a reference which implies, that the service of the widows was not performed with their hands, but with their hearts.

The institution had a strictly ascetic character. This appears from the circumstance that the pious women—in accordance with the order given to Moses that he should receive the free will offerings of the Israelites for the erection of the Tabernacle, Exod. xxv. 2, “Of every man that giveth willingly with his heart, ye shall take my offering,” compare ch. xxxviii. 24, Num. ch. vii.—presented their mirrors, the means of assisting them in decorating their persons and exciting general admiration. The surrender of

the use of the mirrors is parallel to the Nazarites' allowing the hair to grow, by which they gave a practical demonstration that, as long as they continued that practice, they forsook the world, in which trimming the hair was a social custom, in order to serve God alone. In this light the presentation of the mirrors was viewed by ABEN EZRA, (LIGHTFOOT, i. 643.) *Consuetudo est omnium mulierum inspiciendi unoquoque matutino tempore faciem suam in speculo, ut possint comam componere, sed ecce erant mulieres in Israele, quae serviebant domino, quae omiserunt mundanam hanc voluptatem, et tradiderunt specula sua tanquam oblationes spontaneas; neque enim iis amplius indigebant, sed quotidie veniebant ad ostium tabernaculi ad orandum et audienda verba praecepti.* That the presentation of the mirrors had this meaning, is also indicated by the use to which they were devoted by Moses, which adds the positive to the negative import. They were to adorn themselves, not for the world but for God, and seek to please him alone; compare 1 Peter iii. 3, 4.

That females of distinction dedicated themselves to the Lord is probable, from the nature of the case—(where such a way is once opened, it will be trodden, in proportion, more frequently by those of higher rank than by those of a lower station)—and is here very evident from the mention of mirrors. Metallic mirrors were, as their presentation on this occasion shows, an article of luxury, and as such, are enumerated by Isaiah, ch. iii.

Having at last brought the second interpretation into a condition capable of maintaining its ground, it is time that we should set the two modes of interpretation in array against each other.

For the death of Jephthah's daughter the following reasons have been alleged.

*First*, The letter of the text forms an incontrovertible argument for the bodily sacrifice. It is this which renders this interpretation so tenacious of life. As long as persons fix their attention too exclusively on the outward appearance of the sacrificial system under the Old Testament, they do not properly perceive that it formed a transparent veil; that, as it originally represented spiritual relations, so also it must again lend expression to spiritual relations; and thus it has been supposed that violence would be done to the letter of the text if the notion of a bodily sacrifice was given up. That a burnt-offering is a burnt-

offering has been repeated by all the advocates of the latter, and must be repeated as long as a correct and comprehensive view is not taken of the sacrificial system of the Old Testament. The numerous individual passages which may be adduced for the use of sacrificial expressions in a spiritual sense, can only gain full acceptance if persons are led by them to that comprehensive view which will free them from being regarded as isolated and accidental. Moreover, persons will constantly return to the words of Luther in the marginal gloss, "People will have it that he did not sacrifice her, but there it stands clearly in the text." But at all events, a reference to a number of these passages will serve to shake the confidence with which an appeal is made to this argument. We will here give them. Hosea speaks of "the calves of the lips" which Israel would offer to the Lord, ch. xiv. 3. "Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire," it is said in Psalm xl. 7-9, "mine ears hast thou opened, burnt-offering and sin-offering hast thou not required; then said I, Lo I come; in the volume of the book (in the sacrificial ordinances of the Books of Moses) it is written of me. I delight to do thy will, O God, yea thy law is within my heart." The Psalmist represented the surrender of his own personality, which was evinced by obedience to the Divine commands, as constituting the true sacrifice required by God, as the kernel which lay concealed in the shell of the animal sacrifices that were commanded in the law, (which, as soon as it is isolated, is useless,) and expressed himself ready to present this sacrifice. "The sacrifices of God," says David, Ps. li. 17, "are a broken spirit." "Accept, I beseech thee, the free-will offerings of my mouth," it is said in Ps. cxix. 108. In the New Testament, compare Rom. xii. 1, xv. 16; Philip. iv. 18; Heb. xiii. 15, 16. Since the animal sacrifices symbolised the offering of the persons, these were the sacrifices strictly speaking, so that the expression, which outwardly taken is figurative, when inwardly apprehended, is the proper and literal meaning; thus the presentation of sacrifices was directly connected with the consecration of persons. This we see from 1 Sam. i. 24, 25. When the child Samuel was brought by his parents to Eli, they slew three bullocks. The sacrifice in reality was Samuel himself; the presentation of the bullocks only served to symbolise his consecration. Gen. xxii. 2, furnishes one of the most remarkable proofs for the

use of sacrificial terms, especially as it is probable that the author of the Book of Judges had it in his eye on this occasion. Abraham there receives a command in reference to his son Isaac, "offer him as a burnt-offering." If these words were taken literally, then God, who, according to the doctrine of the Old Testament, "is not a man that he should lie, nor the son of man that he should repent," could not afterwards have forbidden the performance; what according to his own law is impious to a surpassing degree, *that* he could not command, even by way of trial; ver. 12 shews that satisfaction was rendered to the Lord's command, when the *spiritual* sacrifice was completed. Hence we perceive that the trial lay in the ambiguity of the language.

It has been objected, that if the expression is to be figuratively understood, this at least ought to be indicated by a word. But since the professors of the religion of Jehovah never offered human victims, all ambiguity was avoided, and a saving clause was unnecessary. Since the use of sacrificial terms, in a spiritual sense, runs through the whole of the Scriptures, and the nature of the case is in favour of a spiritual sacrifice, the author might rather have been expected to remark, had that been his intention, that the expressions he used were to be understood of a bodily sacrifice.

It has been further objected, that all the passages in which sacrificial terms occur in a *figurative* sense (it might as well be said in a *literal* sense; for the sacrificial act is an allegory which is explained in such passages) speak only of a spiritual sacrifice, never of a bodily consecration to temple service. But this objection is founded chiefly on the wrong view we have already exposed of the service in the sanctuary. The spiritual consecration is here the first and main subject; the outward consecration is only noticed as, at that time, its usual form and covering. Samuel also, for whom as for Isaac, a bodily sacrifice was presented, was regarded as a spiritual sacrifice, and yet in his case an outward consecration was added to the inward.

*Secondly*, An appeal is made to Jephthah's intense sorrow. But for this there was sufficient occasion, according to the other interpretation. The ardent desire of men for perpetuating their existence for immortality, had not, under the Old Covenant, found its right end, from a defective clearness in the prospect of a

future life. They sought to satisfy this desire in the present life. Hence that extravagantly vivid yearning to perpetuate life in their posterity, from regard to which the Lawgiver himself made an exception from the laws of marriage which were so strictly defined, and sanctioned the obligatory marriage (*Pflichtehe*) which arose out of that feeling and had been already customary. It was regarded as a cruel want of affection in a surviving brother towards the deceased, if he refused to do his part, that the name of his brother, his memory, might not perish out of Israel. Compare Deut. xxv. 5. Isaiah, in ch. lvi. 5, first looks for consolation to the future, for the disconsolate anguish of the childless in the present. Supposing this to be the general ground of Jephthah's sorrow, whose only hope of posterity rested on his daughter, it must have been greatly heightened by his peculiar circumstances. What the Lord had bountifully given him with one hand, he had taken entirely away with the other. He had been raised from the dust of depression to be a chieftain of Gilead; he had attained to honours and riches; but of what avail was all this to him? At his death all would be lost; and therefore he could derive no joy from it now. His state of mind resembled Abraham's in Gen. xv. 3. He had no one with whom he could rejoice. His daughter, the dearest object to him on earth, was to him as if dead. That children who were dedicated to the Lord were considered as altogether withdrawn from their parents, is shewn in 1 Sam. ii. 20, 21, where other children are promised by Eli and guaranteed by God to Samuel's parents as a compensation for him.\*

---

\* The Catholic Church furnishes many interesting parallels to the history of Jephthah's daughter. One of the most remarkable is the farewell which the wife of Chantal took of her child on her entrance into a convent. It is narrated in *Vie de St François de Sales*, by MARSOLLIER, ii. 144. Paris 1821. "Madame de Chantal, étant arrivée à Dijon, eut devoir se munir du pain des forts contre les assauts que la tendresse et la compassion aillent lui livrer, dans la separation de ce qu'elle avoit de plus cher. Elle n'étoit pas de ces personnes dures qui ont étouffé tous les sentiments de la nature. Elle étoit fille, elle étoit mère; elle ressentoit pour un père, qui l'avoit toujours uniquement aimée, tout ce que la plus tendre reconnaissance peut inspirer. Elle avoit pour ses enfants tout l'amour dont la cœur d'une bonne mère est capable. On ne rompt pas de pareils engagements, sans se faire une extreme violence; tout se révolte, tout se soulève au fond du cœur. Le premier objet, qui se présenta à elle en entrant chez le president, son père, fut fils unique tout en larmes, qui se vint jeter a son cou, il la tint longtemps embrassée, et fit et dit en cet état tout ce qu'on peut dire et faire de plus capable d'attendrir. Il se coucha au travers de la porte par où elle devoit pas-

*Thirdly*, J. D. Michaelis urges that the lament of Jephthah's daughter for her virginity is only explicable on the supposition of her being devoted to death. "The Nazarites devoted from their mothers' womb, and all those who were dedicated to the sanctuary, were at liberty to marry." That this in reference to men was really the case, is shewn by the example of Samuel. But it is certainly very precipitate when that is applied, without hesitation, to women, which only holds good of men. With their vow, marriage was incompatible. It is urged, indeed, that the word *virgin* is never introduced in connection with these ministering females. But there is a valid reason why it should not, which we gather from Luke ii. 37, and 1 Tim. v. 5. Not merely virgins, but widows also, and, as it appears, those principally who were weary and tired of the world, devoted themselves to the sacred service. On this account a general term was chosen. But that only those who were not in the state of wedlock could dedicate themselves to the service of the sanctuary, and hence, that those who were virgins when they entered upon it, must remain virgins, lies in the nature of the case. A woman who is under a husband (Num. v. 29; Rom. vii. 2), cannot dedicate herself to the exclusive service of the Lord; she would be obliged to take what was not her own in order to give. Even in reference to acts of religion, the wife, according to the law, was to be subject to her husband, as is shown by the regulations respecting the vow. It was only by the consent of the husband, that a vow made by a wife was binding. What the Apostle says in 1 Cor. vii. 34, "There is a difference between a wife and a virgin. The unmarried woman careth for the things of the Lord, that she may be holy, both in body and

---

ser—"Je suis trop foible," lui dit-il, "Madame, pour vous arrêter; mais au moins sera-t-il dit, que vous aurez passé sur le corps de votre fils unique pour l'abandonner." Un spectacle si touchant l'arrêta, ses larmes, jusques-là retenues, coulèrent en abondance, mais la grâce, plus forte que la nature, l'emporta. Elle passa sur le corps de ce cher enfant, et fut se jeter aux pieds de son père, le supplia de la bénir, et d'avoir soin du fils, qu'elle lui laissoit. Quelque temps qu'eût eu le président pour se préparer à cette triste séparation, il n'avait encore pu s'y résoudre; il reçut sa fille les larmes aux yeux et la cœur si serré de douleur, qu'il faillit à en mourir. Il embrassa sa fille, et levant au ciel ses yeux tout baignés des larmes, "O mon Dieu, dit-il, quel SACRIFICE me demandez vous! Mais vous le voulez, je vous l'offre donc, cette chère enfant, recevez-la, et me consolez." Ensuite il la bénit, la releva et l'embrassa; mais il n'eut pas la force de l'accompagner." Here also we have a sacrifice without blood, and sorrow for the living exactly as for the dead.



spirit; but she that is married careth for the things of the world, how she may please her husband"\* applies still more strongly here, since the question is not respecting the service of the Lord in general, but about a distinct form of it which was incompatible with the discharge of household duties. It was not till after her husband's decease that Anna engaged in the sacred service; and in 1 Tim. v. 5, "she that is a widow indeed, and desolate. . . . continueth in supplications and prayers night and day." We see from Matt. xix. 12, (*εἰσιν εὐνούχοι, οἵτινες εὐνούχισαν ἑαυτοὺς διὰ τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν*), that even under the Old Covenant, in particular cases, men remained single, that they might be able to carry on the work of God more zealously and uninterruptedly. What in men was only matter of free determination (the maxim "No man can serve two masters," was not in general applicable to them), depended in women so much on the nature of the case, as not to admit of exceptions.† If the women at the Tabernacle were devoted to perpetual virginity, the criminality of Eli's sons appears in a far more glaring light, in the light in which the author regards it.

The reasons, therefore, that have been alleged for the literal (bodily) sacrifice of Jephthah's daughter are not valid; on the other hand, for the non-literal (or spiritual) construction of the vow, we adduce the following arguments. *First*, the presentation of human sacrifices is so decidedly contrary to the spirit and letter of the religion of JEHOVAH, that in the whole history we cannot find a single instance of any one who even outwardly acknowledged JEHOVAH and yet presented such a sacrifice. But let us make a distinction—it is not the question whether a Hebrew by birth, who very possibly might be a heathen in his habits, ever presented a human sacrifice, which there would be no difficulty in admitting, but whether a worshipper of Jehovah, to whom he was known by being made an instrument of salvation to his people,

---

\* The Apostle's remarks in this chapter on marriage and celibacy, receive much light if viewed in connection with the Israelitish institution, which we have now been considering.

† See ABARBANEL on Judges xi. *Femina, donec viro adhaeret, non potest divino cultui dicari, quoniam mariti ministerio et usui astricta est, pro lege mulierum merito legitime adjunctarum.*

ever presented to Jehovah a human sacrifice. Certainly a thing so improbable in itself would only be admitted by an extreme necessity.

Human sacrifices do not belong to heathenism generally, but only to the darkest midnight of heathenism. They are only found among nations sunk the lowest in the scale of religion and morals. The conscience of the nobler heathens revolted from it, unseduced by the appearance of grandeur. CICERO (*de officiis* iii. 25) calls the sacrifice of Iphigenia *tetrum facinus*; and CURTIUS iv. 3, § 23, describes the offering of human sacrifices as *sacrum, quod quidem diis minime corde esse crediderim—sacrilegium verius quam sacrum—dura superstitio*. The people who were favoured with Divine revelation were taught by one of the most ancient and sacred traditions—the offering of Isaac—that human sacrifices were not acceptable to the Lord, that he only required the surrender of the dearest object in the disposition; and as an expression of this surrender, the presentation of animal sacrifices. In the LAW, human sacrifices were always branded as an accursed crime, which could only be perpetrated in connection with total apostasy from the true God. Not to JEHOVAH, but only to Moloch, were human sacrifices presented. The deepest detestation prevails whenever the human sacrifices of the heathen are mentioned. Compare Lev. xviii. 21, Deut. xii. 31, xviii. 10, xx. 1–5. Human sacrifices, and particularly those of children, are stigmatised as the foulest of heathen abominations. “Thou shalt not do so unto JEHOVAH thy God, for every abomination to the Lord which he hateth have they done unto their gods; for *even* their sons and their daughters they have burnt in the fire to their gods.” Deut. xii. 31. These special declarations of the law respecting human sacrifices, are only the results and corollaries of its fundamental principles, to which human sacrifices stand in direct contradiction. The very name of the God of Israel, JEHOVAH, denotes his spirituality, and testifies aloud that the sacrifice of the heart is to him the only acceptable one, for which nothing outward, not even the dearest object, can be substituted. God, who, according to the definition of his nature (Exod. xxxiv. 6), is “gracious, and long-suffering, and abundant in goodness,” cannot desire that man, who bears his image, should destroy that image in his fellow-men, in order to make himself acceptable to

him. The law places all human life under the guardianship of God, and represents the blood of the murdered as crying to God against him who shed it.

The glaring opposition in which Jephthah's conduct, if we admit the notion of a literal sacrifice, would stand to the law, is rendered still more striking, if it can be proved from the narrative itself that the supposition of the crudeness of his religious notions and unacquaintedness with the law is destitute of foundation. We have already shown that Jephthah's argument against the Ammonites is almost a literal extract from the corresponding section in the Pentateuch, What Jephthah says to his daughter in ver. 35, "I have opened my mouth unto the Lord, and I cannot go back," and still more his daughter's answer in ver. 36, "do to me according to that which hath proceeded out of thy mouth," present a literal reference to Numb. xxx. 2, "If a man vow a vow unto the Lord . . . he shall not break his word; he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth." Compare Deut. xxiii. 23, "thou shalt keep and perform . . . which thou hast promised with thy mouth." If it be objected, that we have no security that the historian has exactly recorded the words of Jephthah and his daughter, thus much at least is certain, that according to his own view Jephthah was not destitute of religious culture, and this is sufficient for our object.

To meet the argument that the offering of human sacrifices is entirely opposed to the spirit and letter of the religion of JEHOVAH, an appeal is made to the example of Abraham. But here it is overlooked that the idea of offering his son did not, as was the case with Jephthah, proceed from his own mind, but was received as a distinct Divine command—that a trial like that to which he was subjected is only conceivable in a state of childlike undeveloped faith, beyond which the kingdom of God had proceeded in its later development; and that even by this event it was established in what sense alone God alone required human beings for sacrifice, as we read in the history of Samuel, "And they slew a bullock, and brought the child to Eli," 1 Sam. i. 25; that after this event a misunderstanding like that of Abraham, in case there had been a similar call, would have been sinful, nay, impious.

*Secondly*, If the literal interpretation were correct, it might be

expected that in the narrative so outrageous an act as the death of a daughter by her father's hand would be alluded to, though ever so briefly. But we find nothing of the sort. It is simply said, "he did with her according to his vow, which he had vowed;" and then follows, "and she knew no man." BUDDEUS very properly remarks, *Quis vero ferret in narratione historica id quod praeceptum esse debebat praetermitti, et poni illud quod jam notum erat, eam fuisse virginem.* Only compare this with the representation in Gen. xxi. With all the objective cast of the narrative, how is the most striking incident placed in the strongest and most affecting light. Whoever had to give an account of such a transaction as, according to the literal interpretation, was here to be described, would never write as our author had done; in fact, he could not do so.

*Thirdly,* If Jephthah's daughter was devoted to death, one cannot see why the only topic of lamentation was her being unmarried, and why the author should even, at the last, exhibit this circumstance as the most severe and painful. In the sight of death, and particularly of such a death—a death that a daughter was to receive from the hand of a father—*death*, if not the only, yet certainly would be the principal, object of contemplation. Whatever has been said of the disgrace of a single life among the Hebrews, by no means removes this difficulty; all the purpose it answers is, that it accounts for the grief of Jephthah's daughter, according to our view of her case. Some expositors, to meet this argument, would attach to the word בְּתוּלָה, which never means any thing but *virginity* in a physical sense, the sense of *youth*, as if Jephthah's daughter lamented her *premature* death; but this attempt is only worth mentioning in order to show how much our opponents have felt the force of this argument.

*Fourthly,* It is worthy of notice, that, according to the law, the consecration of those who entered into the service of the Lord was in consequence of a vow, "When a man shall make a singular vow," &c. Levit. xxvii. 2. Thus also Jephthah's daughter was presented to the Lord in consequence of a vow, "And Jephthah vowed a vow unto the Lord," ver. 30; "And he did with her according to his vow that he had vowed," ver. 39. Such a vow appears in the law as a standing form of Jewish piety; of vows, on the other hand, in connection with human sacrifices, we know nothing—

*Fifthly*, As an accessory, the following argument is of some force. According to ch. xi. 40, this event formed the foundation of a long-continued custom in Israel. “And it was a custom in Israel, that the daughters of Israel went yearly to *celebrate* לְתַיִת? the daughter of Jephthah the Gileadite, four days in a year.” We have already made it probable, that this festival was held annually at the Tabernacle. If this was the case, then between Gilead and the rest of Israel a strict religious connection must have existed—which, indeed, might be inferred from the fact, that an event which formerly belonged to Gilead, was the occasion of a festival for all the daughters of Israel—and then the improbability appears so much the stronger, that such an act of barbarity could have happened in Gilead. And we are more justified in comparing Jephthah’s act with what we know from other quarters of the religious state of the Israelites at that time. If we make this comparison, it will appear, that the statement that the daughters of Israel assemble yearly to *celebrate* Jephthah’s daughter, serves to confirm our views. Only in an age of absolute barbarism, which, according to existing accounts, the period of the Judges was *not*, could such a horrible event be a subject of national joy and festivity. This has been felt by the ancient translators, on which account they substitute *lament* for *celebrate*. Only compare 2 Kings iii. 27, where the indignation of the Lord was kindled against Israel, because they were indirectly the occasion of the king of Moab’s offering, in despair, his son as a burnt sacrifice.

If our view of this transaction be correct, as we believe we may confidently maintain, it furnishes a very striking proof of a living and deeply seated piety in the period of the Judges. Besides the conduct of Jephthah and his daughter, let regard also be paid to the recognition of it by all Israel, as well as to the trace of the existence and decided religious tendency of the institution of sacred women, which we here find.

Our investigation is brought to a close. We do not believe that any one can now, with a good conscience, say that De Wette’s Essay still remains unanswered.

## STATEMENTS OF THE PENTATEUCH

RESPECTING ITS

## A U T H O R .

THE passages of the four first books in which certain portions are stated to have been committed to writing by Moses, have been brought together in vol. i. p. 435. Their full importance is not seen till we point out the internal connection which binds together all the parts of the Pentateuch. If this is perceived, it follows, that what applies to the parts, will apply to the whole, and especially since we are then justified, in addition to the statements in Deuteronomy, to unite all the testimonies of the Pentateuch respecting its author into a whole—to determine from generals what is to be thought of particulars—that it refers to the committal to writing of particular portions not as such, but as a component part of a greater whole.

VATER remarks, p. 557, in reference to the Divine command to Moses to write down particular portions, “ In recording such a command, the opinion of the reporter possibly is indirectly conveyed, that Moses did not commonly make a practice of committing things to writing on the spot.” But we must feel surprise, that BLEEK also (*Studien und Kritiken*, 1831, p. 511), could repeat this assertion, which is so plainly a kind of subterfuge, and so little suits BLEEK’S own view, since he himself admits the composition of a very considerable number of passages by Moses, in which nothing of the kind is said. If the conclusion is well founded here, why not apply it also to the prophets? But who would think of inferring from such passages as Is. xxx. 8; Jerem. xxx. 2; Ezek. xliii. 11; Hab. ii. 2, any thing to the disparagement of the remaining portions? These passages stand on precisely the

same footing with those of the Pentateuch. In both cases, the command for committing them to writing indicates the value of the contents, and their importance for posterity, while it is implied, that this written form was the only means of their secure tradition. Why should we not attribute to every thing of the same kind what is here expressed of particular portions? Surely, it can be only the individual application of a general maxim!

Among the passages of the earlier books is one, which, of itself, without our placing it in connection with other facts, or making use of the particulars contained as a foundation for general conclusions, leads us to the composition of an extensive work by Moses. It is in Exod. xvii. 14, "And the Lord said unto Moses, Write this for a memorial in *the* book מִצְוֹתַי, and rehearse it in the ears of Joshua, that I will utterly put out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven." This passage has one thing in common with Num. xxxiii. 2; it shows that Moses acknowledged not merely in the laws the necessity of written documents as a support of oral tradition. But what is peculiar to it is the allusion contained in the article to a larger whole, with which this portion was to be incorporated—whether (a point which the passage itself does not decide, and which must be decided on other grounds) the larger whole was already begun, and the insertion was to be made immediately (as J. D. MICHAELIS, ROSENMÜLLER, and others suppose)—or the whole was to be composed in proper time, and the declaration of Jehovah to be inserted in due time. It might be surmised, that attempts would be made to get rid of this troublesome passage. Indeed, both VATER (p. 558), and BLEEK (p. 511), maintain that מִצְוֹתַי means just the same, as if, by a slight alteration of the points, it was מִצְוֹתַי. But we are now too far advanced for such grammatical laxity; that the sacred writers knew how to distinguish between *A* book and *THE* book, is shown by such passages as Jerem. xx. 2, "Write thee all the words that I have spoken unto thee in *a* book," מִצְוֹתַי אֶת־כָּתוּב; Jer. xxxvi. 2; Is. xxx. 8; Deut. xxxi. 24. And then, supposing it allowable to deprive the article of its proper force, or to remove it without ceremony by a different reading, yet in this connection only *the* book and not *a* book can be intended, so that if מִצְוֹתַי were handed down to us unpunctuated, we must punctuate it מִצְוֹתַי. Certainly מִצְוֹתַי does not in and by itself denote a large book; any written document can be

so called; (vol. i. p. 452). But that Moses drew up a special writing, which contained nothing more than the words, "I will utterly put out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven," to which alone and not also to the history of the wars against the Amalekites, the command to write refers, is perfectly inconceivable. Therefore, nothing is left to our opponents but to reinstate the article in its rights, at the same time maintaining that the book intended was a memorial of the transactions with the Amalekites, in which the prophecy of their overthrow remained to be inserted. But even this expedient appears to be inadmissible. Not a word is said in the context of a monograph on the wars with the Amalekites. How then could the historian, without any preface, refer to such a work? Since nothing is said in the foregoing part of any specific book, *the* book, of course, can only be that of which every reader would immediately think, or could think, from the connection in which the mention of the book occurs. For the article stands "when only individuals of a class are spoken of; but such as are plainly determined to the readers in the class, from the circumstances of the discourse and the connection of the words." EWALD, p. 567. But who would ever maintain, that this was the pretended monograph on Amalek, the existence of which was very far from being so self-evident, that it would directly occur to any one's thoughts? Who could think of any other book than that to which, according to the conviction of every Israelite, that expression of the Lord's peculiarly belonged—the book of the manifestations of the Lord, in which every one who read סֵפֶר, actually found it, while no one knew any thing of a monograph on the Amalekites? We need not, indeed, insist on the improbability of the existence of such a monograph, nor point out that Moses would certainly much rather write a connected representation of the leadings of God's people than such monographs. But if any doubt whatever remains how to construe סֵפֶר, definitely or indefinitely, and to what book the reference is immediately made, which we must deny, yet it would be settled by a comparison with the passage in Deuteronomy, which restricts it to the view we have taken. Every unprejudiced person must admit, that *caeteris paribus*, that explanation of the passage in Exodus deserves the preference which brings it into unison with the expressions in Deuteronomy. We would further remark, that this passage alone is sufficient to



evince the nullity of the inference, from the special mention of the record that was to be committed to writing, respecting the rarity of written documents, and the monographic character of the records.\*

We now turn to Deuteronomy, and first of all to the principal passage in ch. xxxi. It is said, ver. 9-11, "And Moses wrote † this law, and delivered it unto the priests, the sons of Levi, who bare the Ark of the Covenant of the Lord, and unto all the Elders of Israel. And Moses commanded them saying, At the end of every seven years, in the solemnity of the year of release, in the feast of Tabernacles, when all Israel is come to appear before the Lord thy God in the place which he shall choose, thou shalt read this

---

\* HÄVERNICK (*Einleitung*, I. ii. 159) believes he has discovered a *second* passage which must refer to the composition of a large work by Moses in Ex. xxiv. 4, 7. He thinks that the Book of the Covenant there mentioned was the Pentateuch, as far as he could then have composed it. But a closer examination leads us to reject this opinion, and confirms what has been stated already in vol. i. p. 435, that the contents of the book consisted of Ex. xx. 2-14, and xxi.-xxiii.—that it contained the *תְּוָרַת מֹשֶׁה* in miniature, the further enlargement of which was the purpose of the subsequent legislation. The Book of the Covenant could contain *only* the law. This appears (i.) from ver. 7, "And he took the Book of the Covenant, and read in the audience of the people," (let it be observed, it is not said—he read *out of* it), "and they said, All that the Lord hath said will we do, and be obedient." According to this account, the Book of the Covenant contained only the words of Jehovah, only that which was the object of obedience. Exactly as here, after the reading of the Book of the Covenant, they express themselves in ver. 3, after the oral delivery of "all the words of the Lord and all the judgments: all the people answered with one voice and said, All the words which the Lord hath said, we will do." (ii.) The same appears from ver. 8, where the covenant is represented as ratified "concerning all these words," which are contained in the Book of the Covenant. Accordingly, the Book of the Covenant could contain nothing more than what was to be performed by Israel, in case the covenant stood. (Ex. xxxiv. 27, "And the Lord said unto Moses, Write thou these words: for after the tenor of these words I have made a covenant with thee and with Israel." The Book of the Covenant is, according to the explanation contained in this verse, not the book which contained every thing that referred to the covenant of the Lord with Israel, but the book which contained the duties of the covenant (*die Bundes-pflichten*). These reasons are so decisive, that it can be scarcely necessary to point out how this view of Hävernicks separates things that are manifestly connected—what Moses orally delivered that he wrote—and what he wrote, the Book of the Covenant wherein what he delivered was solemnly and formally registered (*protocollirt*), he read; how improbable it is that Moses, on that occasion, read to the people the whole of Genesis, the history of the departure from Egypt, and the march to Sinai, &c. &c.

† In reference to *וְיָרַבֵּן* MARK justly observes (Comm. in Pent. p. 627.) *haec scriptio indefinite intelligenda tanquam successive facta potius, quam eodem tempore, coll. Ex. xxiv. 4-7; Num. xxxiii. 2. Ut hoc tantum velit textus, Moses legem suam quoque scripsisse, non determinato uno aliquo tempore, quo id contigerit.* The expression "And Moses wrote," &c. is tantamount to, "And Moses gave the law which he had written."

law before all Israel in their hearing." Then ver. 24-26, "And it came to pass, when Moses had made an end of writing the words of this law in a book, until they were finished, that Moses commanded the Levites which bare the Ark of the Covenant of the Lord, saying, take this book of the law, and put it in the side of the Ark of the Covenant of the Lord your God, that it may be there for a witness against thee."

The defenders of the Genuineness of the Pentateuch regard this passage as an express testimony for the composition of the whole by Moses. Their opponents strain every nerve to wrest this testimony from them. We shall first examine BLEEK'S objections, as they are the most plausible, and then take notice of VATER'S.

BLEEK remarks, *First*, "In ver. 24 is the first mention of the completion of writing out the book which Moses, according to ver. 9, had already delivered to the Priests and Levites. This confusion suggests the notion rather of an author removed at some distance from the events than of one who was a principal actor in them. But such—not confusion indeed—but exceeding thoughtlessness could be chargeable on no one, unless no conceivable expedient could be found, in order to escape so gross a contradiction. We must give the person credit for some soundness of understanding who assumed the character of Moses. The opposite opinion would be a gross insult on those who still continue to hold him for Moses, after every expedient has been called up to unmask him." The simple solution is the following. Ver. 9-11 and v. 24-26 treat of a different delivery. According to ver. 9, the book of the law was given to the priests and the elders of the people—though in a public and solemn assembly of all the people. For it is said in ver. 1, "And Moses went and spake these words unto all Israel;" in ver. 7, "And Moses called unto him Joshua, and said unto him in the sight of all Israel;" and as no change of place or of auditory is intimated, and the presence of the elders is expressly mentioned, the transaction narrated in ver. 9-13 must have taken place in the sight of all Israel.\* This first delivery had a symbolic character. It indicated that the ecclesiastical and civil polity were to be regulated according to the prescriptions

---

\* Ch. xxix. 1, 2, "And Moses called unto all Israel, and said unto them."—xxxi. 13 form one great transaction.

of the book of the law; it marked that book as the foundation of the whole ecclesiastical and civil commonwealth, as the precious bequest of the Lawgiver which was to form a compensation for the cessation of his personal agency. After this delivery, which had merely a representative character, Moses took back the volume and wrote what still remained to be written.\* Compare the words in v. 24, "And it came to pass, when Moses had made an end of writing the words of this law in a book until they were finished," with the brief expression in ver. 9, "And Moses wrote this law." Then follows the second delivery, which is plainly distinguished from the first by the circumstance that the elders of the people were not present, much less the whole people: compare ver. 28. This delivery plainly shows its object; the book of the law never came again into the hands of Moses, who now, as the author expressly states, had written all that he designed to write. With this second delivery the command is given, "Take this book of the law, and put it in the side of the Ark of the Covenant," whereas on the first occasion it is merely said, "And he gave it."† The author, whoever he might be, certainly supposed that things took this course, and how could any one with reason object to what was so natural?

*Secondly*, The book of which the writing, completion, and delivering for preservation is here spoken of, could not itself contain the account of its delivery, or if it did, Moses must have written it by anticipation, a supposition to which no sober enquirer would accede. With equal reason the narrative of Moses' death might be attributed to himself. Therefore the statements in ch. xxxi. cannot be regarded as the testimonies of the work itself, and of the author respecting its composition, but rather the testimony of a foreign hand, we know not whose, nor of what age (p. 517.)

---

\* First of all, the section ch. xxix. 1, (2)—xxxi. 13, then xxxi. 14-23.

† It is indeed not accidental that in ver. 9, the priests are called the sons of Levi, and in ver. 25, the Levites. Under the latter, indeed, the priests are included. (MARK on the passage observes, *His deinde quoque præcipitur convocatio omnium seniorum et præfectorum, absque ulla sacerdotum mentione, v. 28.*) But in that first symbolical act, only the priests were principally interested, whereas in the second the whole Levitical order was concerned. The book of the law likewise was carried not by the priests, but by the common Levites with the Ark of the Covenant; (the carrying of it is only so far attributed to the priests as the Levites performed it in their service, and under their inspection. Num. iv. 4.)

The first remark we have to make is that, with this view, the admission of a fraud is unavoidably connected. For the author of Deuteronomy must have pretended that that was written by Moses which he himself had written. A mistake here is inconceivable. The only way of escaping the admission of a fraud, would be the hypothesis, that another author commenced with ch. xxxi. 9, &c., who *bonâ fide* assumed that the preceding part was by Moses. But with the earnest endeavour with which the deceiver would interpolate his workmanship with that of Moses (surely Deuteronomy does not give us the impression of any such thing!) the carelessness ill agrees with which he joins to the supposed Mosaic work what must be regarded as his own performance, or at least as the addition of a foreign hand; (for no one will maintain that he designed to pass off the conclusion of the account of Moses' death, &c., as written by Moses). A deceiver would certainly, smitten by his own evil conscience, mark the passages as strongly as possible, where the Mosaic and non-Mosaic separate. But the whole objection vanishes on closer examination. The argument against the Mosaic composition of ver. 9-13, has been already set aside by the foregoing remarks. Here was no anticipation, but merely what had already happened is reported. With ver. 24 begins the addition of a foreign hand. That Moses' labour now ceases, and his own begins, the continuator points out as plainly as was necessary (supposing he had a good conscience, and hence guileless himself, would not reckon on a suspicious reader), by the phrase, "when Moses had made an end," and "until they were finished," עַד כִּי יִסְּוּ. This implies, (i.) That Moses wrote all that preceded as far as this verse; and (ii.) That he wrote nothing more, which indeed is self-evident, since the book of the law had passed out of his hands. Thus the words in ver. 25 form the close of Moses' autograph—"And he gave Joshua the son of Nun a charge, and said, be strong, and of a good courage, for thou shalt bring the children of Israel into the land which I swear unto them; and I will be with thee." No one can deny that this conclusion is highly suitable and becoming. It is also evident that the Book of Joshua, ch. i. 6, begins with the same hortatory promise of God, "Be strong and of a good courage," with which this closes. The song in ch. xxxii. was indeed written down by Moses (compare ch. xxxi. 22); probably

also the blessing on the tribes, but neither of them could be inserted in the *Torah* till they had been delivered to the people. The continuator in the first place gave an account of the completion and delivery of the book of the law; then the introduction to the song and the blessing; and lastly, the narrative of the death of Moses. He is plainly distinguished from the author himself by the expression אִישׁ הָאֵלֹהִים in ch. xxxiii. i., which never occurs in the part written by Moses; by אֲנִי הָאֵלֹהִים in ch. xxxiv. 5; and above all, by the words in ver. 10, "And there arose not a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses." Such a reference, by way of comparison to later times, is found nowhere else in the whole Pentateuch. Thus we have a twofold testimony for the composition of the Pentateuch by Moses, that of the author, and that of the continuator.

Let us now turn to the objections of VATER, while we pass over in silence assertions like that in p. 562 (that ch. xxxi. 19 might be brought, not without plausibility, against the common representation, as a proof that nothing could be said here of a larger collection of laws, since the law was to be learnt by heart), since it rests on a palpable misunderstanding; the verse refers not to the body of the law, but to the Song.

I. The thirty-first chapter falls into a number of separate fragments, following each other in succession, ver. 1-8, ver. 9-13, ver. 14-23, and ver. 24-30. Under these circumstances, since the fragmentary quality of the Pentateuch has extended even to this chapter, what could not have been written down by the same author *unâ serie*, cannot be considered as a testimony to the Mosaic composition of the whole Pentateuch (p. 402). But the section, ch. xxxi. 1-23, as it closely connects itself with what goes before—in reference to the expression, "And Moses went and spake these words," MARK justly observes, "*ivit*" *hic non dicit localem motum aliquem, sed mentis lingueque progressum ulteriorem in loquela, ut idem sit cum adv. porro, ultra, amplius*)—so it forms in itself an orderly, regular narrative, of which MARK thus traces the progress—*Quae post hunc foederalem sermonem Moses sequitur narratio cxxx. i. est spectans I. ad Moseu, qui agit hic (i.) cum populo, ver. 1-6 (ii.) cum Josua, ver. 7, 8 (iii.) cum populi praefectis sacris et civilibus, ver. 9-13. II. ad Jehovam qui (i.) Mosen cum Josua ad se vocat, ver. 14 (ii.) iisque*

*si manifestat, tum ad visum, ver. 15, tum ad auditum, ver. 16-23.*

II. By the book of the law can only be understood DEUTERONOMY, for the other books were by different authors. But Deuteronomy again is divided into many parts, so that only one single part of Deuteronomy can be alluded to (p. 563). VATER in this statement has taken a step in the right direction, since he acknowledges that by the book of the law a larger collection is to be understood; while his predecessor NACHTIGAL (compare, on the other hand, ECKERMANN *Beitr.* v. 44) went so far as to maintain that by the book of the law we are to understand the Decalogue! BLEEK goes still further in his concessions. He remarks (p. 515) that by the book of the law could be intended only a larger writing, which contained the Divine laws with the Divine threatenings, and, consequently, the whole preceding portion of Deuteronomy. This much is certain, if no positive reasons can be assigned for the contrary, then by the book of the law we must understand the whole of the Pentateuch. For as far as we can trace back the history, we find the five books as a whole, of which the distinct portions possess a perfectly equal dignity. Not the least trace appears that Deuteronomy *alone*, or any single portion of it, was esteemed as the sacred book of the nation. Nor are there now any reasons for such an opinion. For the evidence from the pretended fragmentary character changes on closer examination into the opposite. Besides, if it were possible that by the book of the law merely Deuteronomy, or some single portion of it, were intended, yet it would be inadmissible on this account—that all the parts are most intimately connected with one another; Deuteronomy presupposes the existence of the remaining books; the book of the law in ver. 9 must be identical with the book of the law in ver. 24; the depositing of the book of the law in the side of the Ark of the Covenant, mentioned in the latter passage, cannot possibly refer to any single part of the records of Divine revelation, to the exclusion of the rest that were then extant.

It has been urged, moreover, that the extent of the Pentateuch was far too great to allow of its being read through during the feast of Tabernacles. Hence in ver. 9 only Deuteronomy can be intended, and likewise in ver. 24, since it is inadmissible to understand the book of the law in a different sense in the two pas-

sages. But this difficulty is obviated in a far more easy manner by supposing that, while by the book of the law that was to be read to the people, the whole Pentateuch is to be understood, it was left to the discretion of their spiritual overseers to fix on those sections which were proper to be read as the main substance of the whole legislation,—the book of the law in miniature; from which it follows of course, that most of the sections would be selected from Deuteronomy. In this quintessence of the Law, the whole would, in a sense, be communicated to the people; compare Matt. xxii. 40, *ἐν ταύταις ταῖς δυσὶν ἐντολαῖς ὅλος ὁ νόμος καὶ οἱ προφήται κρέμανται*. The Mishnah furnishes us with an epitome of the kind, (*Sota* 7, 8, compare HOTTINGER *de solenni legis praelectione*, on Deut. xxxi. 10, Marb. 1717, p. 7.) But no one among the Jews has ever thought of limiting the book of the law to Deuteronomy. According to the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah, the law was read at the feast of Tabernacles, and that by this term they understood the whole law, and not Deuteronomy alone, is as clear as day. *Loci Nehem. inspectio non otiosa*, remarks GOUSSET (*Lex*. p. 347) *manifestat eum loqui de toto Mosis volumine*. Nam. c. viii. 1, 2, *proponit absolute librum legis, legem*. In *Esdra quoque* vii. 6 *כֻּלָּהּ עֵשֶׂה עִם כָּל הַדְּבָרִים אֲשֶׁר כָּתוּב בְּסֵפֶר הַתּוֹרָה* est tota lex Mosis. Item *Esr.* iii. 2. *Nam holocausti statuta sunt in Lev. i. non in Deut.* JOSEPHUS *Antiq.* iv. c. 8, § 12, represents Moses as saying—*συνελθόντος δὲ τοῦ πλήθους εἰς τὴν ἱερὰν πόλιν ἐπὶ ταῖς θυσίαις δι' ἐτῶν ἑπτὰ, τῆς σκηνοπηγίας ἑορτῆς ἐνστάσης, ὁ ἀρχιερεὺς, ἐπι βήματος ὑψηλοῦ σταθεὶς, ἐφ' οὗ γένοιτο ἐξάκουστος, ἀναγινωσκέτω τοὺς νόμους πᾶσι*.

The injunction that the book of the law should be read to the people every seven years, is naturally very irksome to our opponents. VATER especially sets himself to combat it. He remarks, *first*, that it is not said expressly whether it was to be only once in the next seventh year, or every seven years. Yet it is strange that the people were never in doubt on this point. And if we examine the matter more closely, the following words at once strike our eye, in ver 13, “and that their children which have not known any thing may hear and learn to fear the Lord your God as long as ye live in the land, whither ye go over Jordan to possess it.” But the refutation of VATER’S objection lies in the phrase *כִּי יִשְׁמְעוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל*. This cannot mean, *when seven years from*

*the present time have elapsed, but only, from seven years to seven.* Moreover, the *terminus a quo* must be expressly and distinctly marked. Wherever  $\text{יָקַו}$  stands as it does here, it relates to a transaction or act, regularly repeated. Thus, for instance, in Deut. xv. 1, which is of greater weight since the author refers precisely to this passage; “ $\text{יָקַו שְׁבַע שָׁנִים}$  thou shalt make a release  $\text{שְׁבַע שָׁנִים}$ .” Ch. xiv. 28,  $\text{אֶתְּקַדֵּם שְׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים}$  *a fine trium annorum = tertio quoque anno*; compare “*year by year*”  $\text{שָׁנָה שָׁנָה}$  in ver. 22. Jerem. xxxiv. 14, &c. Only in historical composition, where the *terminus a quo* is fixed of itself,  $\text{יָקַו}$  is used respecting an act performed once; compare Gen. viii. 6, “At the end of forty days, Noah opened the windows of the ark;” xli. 1, “At the end of two full years Pharaoh dreamed.”

*Secondly*, (VATER remarks,) such a reading is never mentioned, except in Nehem. viii. 18, at a great celebration of the feast of Tabernacles, respecting which it is expressly said in ver. 17, that, “since the days of Joshua, the son of Nun, unto that day, had not the children of Israel done so.” This, therefore, probably first of all relates to the reading of the law. But the *argumentum a silentio* will here amount to nothing, and the positive evidence has a very sorry appearance. It is said in Neh. viii. 17, 18, “And all the congregation  $\text{כָּל־בְּנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל}$  of them that were come again out of the captivity made booths, and sat under the booths; for since the days of Joshua the son of Nun, unto that day, had not the children of Israel done so,  $\text{וְזָר}$ , and there was very great gladness. Also, day by day, from the first day unto the last day, he read in the book of the law of God; and they kept the feast seven days, and on the eighth day was a solemn assembly, according to the manner.” The  $\text{וְזָר}$ , *so*, cannot be referred to the reading the book of the law, since this cannot be considered as a peculiarity of the erection of booths; it is this special occasion, not the celebration of the feast in general, that is spoken of. The emphasis rests upon “ALL the congregation.” From the time of Joshua to the captivity, the people were torn by divisions; a large part cleaved to idols, and did not celebrate the feasts of the Lord. Jeroboam’s policy had altered the time of celebrating the feast of Tabernacles, in order to disturb the unity of the religious spirit. But now the people were once more, as in the time of Joshua, of one heart and one soul. In



Ezra iii. 1-4, it is said, "the people gathered themselves together as *one man* to Jerusalem, . . . they kept also the feast of Tabernacles, as it is written." But this first feast of Tabernacles was not suited for the *ἀντιστοιχον* (the counterpart) of that in Joshua's time. For the number of the returned was yet too small; the condition of the people altogether formed a kind of interim. In reference to the parallel passage, 2 Kings xxiii. 21, (where it is said of the times of Josiah, "Surely there was not holden such a pass-over from the days of the Judges that judged Israel, nor in all the days of the kings of Israel, nor of the kings of Judah") MOVERS, (*Zeitschr. f. Philos. u. Kath. Theol.*, Heft xiv. p. 97.) has shown that the difference of the festival under Josiah from that under the kings, consisted in the unanimity with which, at that time, after the downfall of the kingdom of Israel, the whole people shared in its celebration.

Thus we have removed every thing out of the way by which it has been attempted to deprive the very important explanation in ch. xxxi. of its force. It is settled that the author of the work, (strictly so called) makes himself known at the end expressly as Moses, and that the author of the Appendix testifies to the Mosaic authorship of the whole. In addition to the reasons already adduced, it would be improper to confine these expressions to Deuteronomy on account of Exod. xvii. 14. According to this passage, something that is not found in Deuteronomy but in Exodus, was inserted in that Book of the Covenant, which, we are informed at the end of Deuteronomy, was delivered to the elders of the people, and put in the side of the Ark of the Covenant.

We now turn to the remaining expressions in Deuteronomy respecting the author of the work. It is said in Deut. xvii. 18, 19, "And it shall be when he (the king) sitteth on the throne of his kingdom, that he shall write him a copy of the law in a book, out of that which is before the priests, the Levites. And it shall be with him, and he shall read therein all the days of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God," &c. It is here implied that the speaker, Moses, would not confine himself to an oral communication, but would deliver a written codex to the priests. The passage points forward to ch. xxxi., which states that Moses gave the book of the law to the priests. From comparing the

two passages together, we must determine what is to be understood by "*this law.*" That it must not be limited merely to Deuteronomy, will appear from the following circumstances. "*This law,*" is the law which had been spoken of in the preceding context, the knowledge of which, according to ver. 8-13, was to be obtained from the priests. But ver. 8 points to Exod. xxi. 18. BLEEK (p. 513) concedes that evidently not the special laws relating to kings are meant, but a whole code of legal prescriptions—a large book of the law; and that, according to the connection in the address spoken by Moses, it is without doubt intended that this whole book of the law, together with the laws relating to the kings, proceeded from Moses himself. But he then raises the difficulty, that the existence of the book of the law, the original of which the priests would have in their keeping, is presupposed. Moses could not have spoken thus, at a time when the book of the law was not yet finished and committed to the priests. By this blunder the author, who personates Moses, betrays himself to be some one else. But this difficulty (*and similar ones in abundance may be raised against every historical testimony, when once a person exchanges the position of an impartial judge for that of an advocate*) vanishes with the remark, that the committal of the law to writing, and the delivery to the priests, occasioned no surprise to the people. If, when Moses was first installed in his office, he evidently perceived that one of its principal duties was to compile a codex of the Divine revelations (Exod. xvii. 14), would he not make the people acquainted with this part of his vocation, and thus prepare them for the reception of the book of the law? and that, at the time when he addressed the contents of Deut. xvii. to the people, that it was almost completed, in order to be handed over to the custody of Levitical priests, is self-evident from the whole position which the priestly order assumed; and is almost expressly said in the passage immediately preceding. For, if the knowledge of the law was to be sought from the priests, must they not also be the chief depositories of the book of the law, the only authentic source of the law? Thus every one, when he heard of the law that the king was to receive from the priests, would think of the law that was on the point of being closed, and delivered to the Levitical priests.

There are still the following passages to be noticed; Deut. xxviii. 58, "If thou wilt not observe to do all the words of this law that are written in this book;" ver. 61, "Every sickness and every plague which is not written in the book of this law;" ch. xxix. 19 (20), "All the curses that are written in this book shall lie upon him;" ver. 20 (21), "All the curses of the covenant that are written in this book of the law;" ver. 26 (27), "All the curses that are written in this book." In reference to these passages, BLEEK remarks (p. 514), that certainly Moses is not expressly named in them as the author of the book of the law with the curses; but it is self-evident, that he is supposed to be such, since, where he himself appears as the speaker, a book cannot be supposed which was the production of a later author. But here he attempts what he gives with one hand to take away with the other. All these passages give an impression, he thinks, as if Moses had the book he mentions already before him, or in his hand, and thus pointed it out to the people. But these discourses could not then be found in the work here described as the book of the law. This difficulty has already been noticed by the earlier critics. MARK observes, by way of obviating the objection, on ch. xxix. 19, *quo pacto Moses tum loqui potuit ob scriptiōnem partim peractam, partim proxime peragendam et communem cognitionem ac aestimationem libri illius*. J. D. MICHAELIS (*Einleitung*, p. 253) assumes that Moses had previously written down the discourses in ch. xxviii. and xxix., and then delivered them, to which an analogy may be found in Exod. xxiv. 4.\* If these two assumptions (and no one will assert of the latter that it is altogether inadmissible) are somewhat doubtful, yet certainly no one can object against the third, that Moses, as was certainly done in many other cases, in writing down his discourses,

---

\* HAVERNICK (p. 160) maintains that Deut. i. 5 contains an express testimony, that the Lawgiver appeared before the assembled people with Deuteronomy already written in his hand. He translates  $\text{וַיִּתֵּן מֹשֶׁה בְּאָזְנוֹתָם הַזֵּאת וַיִּתֵּן בְּאָזְנוֹתָם הַזֵּאת}$  "Moses began to write down the following law." But it has already been shown, that  $\text{וַיִּתֵּן}$  (vol. i. p. 448) always means to *make plain*, and that the meaning to *write*, which is rejected by the context, has no foundation. It is not the fault of modern lexicographers that they have not obtruded the arbitrarily affixed meaning to *write* on this passage, but that they have rejected the meaning *explainare* in ch. xxvii. 8, and Hab. viii. 2. In the older lexicographers, the meaning is given with perfect correctness. CASTELL, for instance, has  $\text{וַיִּתֵּן}$ , *declaravit, elucidavit, expressit, verbis aut characteribus*, Deut. i. 5; xxvii. 8; Hab. ii. 2.

somewhat modified the expressions. For us, the discourses exist as written by Moses, for no one would stretch the statement that Moses uttered them to each syllable; and only what disproves their written composition by Moses can be rendered available to cast suspicion on their testimony relative to the authorship of the book of the law.

It is therefore settled, that Moses must be regarded as the author of the Pentateuch. Such self-testimony of the author must always be treated with respect until its untruth is shown on decisive grounds, and he can be convicted as a deceiver. But here the importance of the testimony is increased by the way and manner in which it is given. On this point J. D. MICHAELIS pertinently remarks, "If he had written at the end something of this sort, *And I Moses, who led the children of Israel out of Egypt, have written this book with my own hand*—it would have been the subscription of a deceiver. He says it exactly as it would flow from the pen of a writer who gave himself no concern about the authorship." Certainly a supposititious writing would bear no such marks of the absence of all design.

HARTMANN (p. 538) honourably allows the author of the four last books intended to be considered as Moses; by this admission, it is acknowledged that a mutual connection exists between all the books. He also recognises with us that there is no third supposition between the composition by Moses and a deceitful forgery. For the latter he there adduces certain facts, intended to prove, that the part of Moses was merely assumed, which the author knew not how to carry through. On closer consideration, the only circumstance in favour of this opinion is, that the author who wished to pass for Moses speaks of the Israelitish lawgiver in the third person. For what HARTMANN adduces in proof (p. 546), "that the narrator attributes a tone to Moses which strikes on our ear as that of a totally different, distant person," is only a simple consequence of it. But the argument taken from the use of the third person belongs only to the infancy of the attacks on the genuineness,\* and we cannot help being surprised to see it, after it had

---

\* LE CLERC (*de sc. Pent. iii.*) has remarked, *Verum dudum confutati sunt, exemplo Xenophontis, Caesaris, Josephi (?) aliorumque praestantissimorum historicorum, qui, ipsi de se loquentes, tertia pers. na perpetuo utuntur.*

long ago been consigned to oblivion, brought forward again with such confidence.

Those who, first of all, started this objection, were immediately met by some well known analogies from classical antiquity. CÆSAR and XENOPHON (in his *Anabasis*) speak of themselves throughout in the third person. Against the applicability of the latter analogy, it will not avail to urge that XENOPHON, in his *Hist. Græc.* iii. 1, 2, attributes *the Anabasis* to THEMISTOGENES the Syracusan, and therefore he made use of the third person not as XENOPHON, but only in the service of a literary imposture; for XENOPHON could not have made such an allegation in real earnest. The absolute unanimity of antiquity in reference to his authorship can only be explained on the ground, that he himself made no concealment of it; so that the allegation in reference to THEMISTOGENES is only a disguised declaration, that he studied objectivity to the utmost, and thus proceeds from the same motive as the use of the third person. How a certain strangeness of tone is inseparable from the use of the third person is shown very plainly by such passages as *Anab.* iii. i. § 4, ἦν δέ τις ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ Ξενοφών Ἀθηναῖος, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγὸς κ.τ.λ., which is the more remarkable, since XENOPHON'S name had occurred before, i. 8, § 15; ii. 4, § 15, which he could not have forgotten. How would the discovery of such a circumstance, in one of the sacred books, be hailed by the opponents of their genuineness! But here the critics take good care not to be misled. KRÜGER, for instance, (*De Xen. vita quaestiones*, p. 15), remarks briefly, but to the purpose, *Hic de se tanquam homine etiamnum ignoto loqui potuit, cum quæ ll. ll. relata sunt, fere plane ignotum cum reliquerint.* This shows very plainly that it would be well for theologians to mark attentively the labours of their critical brethren in the department of profane literature, in order that, where their peculiar prejudices do not come into play, they might acquire a calmer mood, and learn to practise a little modesty and sobriety. For must it not put those persons to the blush who so confidently urge the use of the third person in the Pentateuch, to be told that in the whole discussion on the genuineness of *the Anabasis*, this fact is not so much as mentioned; that so little weight is attached to it, that it is thought superfluous to assert its unimportance? And in the same man

ner, that it never entered into any one's thoughts to attempt proving from *the Memorabilia* I. 3, § 8, &c., where Xenophon speaks throughout of himself in the third person, that he could not be the author of that work? And that, in the abortive attempts to impugn CAESAR'S *Commentaries*, wrong-headed as those were who engaged in them, the use of the third person was never made a handle of?\*

From the later Oriental literature we shall only adduce the instance of BARHEBRAEUS, who in his autobiography (*ASSEMANI Bibl. Or.* ii. 248), always speaks of himself in the

\* To justify the wish we have expressed above, we would here introduce some additional instances. KRUGER, *de authentia et integ. Anab. Xen.* Halle 1824, in reference to one passage which seems to betray a gross ignorance of the localities in which Xenophon had been, after having given an explanation different from the common and superficial one, remarks (p. 12)—*Cacterum non ignoro huic explicatione nonnulla posse opponi. Sed etiamsi prorsus abjicienda esse videatur, inde tamen non sequeretur Anabases auctorem non fuisse testem oculatum. Ea enim rejecta totus locus additamenti nomine non damnari non potest.* The same critic observes, in reference to the difference in phraseology of the *Anabasis* from Xenophon's other writings, (p. 17), *Hoc argumentandi genus perquam lubricum est. Si quid numerus valeret, urgeri posset, quod in his libris amplius quadrigenta vocabula leguntur, quae in reliquis Xen. operibus frustra quaerantur.* But this is of no importance; and equally so, that many words are used in a different meaning. *Omnino enim si quis propter vocabula alibi ab hoc scriptore vel alia potestate, vel prorsus non usurpater Anab. ab eo profectam esse neget; hoc ratione admissa quodvis aliud ejus opus injuria ei tribui ostendi potest.* The appendices to RANKE'S *History of the Papacy* contain some valuable antidotes against the critical fool-hardiness of theologians. One of the best is his decision on the *Relazione dello stato dell' imperio e della Germania fatta da Monsr. Caraffa* (iii. 417). The difficulties which this work presents are very considerable. "The connection is excessively loose. We first meet with the report on Bohemia again with some few omissions; we then find a very remarkable statement concerning the election of a king of Hungary in 1625, but inserted in its wrong place; and lastly, what indeed is more important, a report of the year 1629 (but in which there is no trace that it is Caraffa's), concerning Germany, the Emperor, and the princes, is here given, somewhat amplified, but otherwise literally copied. Many other portions of this work are evidently stolen. King James I. of England is mentioned as the *presente re d'Inghelterra*, which could not be said in 1628." What book of Scripture, which presented such appearances, would have any favour shewn it at the tribunal of theological criticism? But how different is it with the clear-headed truthful historian! "We should guess," he says, "that some compiler had put together these documents without any system or design; but after further consideration this conjecture does not appear to be probable. Most important and striking facts relating to recent times, of which no compiler would have dreamt, are here added to the Ragguaglio of Caraffa. Circumstances are related which could only be known to the initiated. . . The nuntio also occasionally speaks in the first person. I conclude therefore," says Ranke, "that this work really proceeded from Caraffa, but was not completed by him, owing either to want of time or inclination, or perhaps of power to do so; for his Bohemian report has somewhat of the same diffuse and formless character. He probably intended on his return to Aversa to fill up some of his leisure hours with the arrangement of his materials."—MRS AUSTIN'S translation. London, 1840. Vol. iii. pp. 242, 243.

third person.\* In modern times we may mention *FREDERICK the Great*.

Yet we need not go far in search of analogies. The Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament furnish them in abundance. In them it is *the rule* that the authors of the historical books speak of themselves in the third person; the contrary, as we find it exemplified in Ezra and Nehemiah, is *the exception*. We have already collected the facts on this point in *Die Authentick des Daniel*, p. 227, hence only to remark further, that in the inquiries relative to the genuineness of John's gospel, no weight is attached to this circumstance.

HARTMANN makes a show of calling in question the applicability of all these analogies, by talking of the unsuspecting language of nature among nomade tribes, which knows and allows of nothing but *I*, and *thou*, and *ye*. But where did he gain the knowledge of this nomade language of nature? If the use of the third person be the product of reflection and high mental culture, how came MATTHEW *the publican*, and JOHN *the fisherman*, to be so familiar with it?

Evidently the remotest antiquity is here measured by the standard of our times. In an age of subjectivity like our own, a man who writes his own history will, generally speaking, do violence to himself if he makes use of the third person. If counsellor HARTMANN, for instance, should think of doing so, it would sound very oddly, and every body would be struck with the want of ease in the composition. When a man in whom the principle of subjectivity attained full sway, WEITZEL (*Das Merkwürdigste aus*

---

\* In another respect also BARHEBRAEUS forms a striking parallel to MOSES. As the life of MOSES falls into these periods of equal extent (of forty years each), which has been taken as a proof of the mythical character of the Pentateuch (compare NIEBUHR'S R. G. i. p. 260), so likewise did that of BARHEBRAEUS. At twenty years of age he became a bishop, at forty Mafrian, or second superintendant of the Jacobites, and at sixty he died. Like MOSES he cherished the certain expectation of his death, which he expresses in the year he died at the close of his biography, and which, though all appearances were against it, took place exactly at the time he had assigned for it. As an account of the *ultima Mosis* is annexed to the work of MOSES by another hand, so we also read at the close of the autobiography of BARHEBRAEUS, an account of his death by another person, his own brother, which is annexed to his own work by the words—*quum ergo perpetuo hunc animum mente revolveret*, etc. If such an instance had been found in the later Jewish history, it would have been roundly asserted by some persons, that the accounts respecting MOSES had been copied from it.

*meinem Leben*, Leipz. 1821. i. 2) remarks, " CAESAR and FREDERICK II. spoke of themselves in the third person, perhaps in order to avoid the charge of *Egoïsme*, which the ever-repeated *I* might very often revive ; I doubt, however, whether it would be thought a mark of modesty in common men to follow this example. The modesty would look very much like arrogance ;"—he has evidently referred a true feeling to a false foundation. There are still in our own age objective natures, whom the use of the third person would well become, and cost them no trouble. Only think of GOETHE !

Certainly it might be maintained that the farther we go back into antiquity, the greater the objectivity. But in the sacred writers the prevalent objectivity had special grounds. In them the root of subjectivity, namely *vanity* and *self*, which grow even in times and natures that are relatively the most objective, were eradicated by the Spirit of God. They saw their own doings in no other light than that of all other men. They stood on the level of humanity, and not on an elevation from which they could see it under their feet. God alone occupied that elevation, and if by his Spirit they were raised to it, that they might be able worthily to describe his mighty acts, still they always regarded themselves as walking among the sons of men below.

It is passing strange that the use of the third person can be so rudely torn from its connection, and regarded as an isolated fact. It evidently bears the mark of being the product of the total character of objectivity ; with that it stands or falls. Hence the attack must be decided against objectivity. The use of the third person is indeed not *necessarily* connected with objective representation. The main point is that the *I* has nothing lovely ; but where this is not the case, the third person is as eligible as the first, and even more so, as it is the most suitable form for objectivity—it avoids also the appearance of attaching an importance to one's own personality, which it represents also outwardly as standing in a line with other beings. There was a special reason for the use of it in the case of MOSES, that he wrote not merely his own history, but that of the earlier recipients of revelation. He had spoken of ABRAHAM, of ISAAC, and of JACOB, so that nothing seemed more a matter of course than to speak of MOSES, exactly as XENOPHON, in the passages we have noticed of *the Me-*



*morabilia*, where he is an object of history, places himself in a line with the rest.

VON BOHLEN (*Einleitung*, § 4) lays a stress on the circumstance, that the author, in the blessing of Moses, presents him objectively, "Moses gave us a law." This would only be somewhat singular if מֹשֶׁה stood in the text instead of אֲנִי. But Moses speaks in the person of the people. Where Moses speaks *to* the people he always uses the first person.

In proof that the author merely assumed the person of Moses, VON BOHLEN urges that he speaks of him in terms of praise and respect. It is worthy of notice that only one such passage can be found in the whole work, namely that in Numb. xii. 3; for as to the other which is appealed to in Deut. xxxiv. 10, we have already seen that it belongs to the author of the Appendix. Thus this proof seems to establish the very opposite. It is inconceivable that in the work of a later author, the reverential love of the nation towards their lawgiver should not have given a more decided colouring to it. What appearance the whole work would have presented under such circumstances we may conjecture from the Appendix.

That one passage is, indeed, of a kind that must necessarily give offence to those who are enthralled in the narrow limits of their own subjectivity, and measure Moses by a standard taken from their own *self*. Let us first of all consider it in its connection. "Now the man Moses was very *meek* אַדְמֹד above all the men which were upon the face of the earth." The reference of these words to the foregoing context may be taken in two ways. Either it is to be considered as an answer to the reproach of Aaron and Miriam, and is suggested by the expression—"the Lord heard it." "And they said, Hath the Lord indeed spoken only by Moses? hath he not spoken also by us? and the Lord heard it;"—and he heard righteously; for the reproach was as unrighteous as possible; *or* it may be admitted that the words are intended to guard against a misconception of the expression, "and the Lord heard." Thus CALVIN remarks—*haec parenthesis inserta est, ut sciremus deum non fuisse commotum Mosis querimonia ut tantopere excandesceret contra Aharonem et Mariam. Dictum fuerat deum audisse, nempe ut pro iudicis officio causam susciperet. Nunc subjicitur ultro reos citasse ad suum tribunal, quum*

*nullus delator jus sibi dici postulare. Huc enim spectat elogium mansuetudinis: quasi diceret Moses, se injuriam illam tacitum vorasse, quod pro sua mansuetudine patientiae legem sibi indiceret.* For the latter interpretation the following reasons appear decisive. (1.) The word מִיָּדָה has always in the Scriptures, like *πραΐς*, the meaning of *meekness*, though this cannot be separated from *humility* as its root. But *meekness* belongs only to Calvin's view of the passage. *The arrogance* with which Moses was charged, stands opposed not to *meekness*, but to *humility*. Meekness forms the opposite to that passionate excitement, which, at every opposition that it encounters, would move heaven and earth for vengeance. Praying for another's death (*das todt beten*) stands on the same line with perpetrating it, (*das todtschlagen*). (2.) This view is also supported by the word מִיָּדָה. Its use is founded on the contrast between man and God. God heard:—the man Moses was very meek; he committed the matter to Him who judgeth righteously; he cried not to Him for vengeance. The same contrast between JEHOVAH and the man Moses occurs in Exod. xi. 3. (3.) We find elsewhere the accusation which Moses here meets by anticipation actually expressed. In Num. xvii. 6 (xvi. 41) it is said, "all the congregation of the children of Israel murmured against Moses and against Aaron, saying, ye have killed the people of the Lord." The reproach cast upon them was, that by their prayers they had brought down the judgments of the Lord. In practical refutation of this charge, Moses prayed for those who had wronged him. (4.) Ver. 13 leads us to the same conclusion. Certainly it is not without design that it is said here, in reference to the punishment, simply—"and the Lord heard," and there "and Moses cried, heal her now, O God, I beseech thee!" The difference which in this manner is indicated is in ver. 3 still more expressly brought forward.

By thus pointing out the connection in which the words stand, the difficulty they present is considerably diminished. The reproach that was cast on Moses was very exciting. It was not allowable to satisfy himself with the inward witness of a good conscience, partly because the cause of God was involved with his own character; partly and principally, because his example, if not rightly understood, might exert a very pernicious influence. Pharasaical piety is only too much disposed to give free scope

to revenge in prayer, in proportion as it feels itself compelled to check its practical outbreakings. It flatters itself with satisfying the injunction, "Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord,"—if it only takes its revenge through the medium of God, and thus joins with the sin of revenge an act of profanity towards the Almighty. The declaration that "the man Moses was very meek," stands in contrast to this woeful error, this shocking delusion. Of all the passages which prove the falsehood of the current opinion that the Old Testament favours revenge, this is the most striking. It passes a practical condemnation on revenge in its most subtle and refined form—a form which we still find it assume among those who fancy themselves elevated far above its influence, as for instance in BOURIGNON and many other mystics.

Yet it is not to be denied that this passage still wears to us something of a foreign air. Even those among us whose disposition resembles that of Moses, would not have expressed themselves exactly thus. A feeling of this kind has induced the older expositors, some of them following the example of LUTHER, to give  $\ddot{z}$  the totally unfounded meaning of *harassed, plagued* (*geplagter*, LU. LXX. correctly  $\pi\pi\alpha\upsilon\varsigma$ . VULG. *mitissimus*), and others to regard the passage as an interpolation: compare CALOVIUS on the passage; in this latter view the modern advocates of the genuineness of the Pentateuch, EICHHORN (ii. § 440), and ROSENMÜLLER, concur.

But this appearance of strangeness vanishes, if, laying aside our standard, we measure Moses by his own. "*Comme il se loue,*" remarks CALMET, "*ici sans orgueil, il se blamera ailleurs avec humilité.*" The more vain and self-complacent any one is, the less will he be satisfied with this passage, just as lewd persons are the loudest in declaiming against the simple and straightforward manner in which the Scriptures speak of the relation of the sexes. But whoever, without any holding back, without the cost of a struggle with himself, without being in a different mood from what he would be in, if speaking of another, can report his own defects and offences as Moses has done (let the reader only call to mind the slaying of the Egyptian, judgment on which is expressed by its consequence, the protracted exile which Moses was obliged to submit to as a purification for his call—the history of his calling, when Moses went so far as to kindle the anger of the Lord

—his deficiency as a speaker—the occurrences connected with his neglect of circumcising his children, Ex. iv. 24, &c. where we find to our astonishment that the mediator of the Covenant had not observed the fundamental law of the Covenant—the unbelief of Moses after such abundant experiences of the power of the Lord, and its punishment—likewise the absolute openness with which the misconduct of his progenitor Levi is narrated)—he who can give such proofs of his objectivity, can thus prove by deeds, that “To thee, O Lord, belongeth honour, but to us shame and confusion,” is not merely the motto, but the text of his inner life—such a man can speak of what the Lord wrought in him, with an openness altogether different from what we can use. If *all* self-commendation be blameworthy, how was it with CHRIST? Did *He* not say (referring, as it would seem, to the passage under consideration), “*I am meek and lowly of heart ;*” besides much stronger things.

We do not wish to repeat the remarks that have already been made on the same subject in *Die Authentie des Daniel*, p. 220, and which will serve to fill up the hints that are here given. Only one remark more. GOETHE says (in ECKERMANN'S *Gespr. mit G.* i. 143), “TIECK has a talent of high value. No one can better understand his extraordinary merits than myself ; but if any one is disposed to exalt him above himself, and place him on a level with me, such a person is in error. I can say this without reserve, for as far as I am concerned, I have not made myself. It would be just the same if I meant to compare myself with SHAKSPERE, who also did not make himself, and yet is a being of a higher kind, to whom I look up, and whom I hold in reverence.” This passage also contains praise of the writer's own gifts ; but who dare say that the *propria laus sordet* should be applied to it ? The vanity which, on other occasions, not unfrequently appears in those conversations with ECKERMANN, had no share in this language. It shews itself, by the subordinate position which GOETHE clearly and firmly assigned himself in relation to SHAKSPERE, to be the product of that noble objectivity which we often perceive in GOETHE. Great natures, as we learn from this example, are, as such, far less subject to that cramped isolation of the beloved *self* which vanity often practises to a ridiculous degree. The greater they are, the more they feel themselves to be part of a great whole,

dependent on a higher power, "living, moving, and having their being" in a greater connection. But this consciousness attains to full and absolute supremacy only in those among great minds who clearly recognise the essence of Him who conditionates all other beings not as an unknown quantity (*ein unbekanntes X*), or nature, but as the living God. Otherwise, their greatness always has a taint of littleness. GOETHE felt this. If he had not been conscious that the objective position, which he here inwardly assumed, was only momentary—one to which he must raise himself—he would not have added the comparison with SHAKSPERE. To MOSES, on the contrary, that objective position had become a second nature. He lived so in the consciousness that he had nothing which he had not received, that God was "all in all," that he did not dream of making it a distinct object of remark. Here, also, the saying holds good, *Qui s'excuse, s'accuse*. A reference to the suspicions of others is first made, when a man is conscious that these suspicions are founded in reality.

Thus, then, it is settled that the Pentateuch itself loudly and repeatedly claims Moses for its author, and those "contradictory appearances," to which importance has been attached, on closer inspection vanish like a morning mist.

ON THE

ALLEGED TRACES OF A LATER AGE

IN THE

PENTATEUCH.

---

IF the question to be answered be—*What relation does the historical character of the Pentateuch bear to its genuineness?* we must, first of all, investigate the anachronisms it is said to contain. For if here we obtain, on the most palpable of all critical grounds, which are taken from the composition of the work itself, a result absolutely unfavourable to the Pentateuch, we shall enter with great mistrust on an examination of the positive historical grounds for the composition of the Pentateuch in the Mosaic age, and by Moses. On the other hand, should the result here, and in reference to the contradictions which run parallel with the anachronisms, be absolutely favourable, we shall meet, without embarrassment, the remaining historical arguments against its genuineness. On improbable and suspicious accounts, and traces of a mythical character, much has been controverted and argued on both sides. To be justified, therefore, in putting the worst construction on the author, he must, first of all, be unmasked on ground where the opposite statements of truth and falsehood exhibit themselves clearly and sharply, and independent of subjective presuppositions. This is peculiarly the case in a work like the Pentateuch, on account of its contents, its extent, and the very long interval which separates Moses and the pseudo-Moses. It is quite inconceivable that the pseudo-Moses (whether he is taken as an individual or the representative of several persons) should not betray himself by anachronisms (as well as by contradictions); and

these anachronisms must in part be so palpable, that even the most adroit sophistry could not do more than partially cloak and conceal them.

The history of the criticism of the Pentateuch shews, that from an early period, the importance of the inquiry respecting the anachronisms has been felt. This point, and this alone, excited the doubts of ABEN ESRA, if not as to the genuineness, yet the integrity of the Pentateuch. The opponents of the genuineness in the 17th century, PEYRERIUS, SPINOZA, and HOBBS, took their stand only on this ground, although internally their opposition arose from a very different quarter; for at that time there was discernment enough to perceive that arguments and wishes were two very different things. And the earlier vindication attached itself almost entirely to this point. The treatise (very able for the time when it was written) of WITSIUS, *An Moses auct. Pent. Misc. Sac. i. c. 14*, relates to it alone. LE CLERC, *de Script. Pent.* § 3, observes, *Duo genera argumentorum recentioris Mose aetatis volunt esse in Pent. Alia ex stylo totius libri, alia ex singularibus locis petita sunt.* He quickly dispatches the first argument as very unimportant; but in reference to the second he remarks, *Non ita solutu facilia sunt omnia argumenta, quae ex variis locis Pent. ducuntur.* These passages, eighteen in number, which he quotes and explains, fall entirely under the category of anachronisms. CARPZOV also almost entirely occupies himself with these in his Vindication of the Genuineness.

Although by later opponents the field of argument against the genuineness has been considerably widened, yet even they have attached great importance to the alleged anachronisms. VATER (§ 73) has distributed them into four classes; (i.) Cities are mentioned by names which, according to the plain statement of other books, were not given them till after the time of Moses. (ii.) Passages with explanatory additions, especially names of places, such as could not have been expected in the time of Moses. (iii.) Passages in which it is said that certain things continued to this day. (iv.) Passages which imply circumstances which did not exist till after the time of Moses. With this writer concur BERTHOLDT (iii. § 230), DE WETTE (*Einleitung* § 158–160), HARTMANN (p. 686), VON BOHLEN (*Einl. zur. Gen.* p. 68).

An essential difference may be noticed in reference to the con-

duct of this argument between the older and modern opponents of the genuineness, inasmuch as the former confined themselves strictly to the department of historical investigation. While the latter treated, in strange confusion, and without any discrimination, things as anachronisms, which, in case they could not be accounted for, must, from every point of view, be considered as really such, and likewise things which are only placed in this class by their dogmatical prepossessions. The way in which they have proceeded borders very closely on *naïveté*. Thus VATER remarks (p. 641) on Genesis xlix. "It is certainly the most natural (!) view which can be taken, after reading this beautiful song, that it was sung at a time when the Israelitish tribes were already in possession of the land of Canaan, and had already passed through those fortunes which are here so plainly described." And BERTHOLDT says quite drily, "No other object can be kept in view by criticism, but to establish and to bring to light historical truth. Hence (!) for a long time the method has been resorted to of explaining all that is contained in the Pentateuch which manifestly, according to the ordinary powers of man, could not have been penned by Moses, as later additions and interpolations." To find such anachronisms, forsooth, requires neither skill nor sense. The number of passages which really merit the name of anachronisms has, in modern days, received no important accessions.

In the most recent times, critical young Germany, of which VATKE is here the chief representative, has made the attempt to enlarge the field of anachronisms by important conquests. He treats everything as an anachronism which will not suit his mode of viewing the Israelitish religious history. But till that mode is fixed on firmer foundations, we shall venture to consider what he calls anachronism as an argument against it. Fortunately, the history continues to exist, though the builders of historical castles-in-the-air have no room for it in their contracted heads.

As to the line of conduct adopted by the defenders of the authenticity of the Pentateuch in reference to the anachronisms, they have endeavoured to nullify the force of the arguments brought forward by their opponents, but yet have felt themselves obliged, some more, some less, to make certain concessions, and thus to admit later interpolations. Of this class, WITSIUS has noticed the mention of Dan in Gen. xiv. 14, and of Hebron; the passage



in Ex. xvi. 35, "And the children of Israel did eat manna forty years, until they came to a land inhabited," &c. ; the expression "unto this day" in Deut. iii. 14 ; in all four passages. LE CLERC goes considerably farther. JAHN (*Einl.* ii. § 10, and *Introd. ed* 2, p. 189) admits interpolations in about twelve places, which, in part, consist of several verses. The longest is that in Ex. vi. 13-29, where he considers the whole genealogy to be interpolated. But among those whom the history of criticism requires to be noticed, EICHHORN goes the farthest in the admission of interpolations. He calls in question a whole chapter as a later interpolation.

LE CLERC was so discreet, or so honourable, as to confess, that the traces of a later age, which one seems forced to acknowledge as existing, are just so many grounds for the spuriousness of the Pentateuch, which must be counterbalanced by other more weighty grounds for its genuineness—that the supposition of interpolations is the most far fetched, the justification of which must be gained by arguments drawn from other quarters. He remarks (§ 4), *Si aliunde certe non constaret a Mose longe maximam Pent. partem scriptam, ut antea ostendimus ; gravissimae essent fateor in indiciis illis aetatis recentioris rationes credendi, serius totum illud opus conscriptum fuisse.* On the other hand, the modern advocates of the genuineness speak of the interpolations as quite an insignificant matter, as something which, on the supposition of the genuineness of the Pentateuch, could not be otherwise, since no writer of antiquity has entirely escaped interpolations. The opponents of the genuineness mostly exhibit here a certain kind of liberality. WATER (§ 75) admits that one or two single passages would prove nothing. BERTHOLDT is of opinion, that, as to all later names of places, all geographical anachronisms, all comparisons with the present—the admission of interpolation is allowable, and disclaims the use of it for his object.

But here we must be more strict than our opponents. Every admission of a larger interpolation appears to us as extremely doubtful, and even anachronisms, which only depend on a few or single words, we do not hold to be unimportant, although, if their number be small, and one does not support the other, they may easily be outweighed by positive reasons for the genuineness. For (i.) it is to be considered, that the Pentateuch, if Moses was

its author, must have been the sacred book of the nation, which no one would readily tamper with. (ii.) The admission of interpolation in passages which appear to belong to a later age, could only escape the charge of arbitrariness, if interpolations of another kind could be pointed out in the Pentateuch. Since this is not the case, it would, at all events, readily occur to make use of the anachronisms, as the opponents of the genuineness have done.

The following investigation will show that the advocates of the genuineness have, in no case whatever, certain, or at the most, in a single case (the name of a place), any probable occasion to take refuge in the supposition of a later interpolation or alteration.

It is very important, in this investigation, not to pass over anything really plausible, and demanding a deeper examination, if till now such a one has not yet been made, and to discard all mere accidental suggestions, which we can never thoroughly master, since they vanish like a dream. For separating the two classes, it will be necessary to make use of an external as well as internal standard. Whatever constantly makes its reappearance, although it may not strike our own minds as important, must have something in it whereby even the well-disposed may be perplexed. After these preliminary observations, we shall now turn to the consideration of particulars.

#### THE CANAANITES.

In Gen. xii. 6, it is said, "And the Canaanite was then in the land;" xiii. 7, "And the Canaanite and the Perizzite dwelled then in the land."

The passages are found among the eighteen *loci suspecti* of LE CLERC. Both ancient and modern opponents of the genuineness (VATER, p. 636; HARTMANN, p. 695) maintain, that they could only be written at a time when the Canaanites had been driven out of the land. They allow themselves to interpolate—*still* (*noch*). The advocates of the genuineness, on the contrary, with whom also EWALD agrees (*Compos.* 218), allow themselves the addition of—*already* (*schon*); and then either with J. D. MICHAELIS, to explain the remark as meaning, that the Canaanites must have been settled earlier, near the Red Sea, (see, on the

other hand, my essay, *De Phoenicum ad mare rubrum sedibus primis*, in the work *De rebus Tyrriorum*, p. 93, &c.); or with EWALD suppose an allusion to the dispersion in ch. xi. That both supplementary expressions, *still* and *already*, are equally arbitrary, is evident. That construction alone can be correct which requires neither of them, and as soon as this is discovered, it is at once seen, that these passages have been, without reason, dragged into the controversy on the genuineness.

The remark in ch. xii. 6, stands in close relation to ver. 7—“And the Lord appeared unto Abraham and said, Unto thy seed will I give this land.” The words, “The Canaanites were then in the land,” were introduced for the purpose of marking the contrast between the present and the future, the reality and the idea. Strictly speaking, the words contained nothing new—for in ch. x. 15, it had already been noticed that the Canaanites were then in the land—but a reiteration of what was already known answered the purpose of giving a more vivid representation of the relations into which Abraham had entered, that he *πίστει παρέκτισεν εἰς τὴν γῆν τῆς ἐπαγγελίας ὡς ἄλλοτρίαν*, Heb. xi. 9. The terms *already* and *still* are both equally foreign to the passage. It merely records the fact that they were there; that Abraham, the bearer of so great a promise, came as a stranger and pilgrim unto the land, with which at that time his relation was very limited; that he had not a foot of land which he could call his own, but was obliged to content himself with what the possessors of the soil could not make use of.

In the second passage, also, the object and meaning of the remark is known from the connection—“And the land was not able to bear them, that they might dwell together; for their substance was great, so that they could not dwell together. And there was a strife between the herdsmen of Abram’s cattle, and the herdsmen of Lot’s cattle, and the Canaanite and the Perizzite dwelled then in the land.” Here, also, the remark merely serves to throw light on the existing relations of the patriarchs. Had Lot and Abram possessed the land to themselves, they would not have found themselves straitened. But the space was too narrow for them, for they were hemmed in on all sides by the native inhabitants. Besides the Canaanites, the Perizzites are also named, because they were most in contact

with Abraham and Lot, and had a stronger feeling of jealousy towards them.\* The Perizzites, who do not appear in the genealogical enumeration of the Canaanitish race, Gen. x. 15, but only in the geographical description of the inhabitants of the land, as ch. xv. 20, Exod. iii. 8, Deut. vii. 1, Jos. xi. 3, and whom we find in various parts of Canaan; compare RELAND, p. 139, ROSENMÜLLER II. i. p. 258, were the inhabitants of the lowlands, which served for agriculture and pasturage; פְּרִזִּיטִים = פְּרִזִּיטִים אֲשֶׁר בְּאֶרֶץ הַיְּבֵלִים, compare Ezek. xxxviii. 11, "And thou shalt say, I will go up to the land of unwalled villages," אֲשֶׁר בְּאֶרֶץ הַיְּבֵלִים, "I will go to them that are at rest, that dwell safely (confidently, *Eng. Marg. R.*), all of them dwelling without walls, and having neither bars nor gates." Zech. ii. 8 (4), "Jerusalem shall be inhabited as towns without walls אֲשֶׁר בְּאֶרֶץ הַיְּבֵלִים for the multitude of men and cattle therein." The equivalent אֲשֶׁר בְּאֶרֶץ הַיְּבֵלִים occurs in Deut. iii. 5, "All these cities were fenced with high walls, gates, and bars, besides unwalled towns אֲשֶׁר בְּאֶרֶץ הַיְּבֵלִים a great many." 1 Sam. vi. 18, "both of fenced cities and of country villages" אֲשֶׁר בְּאֶרֶץ הַיְּבֵלִים. The Perizzites, the author intimates, were in possession of the best pasture lands, and Lot and Abraham only occupied what they despised. That the observation in this connection was an idle one, no person will assert. It would appear far more to be such if "*still*" were arbitrarily inserted. "*Quis enim,*" LE CLERC remarks, "*eo tempore ignorabat a Canaanaei Abrahami aeo incultam fuisse Palaestinam?*"

#### HEBRON.

The city of HEBRON, it has been remarked (compare VATER, p. 631, HARTMANN, p. 691), which is mentioned Gen. xiii. 18, xxiii. 2, Numb. xiii. 23, received this name, as is evident from Josh. xiv. 15, xv. 13, not till after the time of Moses. Before that it was called KIRJATH ARBA; that this latter name was commonly used in Abraham's time is directly confirmed by Gen. xxiii. 2.

---

\* Either the Canaanites are the *genus* and the Perizzites the *species*, or the Canaanites are specially, a *potiori*, the civilized inhabitants of towns. Thus probably in Judges i. 4, 5, and Gen. xxxiv. 30, so the Arabians distinguish themselves into the people of the towns and the people of the desert. If there had been only the Canaanites, the state of things would not have been so bad.

This difficulty, also, has not been first brought to light by the opponents of the genuineness, but long ago has been repeatedly canvassed. To settle it, BACHIENE (II. 2 § 336) assumes that the name HEBRON, where it occurs in the Pentateuch, has been introduced by a later hand. HAMELSVELD, on the other hand, maintains (II. p. 273) that Hebron was the oldest name of the city; that after it had been supplanted in the interval between the patriarchs and the conquest of Canaan, by the new KIRJATH ARBA, it was restored by the Israelites. Among the modern defenders of the genuineness, JAHN assents to the latter view; KANNE in his *Biblische Untersuchungen*, i. 104, has endeavoured to establish it by a method of his own, and ROSENMÜLLER has acquiesced in his argumentation. We proceed to examine it.

KIRJATH ARBA, so KANNE concludes, means the city of ARBA, who, according to Joshua xiv. 15, was a noted giant—"And the name of Hebron before was Kirjath Arba (city of Arba), he was a great man among the Anakim, *הָאָדָם הַגָּדוֹל בְּבָנֵי הָאָדָם*. This Arba, according to ch. xv. 13, was the father of Anak; "And unto Caleb he gave a part among the children of Judah . . . the city of Arba, the father of Anak, *קָרְיַת אֲרָבָע אָבִי הָאֲנָקִים* which is Hebron." Anak had three sons, who lived about the time when Canaan was invaded by the Israelites; ver. 14, "And Caleb drove thence the three sons of Anak, *בְּנֵי הָאֲנָקִים* Sheshai, and Ahiman, and Talmi, the children of Anak," *בְּלִידֵי הָאֲנָקִים*. According to this, the name KIRJATH ARBA at the time of the invasion of the land had been first used three generations before, and therefore after Abraham.

On this reasoning we have the following remarks to offer: That the *B'ne Anak*, or Anakim, was not the denomination for giants in general, but a particular race of giants, appears from Deut. ii. 11, 21, where the Anakim are compared with another *species* of giants, and are noticed as belonging to the Rephaim; also from Num. xiii. 33, according to which the sons of Anak were a particular kind of Nephilim. That the progenitors of this race of giants was a man named Arba is expressly said in Josh. xiv. 15; the following clause only suits an individual, "a great man among the Anakims." But that an individual's name Anak, a son of Arba, and the second progenitor of this race of giants, was intended, cannot be concluded from Josh. xv. 13, 14, xx. 11,

“ And they (the sons of Judah) gave them (the Levites) the city of Arba, the father of Anak” אַרְבָּאֵי אֲנָכִים; for Anak, or Anok, may stand collectively to denote the race of the Anakites, just as *Jelide Haraphah*, 2 Sam. xxi. 16, 18, for *Jelide Harephaim*. As little does it follow, from the other reasons adduced by KANNE, p. 108, that by בני עַנֹּק are not to be understood Anakites, but really sons of Anak, in Josh. xv. 14, where a peculiar expression for sons in the strict sense is added לְיָדֵי הָעַנֹּק, which would be a most idle addition if it again stood for Anakites. On closer examination, this reason changes into its exact opposite. We never find לְיָדֵי in the sense of *son*. In Genesis and Jeremiah (ii. 14) it occurs in connection with אֲרָבָה *verna*. It is also found twice in 2 Sam. xxi. 16, 18, and once in 1 Chron. xx. 4, in connection with אֲרָבָה; here the meaning *sons* is not admissible, for the אֲרָבָה existed centuries before. If now the phrase cannot have the meaning which KANNE assigns to it, since it is at all events incorrect that אֲרָבָה means specially and more definitely *son* like בֶּן — it tells exactly against him. For it cannot stand there without a meaning, as ROSENMÜLLER remarks. Its only use, therefore, must be to remove any ambiguity in the term בני, to indicate that it does not mean *sons* in the proper sense, but only in general, *progenies*. Proceeding from this we shall not fail to notice, that in Num. xiii. *Jelide* first stands in ver. 22, and then in ver. 28 *B'ne Haanak*, The following decisive reasons remain to be stated against KANNE'S view. (i.) עַנֹּק almost always occurs with the article, which in proper names is only rare when they have a plain and palpable appellative meaning. KANNE and ROSENMÜLLER observe that when appellatives become proper names, they not unfrequently have the article. But in this remark it is altogether left out of sight (which is here of importance) the almost constant insertion of the article. (ii.) The giants are not merely called *Jelide* or *B'ne Haanak*, as in Num. xiii. 22, but also אֲנָכִים דְּבָנֵי דְּעַנֹּקִים Deut. i. 28; compare Deut. ix. 2, where בני עַנֹּקִים stands first, and then בני עַנֹּק, and *Anakim*, Deut. ii. 10, 11, 21, Jos. x. 21, 22. The plural in these passages seems to be an explanation of the singular in others. (iii.) In Jos. xiv. Arba is said to be great among the Anakims, which would be unsuitable if Anak was his son. But even if we were disposed to grant that Anak is the proper name of a man, yet KANNE'S chronological reckoning would be inad-

missible. For we have no reason for maintaining that the three so-called sons of Anak were so in a strict sense, and not rather his descendants. The three are evidently not individuals, but whole generations. For it can hardly be supposed that these three individuals, whom the spies found in the second year of the Exodus, were still living when Caleb took the city

We cannot, therefore, in the way marked out by KANNE prove, from the name KIRJATH ARBA itself, its post-patriarchal origination, and hence the earlier existence of the name HEBRON. But this result may be obtained on other grounds, namely the following: (i.) That HEBRON was the earlier and KIRJATH ARBA, a later one, must be at once admitted, (as soon as there are not decisive grounds for the opposite, on which afterwards), simply from the occurrence of the name HEBRON in the Pentateuch, compared with the account of the Books of Joshua and Judges (i. 10), that the town at the time of the invasion of Canaan by the Israelites was called KIRJATH ARBA. For only by this easy and natural supposition can the Pentateuch be freed from the suspicion of an anachronism proceeding from ignorance; but this is peculiarly improbable in reference to HEBRON, since the author shows the most intimate acquaintance with the history of this city. Let any one observe the passing notice in Num. xiii. 22, "And they (the spies) ascended by the south, and came into Hebron, where Ahiman, Sheshai, and Talmi, the children of Anak, were; *now Hebron was built seven years before Zoan in Egypt.*" How exactly must he have been acquainted with historical relations, if he was not a mere braggart by profession, who ventured to meddle with such definite remarks? The impression which this passage is adapted to make even on opponents, in an unprejudiced moment, is shown by STUDER'S language (on Judges i. 10), "The notice respecting the antiquity of this city is very remarkable. If this account is well founded, what consequences may be drawn only from the circumstance, that so exact a computation was possible!" 2. The city of Arba the giant retains the name KIRJATH-ARBA. But in the time of the Patriarchs there are no traces of a race of giants in and about Hebron, and yet, in the history of Abraham there are many occasions for mentioning them; for example, in ch. xxiii., in the narrative of the expedition of the kings from Eastern Asia, &c. In the remaining books

of the Pentateuch, in Joshua and Judges, giants are alluded to in almost every mention of HEBRON. The recollection of them seems to be most intimately associated with the recollection of the city. 3. In the name HEBRON, there is no reference to the time of Joshua, though it might be expected, if the Israelites had not merely revived the name, but had imposed it entirely as a new one. Compare analogical instances such as Kadesh, En Mishpal, Hormah, Hermon, Meribah, Shiloh, &c. The name, according to the most probable derivation by HAMELSVELD (ii. 273) and others, alludes to the first origin of the city, "from associating, acting together, since they here formed themselves into a civic dwelling together." 4. The name KIRJATH-ARBA implies like *Jebus* (Judges xix. 11), and *the city of David*, the existence of a peculiar proper name. It stands altogether in a similar relation to the name *Mamre* = *city of MAMRE*, which the city bore in the patriarchal times. Only instead of this latter name, that of KIRJATH-ARBA was probably substituted, and the Israelites used the name HEBRON, which had been so dear to them from the history of the Patriarchs, not absolutely to revive it, but they only aided its sole use when KIRJATH-ARBA had become a *nomen vanum*.

Against our view, which is supported by such substantial reasons, nothing can be urged but the passage in Genesis xxiii. 2, in which it is assumed that it is settled, that, in Abraham's time, the usual name was KIRJATH-ARBA. It is there said, "And Sarah died in KIRJATH-ARBA, the same is HEBRON in the land of Canaan." The assertion rests only on this, that the name mentioned *primo loco* must always be the older and original one. But ch. xxxv. 27 is decisive to the contrary, "And Jacob came unto Isaac his father unto MAMRE, unto KIRJATH-ARBA, that is HEBRON." Here MAMRE is named *primo loco*. But MAMRE cannot have been the original name of the city; for Hebron was built long before Abraham, but MAMRE was his contemporary. Moreover, whatever weight this passage can have, is certainly outweighed by the circumstance, that the author, when he first mentions the city in Gen. xiii. 18, calls it HEBRON without any further addition, which sufficiently marks this name as the unchangeable original one. The author, when in a subsequent passage ch. xxiii. 2, mentions the city under several names, designedly says, not HEBRON, that is, MAMRE, or KIRJATH-ARBA, but always MAMRE, or



KIRJATH-ARBA, that is, HEBRON." He thus indicates, that Hebron was and continued to be at the time he was writing the legitimate name. That where he only uses *one* name, as in Gen. xiii. 18, and Num. xiii. 22, he calls the city HEBRON, and that when he cites other names, they are always followed by *היה הבית* rests on the same grounds. We have here another example of intentionality descending to the most minute particulars.

## DAN.

A place called DAN is mentioned in the appendix to the Pentateuch, Deut. xxxiv. 1, and in Gen. xiv. 14. If this DAN be identical with that mentioned in Joshua xix. 47, Judges xviii. 29, it will occasion no small difficulty to the advocates of the Mosaic authorship. For, according to the books of Joshua and Judges, the city at an earlier period was called LAISH or LESHIM, and received the name DAN not till the post-Mosaic times from the *tribe* of DAN, who had captured it.\*

Some of the advocates of the genuineness (PRIDEAUX, WITSIUS, RELAND, BACHIENE, ii. 4, § 758) allow the identity, and maintain that the name LAISH was afterwards altered to DAN. If this be done, it must be acknowledged that DAN furnishes an argument against the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, which must be overcome by stronger counter-arguments, (see p. 183.) Yet the alteration here is so inconsiderable, that much labour is not requisite in order to justify its admission. Others, as JAHN and EICHHORN, maintain the difference.

The resemblance of *situation* is a stronger proof of identity than the resemblance of *name*. The DAN of Genesis lay, like that of the books of Joshua and Judges, in the most northern part of Canaan. That two cities were situated there, which bore the same names independently of one another, is antecedently

---

\* The event took place soon after the death of Joshua; compare STUDER, p. 360. According to KONIG (*Alttest. Stud.* i. 84) it belonged to the times of Joshua. But this view is opposed by the contrast of the state of religion which this narrative presents to us to that which existed under Joshua, and by the passage in Judges xvii. 6, according to which it happened, when there was no king in Israel, but *every one did that which was right in his own eyes*; this latter expression does not apply to the times of Joshua.

improbable. Yet such an accidental concurrence, though rare, is not without example, and the authority of the Pentateuch required only some support by traces elsewhere of the existence of two DANS in those parts, completely to outweigh that improbability. Now such a trace, the older critics supposed they had found in JOSEPHUS, *Antiq.* i. 10, § 1, where in reference to Gen. xiv. 14, it is said, “πὲρὶ Δάνων οὕτως γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα τοῦ Ἰορδάνου προσαγορεύεται πηγή. But GESENIUS (in his translation of BURCKHARDT’S *Travels*, i. 496) remarks on the contrary, that the source of the Jordan obtained the name DAN without doubt from the settlement of the Danites and the erection (?) of the town of DAN in its neighbourhood; and if any one will compare the description of the situation of the town of DAN which received its name from the Danites in ver. 3, § 1, and viii. 8 § 4 (ἡδέ ἐστι πρὸς ταῖς πηγαῖς τοῦ μικροῦ Ἰορδάνου), it is certainly probable that the name was transferred from the town to the fountains. On the other hand, the passage in 2 Sam. xxiv. 6. (“Then they came to Gilead, and to the land of Tahtim-hodshi, and they came to DAN-JAAN and about to Zidon,”) furnishes an argument for two DANS, which we cannot see how to dispose of. It is difficult to suppose that the DAN that commonly occurs, is here intended. For of DAN-LAISH there occurs nowhere a more exact description. It is mentioned before in ver. 2, and after in ver. 15, without any addition. For what purpose is the JAAN here, unless it served to distinguish the place from the other DAN which would most readily occur to any one when he heard the name? That DAN-JAAN lay in the neighbourhood of DAN-LAISH or DAN simply, is apparent from the description. For it stood between Gilead and the country round about Zidon.

Yet we do not mean to deny that the argument drawn from the occurrence of the name DAN, might again acquire some weight, if it were accompanied by a number of similar instances. But this is so little the case, that of all the alleged anachronisms the worthlessness of this may be most strictly proved. But to suppose that with DAN alone, anything can be done, would be as absurd, as to imagine that a breach would be made in a well-built fortress by a single musket-shot.

## MORIAH.

It is probable—VATER remarks (p. 631), that the author of Gen. xxii. 14, deduced the name Mount Moriah from an event in Abraham's life, because on a mountain of this name, Solomon had built his temple. In propounding this argument, he had the older opponents of the genuineness, as SPINOZA and LE CLERC (in his *Sentiments*, &c. p. 131,) for his predecessors, and later ones as SCHUMANN and VON BOHLEN (who asserts it with still greater confidence) have been his followers.

Some have endeavoured to set aside this argument, by denying the identity of the two places which has been decidedly acknowledged by the great majority, and have maintained that the MORIAH of Genesis has nothing to do with the Mountain of the Temple. So, first of all, which must have produced an unfavourable impression, OUTHOV, in an essay in the *Biblioth Brem.* ii. 261, then *Jahn*, lastly BLEEK *on the mention of Moriah in Gen. xxii. 2.* (in *Contributions to inquiries on the Pentateuch. Stud. u. Krit* 1831. p. 520), whose reasoning has gained the approval of DE WETTE. He thinks, that by the Moriah in Genesis is to be understood a district in Sichem, which in Gen. xii. 6; Deut. xi. 30; and Judg. vii. 1, is designated *Moreh*. Probably מוריה originally stood here in the text. The present reading was probably brought into the text at rather a late period, perhaps not before the introduction of points.

The latter supposition, to mention no other reasons, is proved to be untenable by a passage in JOSEPHUS I. 13, § 2, where it is said of Abraham,—*παραγίνεται εἰς τὸ ὄρος, ἐφ' οὗ τὸ ἱερόν Δαβίδης ὁ βασιλεὺς ὕστερον ἰδρύεται.* At all events this shows that in the time of Josephus, MORIAH stood in the text.

But we cannot reconcile ourselves to the whole hypothesis, which destroys the connection of the MORIAH of Genesis and that of the Mountain of the Temple. The chief reason urged in its favour by BLEEK is the following. Nothing is said in Genesis of a *Mount MORIAH*; only the *land* of MORIAH is named in ver. 2, and if this designation occurs as known to Abraham and at once intelligible to him, the mountain must have been so designated at a later period. When it is afterwards said in ver. 14, that Abraham had given to the mountain the name of JEHOVAH JIREH, it would

be perfectly arbitrary and unnatural to suppose that the author wished it to be so understood, that Abraham had not given it this name, but the name of MORIAH, which in ver. 2, is used as the name of the land or district where, this mountain or hill was situated with several others. But this argumentation loses its importance as soon as the fleeting nature of *nomina propria* in the remotest antiquity, and especially in Genesis, is understood. That MORIAH in ver. 2, is a *prolepsis*, the author himself afterwards explains. It follows from its etymology. We have shown in vol. i. pp. 274, 275, that the only legitimate explanation of the name is that furnished by the appearance of the Lord. It is also shown that the name was first occasioned by the event narrated in Gen. xxii., and therefore, in ver. 2, must be used proleptically. If the name denotes the appearing of the Lord, it must belong primarily to the mountain on which this manifestation took place; and was then transferred to the whole district to which the mountain belonged. On account of this close connection between the mountain and the district, the name in its peculiar form, after it had been used in ver. 2, might be presumed to be known. On this account, in ver. 14, an explanatory paraphrase is substituted for it, יהוה יִרְאֶה, such as is usual in Genesis; not a strict etymological derivation, but only an allusion to the etymology. The JEHOVAH - JIREH bears the same relation to MORIAH as the אֵיֶשׁ קַיִיִּי to CAIN,—the זֶה יִרְאֶנִי in ch. ver. 29, to NOAH, the אֲדָהָה אֲשֶׁר אֲדָהָה to JEHOVAH. The form shows that it is not strictly a *nom. propr.* but merely a paraphrase of one.

Other things alleged by BLEEK will be noticed elsewhere in another connection. On the contrary, there are the following reasons for the identity—(i.) The situation. Abraham comes on the third day from BEERSHEBAH to *Mount Moriah*. The distance between BEERSHEBAH and JERUSALEM is reckoned at fourteen hours, equal to as much as an ass would travel over a mountainous tract in the time mentioned. (ii.) The name. This argument, of peculiar importance, lies precisely in the peculiarity of the name. It is hardly conceivable that there should be two Moriah's independent of one another. Then again (iii.) a theological reason, which we do not expect to be universally acknowledged. It can scarcely be supposed that, while so many places in Canaan were hallowed by transactions of the patriarchal age, that precisely the

most sacred place in later times should be altogether without any such sacred associations. This would be attributing more to chance than to the secret guidance of Divine Providence, which we perceive everywhere else in this reference. Hence, if from this theological point of view, we find only a slight trace of such an ancient consecration of the place which was afterwards the seat of the glory of God, and where he made himself known to his people, we shall be disposed to follow it. In addition, there is the typical connection of the sacrifice of Isaac with the sacrifice of Christ, to which the New Testament alludes, Rom. viii. 32. God's command to Abraham to offer his son, was a prediction of the giving up to death of the Son of God. God desires nothing which he himself does not also give. But revelation delights in indicating the internal harmony by external similarities. Hence, if there are other grounds for asserting the identity of the place of these events—the type and the antitype between which the Temple with its sacrificial system forms an admirable link—we shall with greater confidence maintain it from this point of view.

But while we admit the identity of the place, we utterly deny the correctness of the conclusion which our opponents draw from it. They have no positive argument in its favour. For who will maintain, that when two important transactions are stated to have passed at one and the same place, that one must always be feigned on account of the other? Could not the Divine Providence bring about this coincidence as it effected, at a later period, the coincidence in place of that incomparably more important event, the sacrifice of Christ, with the sacrifice of Isaac? To be logically consistent, must it not be maintained, that, in all probability, the author had invented the whole history of the sacrifice of Isaac in the land of MORIAH in order to form a typical representation of the sacrifice of Christ? And then, who will say, that the ancient historical consecration of the place was not an inducement to David and Solomon for erecting the temple on that precise spot? It is no argument against this, that the immediate occasion of selecting that site for the temple was a Divine appearance to David; 2 Sam. xxiv. 1, &c; 1 Chron. xxi. 28; xxii. 1. For this appearance was in fact only a revival of the remembrance of the earlier one, a corroboration of the invitation contained in that to fix upon this spot. The following reasons may be alleged

against the view of our opponents. (i.) Analogies are against it. In all other places, in which a later consecration coincides with one of an earlier age, as, for instance, at BETHEL, BEERSHEBAH, GILGAL, it is quite impossible to regard the latter as the product of the former; the relation of the two is exactly the reverse. Even VATKE (p. 457) is forced to acknowledge that "the typical consecration which the patriarchal worship imparted to these places, which were regarded as profane by the Jewish prophets of the eighth century, indicate an early age for the narratives relating to them in Genesis." That a presumption very unfavourable to the views of our opponents arises from these analogies, is evident. (ii.) The name MORIAH, compounded of *Jah* = *Jehovah*, and the *hophal* participle of the verb  $\text{מָרַח}$ , cannot belong to a later period, since the *hophal* of the verb  $\text{מָרַח}$  occurs only in the Pentateuch. (See vol. i. p. 275.) (iii.) The supposition, that the sanctity which Mount Moriah obtained from being the site of the temple had given birth to a legend of which the name Moriah forms the centre, implies that this name, as that of the mountain of the temple, was in common use, and also that the circumjacent country received from it the name of the land of MORIAH. But the exact contrary proves to be the fact. RELAND has remarked (p. 854), *Certe in sacris litteris, quum de templo sermo est, quod Moriae incubuisse, nemo est qui neget, illud Sion solet tribui, quo spectant hi modi loquendi, deum elegisse Sionem, habitare in Sione, &c.* As the name of a *district*, MORIAH occurs in not a single passage of the later books; as the name of the *mountain* of the Temple only in 2 Chron. iii. 1. From our point of view, the explanation of the fact has no difficulty. That the name MORIAH proceeded from an event in Abraham's life, and remained enclosed within the limits of the family of the Patriarchs, is self-evident. If the Israelites, at the invasion of the land under Joshua, had at once obtained this district for an abiding possession, the name MORIAH, like so many others, BEERSHEBA, BETHEL, GILEAD, MAHANAIM, PENUEL, HEBRON, would soon have come into general use. In connection with the total change in all the relations of the country, the new name very easily expelled the old, and in the pious zeal which animated the people, we may presume that they would as soon, and as completely as possible, substitute sacred for profane names. But

ZION remained till David's time in the possession of the Jebusites, (2 Sam. iv. 7), and the Israelites had been accustomed for a long time not less to this name than the original inhabitants, with whom they dwelt together in JERUSALEM.\* Thus they neglected to drive out the ancient name from its stronghold, though every body knew that ZION was the MORIAH of the ancient sacred history. After the captivity, when the national relations underwent a fresh revolution, the name MORIAH first obtained its rights, yet not so as to abrogate the name ZION, with which so many heart-felt recollections were combined, but only as applied to that particular spot on which the Temple was situated, though it belonged originally to the whole.

## BETHEL.

"The name BETHEL," VATKE remarks, "most evidently proves the use of a post-Mosaic name. This name is very often employed; Abraham dwelt near the town of BETHEL, Gen. xii. 8; Jacob gives the place which before was called LUZ, the name of BETHEL, Gen. xxviii. 19, xxxv. 15, though the place was still, in the time of Joshua, called LUZ, as is plainly shewn by Josh. xviii. 13.

But the apparent anachronism vanishes on a closer examination. Jacob called first of all, not the town, but the place in its vicinity, where he had seen the angels of God ascending and descending, BETHEL, Gen. xxxv. 15. They are distinguished from one another in Josh. xvi. 1, 2, "And the lot of the children of Joseph goeth out from Bethel to Luz." By his descendants the name was transferred to the town; compare, for instance, Gen. xxxv. 6, "So Jacob came to Luz, which is in the land of Canaan, that is Bethel." That the Canaanitish inhabitants of the town still persisted in calling it as before Luz, and that the name Bethel had only a prophetic importance, was perfectly natural, and needed not to be expressly noticed. Not till the Israelites captured the town would the name Luz be superseded by the name Bethel.

---

\* That the name of ZION was used by the original inhabitants, appears from 2 Sam. iv. 9.

That this name (Bethel) was already in existence appears from its being given by the Israelites to Luz as soon as it was taken. It stands in no relation to any event of that time ; it only points to the fact recorded in Genesis ; and the fact to which the name refers lies far beyond the period of the invasion of the land ; and from the internal connection between names and things, this must also be true of the name.

How powerfully the minds of the Israelites were impressed by the transaction in which, according to the Book of Genesis, the name Bethel originated, we may learn from the circumstance, that during the war against the Benjamites, the Ark of the Covenant was in Bethel ; there also, after the war was over, the gathering of the people was held, before the Ark of the Covenant ; Judges xx. 18, 26 ; likewise from the fact that Bethel belonged to the number of the places consecrated by the recollection of past time, at which the people of the Ten Tribes rendered their self-chosen worship to the Lord. (See vol. i. p. 142.) Jeroboam trusted so much to the ancient sanctity of this place, that he considered it suited, in preference to all others, to be the rival of Jerusalem ; and, accordingly, there he erected his sanctuary. (See vol. i. p. 210.) Certainly as early as Samuel's time it was the seat of a private worship. 1 Sam. x. 3.

GESENIUS gives as his opinion, in the *Thesaurus*, p. 194, *ab his sanctuariis* (in the time of the Judges and Jeroboam) *haec urbs domus dei nomen facile sortiri potuit*. But the question arises, how came these *sanctuaria* there ? That the author of the Book of Judges places the ground of the choice of Bethel for a temporary seat of the Ark, in the transactions of past time, has been already shown (p. 38). And thus the name of Bethel is, at all events, earlier than these *sanctuaria*. Or must the passages in the Book of Joshua, and the minute narrative in Judges i. 22, be rejected ? How could the name Bethel have been current in the kingdom of Judah, if it had not, at a time when the name and the actual character of the place were strikingly contrasted, altogether abrogated the former name, and obtained absolute supremacy ? That the name Bethel is deduced, in Hosea iv. 15, xii. 5, from the transactions recorded in Genesis, has been already pointed out. (Vol. i. p. 114, 129.)



## BEFORE THERE REIGNED ANY KING OVER THE CHILDREN OF ISRAEL.

It is said in Genesis xxxvi. 31, "And these are the kings that reigned in the land of Edom, before there reigned any king over the children of Israel."

This passage is regarded by LE CLERC as a later addition. VATER (p. 643) maintains that it could not have been written till Israel had a king. VON BOHLEN (*Einleitung*, p. 69) remarks, the author is acquainted with kings in Gen. xvii. 6, 16; xxxv. 11; xxxvi. 31; xlix. 20; Deut. xvii. 14, xxviii. 36. "In many of these passages" (a proof of the almost inconceivable inaccuracy of this writer) "it is said, 'before kings ruled over Israel,' as if in the times of Charlemagne it was said, 'this happened before the Reformation.'"

The doubts which arise at the first view of this passage vanish entirely, when the reference it so palpably contains to the preceding promises to the patriarchs of a kingdom among their posterity is borne in mind, especially the passage in the preceding chapter (xxxv. 11), where God says to Jacob, "I am God Almighty; be fruitful and multiply; a nation and a company of nations shall be of thee; and kings shall come out of thy loins."

This reference has been perceived by the older expositors. J. H. MICHAELIS remarks, *Antequam impleretur promissio*, c. xxxv. 11, *mysterium crucis*. And CALVIN gives an excellent commentary on this short but pregnant intimation: *Memoria tenendum est, quod paulo ante diximus, subito excellere reprobos, ut statim concidant, sicut herba tectorum, quæ radice caret, præcocem habet vigorem, sed citius arescit. Duobus filiis Isaac promissa fuerat hæc dignitas, quod oriundi essent ab ipsis reges; priores incipiunt regnare Idumæi; ita videtur deterior esse Israëuitarum conditio. Sed tandem successus tempores docuit, quanto melius sit humi reptando altas agere radices, quam præposteram excellentiam momento acquirere, quæ statim evanescat.\**

---

\* Compare also WITSIUS, *Misc.* i. p. 125. Jacobo facta erat de regibus promissio, Esavo non Merito ergo observat Moses, tanquam r. m. memorabilem, et in qua ingens

Thus all peculiar difficulty is removed from this passage. It stands in a similar position with the rest, in which the erection of a kingdom is regarded as a necessary step in the development of the people of God. If persons are disposed to consider these passages collectively as marks of a later age, let them do so. But then, let them also strike out of history all other events, which tell us that to spirits of a high order a far-reaching glance into the future has oftentimes been permitted; let them with an unintelligent consistency blot out from the records of humanity whatever transcends the comprehension of their own little minds.

VON BOHLEN could not have appealed to a worse example than that of the Reformation. He has no perception that the pre-announcements of it, both in name and character, were made for centuries before it took place. Compare the copious collections in LÖSCHER, *Reformationsacta*, i. 145. WEIKHMANN, *de vaticiniis in genere, speciatimque de vaticiniis Lutheri*, Witten. 1755, p. 24. (Luther's own predictions, p. 30, &c.), and other writings there quoted; in reference to Joachim, at the end of the 12th century, RUDELBACH's *Life of Savonarola*, p. 297. St Brigitta, in the 14th century, p. 300, &c. Savonarola himself, p. 302, &c. What remarkable glimpses of the future BENGEL had, when his mind was freed from the fetters of his apocalyptic system, are collated by BURK in his *Life of Bengel*, p. 295. "Let us only observe," he writes, "whether the King of France will not become Emperor." "The German bishoprics and abbeys will become secularised." "The Latin language will no longer continue in current use, as it is at present. Generally literature will become quite a new and different thing." "The doctrine of the inner word will do immense mischief, if once the philosophers begin to make use of it. They will want to have (to speak humanly), the kernel without core, husk, or shell; that is, Christ without the Bible, and so, from what is most subtle, advance to what is grossest, without knowing what they are doing," &c.

Nor ought we to omit noticing the natural foundations which the presentiment of the erection of a kingdom had in Israel.

---

esset fidei exercitium, quod antequam haec promissio impleritur in posteritate Jacobi, Esavitae tot jam reges habuerint. Non est necesse propheticum hic quicquam fingere. Omnia historica sunt.

First of all, as regards the people. In this respect the phrase, "as all the nations," in the law respecting the king, Deut. xvii. 14, and the longing which the people expressed to Samuel, 1 Sam. viii. 4, show the strong desire and leaning of the people towards a kingly government. Surrounded on all sides by nations who had kings, how could they repel the influence of the monarchical spirit of the age? That this would sooner or later decidedly and inevitably assert its power, every intelligent person could foresee, especially when the defects of the existing polity were so apparent. Then, as regards God—whoever was aware of the defects of the existing polity, and perceived how injurious it was that the invisible king was not regularly represented by a visible ruler, and had learned by daily experience the truth of the maxim—

οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίῃ· εἰς κοίρανος ἔστω,  
εἰς βασιλεύς— II. ii. 204.

and at the same time that, on account of the sinful weakness of the people, the unity of the heavenly ruler was not alone sufficient to meet the exigency—for such a person, the expectation of the future institution of a regal government would be a simple result of the conviction that the Israelites were the chosen people, since it is regarded as a consequence of their election, in all the passages relating to the subject in Genesis.

#### THESE ARE THAT AARON AND MOSES.

Exod. vi. 26, 27. It is said at the close of the genealogy of Aaron and Moses, "these are that Aaron and Moses, to whom the Lord said, Bring out the children of Israel from the land of Egypt, according to their armies. These are they which spake to Pharaoh king of Egypt, to bring out the children of Israel from Egypt, these are that Moses and Aaron." This passage is one of the eighteen suspected by LE CLERC. *Non urgetur quidem*—he remarks—*tertia persona, sed pronomem demonstr.* אֵלֶּה et הֵם, *quod a vivente Mose et de se ipso scribente vix adhiberi potuisse videtur.* He then tries to remove the difficulty, but in a very unsatisfactory manner. VATER remarks, "We should only write thus of individuals after a considerable lapse of time."

KANNE (ii. 82) has remarked, that the words, even from the

point of view taken by our opponents, cannot possibly have for their object, to distinguish Moses and Aaron precisely as the individuals, by whom God effected the departure of the Israelites from Egypt, so that it might be known that they and no others were the persons. At what time would this have been necessary? Every child knew it. And it was sufficiently expressed in the preceding context.

If the real object and the true meaning of the words can be ascertained, their singular appearance, and every difficulty connected with it, will vanish.

Ver. 13, and ver. 26, 27, the beginning and the close of the Genealogy contained in ver. 14-25, have one common object—to show why it was inserted at all, and why at this particular place. They were the persons to whom God spoke, whom he sent to Israel and to Pharaoh, and who performed what this commission involved. In their dignity as the messengers of God, who were now entering on public life, lay the importance of their genealogy in a work which was intended to describe the Divine leadings of Israel. “These are that Aaron and Moses,” in this connection is equivalent to saying, this is the genealogy of Aaron and Moses; or these are Aaron and Moses according to their genealogical relations.\* We obtain a reason for justifying this more exact description from what immediately proceeds; “these are the heads of the fathers of the Levites, according to their families.” We obtain the same result from comparing ver. 27 with ver. 13, the end reverts with undeniable design, and a verbal coincidence, to the beginning—“to Pharaoh king of Egypt, to bring out the children of Israel from Egypt.” So also the expression “these are that Aaron and Moses,” at the close in ver. 26, corresponds to “these be the heads of their fathers’ houses, in ver. 14, at the commencement of the genealogy. At the beginning we have, “And the Lord spake unto Moses and unto Aaron,” whose genealogy follows; at the end, this is the genealogy of Moses and Aaron to whom God spake.

---

\* The words are repeated at the end of ver. 27, in order to mark precisely the close of the genealogy and the resumption of the history. They here perform the same service as the phrases of transition in more connected historical writings. At the beginning the genealogical reference predominates, and Aaron stands as the elder,—at the end, the historical point of view is taken, and Moses is named first as the most important personage; just as in ver. 13, Moses is first, where the author passes from history to genealogy.

## EXOD. XVI. 33-35.

It is here said, at the close of the account of the Mannah, ver. 33, "And Moses said unto Aaron, Take a pot, and put an omer full of manna therein, and lay it up before the Lord, to be kept for your generations;" ver. 34, "As the Lord commanded Moses, so Aaron laid it up *before the Testimony*, to be kept;" ver. 35, "And the children of Israel did eat manna forty years, until they came to a land inhabited; they did eat manna, until they came unto the borders of the land of Canaan."

Most of the inferences which have been drawn from this passage (see VATER p. 445, 446), can only be of force against those defenders of the genuineness who maintain the successive composition of the Pentateuch in its present form. These persons indeed are here thrown into extreme perplexity, and the means which they use to free themselves from it, only serve to make it more visible. Particularly this is the case in reference to the *לִפְנֵי הַתְּעוּדָה* in ver. 34, according to the common interpretation: "before the testimony" = the tables of the law; this is incompatible with the supposition of the account being recorded at this place and time; for the tables of the law were not constructed till afterwards, and the account of their being laid in the Ark of the Covenant is in ch. xl. 20. Following SCHEIBEL (i. 120), KANNE (ii. 82), denies that *תְּעוּדָה* denotes the tables of the law. According to him the testimony means the place where God testified of himself to the Israelites, a holy place in the camp where God manifested himself before the erection of the Tabernacle. This supposition which has lately been adopted by BAUER (*Die Rel. des A. T.* Berl. 1838, i. 300) is just as arbitrary as the attempt of VATKE, (p. 409), to understand by the word *תְּעוּדָה* in 2 Kings xvii. 15, a passage irreconcilable with his hypothesis—not the law but some of the royal ensignia no longer known. HERTZ (in his *Spuren des Pent. in den BB. der Könige* 66), has noticed that *תְּעוּדָה* in more than a hundred passages where it occurs has never any other meaning than that of *Testimonies* = *Law*:\* KANNE's interpreta-

---

\* Even the two passages, Ps. lx. 1, and lxxx. 1, are not (as ROSENMÜLLER thinks) to be excepted. We can scarcely conceive how any person can explain *לִפְנֵי הַתְּעוּדָה*

tion is the less admissible, since the law bears the name of עֲדוּת not as testifying the will of God, in which sense it would be equivalent to Revelation, but as testifying against the transgressions of the people. This is evident from Deut. xxxi. 21, 26, "Take this book of the law, and put it in the side of the Ark of the Covenant of the Lord your God, that it may be there for a witness against thee." This meaning is also supported by the relation of אֲדוּת to אֲפֹרֶת *Ἰλαστήριον*; compare Exod. xxv. 21, "And thou shalt put the *Capporeth* above upon the ark; thou shalt put the *Eduth* that I shall give thee." Between the *Eduth*, which accused the people of their sins, and the Lord, the holy and the righteous, the *Capporeth* was placed, which was sprinkled with the blood of Atonement; compare Lev. xvi. 13, "that the cloud of the incense (the symbol of prayer that founds itself on the blood of atonement) may cover the *Capporeth*, that is upon the *Eduth*, that he die not." Num. vii. 89.

But as soon as it is felt necessary on many other grounds, particularly by the artistic composition, to refer the final digesting of the Pentateuch to the latter days of Moses, all difficulties vanish. We have here the *locus classicus* on the manna; Num. xi. 7, is only a supplementary notice. That the author here introduces an account of the manna which belongs to a latter time, is quite natural and agreeable to his constant practice, as for instance in Genesis, that everything belonging to one patriarch might be told together, his death, &c., although it might be considerably beyond the following time. A similar method occurs in the other historical books. Thus in 1 Sam. xvii. 54, in the narrative of David's victory over Goliath, it is mentioned that he brought his head to Jerusalem, which did not happen till four years later; Luke, in ch. ii. 19, 20, adds to the narrative of the public appearance of John the Baptist, the account of his imprisonment.

But the statement in ver. 35, that the Israelites eat manna forty years, till they came to an inhabited country, to the borders of

---

otherwise than of the law, if they only compare the four passages, Exod. xxv. 16, 22; xxxi. 18; xxxii. 15. Not without design, moreover, is the law here called עֲדוּת. The testimony of God's grace towards his people, strengthening the accusation, must stand beside the other testimonies against the transgressions of his people. That the law under this character is called עֲדוּת we shall afterwards prove more fully than has been done above, in the disputation on the theology of the Pentateuch.

Canaan, appears to go beyond the time of Moses, particularly if compared with Josh. v. 11, 12, according to which the manna lasted some time after the death of Moses. LE CLERC, with whom ROSENMÜLLER agrees, knows no other expedient than to explain the verse as a gloss, a supposition which is so much the more doubtful, because the verse stands in so strict a connection with the foregoing statements, which likewise relate to the later history of the manna. *Respondent quidem nonnulli*, observes LE CLERC (de scr. Pent. No. 12)—*scivisse Mosen, ut liquet ex Num. xiv. 33, Mannam post quadraginta annos, ingredientibus Israelitis terram Cananaem cessaturam, sed hoc narratur hic, non prædicitur, ideoque præterito utitur Moses. Itaque hunc versum κατά παρενθήκην additum dicere malim, ex occasione antecedentium, ubi de Gomero Manna pleno ad arcem ponendo scomo est.*

But on looking at the passage more closely, it appears to contain nothing which goes beyond the time of Moses, or which he could not have written. He informs us that the manna was not imparted to the Israelites as a transient benefit, to meet a sudden emergency, but was continued through the whole time of their march from the first to the fortieth year, when they reached the borders of an inhabited country. Nothing is said about what happened afterwards (compare the remarks on  $\tau$  in *the Introduction to Daniel*), though it lies in the nature of the case, and is intimated by the expression, “to a land inhabited,” that the manna could now be continued no longer. The author does not forestall the later historical development, and its expected record. That the  $\tau$  must be understood, as we have taken it, that the author means only to state the time when the manna still continued, not to determine the point of time when it ceased, appears from Josh. v. 11, 12. According to this passage, which, agreeably to the constant relation of the Book of Joshua to the Pentateuch, can contain no contradiction to the one before us, the manna lasted for some time after the Israelites had entered the inhabited land. Let any one compare this passage, which annexes itself to the other exactly as a continuation, how entirely different it is constructed:—“And they did eat of the old corn of the land—and the manna ceased on the morrow after they had eaten of the old corn of the land. neither had the children of Israel manna any

more, but they did eat of the fruit of the land of Canaan that year." What is *here* narrated really happened at a time when Moses had closed his work.

## OMER.

VATKE remarks (p. 633), In Exod. xvi. 36, Num. iii. 47, xviii. 6, it is written, "an Omer is the tenth part of the Ephah;" this explanation is remarkable, if it was not rendered necessary by the changes of time.

In the first place, here is an oversight to be corrected, which we would pass over in silence, if it did not show how our opponents pick up whatever may serve their object, without previously subjecting it to rigid proof, like persons whose great aim is truth. The observation is found only in Exod. xvi. 36; in the two latter passages there is nothing of the kind but only the remark that "the shekel is twenty gerahs." Very far from connecting the passages in the original, VATKE only takes them at second-hand from LE CLERC, *de scr. Pent.* where (No. 13. p. 28) the words occur which, very slightly glanced at, gave occasion to his mistake: *similia occurrunt de nummo*, Num. iii. 47; xviii. 6, that the observation by which LE CLERC endeavours to obviate the objection against the genuineness taken from Exod. xvi. 36—(*non constat unquam Judæos inter se aliis mensuris in Palaestina usos esse, ut ea de causa veteres mensuras definiri oporteret*)—is past over without notice, is just what might be expected.

J. D. Michaelis first pointed out the way for completely removing the difficulty (*Suppl.* p. 1929), when he gave up the current supposition that אֵמָר is the name of a measure. He

compares the Arabic وَرْد *catini sive poculi parvi genus omnium minimum*; and remarks, *proprie ergo nomen poculi fuit, quale secum gestare solent Orientales per deserta iter facientes, ad hauriendam si quam rivus vel fons offerret aquam—hoc in poculo, alia vasa non habentes, et mannam collegerunt Israelitæ.* KANNE also, independently, as it would seem, of MICHAELIS, arrived at the same result. (ii. 77). He thinks that the Omer was a common earthen vessel which was generally about the



same size as for instance the copper mug (*Kufferkrüge*) among us, so that it could be easily used as a measure.

With this result we also agree, and would here attempt to raise it above a mere conjecture; which cannot be effected by appealing to the Arabic, to which KANNE confines himself. Against this method many objections present themselves; for instance, that it separates עֹמֶר from the meaning of its root in Hebrew,—*Omer*, in the sense of *a vessel*, is separated in an unallowable manner from *Omer* in the sense of *a sheaf*. However, the isolated comparison could only acquire importance on the ground of a comprehensive investigation respecting the root עֹמֶר in the Semetic dialects; and this presents so many difficulties, that the question at once arises whether it is suited to form a solid basis for any other.

Far more important, as it appears to us, is the following reason. The word *Omer* occurs in ver. 16, 18, 22, 23. At the close of the whole section in which it is used so often, stands the observation which determines its relation to the Ephah. It occurs nowhere else in the Pentateuch, nor in the rest of the Sacred writings. This must, indeed, appear strange; we can hardly suppose that *Omer* was the name of a measure. In that case, it would seem that there must have been other occasions for mentioning it; and if we were disposed to attribute this to accident, such an explanation is quite negatived by the fact, that a measure exactly of the size here attributed to the Omer, appears in a great many passages of the Pentateuch, without being called an Omer. In some places it is merely described appellatively as the tenth of an Ephah עֲשֵׂרִית־אֶפָה just as in the passage before us, compare Lev. v. 11; Num. v. 15; xxviii. 5. Very frequently (above twenty times in the Pentateuch) it is mentioned by the name עֲשֵׂרִית \* If *the Omer* had been the name of a measure, let it be explained why it never appears in these passages, as little as in this chapter עֲשֵׂרִית is interchanged with it. †

To this must be added the improbability that every Israelitish

\* WINER erroneously says, *mensura liquidorum* inst. ad *aridorum*. It is always used for dry things.

† From this it may be judged with what right Gesenius (*Thes. v. s. עֲשֵׂרִית*) remarks, (transferring to the עֲשֵׂרִית what at best could be only true of the Ephah,) *decima Bathi pars עֲשֵׂרִית dicatua*.

family, even to the least, possessed a measure. Even with us, such a thing is not found in the majority of households. On the other hand, every one must have some kind of cup or bowl. And if this was generally of about the same size among the Israelites, it lay in the very nature of the case that it was not always so; and the fixing of its contents by a statement of the proportion to a fixed measure, which was determined by the legal authorities, was altogether regular.

#### SIN-OFFERINGS AND TRESPASS-OFFERINGS.

“ The obscure distinction of sin-offering and trespass-offering, Lev. c. iv.–vii.,” it is asserted (see DE WETTE, *Einleitung*, § 149), “ must be put to the account of a writer who knew the Mosaic legislation only from practice.” This alleged anachronism can only therefore be disposed of, by our showing that the distinction in question was clearly defined and understood.

Sin may be contemplated under a two-fold aspect; first, as an indwelling faulty disposition, by which the harmony of the individual soul is disturbed, so that man falls out with himself, in a kind of internal distraction and self-apostacy; and, secondly, as an outrage against the holy God, a violation of his law, which man is bound, as a bearer of the Divine image, to keep, as an act of sacrilege which demands restitution and penitence, in short, as demerit and guilt. This latter mode of contemplating it is the more grave, and places in a clearer light the detestable nature of sin: while the former is conceivable on the ground of deism, or even of atheism; *this* can only exist where man recognises a living and holy God. From the point of view occupied by a true and vital godliness, it is said in 1 John iii. 4, *πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, καὶ τὴν ἀνομίαν ποιεῖ, καὶ ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία*, and our Lord teaches us to pray for the forgiveness of our debts, *ὀφειλήματα*, by which we are *deo obstricti, obnoxii*.

This distinction is expressed in Hebrew by the terms *חַטָּאת* and *פְּשָׁע*. That the latter has been erroneously defined, that to the verb and noun the meaning of *sinning* and *sin*, instead of *being indebted* and *debt*, is the cause that the distinction has not been clearly understood between *חַטָּאת* and *פְּשָׁע*, when they are used respect-

ing offerings. Also, in reference to the Arabic عُذْرٌ lexicographers have fallen into the same error; it means only *culpam contraxit*, not *peccavit*.

That עָשָׂה does not mean *deliquit*, that the primary meaning cannot be that of *negligentia*, is evident from the fact that עָשָׂה everywhere appears as a *consequence* of sin. Only compare Leviticus iv. 13, "And if the whole congregation of Israel sin, . . . and they have done some thing against any of the commandments of the Lord, concerning things which should not be done, עָשָׂה," ver. 22, "When a ruler hath sinned, and done somewhat through ignorance," &c. . . . עָשָׂה.

But the passage in Num. ver. 6, is peculiarly important for determining the meaning of עָשָׂה, where that is called עָשָׂה which a person had unjustly taken away from another, and for which he was bound to make reparation; ver. 7, "Then they shall confess their sin which they have done, and he shall recompense his *Asham*, עָשָׂה, with the principal thereof, and add unto it the fifth part thereof, and give it unto him against whom *he hath trespassed*, עָשָׂה; ver. 8, "But if the man have no *Goel* to recompense the עָשָׂה unto, let the *Asham* be recompensed unto the Lord, even to the priest; beside the ram of the atonement, whereby an atonement shall be made for him." This passage serves so much the more to determine the meaning of עָשָׂה in the *locus classicus*, Lev. ch. v., since it stands in undeniable relation to it. Num. v. 5-8 is the complement of Lev. v. 20-26; that this is its true character we may perceive, if we notice that the precept, as far as it is a repetition of the earlier, has the form of a verbal epitome, with which the supplementary matter is combined; the epitome is contained in ver. 5-7, the complement in ver. 8. Originally the case was left unnoticed, when the injured person was no longer living, and had no heir. The natural heir was then the Lord, who was wronged in the person of the brother. The Lord received in such a case a double עָשָׂה.

Now, if the meaning of עָשָׂה is thus defined, as we have shown, the passage in Lev. v. 15 will be explained. "He shall bring for his *Asham* to the Lord, a ram without blemish out of the flocks, with this estimation by shekels of silver, after the shekel of the sanctuary, עָשָׂה for an *Asham*." ROSENMÜLLER would here supply *is vel; is vel offerat in sacrificium pro peccato illo*

*arietem integrum vel siclos argenteos recti et justii ponderis, quantos sacerdos aestimabit, sive constituet.* But it is clear that this is not allowable. The ram of the זָשֵׁן receives an imaginary value according to the estimate of the priests. This ram, (it is intended to say), which N. N. presented as a compensation for his sacrilege, must be equivalent to the amount of the sacrilege. The ram which was presented as a compensation for the spiritual ὀφέλημα, was taxed as high as the sum which was given for the compensation for the outward material ὀφέλημα. By this symbolic act the idea of debt was most vividly impressed, the necessity of making a settlement with God was clearly exhibited.

It is also deserving of notice, that the circumstance is so distinctly marked that the זָשֵׁן was to be put to death at the holy place, like the זָשֵׁן and the זָשֵׁן; compare Lev. vii. 1; xiv. 13. This implies that there was something in the nature of the זָשֵׁן which might lead to an opposite conclusion, and to suppose that it was not to be reckoned among the other sacrifices, which it could be only according to our interpretation.

Our views also serve to explain the difference which existed in reference to the זָשֵׁן and הַזָּשֵׁן in the selection of animals for sacrifice. Compare CARPZOV (*Appar.* p. 708). *Ad זָשֵׁן arietes semper agnive masculi, ad הַזָּשֵׁן plane nulli usurpantur.* This implies that זָשֵׁן was the more valuable; for no one will agree with VENEMA (*Dissertatt.* p. 324), who, on the supposition that זָשֵׁן was the least considerable, remarks—*Quo autem gravius est peccatum, vilior erat oblatio.* That the הַזָּשֵׁן was the least heavy, appears also from the circumstance that lepers in cases of poverty were allowed to substitute two doves for it, while for the זָשֵׁן this was inadmissible.

After the preceding arguments, the cases may be now considered in which זָשֵׁן occurs without הַזָּשֵׁן—such namely in which a Divine law was transgressed without knowledge and intention, and others in which a person shared in the debt contracted by the sins of those with whom his own existence was closely implicated. Compare Lev. iv. 3, “If the priest that is anointed do sin according to the sin of the people,” אִם-הִפְתָּן הַקֹּהֵן הַמְּשִׁיחַ יִהְיֶה לְאִשְׁמַת הָעָם. On the other hand there is no case conceivable in which הַזָּשֵׁן is found without זָשֵׁן; every sin is at the same time a debt. This is shown very plainly in Lev. ch. iv. and ver. 1–13, where the הַזָּשֵׁן is spo-

ken of. Everywhere the *חטאת* is spoken of at the same time as an *זבח*, so that several expositors have erroneously referred the section v. 1-13 to trespass-offerings instead of sin-offerings. Compare for instance Lev. v. 5-7, "And it shall be, when he shall be guilty *אִשְׁמוֹתָא* in one of these things, that he shall confess that he hath sinned *חָטָא* in that thing. And he shall bring his *trespass-offering* *זֶבַח-חַטָּאת* unto the Lord for his *sin* *עַל חַטָּאתוֹ* which he hath sinned, a female from the flock, a lamb or a kid of the goats for a *sin-offering*, *זֶבַח-חַטָּאת*. And if he be not able to bring a lamb, then he shall bring for his *trespass* *זֶבַח-חַטָּאת* which he hath *sinned* *חָטָא*, two turtle-doves, or two young pigeons unto the Lord, one for a sin offering *זֶבַח-חַטָּאת*, and the other for a burnt-offering."

But although all sin-offerings were at the same time trespass-offerings, and there are good reasons for holding up this fact to notice, yet to give a stronger impression of the peculiarity of the latter, there was one particular class of trespass-offerings, for offences, in which the idea of debt was peculiarly prominent. That such was really the case, may be plainly pointed out in the three instances mentioned in Lev. v. 14-26, (v. 14-19; vi. 1-7), in which an *asham* was to be presented.

A two-fold *genus* of *זבח* is distinguished in Lev. v. 20 (vi. 1), by, "And the Lord spake unto Moses saying." Just as in ver. 14, the transition from *חטאת* to *זבח* is marked by the same expression. The two cases in ver. 14-16, and ver. 17-19, so far agree, that in them the trespass is committed immediately against God, and belongs to him alone. Hence the second case is joined to the first with an *or*. The third case of the *זבח*, on the contrary, in ch. v. 20-26 (vi. 1-7) is one in which God is only injured mediately. "If a soul sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord, and lie unto his neighbour in that which was delivered him to keep," &c.

In ver. 14-16 the idea of *incurring a debt* is not merely prominent, because sin is directly against God, but rather because it here relates to an injury against God in the grossest sense, a violent seizure of what peculiarly belonged to him. This is conveyed in the clause *נָשַׁב בְּיָד הַיְהוָה זֶבַח*. The *זֶבַח* always denotes faithfulness, and that of the most secret kind. In Num. v. 12-27, it is used respecting the secret infidelity which a woman practised

against her husband. In Jos. vii. 1 it is said  $\text{וְהִמְעֵל מִעַל בְּהֶרֶם}$ . Also merely  $\text{וְהִמְעֵל}$  with  $\text{פ}$  occurs, as for instance 1 Chron. v. 25. Hence J. D. MICHAELIS and others erroneously render the passage *cum deliquerit delicto*. Because there had been breach of trust there must be compensation. Achan had defrauded God in a two-fold respect, as owner, as one of the injured parties, and as the living moral governor of the world. The first respect—according to which God had a share in the same compensation as Achan's injured brethren—was peculiarly Israelitish, a consequence of the theocracy. God as king had his crown-rights. We only remark further, that the  $\text{וְהִמְעֵל בְּשִׁטְתָּהּ}$  in ver. 15 does not mean some specific offence, but what is common to all sins which could be atoned for by sacrifices. It stands parenthetically (it being supposed that the sin is one of inadvertence). The opposite is expressed by  $\text{בְּיַד גְּזֵהָ}$ , *manu elata*, Num. xv. 30, 31 = *ἐκουσλως* in Heb. x. 26. The specific offence is expressed by  $\text{בִּי הִמְעֵל מִעַל}$ .

In the second case, v. 17-19, the emphasis rests on  $\text{וְלֹא יָדַע}$ ; "And if a soul sin, and commit any of those things which are forbidden to be done by the commandments of the Lord, though he wist it not (viz., the commandment, or that he had violated it), yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity." That the idea of debt is here peculiarly intended, appears evident from what has been already remarked. Satisfaction must be rendered to the law of the holy God, even when it has not been recognised as such. The  $\text{וְשֵׁם אֲשֶׁר}$  *reus est omnino domino*, stands in contrast to the very probably opposite opinion, in which a tender conscience, when brought into such a situation, would never rest, but would rather seek forgiveness for the sin of which it was unconscious at the time. It is worthy of notice how sharply distinctions are marked in the Mosaic law, that what is common is expressed in the same words, and then what constitutes the difference is added. As in ver. 14, the great leading word is  $\text{וְהִמְעֵל מִעַל}$ , so here it is  $\text{וְלֹא יָדַע}$ . This is wanting in iv. 22, "When a ruler hath sinned, and done somewhat through ignorance against any of the commandments of the Lord his God," &c. Where  $\text{לֹא יָדַע}$  does not occur, there is  $\text{הִשָּׂאָה}$ . Then in this case it plainly appears that  $\text{וְשֵׁם אֲשֶׁר}$  in relation to  $\text{הִשָּׂאָה}$  is only of greater weight *in abstracto*, not *in concreto*. Circumstances might occur which would be the occasion of rendering prominent the importance of the  $\text{וְשֵׁם אֲשֶׁר}$  even in pro-

portionably lighter violations of the law. The selection of more valuable victims for the  $\text{זָנוּה}$  must be referred to the idea of  $\text{זָנוּה}$ , not to the concrete case.

The third case, ver. 20, &c. (*interversio rei alienae vel creditae, vel casu repertae, vel vi extortae et jurato abnegatae*, MICHAELIS), may be explained by the first, from which it is only distinguished in this particular, that here the robbery was mediate, committed on God in the person of a neighbour, while there it was immediate. *Every laesio proximi* is strictly and equally an  $\text{זָנוּה}$ ; but primarily the idea of  $\text{זָנוּה}$  is connected with a material breach of trust.

## HORMAH.

It is said in Num. xxi. 1-3, "And when king Arad the Canaanite, which dwelt in the south, heard tell that Israel came by the way of the spies, then he fought against Israel, and took some of them prisoners. And Israel vowed a vow unto the Lord, and said, if thou wilt indeed deliver this people into my hand, then will I indeed utterly destroy their cities. And the Lord hearkened unto the voice of Israel, and delivered up the Canaanites, and they utterly destroyed them and their cities, and he called the name of the place HORMAH,"  $\text{הֹרְמָה}$ .

The earlier critics have found considerable difficulties in this narrative. Thus RELAND, *Videtur illa victoria contigisse cum duce Josua et trajecto Jordane triumpharunt de rege Arad. Jos. xii. 14, illic (Num.) per prolepsin narrata. Cur enim ex terra existiissent, in qua jam triumphabant?* (Pal. p. 721.) The view that the event is narrated *per prolepsin* is also adopted by BACHENE, ii. 2 § 366. The translator\* sets aside the euphemism, and remarks, in this case Moses could not have written this section, and Numb. xxi. 2, 3, must have been interpo-

---

\* BACHENE's work was originally written in Dutch, and translated into German by G. A. MAAS, under the title, "*Histor. und geogr. Beschreibung von Palästina, nach seinem ehemaligen u. gegenwart. Zustande, m. Charten, a. d. Holländ. m. Ann.*" Lpzg. 1766-1778, 2 Thle in 5 Bdn. gr. 8. [TR.]

lated by a later hand. Besides the reasons adduced by RELAND, it cannot be supposed that Israel could leave the southern part of the land, if at that time they had gained the victory over the Canaanites; he appeals also to Judges i. 17, according to which the place which hitherto had been called Zephath was first under Joshua, or, according to others, after Joshua's death, by Simeon, in connection with Judah, taken, placed under a curse, and called Hormah. ROSENMÜLLER agrees with this writer. (*Alt.* ii. 2, p. 313.) That by the later opponents of the genuineness of the Pentateuch this passage is confidently regarded as in their favour, is self-evident.

But the whole objection rests upon ignorance of the locality, and may be regarded as completely set at rest, by the light which the researches of modern travellers have cast upon it.

The southern boundary is formed by a mountain range which, in the Pentateuch (Deut. i. 7, 19, 20, 42, &c.), is mentioned under the name of the mountain of the Amorites. (Compare RAUMER, *Pal.* p. 41.) SEETZEN, when he travelled from Hebron to the mountains of Madarah, which lie to the south-west of the Dead Sea, descended by a rocky declivity to a fearfully wild, deep, and barren valley (xvii. 134). LEGH and his companions, when they travelled from Hebron towards the southern parts of the Dead Sea, saw, from the high western shore of the Sea, the great plain to the south of the Sea, and were descending for two hours into this plain by a path so steep that they were obliged to lead their horses. (See RAUMER, p. 42.)

Now, according to Numb. xiv. 45 ("Then the Amalekites came down, and the Canaanites which dwelt in that hill, and smote them, and discomfited them, even unto Hormah"), Hormah was situated on *this* side the southern mountain range. The attempt of the Israelites to take possession of the mountain did not succeed; they were driven back, and now the Amalekites and Canaanites "came down, and smote them, even unto Hormah." According to Deut. i. 44, Hormah and its vicinage belonged, strictly speaking, not to Canaan, but to Seir. "And destroyed you in Seir, even unto Hormah." RELAND, in a previous passage, remarks (p. 574), "*Sed Canaanaci se diffuderant jam eo tempore extra limites terrae Canaan proprie sic dictae, quod et in Emoraecis trans Jordanem videri potest.*"



Hence, when, at a later period, Hormah and the surrounding places were taken and put under a curse by the Israelites, their principal object was not yet gained. The chief power of the kings of Arad remained unconquered; the mountain boundary was insurmountable. Hence in Num. xxxiii. 40, 41, the march of the Israelites from the Red Sea is properly put in causal connection with the report that reached the kings of Arad, "And the Canaanitish king of Arad, who dwelt in the south of the land of Canaan, heard of the coming of the children of Israel. And they departed from Mount Hor, and pitched in Zalmonah."

The event has been correctly represented by LEAKE in the preface to BURKHARDT'S *Travels through Syria and Palestine*, i. 21 (of the German translation). "During their sojourn in the neighbourhood of Kadesh, the Israelites gained some advantages over the neighbouring Canaanites; but when they gave up, at last, all hope of penetrating through the boundaries which lie between Gaza and the Red Sea, they turned eastward with the design of making a circuit through the countries on the southern and eastern side."

Admitting this to have been the fact, that the Israelites again withdrew from this tract of country, and that the power of the Canaanites remained unbroken, it is evident, even without the information conveyed in the Book of Judges, that Hormah soon again became Zephath, and that it was reserved for a later age to change it again into Hormah. Joshua, indeed, made his way into these parts (Josh. x. 41); and the king of Hormah is in the catalogue of the kings conquered by him, xii. 14. But it does not appear that he took the city itself, or, if he did so, that the capture had any abiding consequences. Not till the expedition which the tribe of Simeon (to whom the city had been allotted in the division of the land, Josh. xix. 4) undertook in conjunction with Judah, did Zephah permanently become Hormah. That the name of the city was then altered, shows how vivid the recollection was of what had happened there in the days of Moses, and far from contradicting the narrative in the Pentateuch, serves to confirm it.

Still one difficulty remains, that the name Hormah appears in Num. xiv. 45, while yet, according to ch. xxi. 1-31, that name was first given to the place from the event there recorded. But this is an intentional and significant prolepsis, intimating that

both events stood under the same idea ; that the place had already become devoted by judgment on the house of God, before it received its name from the judgment on the world. The nominal, points to the real, prolepsis.

THE BOOK OF THE WARS OF THE LORD.

The citation in Num. xxi. 14, "*Wherefore it is said in the Book of the Wars of the Lord,*" &c., has already been eagerly applied to their purpose by the older opponents of the genuineness, such as PEYRERIIUS and SPINOZA ; and by the moderns, it has been reckoned as a principal passage among the alleged traces of a later age. (i.) A book, it is maintained (VATER, p. 643), in which the Wars of the Lord are described, is very hard to be imagined in the time of Moses, when the wars of God's people, some early victories over the Amalekites excepted, had only begun a few months before. But (ii.) it is absolutely inconceivable, that a book composed at that period, could be quoted as a voucher for the geographical notices which are contained in the preceding verses.

Several advocates of the genuineness have allowed themselves to be so pressed by these difficulties, that they have considered ver. 14 and 15 as a later gloss. Thus ROSENMÜLLER, who, in unison with the opponents of the genuineness, defines the object of the citation to be, *ut probetur Arnonem tangere Moabitarum fines, vel . . . ut Israelitas ad Arnonem usque victricia arma protulisse testimonio fide digno confirmetur.* We wish at once to set aside this solution. The two analogical expressions in ver. 17 and ver. 27, both oppose the notion of a gloss. There is also an agreement in the form of citation, particularly in the use of the future, here יֵאָמַר in ver. 17 יֵאָמְרוּ, in ver. 27 יֵאָמְרוּ.

Others attempt to weaken the force of the second argument by supposing that the book was written by an Amorite or a Moabite. Thus J. D. MICHAELIS, who is of opinion, that Moses appealed, on account of foreigners, with whom his assertion would have no weight, to a foreign authority. But, to set aside this unfortunate explanation, the use of the name JEHOVAH is sufficient. An attempt to force the truth of the history on doubters, and moreover

heathens, is altogether foreign to the Pentateuch. That the course of the Arnon was on the borders of the Moabites, was a fact which required no laborious proof; the analogy also of the two other citations is against it, &c. &c.

Let us begin with the second argument, to which alone our opponents themselves attribute decisive weight. We must reject, as altogether unfounded, the assumption to which it owes all its force, that the object of the citation is, to verify a geographical notice. That its object is a different one may be confidently inferred from the analogy of the two other poetical pieces in ver. 17, 18, and in ver. 27. These represent the impression which the leadings of the Lord had made upon his people. We obtain the same result from the consideration of the passage itself, if its sense is correctly determined. "Wherefore (since Israel, by the help of the Lord, conquered the country adjacent to the Arnon) it is said in the book of the wars of the Lord,

Vaheb (he took) in a storm  
And the streams of Arnon  
And the lowlands of the streams  
Which turn to the dwelling of Ar,  
And incline to the border of Moab."\*

וַאֲהֵב בְּסוּפֹה  
וְאֶת־הַנְּחָלִים אֲרֹנוֹן  
וְאֶת־הַנְּחָלִים  
אֲשֶׁר נֹשָׁף לְשֹׁבֹת עַר  
וְנִשְׁבְּן לְגִבְלוֹ מוֹאָב

The complement "Jehovah took" is borrowed from *מִלְחָמֹת יְהוָה*; Vaheb we are justified in taking as *nomen propr.* by the form which, in Hebrew, has very seldom ׀ at the beginning, (only two appellations with ׀ in the Pentateuch, (see EWALD'S *Smaller Grammar*, § 223; NICHOLSON'S *Trans.* p. 111; compare יִי as *nom. propr.* of a place in Arabia, Ezek. xxvii. 19; יִיִּי has its analogy in Nah. i. 3, "JEHOVAH hath his way in the storm." According to this construction, the passage is a voice from the congregation of Israel, acknowledging what the Lord had done for them. Under his leadership, they pressed forwards, without

\* The LXX. give essentially the same sense; διὰ τοῦτο λέγεται ἐν βίβλῳ πόλις κυρίου την' Ζοοβ ἐφλόγισε, καὶ τοὺς χειμάρρους Ἀρνών.

stopping, from place to place. Whatever withstood them, he overthrew it. The citation stands in the same relation to the narrative as the verses of KÖRNER, which a historian of the War of Freedom, who himself took a part in it, might perhaps introduce in his narrative. Who would imagine that the Arabian historians, when they so frequently quote verses which their heroes uttered in the tumult of battle, intended, by so doing, to prop their doubtful credibility?

Let us now turn to the first argument. At the time when Moses wrote this, a succession of wars of the Lord, in a peculiar sense, had already taken place, which might be celebrated in the book of the wars of the Lord, (not exactly a folio). The Amalekites were conquered—the king of Arad—the Midianites—Sihon, king of the Amorites—Og, king of Bashan. But the idea of the wars of the Lord is of much wider extent, according to the phraseology of the Pentateuch. This has been quite overlooked; but any person may be convinced of it by examining the following passages: Ex. xiv. 14, “The Lord shall *fight* for you, and ye shall hold your peace;” ver. 25, “For the Lord *fighteth* for them against the Egyptians;” xv. 3, “The Lord is a man of war.” Also ch. xii. 41, 51, and Num. xxxiii. 1; for when it is said in the last mentioned passage, that “the children of Israel went forth out of the land of Egypt, *according to their armies,*” גַּלְיָאֵם לְפָנָיו, such a representation implies that the Lord went at their head as leader of the host. Such an idea of the wars of the Lord being admitted, instead of a deficiency of objects for a book of the wars, there is the greatest abundance. Not merely the victories which the Lord granted to his people over a hostile world, of which the plagues of Egypt formed a part—but every thing else by which the leader evinced his care for his host when first led against their chief enemies, the Canaanites, events such as the finding of the well, recorded in ver. 16. Nor can we doubt that the song quoted in ver. 17 and 18 was taken out of the book of the wars of the Lord. The citation at the beginning will apply to the two following pieces. The song in ver. 27 is certainly not that of an Amorite. What Sihon had been to the Moabites, Israel was to the latter. If, therefore, such abundant materials existed for the book of the wars of the Lord, there can be no doubt that they were used and put in order for that purpose. The victory of the

idea over the reality will always call forth poetry. It might be assumed beforehand, that the period of the war of freedom would have its Körners and Schenkendorfs. The writing down of poetical productions, and then being united in one collection, is in perfect unison with what we know in other respects of the mental progress of the people, and particularly of the use of writing among them. Thus, then, the subjective in the book of the wars of the Lord harmonizes with the objective representation in the Pentateuch. We may perceive their mutual relation not only from the passages we have been considering, but also from the 15th ch. of Ex. in its connection with the preceding historical details.

HAVOTH-JAIR (חַוּוֹת יַאִיר.)

In the first place, there is a difficulty in reference to their number. In the Pentateuch (Deut. iii. 4), sixty Havoth-Jairs are spoken of; on the other hand, in 1 Chron. ii. 21, their number appears to be limited to twenty-three. But this difficulty vanishes when the passages in Chronicles is correctly understood with the necessary complements. It is as follows: ver. 21, "And afterwards Hezron went in to the daughter of Machir the father of Gilead, whom he married when he was threescore years old, and she bare him Segub. Ver. 22, And Segub begat Jair, who had three and twenty cities in the land of Gilead. Ver. 23, And Geshur and Aram took Havoth-Jair from them (the descendants of Jair), with Kenath and her daughters (the towns thereof, *Eng. Auth. Vers.*), threescore cities (in all)." The passage has this meaning, or it has no meaning. The total sum, therefore, was sixty; but, if these twenty-three were, in a stricter sense, Havoth-Jair, the remaining thirty-seven, Kenath and her daughters, belonged, indeed, to the same circuit (*complexus*), but yet, in some respects, were distinguished from them.

Let us now examine whether we cannot find in the Pentateuch traces of such a division of sixty towns. In Num. xxxii. 40 it is said, "And Moses gave Gilead unto Machir, the son of Manasseh, and he dwelt there; ver. 4, And Jair, the son of Manasseh, went and took חַוּוֹת יַאִיר their (the enemies'), Havoth (small towns, *Eng. Auth. Vers.*), and called them Havoth-Jair,

ver. 42, And Nobah went and took Kenath and her daughters נֹבָחַת־בְּנֵי־קֵנָתַיִם, and called it Nobah, after his own name." The question arises, in what relation Kenath and her daughters, which are here distinguished from Havoth-Jair, stand to the Havoth-Jair mentioned in Deuteronomy. The answer is, they formed a constituent part of them. The Nobah whose name occurs in the Book of Numbers must have been subordinate to the Jair, after whom he is mentioned, so that the towns taken by him were reckoned along with those of Havoth-Jair in a wider sense. There is, besides, no room left for Nobah. For, according to Deut. iii. 14, 15, "Jair, the son of Manasseh, took all the country of Argob, unto the coasts of Geshuri and Maachathi, and called them after his own name, Bashan-Havoth-Jair, unto this day. And I gave Gilead unto Machir." The whole portion of the tribe of Manasseh had only two chief possessors, Jair and Machir. The Havoth possessed by the former formed the region of Argob. That this was identical with Bashan, and did not merely form a part of it (besides ver. 14), is as distinctly as possible said in ver. 4, "all the regions of Argob the kingdom of Og in Bashan;" and ver. 13, "and the rest of Gilead and all Bashan, the kingdom Og, gave I unto the half-tribe of Manasseh, all the region of Argob or all Bashan." \* (נְשֵׁבֵי־אֲרָגוֹב). We obtain the same result from the situation of Nobah, compared with the circuit which is marked out for Jair's district. In the modern Dsholan, on the borders of Dshadur, is a place of considerable size, with ruins called Nobah. (BURKHARDT'S *Travels* p. 443, Germ. Trans. RAUMER on *East-Jordanic Judea*, in THOLUCK'S *Auzeiger*, 1835, p. 7). Nobah, accordingly, lay within Bashan, but all Bashan fell to the lot of Jair.

It appears, therefore, that the twenty-three towns in the books of Chronicles are those which Jair captured, and that the sixty towns which owned his supremacy included those which Nobah possessed under him. The new element which the passage in Chronicles contains, is only the account of the number of the sub-division of Havoth-Jair, which is as good as mentioned in

---

\* The identity of Havoth-Jair, the region of Argob, and Bashan, was acknowledged by the ancients, αὐτόστι' Ἰαεὶρ· αὐτῆ ἐστὶν ἡ Βάσαν. EUSEBIUS, *Argob, regio Og, regis Basan super Jordanem*; JEROME.

the Pentateuch. Moreover, in the passage in Chronicles, Gilead is taken in the wider sense, including Bashan, in which it often occurs in the later books; see RELAND, p. 194. VON RAUMER, Geog. p. 160; STUDER, *z. B. der Richter*, p. 269. The expedient which VON RAUMER proposes for reconciling the passage in Chronicles with the Pentateuch (THOLUCK'S *Auzeiger*, p. 11), that Jair possessed sixty towns in Bashan, but, besides these, had twenty-three towns in Gilead, is destitute of all foundation. This explanation is not reconcilable even with the passage in Chronicles; and a possession of Jair's in Gilead in a narrower sense, of which the part lying nearest to Bashan was allotted to Machir, the remainder to Reuben and Gad, cannot, according to the Pentateuch, be thought of; compare particularly Deut. iii. 12, a passage which is as distinct as possible; also Num. xxxii. 39, 40. The collective relations of the region on the other side Jordan were as follows. Reuben and Manasseh possessed the southern part of Gilead; the half-tribe of Manasseh occupied the northern part, with all Bashan or Argob; of this district the northern part, Gilead, was allotted to Machir, and Jair possessed Bashan, of which one part was held under his own immediate jurisdiction, the other part Nobah governed under him.

After having removed this difficulty, another awaits us, which in former times has been much discussed. As it is generally regarded as much more important than the first, we have placed the examination of it in the section on the alleged traces of a later age. It is said in Judges x. 3-5, "And after him rose Jair a Gileadite, and judged Israel twenty and two years. And he had thirty sons that rode on thirty ass-colts, and they had thirty cities, which are called Havoth-Jair, which are in the land Gilead. And Jair died and was buried in Canaan. The identity of this Jair with the Mosaic Jair (it is maintained), is evident, because the improbable supposition of a double Jair is wholly excluded, by the circumstance that the origin of the name Havoth-Jair is deduced exactly in the same way from the Jair in the Pentateuch, and the Jair of the Book of Judges; not to say that we cannot imagine that the younger Jair possessed exactly the same place which the elder had captured. But, if this identity be established, it is the commonly received opinion that the author of the Pentateuch must have transferred a person who lived much later into the

Mosaic age. STUDER, indeed, (*z. B. d. Richter*, p. 274, 474), acquits the author of the Pentateuch of all blame, and would lay it on the author of the Book of Judges. According to him, a Jair, who was already living in the time of Moses, must have continued to the time of the Judges who governed Israel after Joshua.

If the case were really so, that we must give up either the author of the Book of Judges, or the author of the Pentateuch, we should unquestionably decide for the former. For the arguments which are urged against the accounts of the Pentateuch respecting Jair, amount to nothing. The assertion, that a particular expedition of Jair's would not be in its right place in the last months of Moses, we may fairly pass over in silence. The question, could so many towns be given as a possession to a single great grandson of Manasseh, receives its plain answer from Num. xxxii. 41, and Deut. iii. 14. Jair, a valiant warrior, held what he had gained with his sword and his bow; the right fairly followed the possession. Objections such as, "The account respecting Jair is rendered improbable by the genealogy, 1 Chron. ii. 21, in which Machir is the father of Gilead, the grandfather of Segub, who was the father of Jair; but Moses must have given Gilead to Machir, and, at the same time, must also have made his great-grandson leader of that expedition, and have called the conquered places after his name"—could only perplex a person who has paid as little attention as he who started them. Machir stands, according to numberless analogies, for his race, his descendants in a direct line. For this we need not appeal to Josh. xiii. 31, where, instead of Machir, it stands the sons of Machir *בְּנֵי-מַכִּיר*; nor to Numb. xxvi. 29, where Machir's genealogy is given at length down to his great-grandson Zelophehad, who stands in the same relation to him as Jair, and who, when he died in the wilderness, had daughters grown up (compare xxvii. 1, &c.) The passage in Num. xxxii. 39, 40, is sufficient by itself not only to refute but to confound our opponents; ver. 39, "And *the sons* of Machir, the son of Manasseh, went to Gilead and took it. Ver. 40, And Moses gave Gilead to Machir!" So much for modern criticism! Then VATER urges that the region of Argob, with its cities, which, according to Deut. iii., were captured by Jair, is, in 1 Kings iv. 13, expressly distinguished from the towns of Jair. Here we have very palpable evidence of



the fragmentary quality of the book of VATER, and for the plurality of its authors. For on Deut. iii. 4, vol. ii. p. 218, we read, "The passages in ver. 14 are plainly of Argob, and particularly 1 Kings iv. 13, according to which this region and its towns are exactly the same which are elsewhere called the towns of Jair." Is it possible that one and the same author could so directly contradict himself, as in the second passage totally to forget what he had written in the first? Lastly, the assertion that no harmony exists between the passages in Numbers and Deuteronomy, but, on the contrary, much that is perplexing, scarcely deserves that we should waste a word upon it. That man's mind must be strangely confused who can find confusion where the harmony is as clear as day. In Numbers it is said, "And Moses gave Gilead unto Machir, the son of Manasseh, and he dwelt therein. And Jair, the son of Manasseh, went and took *their Havoth* אֶת־הַחַוּוֹתָיִם (the small towns thereof, *Eng. Auth. Vers.*), and called them Havoth-Jair;" in Deuteronomy, "Jair, the son of Manasseh, took all the country of Argob . . . and called them after his own name Bashan-Havoth-Jair, even unto this day. And I gave Gilead unto Machir." Does it require extraordinary skill to harmonize these two passages?

On the other hand, in favour of the correctness of the statements of the Pentateuch, and the existence of a Mosaic Jair, there are the following positive reasons. *First*, The name *Havoth* points to an older age than that of the Judges, as likewise the word חֶבֶל (חֶבֶל אֶרֶץ Deut. iii. 4, 13, 14), which afterwards is found only once in poetry in the sense of *region* or *country*; Zeph. ii. 5, 6, חֶבֶל is connected with חֶבֶל *Evah*; see GESENIUS, *Theo.* p. 451; its derivation *a vivendo alicubi* had been already proposed by SERRARIUS; the original more general name was lost at a later period out of the language as an *appellative* out of the language, and then became *the proper name* of those particular towns. It is not essentially different from חֶבֶל in 2 Sam. xxiii. 13 חֶבֶל חֶבֶל, for which we have in 1 Chron. xi. 15, חֶבֶל חֶבֶל.\* And if with SCHMID, *ad. l. Jud.* p. 978, we take *Havoth* to be an Ara-

---

\* The meaning *village* or *borough* (*Dorf, Flecken*) given to חֶבֶל is forced. According to Deut. iii. 5, the "three score cities" were "fenced with high walls, gates, and bars."

maic word, for which it may certainly be argued that already in the Mosaic age the forms *הַיָּר* and *הַיָּרָה* were almost entirely supplanted by the forms *הַיָּרָה* and *הַיָּרָה*, we obtain the same result. For the foreign *appellativum* could only maintain itself a longer time by its connection with the *nomen propr.* That the Mosaic Jair found it and retained it, is perfectly natural; certainly it would not have reached to the Jair of the Book of Judges. *Secondly*, The genealogy of Jair in 1 Chron. ii. 21, &c., is particularly important, by which we have a testimony perfectly independent of the Mosaic for the age of Jair. "If this genealogy be correct" —(STEUDER remarks, p. 274)—"and why should we doubt its credibility? Jair was certainly not contemporary with Moses, but his age falls not long after Joshua, and at all events a considerable time before the Jair of the Book of Judges." The "certainly not," &c. is only supposed, in order to obtain what is advantageous for the friends of the Book of Judges, but not for the friends of the Pentateuch. That the Jair of the Chronicles falls within the Mosaic age, admits of very simple proof. Jair and Zelophehad were both great-grandsons of Machir; the former through a daughter of Machir, of whom Hezron, a descendant of Judah, begat Segub, the father of Jair; the latter by direct male descent. Now Zelophehad died during the journey through the Wilderness, and at a very advanced age, for he left behind him children grown up. How then can it be affirmed that Jair lived beyond the time of Joshua? *Thirdly*, Independently of the Pentateuch, and undesignedly, there is also an indirect confirmatory statement in the Book of Joshua, to which, for this very reason, we give the precedence before the direct evidence. It is said in Joshua xix. 34, in the account of the boundaries of the tribe of Naphthali, "The coast . . . reached to Judah upon Jordan, toward the sun rising." What are we to understand by "Judah upon Jordan?" Nothing else, as VON RAUMER has pointed out, than Havoth-Jair. Jair descended, according to the genealogy in the Chronicles, on the mother's side from Manasseh, and on the father's side from Judah; but commonly he was called Manasseh from the maternal ancestors, perhaps because his father was a bastard (compare Judges xi. 1, 2), and because his possession lay divided by the tribe of Judah, or for some other reason with which we are not acquainted. What is expressly said in the

Chronicles respecting Jair's descent, is implied in the Pentateuch. But hence it appears why Jair is called the Manassite, and yet is descended from the posterity of Machir, the only son of Manasseh, and set in opposition to them, and does not appear in the genealogy of Manasseh. If now a "Judah upon Jordan toward the sun-rising," according to the testimony of the Book of Joshua, was in existence at the division of the Cis-Jordanic land, then must Jair, in whom that existence was founded, have belonged to the Mosaic age. Indeed, only grant in general, that there was a Judah eastward of Jordan, and we arrive at the same. For since there were no later alterations in the possessions of the tribes, and the respective apportionments remained as they were at first determined, there was, if at all, even in Moses' time, a Judah on the east of Jordan. *Fourthly*, The existence of a Mosaic Jair is also confirmed by *the direct* testimony of the Book of Joshua. It is said in Joshua xiii. 30, 31, in the description of the territory of the half tribe of Manasseh, "And their coast was from Mahanaim, all Bashan, all the kingdom of Og, king of Bashan, and all Havoth-Jair (all the towns of Jair, *Eng. Auth. Vers.*) which are in Bashan, threescore cities. And half Gilead, and Ashtaroth, and Edrei, cities of the kingdom of Og in Bashan [were pertaining] unto the children of Machir, the son of Manasseh." According to this account, even in the Mosaic division, Havoth-Jair was situated in the trans-Jordanic tract. It appears from this passage, in proof of its independence, that two cities were taken from the kingdom of Og and assigned to Machir; the *whole* of Bashan, both here and in the Pentateuch, receives, therefore, a limitation. *Fifthly*, It is said in 1 Kings iv. 13, in giving the list of Solomon's twelve officers, "Ben Geber in Ramoth-gilead; to him pertained the Havoth-Jair of the son of Manasseh, which are in Gilead; to him also pertained the region of Argob, which is in Bashan, three score great cities, with walls and brazen bars." The author can by no means intend to say that Ben Geber possessed, *besides* Havoth-Jair, the region of Argob. The verbal coincidence with Deut. iii. 4, 5, which is so striking that it cannot have been accidental, is against such a supposition. In that chapter it is expressly said, in ver. 14, that Jair the son of Manasseh, took all the country of Argob, and called it after his name Havoth-Jair. If the second  $\text{\textcircled{S}}$  "to him," as well as the first, be referred to Ben

Geber, we must suppose that the author began afresh the description of his territory, as if he had said, "to make use of another geographical denomination, he had the country of Argob," &c. But we may, with KANNE, ii. 122, refer the second  $\ddot{\nu}$  to Jair. Ben Geber had the Havoth of Jair, *to whom* belonged the country of Argob. The verbal coincidence with Deuteronomy forbids our supposing that by Jair, the son of Manasseh, any other can be understood than the Mosaic. But this verbal coincidence with Deuteronomy prevents this testimony from standing on an equality with the rest.

We have hitherto shown, that if the passages in the Pentateuch and in the Book of Judges are not reconcilable, the decision must necessarily depend on the former, which has the evidence from other quarters in its favour, while the notice in the Book of Judges stands quite solitary and unsupported. But it now remains for us to show that the passage in the Book of Judges, so far from contradicting the statements of the Pentateuch, serves rather to confirm them.

The occurrence of two Jairs in one and the same district, both having the jurisdiction of cities, could only create a difficulty if they were totally independent of one another. But here it can be shewn that the existence of the second Jair stands in causal connection with the first to whom it conducts us. It is in the nature of things, and hence occurs among all nations, that the names of distinguished ancestors, particularly when (as in the case of Jair, *the resplendent, the glorious one*), they are titles of honour, are transferred to their descendants. A wish arises that they should live again in their grand-children, that by them the family may again attain the splendour which was shed on it by their illustrious progenitor.\* Among us the natural tendency is gratified by surnames; among the Hebrews the whole department of proper names stood open, and there was more eagerness in taking

---

\* SIMONIS, *Onom.* p. 17, remarks—"Inter rationes nominum et haec obtinuit, ut obhonorem alicujus viri intantem eodem nomine cohonestarent, ut Machli filius Muschi cohonestatur nomine Machli avunculi sui. LIGHTFOOT, *Opp.* ii. 494. Maxime vero nepotibus nomina avorum reddita leguntur, ut Jojada, Korah, &c. Idem apud Graecos et Latinos obtinuit. (*Citate*). Talis imposito nominum vel memoriae et exempli, vel similitudinis ergo fiebat. . . Similiter Christiani primi et V. T. Patriarcharum, ex N. T. Apostolorum aliorumque sanctorum nomina liberis indidere.

advantage of this circumstance, in proportion as the feeling of family connection was more vivid. The relations of Zechariah could not imagine that he would choose a name for his son, which had not already been used in the family, Luke i. 61. We have a very notable instance in an ancestor of Jair's, Tola the son of Puah (תּוֹלָא בֶן-פּוּאָה), Judg. x. i. Both names, his own and his father's, are found in Gen. xlvi. 13, "And the sons of Issachar, Tola and Puah" (תּוֹלָא וְפּוּאָה). As now Tola the son of Puah furnishes a confirmation for the existence of a Tola and Puah in Genesis xlvi.\* so the Jair of the Book of Judges corroborates the existence of a Mosaic Jair. No doubt many a time besides, the name Jair was repeated in the family, but only on this occasion was the wish fulfilled that was expressed by the imposition of the name.

It now only remains to notice that, according to the Book of Judges, Havoth-Jair were named from the Jair mentioned in that book, while according to the Pentateuch they were named from the Mosaic Jair. But the difficulty that is found here proceeds only from an incapacity to enter into the nature of the ancient oriental mode of giving names. See vol. i. p. 280, 281. By means of the second Jair who inherited the prowess of his ancestors, the name Havoth-Jair bloomed afresh, which perhaps had already become obsolete, but no doubt was more and more a *nomen vanum*, a mere *nomen proprium* which called up no recollections, although not in all the cities (for he did not succeed in recovering the whole of his ancestral domains), yet at least in one-half. The rest might still be called Havoth-Jair (the passage in the Book of Kings leads us to suppose so), but they had ceased to be the towns of Jair.

## HERMON.

In Deut. iii. 9, it is said, "Hermon the Sidonians call Sirion (סִירִיּוֹן) and the Amorites call it Shenir" (שֶׁנִּיר), ch. iv. 48, "From Aroer,

---

\* Especially since Tola is described as תּוֹלָא בֶן-יִשָּׁכָר, son of his uncle. LXX. υἱὸς Φουὰ υἱὸς πατραδέλφου αὐτοῦ, probably because he was reckoned as his uncle's son according to the Levirate law. In him the two brothers became one, and this it seems was indicated by the choice of the name.

which is by the bank of the river Arnon, even unto Mount Sihon (שִׁיחֹן) which is Hermon."

Following CALMET, JAHN considers the passage Deut. iii. 9 as a gloss. The various denominations of Hermon, he thinks, must have been generally known in the time of Moses, so that he could not have any occasion to mention them. VATER remarks, p. 633, in reference to Deut. iv. 48, that such explanatory additions transport him who writes them down into a time when the explanatory name was the current one, not the other which is given as the name of the place at the time of the event spoken of.

We wish first of all to show that the supposition of a gloss in Deut. iii. 9 is inadmissible. Ch. ii. and iii. have this peculiarity, that we meet in them with a succession of parentheses which break the continuity of the composition. Ch. ii. 10-12, 20-23; ch. iii. 9, 11. From the manifest similarity of these parentheses, it is evident that they must either stand or fall together. Hence if we are successful in proving that any one of them forms an integral part of the composition, the supposition of either of the rest being a gloss will appear untenable.

In ch. ii. 10-12, it is said, "The Emims dwelt therein in times past, a people great and many, and tall as the Anakims; which also were accounted giants, as the Anakims, but the Moabites call them Emims. The Horims also dwelt in Seir beforetime, but the children of Esau succeeded them, when they had destroyed them from before them, and dwelt in their stead, *as Israel did unto the land of his possession, which the Lord gave unto them.*" In these last words the design of the parenthetical portions plainly appears. They were evidently intended not merely for the purpose of gratifying historical curiosity. It was rather intended to show Israel by these examples, that existing things were not unalterable. What in the common course of things had already happened frequently, under the guidance of the Lord, might it not also again occur where the special providence of God was at work? This object was perfectly suitable to the condition of the Israelites under Moses. It would not enter the thoughts of a later interpolator.

The same object is also apparent in ver. 20, &c., "That also was accounted a land of giants (Ammonitis); giants dwelt therein in old time; and the Ammonites called them Zamzummims; a people great and many, and tall as the Anakims; but the Lord

destroyed them before them, and they succeeded them and dwelt in their stead, as he did to the children of Esau, which dwelt in Seir, when he destroyed the Horims from before them, and they succeeded them, and dwelt in their stead even unto this day. And the Avims which dwelt in villages (בְּיַזְרִים, Hazerim, *Eng. A. V.*) even unto Gaza (אֲזָזָה, Azzah, *Eng. A. V.*) the Caphtorims, which came out of Caphtor, destroyed them, and dwelt in their stead." Even the giants, a people great and many, and tall, could not retain their ancient seats when the Lord willed to drive them out. The expression "*as the Anakim*" is not to be overlooked. The apprehensions which these details were intended to obviate are stated shortly before in ch. i. 27, "Whither shall we go up? our brethren have discouraged our heart, saying, The people is greater and taller than we; the cities are great and walled up to heaven; and moreover we have seen the sons of the Anakims there;" compare Num. xiii. 28, where the spies say, "Nevertheless, the people is strong that dwell in the land, and the cities are walled and very great; and moreover we saw the children of Anak there;" ver. 31, "We be not able to go up against the people, for they are stronger than we;" ver. 33, "And there we saw the Nephilim (giants, *Eng. A. V.*) the sons of Anak which come of the Nephilim, and we were in our own sight as grasshoppers, and so we were in their sight." To root out the prejudices which are here expressed, and by which the older generation was excluded from possessing the promised land, was the condition of victory for the succeeding one. Moses met them by reasoning *a minori ad majus*. What God did for the Moabites, Ammonites, Edomites, and Caphtorites, will he not also do for his own people? Thus it appears, that these passages only outwardly break the connection—that they were exactly suited to the state and disposition of the persons to whom Moses primarily addressed himself. The reason, by no means unimportant, which others have adduced for the Mosaic origin of these parenthetical portions, that the historical notices considered in themselves, the exact knowledge of the earliest times which they contain, carry us back to the times of Moses, now assumes only a subordinate position.\*

---

\* From the preceding remarks, it plainly appears what is to be thought of GEDDES' attempt (VATER, iii. 213) to explain ver. 10–12, and ver. 20–23, as interpolations; like-

Thus we have shown, that the supposition of an interpolation in ch. iii. 9 is not admissible. But neither can we understand what emergency could mislead to laying hold of this refuge from perplexity. For how do we know that the Sidonian and Amoritish name of Hermon was current among the Israelites in the time of Moses? According to the nature of things this was much less likely to be the case then, than later, so that the remark is still more difficult to be explained as a gloss. Are we justified in narrowly examining every such notice whether it was absolutely necessary for the contemporaries of the historian? Why should not the words be attacked, (in the passages which have been already justified as Mosaic, Deut. ii. 11), "The Moabites call them Emims;" ver. 20, "The Ammonites call them Zamzummims," which are exactly in the same class with the notice under consideration. If we view these notices collectively, we shall find ourselves transported to a time when information came to the Israelites in the midst of their new position, which precisely, by its novelty, excited an interest, and appeared memorable and worthy

---

wise of Vater's observation, that it is far less credible that such notices should be introduced by Moses than by a foreign narrator. The positive evidence for the Mosaic origin of these passages is so strong, that it will be no longer urged as evidence of a post-Mosaic date, which some have imagined in the preterite עָשָׂה in the former passage, ("as Israel *did* unto the land of his possession.") This עָשָׂה may be explained by Deut. iii. 21, 22, where Moses says to Joshua, "Thine eyes have seen all the Lord your God hath done עָשָׂה unto these two kings; so shall the Lord do unto all the kingdoms whither thou passest. Ye shall not fear them; for the Lord your God, he shall fight for you." Properly it should have been said, "hath done and will do." But the future had such a firm foundation in the past, that the beginning and end are here combined in one. LE CLERC (*Dissert. de script. Pentat.* iii. 15) would erroneously refer the remark merely to the trans-Jordanic land; and Rosenmüller likewise explains it erroneously; *in eo est ut faciat*. The preterite is only prophetic for one-half. It would not have been used if the trans-Jordanic land had not already been taken. The preterite must, moreover, on the supposition of the post-Mosaic composition of the Pentateuch, have been construed as we have taken it. For such a direct mistake, in a connection where everything was designed to rouse the courage of the Israelites for taking the promised land, cannot be admitted. But certainly a later writer would not have expressed himself so ambiguously and obscurely. He would purposely have avoided everything which could excite suspicion. The manner in which VATER treats (p. 638) the passage before us, furnishes a specimen of the accuracy and confidence of our opponents. Instead of Deut. ii. 12, he cites ii. 15, and maintains that it is there told, how Israel had driven out the inhabitants of Canaan, and argues from this text of his own creation, against Le Clerc's supposition, which he designates as very forced, "since those eastern countries were not properly reckoned as belonging to Canaan!"



of being recorded, though it certainly soon after became familiar, and lost all its charms.

It now only remains to justify the passage in Deut. iv. 48, in which a twofold Israelitish name of a mountain, Sihon and Hermon, occurs. That a name should become obsolete and make room for another, commonly requires a long interval. But we can fortunately show, that, even in the Mosaic age, such a change was effected.

SIHON *the exalted* = שִׁיחֹן (compare שִׁיחֹן *elatio* in Job xx. 6) is, as it were, the natural name of the mountain, which it must have received from the Israelites as soon as they caught sight of it, if it was not already, as is probable, already in existence. In fact, this name agrees with the Sidonian and Ammonitish. (On their meaning, see SIMONIS Onom. p. 91.)

In reference to Hermon, the remark of HILARY (from whom otherwise on such topics there is not much to be learnt), on Ps. cxxxiii. (in RELAND, p. 323) is in the right direction. *Hermon mons est in Phœnice, cujus interpretatio anathema est.* For this explanation, the following reasons may be urged: (i.) That it alone is agreeable to the Hebrew *usus loquendi*, while, for the current one, recourse must be had to the Arabic. (ii.) The evident reference to the meaning *devoted, accursed*, in the first passage where the name *Hermon* occurs, Deut. iii. 6–8, “And we DEVOTED them, וְנִתְּתָם אֵתֵם, as we did unto Sihon, king of Heshbon, when we *devoted* all the men in the cities, with the women and children. And we took at that time out of the hand of the two kings of the Amorites, the land that was on that side Jordan, from the river of Arnon unto mount Hermon,” הֶרְמוֹן. That Hermon itself belonged to the devoted land appears from Josh. xii. 5, where it is expressly described as belonging to the territory of Og, king of Bashan. (iii.) The remarkable parallelism between Hormah, the beginning of the devoted district, and Hermon, its termination, so that the express derivation of the name הֶרְמוֹן from the devotement, certainly applies also to הֶרְמוֹן. The name was applied to both extremities of the devoted land. (iv.) There is probably an allusion to the connection of הֶרְמוֹן with הָרִים in 1 Chron. v. 23, “And the children of the half tribe of Manasseh dwelt in the land from Bashan unto Baal-Hermon *and* Senir (= which is Senir) and mount Hermon—they became numerous.” The *nomen* was,

in this case, not the *omen*. Afterwards, in ver. 25, 26, "And they transgressed against the God of their fathers, and went a whoring after the gods of the people of the land, whom God destroyed before them. And the God of Israel stirred up the spirit of Pul king of Assyria, and the spirit of Tiglath-pileser, king of Assyria, and he carried them away," &c. Here we have *nomen et omen*.\* We are not to imagine a mere play upon the words. The name of the mountain was really a prediction. If Israel became, like the heathen, then the *הרם*, *the ban*, fell upon them, as is so often denounced in the Pentateuch. In Hermon, the relation in which Hormah stood was reversed, which at first was rendered sacred by the *הרם* of Israel, and then by the *הרם* of the heathen, (p. 223). (v.) If *הַרְמִיּוֹן* = *הַרְמָה*, then *בְּנֵלְ הַרְמִיּוֹן* in Judg. iii. 3, 1 Chron. v. 23 may be explained. It simply means *the possessor or bearer of the ban*. Compare *בְּנֵלְ גַר*, *the possessor of good fortune*, in Josh. xii. 7.

After these investigations, we venture to believe that we have untied the knot. The name Hermon could not have been brought into use till after the event to which it refers. That along with it the name that had hitherto been usual should be given, and that *primo loco*, must appear to be quite natural. In ch. iii. 9, it was otherwise; there the explanation of the name was given.

#### THE BEDSTEAD OF KING OG.

In Deut. iii. 11, it is said after the mention of the victory over Og king of Bashan, and the conquest of his land: "For only Og king of Bashan remained of the remnant of the Rephaim; behold, his bedstead was a bedstead of iron, is it not in Rabbath of the children of Ammon? nine cubits was the length thereof and four cubits the breadth of it, after the cubits of a man."

This passage was long ago made a handle of by the opponents of the genuineness of the Pentateuch. SPINOZA remarks, that only things of remote antiquity are spoken of in this manner, of

---

\* We have exactly a similar instance in 1 Chron. xxiii. 17, "And Eliezer had none other sons (besides Rehabiah), but the sons of Rehabiah were very many *רַבִּי לְמֵעֹלָה*" so that the name Rehabiah verified itself as true,

which the credibility is supported by referring to their remains, and thinks that this bed was first known from the time of David, who, according to 2 Sam. xii. 30, captured this city. PEYRETIUS adds, that it cannot be supposed that in the Mosaic age the bed was brought from Bashan to Ammonitis. GEDDES repeats SPINOZA'S assertion, that the account was probably given after David's capture of the city; and VATER remarks, that though this is going too far, yet it could not have been written by Moses, since he died in the year of this campaign, and that there can at all events be no doubt that this notice must have been of later date than the Mosaic age. Many advocates of the genuineness of the Pentateuch (CALMET, DATHE, who remarks justly in VATKE'S opinion, p. 219, that Moses died just about that time, and could have had no information on the subject; JAHN, p. 63, and ROSENMÜLLER) have been so timid that they have given up the passage as a gloss.

It must indeed be admitted that remarks like this might have been added afterwards by Moses, when committing his discourses to writing, on which account the verse may properly be enclosed (as by DE WETTE) in brackets. But then all doubt vanishes. The most plausible objection left is, that Moses could not think it necessary to adduce such a voucher for Og's gigantic stature, since it was known to all his contemporaries. But how many of his contemporaries had actually seen Og? and who can assure us that Moses wrote only for his contemporaries? He himself everywhere asserts the contrary; compare, for instance, Exod. xvii. 14, Deut. xxxi. 20, &c., 26, and particularly in the historical parts of his work, it is in the very nature of things that they were not so much intended for the present as for posterity. The most distinguished classical writers expressly declare that they wrote principally for posterity. TACITUS (Hist. i. 1) laments a defect in the *cura posteritatis* among his predecessors. In his *Agricola* he says, "*Clarorum virorum facta moresque posteris tradere antiquitus usitatum. Apud priores, ut agere memoratu digna pronum, magisque in aperto erat, ita celeberrimus quisque ingenio ad prodendam virtutis memoriam sine gratia aut ambitione, bonae tantum conscientiae pretio ducebatur.*" THUCYDIDES, in his introduction, says of his history, κτήμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον, ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν

*ξύγκειται*. HERODOTUS describes it as the object of his work, *ὡς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται, μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά ἀκλεᾶ γένηται*. Will any person lay it down as a principle that Moses could only write what belonged to his contemporaries, why then object to this little harmless notice? why not object to the whole narrative of the war against Sihon and Og, which passed under the eyes of that generation to whom Moses committed his work; and why not object to ever so many other things? But what would become of every contemporary history, if brought to the test of this canon? Moreover, the author's object was not to give a pledge to sceptical readers, of the truth of his history, by referring to the bed. This could only be admitted, if in other passages any sure traces could be found of such an endeavour. But such a design is totally foreign, not only to the Pentateuch, but to the whole of sacred history, including the Evangelists. The authors always write in the consciousness of their veracity, and with the motto, "What have I to do with those that are without?" (1 Cor. v. 12.) The object here was rather to give a striking representation of the greatness of the conquered enemy, and likewise of the greatness of God's grace, which secured the victory; the interrogative *שֶׁנָּא* indicates that the fact was otherwise already known, so that it was only necessary to call it to mind. There is a parallel passage in Deut. xi. 30, "Are they not (the mountains Ebal and Gerizim), on the other side Jordan, by the way where the sun goeth down?" compare also Judg. vi. 13.

Objections such as these, that we cannot make out, how the bed reached Rabbath Ammon, or how Moses should know that it was there, are really downright absurdities. Had Moses, instead of a history of God's people, been writing a history of Og's iron bedsteads, a precise answer to such questions might have been expected from him. But it is doing these cavils too much honour to enter on an enumeration of the various possible ways by which the bedstead might get thither, and the account of it to Moses. Whoever wishes for it may read LE CLERC on the passage, VARENIUS in CARPZOV, p. 138; MICHAELIS, who changes the bedstead into a coffin, and others.

In the account itself there is certainly nothing suspicious. Gigantic races from whom kings have proceeded, are still found

among many savage tribes, as in Australia. CALMET gives a number of instances of iron bedsteads in ancient times. The size need not astonish us, for the Hebrew cubit is only one foot and a half, (see GESENIUS, s. v., אַמָּה); the bedstead is always larger than the man; and LE CLERC has conjectured that Og designedly caused it to be made larger than was necessary, *ut posteritas ex lecti magnitudine de statura ejus, qui in eo cubare solitus erat, magnificentius sentiret*: compare the remarkable instances of similar conduct which that critic has adduced from the history of Alexander. It is very frequently found that people of more than common size are inclined to make themselves appear still larger than they really are. We may not perhaps conclude respecting remote antiquity from our own times, and yet the giant GILLI, whom MICHAELIS himself saw, was four ells high, and so was the door keeper of the King of Persia, mentioned by MALCOLM.

## THE LAW OF THE KING IN DEUT. XVII.

The objections (VATER remarks, iii. 257) which have been made against the genuineness of this regulation respecting the choice of a king, are not unimportant. It is not in accordance with the whole Mosaic constitution; and especially Samuel could not have resented the choice of a king so strongly, as a defect in grateful attachment to Jehovah, if an express law respecting the choice of a king existed in the Mosaic writings. The law, he maintains, could not have existed till after Solomon, since "Solomon had a numerous cavalry, and a large seraglio, and would not have had both, in the face of a law that literally forbade them." It was directed precisely against that line of conduct which was burdensome to the people under the kings after Solomon, and had been reprov'd by the prophets. HARTMANN also (p. 714) adopts the same arguments, and remarks that Samuel knew nothing of this law and of the promise in Gen. xvii. 6, and the Israelites as little, "Since otherwise, as a foundation for their demand, they would not have appealed alone to the example of the neighbouring nations." How could God, he asks, in contradiction to himself, have expressed so much disapprobation at the desire of his

chosen people? The law of the king, he thinks, was evidently an imitation of the constitution framed by Samuel, and of later occurrences. 1 Kings xi. 1. Compare ILGEN *de notione tituli filii dei* in PAULUS *Memorab.* 7 § 7. DE WETTE *dissert. in Deut.* p. 15, and *Beitr.* i. 152, and BOHLEN *Einleitung*, p. 69.

Before we proceed to scrutinize these reasons against the law, we wish to see whether it does not contain internal positive grounds of genuineness. HERBST has appealed to the introduction—"When thou art come unto the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee;" and so much it certainly proves, that the writer of the law wished to be considered as Moses. But against those who are determined to regard the Pentateuch as a work of deceit (like BOHLEN, who remarks; (p. 70), "To ask, with JAHN, why in that law there is nothing said about the division of the kingdom, or the idolatry of the kings, is to require of a fiction that it should wantonly betray itself") it is of no use to argue. Yet even against such persons the passage furnishes a weapon. It is said in ver. 16, "But he shall not multiply horses to himself, nor cause the people to return to Egypt, to the end that he should multiply horses; forasmuch as the Lord hath said unto you, Ye shall henceforth return no more that way." The apprehension here expressed, that the king's desire to multiply horses might at last lead to the return of the whole people to Egypt, was indeed in Moses' time not out of place, when the fastening anew of the broken bond did not appear impossible—when the people on the slightest occasion expressed their longing after Egypt, or rather their resolution to return thither—compare Exod. xiv. 11; Num. xi. 5–20; xxi. 5, 7—but not in the time of Solomon and the later kings, never, indeed, in Joshua's day; when the people had attained to a full consciousness of their national individuality, every thought of the possibility of a reunion with Egypt vanished. If we look at the *ratio legi adjecta* it will appear that Solomon might, with some reason, consider the regulation as transitory, and, in his own times, obsolete. *In hanc legem*, LE CLERC remarks, *peccavit quidem Salomo sed minus periculose, quam peccasset rex qui fuisset electus paulo post mortem Mosis, cum periculum erat, ne redeundi in Aegyptum cupido populum Hebraicum invaderet, quod tempore Salomonis non fuit timendum.* How our opponents can, in any plausible manner, satisfy them-

selves with this argument, we are unable to perceive. It also ill accords with the origination of the law in the later period of the kings, that Egypt here appears as the only place for breeding horses, a circumstance to which J. D. MICHAELIS has drawn attention in an appendix to Part iii. of his *Mosaisches Recht*. p. 257-359. "It really looks as if Egypt was then considered as the native country of the horse, and Palestine was regarded as unsuited for breeding that animal." In Solomon's time, when the breeding of horses in Palestine was at its height, no one imagined that a king, if he wished for a large supply of horses, must needs go to Egypt.

Let us now turn to the reasons against the genuineness. These require to be thoroughly sifted. The argument drawn from the opposition of Solomon's conduct to the law, will be destitute of all force to those persons who know any thing of the human heart and of history, (Compare vol. i. p. 209.) How easily he could dispose of the regulation respecting horses we have already seen; and as to the prohibition of multiplying wives, he could certainly as easily reconcile his conduct with it, as Mahommedan grandees who love wine can evade the stringent law of the Koran against wine-drinking. Nor need we trouble ourselves with the objection, that precisely those things are prohibited which were afterwards most in vogue under the kings. Certainly this need not be considered as a singular coincidence if the Pentateuch proceeded from Moses. The prohibition, and the entrance of what was prohibited, had rather one common root—the universal tendency of royalty in the ancient East, from which it would have been very difficult for a king of Israel to keep himself free (who still must belong to the order of kings), even if nothing of a personal disposition had existed in him, which first of all called forth this tendency. To possess many wives and a numerous stud, belonged peculiarly to the royal dignity, and is still one of its characteristics. Thus we have only two arguments left—the assertion of its irreconcilableness with the whole Mosaic constitution, and the alleged irreconcilableness with the conduct of Samuel and the people at the first election of a king. We will consider the latter first as being the most plausible.

We begin then with adducing positive proof that the transaction presupposes the existence of the Pentateuch in general, and es-

pecially of the law of the king, and shall then proceed to rebut the assertions of our opponents, of which the nullity will at once appear after the adduction of the positive proof. This rests on the numerous references to the section in question in the Book of Samuel to the Pentateuch generally (and we must recollect that owing to its unity what relates to a part is available for the whole, and this for all the other parts), and especially and directly to Deut. xvii. The indication of these references will at the same time contribute to throw light on the confident assertion of DE WETTE (i. 152), and BOHLEN, p. 150, that the Books of Samuel are destitute of any, even the slightest, reference to the Pentateuch. We place at the head the most palpable, and in its isolation most convincing.

First of all, our attention is drawn to a very striking reference in Samuel's address to Gen. xxi. 10. In the latter place we read, "Wherefore she (Sarah) said unto Abraham, cast out this bondwoman and her son; for the son of this bondwoman shall not be heir with my son, even with Isaac; ver. 12, And the thing was very grievous in Abraham's sight, because of his son נִרְבֵּעַ הַדָּבָר בְּעֵינָיו אַבְרָהָם; ver. 12, And God said unto Abraham. . . in all that Sarah hath said unto thee, hearken unto her voice," לְכָל אֲשֶׁר תֹּאמַר אֲמִירָה. In 1 Sam. viii. 6, we read, "But the thing was evil in the eyes of Samuel," וְנִרְבֵּעַ הַדָּבָר בְּעֵינָיו שְׁמוּאֵל; ver. 7, "And the Lord said unto Samuel, hearken unto the voice of the people, in all that they say unto thee," וְשָׁמַע בְּקוֹל הָעָם לְכָל אֲשֶׁר-יֹאמְרוּ אֲלֵיךָ; ver. 9, "Now therefore hearken unto their voice." Also ver. 22, "And the Lord said to Samuel, hearken unto their voice." Ch. xii. 1, "And Samuel said unto all Israel, behold, I have hearkened unto your voice, in all that ye said unto me." The agreement in words is too close with the agreement in facts, for any one with a good conscience to consider it as purely accidental. Sarah's demand proceeded from a sinful motive. Abraham looked only at this, and therefore scrupled to comply with it. The command of God made it clear to him that Sarah was only an instrument in his hand, that her subjectively sinful desire agreed objectively with his will; that what she desired must come to pass if the Divine plan was to be realized. Exactly so, as the relation of Abraham to Sarah (which God indicated to Samuel, Samuel to the people, and the historian to us by the verbal agreement with the passage



in Genesis) was the relation of Samuel to the people. We here obtain, at the same time, a preliminary hint for the explanation of Samuel's opposition. If the people were = Sarah, and Samuel = Abraham, then Samuel's zeal was directed not against the object of their desire, but the disposition by which they were prompted.

Equally undeniable is the reference in 1 Sam. viii. 5, where the people say to Samuel, "Now make us a king, to judge us like all the nations," שִׁימָה לָנוּ מֶלֶךְ לְשֹׁפְטֵנוּ כְּכָל-הַגּוֹיִם, to the beginning of the law of the king; Deut. xvii. 14, "When thou shalt say, I will set a king over me, like as all the nations that are about me" אֲשֶׁר־יָמִיחַ עָלַי מֶלֶךְ כְּכָל-הַגּוֹיִם. This reference would in itself deserve the first place, because it specially points to the law of the king. But we have allowed the reference to Genesis xxi. to take the lead, because the curious subterfuge cannot be applied to that which has been employed here, that the words in the Pentateuch were copied from the narrative in the Books of Samuel. In the verbal appeal to the law, the people exhibited the authority for their proceeding. When they asked Samuel to set a king over them, they wished to satisfy the requirement in Deut. xvii. 15, "Thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee *whom the Lord thy God shall choose.*" To this latter passage—the *third* principal reference—Samuel expressly refers in ch. x. 24, "And Samuel said to all the people, see ye whom JEHOVAH hath chosen," אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בּוֹ, the same as in Deut. אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהוָה בְּתוֹכְךָ בּוֹ יְהוָה.

In connection with these references (which considered in themselves, as well as by their mutual support, are so certain), the following also will be more readily acknowledged, since we shall set aside all general references to the history of the Pentateuch, all cases in which the verbal agreement is not borne out by agreement in matter of fact. We follow the order of the narrative in the Books of Samuel.

Ch. viii. 3 contains a description of the conduct of Samuel's sons contrasted with the ideal of a good judge, as given in the Pentateuch, Deut. xvi. 19, with ver. 7, "For they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me that I should not reign over them;" compare Exod. xvi. 7, "Ye shall see the glory of the Lord; for he hath heard your murmurings against the Lord, and what are we that ye murmur against us?" with ch. ix. 16,

“For I have looked upon my people, because their cry is come unto me;” compare Exod. ii. 23–25; iii. 7, “I have surely seen the afflictions of my people which were in Egypt, and have heard their cry,” iv. 31. By the allusion it is estimated that the history was a prophecy, and thus furnished a support to the weak in faith; it was as if he had said, “As certainly as I heard and saw in beforetime, when my people groaned under the oppression of the Egyptians, so do I now hear and see when the Philistines act towards them as did the Egyptians.” In 1 Sam. x. 25, “And Samuel told the people the manner of the kingdom, and wrote it in a book, and laid it up before the Lord.” The phrase “manner of the kingdom,” מִשְׁפָּט הַמְּלָכָה may be compared with Deut. xviii. 3. “The priests’ due” מִשְׁפָּט הַכֹּהֲנִים; but compare the matter of fact with Deut. xvii. as Calvin has done, *Sane non dubium est quin jus illud regni desumptum sit ex Deut. ch. xvi. xviii, longe sane aliud ab eo cap. viii., quod tyrannis potius, quam jus regni merito dicendum erat. . . Hic vero juris regni fit mentio ad mutuam obligationem inter regem et populum, et contra vicissim ostendendum.* The expression וַיִּנְחַח לְפָנֵי יְהוָה, “and laid it up before the Lord,” is taken word for word from Num. xvii. 7. Samuel, the author intimates, took the conduct of Moses for his model, who had done the same thing for a similar object. (*In sanctuario, quod perinde fuit, acsi Deus testis eorum, quae dicta et facta fuerant, vocaretur.* CALVIN.) Had not the law of the Lord been laid up before the Ark of the Covenant, Samuel would hardly have thought of depositing such a document there. With ch. xii. 3, where Samuel says to the people, “Witness against me before the Lord, and before his anointed, whose ox have I taken, or whose ass have I taken? or whom have I defrauded עֲשָׂקִיתִי? whom have I oppressed? or of whose hand have I received any bribe, to blind my eyes therewith? and I will restore it to you.” Compare first of all Num. xvi. 15, “And Moses was very wroth, and said unto the Lord, Respect not thou their offering, I have not taken one ass from them, neither have I hurt one of them.” As *then* the people had been refractory towards Moses, so *now* they were towards Samuel. But he could also venture, in attesting his own innocence, to copy the same illustrious example. There are, besides, several other passages of the Pentateuch deserving of notice, in which, by the use

of the same words, those offences are denounced of which Samuel here declares himself innocent. In reference to the  $\text{פָּשַׁע}$  and the offer of making restitution, compare Lev. v. 23 (vi. 4), "Because he hath sinned, and is guilty, that he shall restore that which he took violently away  $\text{אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה}$ ; in reference to receiving a bribe  $\text{כֶּסֶף}$ , Num. xxxv. 31, "Ye shall take no satisfaction  $\text{לֹא תִקְחוּ כֶּסֶף}$  for the life of a murderer. . . . but he shall surely be put to death." Ver. 32, "And ye shall take no satisfaction  $\text{כֶּסֶף}$  for him that is fled," &c.; in reference to blinding the eyes, Lev. xx. 4, "And if the people of the land do anyways hide their eyes  $\text{תִּעְלִימוּ אֶת עֵינֵיהֶם}$  from the man. . . . then I will set my face against that man." In both passages the hiding of the eyes is in reference to shedding innocent blood. That very peculiar phraseology in ch. xii. 14, "rebel against the mouth of JEHOVAH"  $\text{הִמָּרְדָה אֶת-פִּי יְהוָה}$  is found also in the following passages with which it is closely allied, Deut. i. 26, 43; ix. 7, 23; xxxi. 27. By the reference to the language of Moses in Deut. i. 43, "you would not hear, but rebelled against the mouth of the Lord." Samuel gives a peculiar emphasis to his own words, "if ye will obey his voice, and not rebel against the mouth of the Lord." If in former times the opposite had existed, and brought severe punishment on the people, there was now inducement enough, not to treat the matter lightly, but to "work out their salvation with fear and trembling." Compare Ps. xcv. 8, "Harden not your heart as at Meribah  $\text{בְּמֵרִיבָה}$  (in the provocation, *Eng. A. V.*) as in the day of Massa  $\text{בְּמַסָּה}$  (temptation, *Eng. A. V.*) in the wilderness," Heb. iii. 7. We find a parallel to ch. xii. 19, 20, ("And all the people said unto Samuel, pray for thy servants unto the Lord thy God, that we die not. . . . And Samuel said unto the people, fear not," &c.) in Exod. xx. 19, 20, "And they said unto Moses, speak thou with us and we will hear, but let not God speak with us lest we die. And Moses said unto the people, fear not."

After having laid this firm foundation, let us now apply ourselves to remove the apparent contradiction in which the narrative in the first Book of Samuel stands to Deut. xvii. We must here reject the solution attempted by several critics, that the lawgiver contemplated the election of a King, only as a necessary evil;—that Samuel knew this;—hence he wished first to see whether this evil was necessary, as MICHAELIS has remarked,

(*Mosaisches Recht*. i. § 54), it seems Moses had wished that the people might continue to retain the political form of a free republic, and by that regal law a concession was made to the inclination of the people only to prevent a total apostacy from Jehovah. Against this view CALVIN has suggested: *Celebre est vaticinium Jacob; non exhibit sceptrum e Juda, donec veniat Siloh. Unde apparet regem incomparabilis beneficii loco filiis Abr. fuisse promissum.* The Pentateuch is so far from considering the regal government as a necessary evil, that it looks upon its establishment as an immutable part of the national destinies, as the goal to which its whole development tended. The regal government among their descendants forms a prominent object of promise to the Patriarch; compare Gen. xvii. 6, where the Lord says to Abraham, "And I will make thee exceedingly fruitful, and I will make nations of thee, *and kings shall come out of thee;*" also ver. 16; "And I will bless her, and give thee a son also of her; yea I will bless her, and she shall be a mother of nations, *kings of people shall be of her;*" ch. xxxv. 11, the Lord says to Jacob, "I am God Almighty; be fruitful and multiply; a nation and a company of nations shall be of thee; and kings shall come out of thy loins;" a passage which shows that the promises of a kingdom to Abraham, refer only to his descendants in a strict and full sense, (compare, "in Isaac shall thy seed be called," Gen. xxi. 12); as they also stand in immediate connection with the promise of Isaac's birth, they cannot be considered as referring to the kings among the Ishmaelites and the descendants of Keturah. The promise reached its highest point in the passage Gen. xlix. 10, already quoted by CALVIN, in which the origin of the typical ruler and his antitype is attributed to Judah. Here the regal government came into connection with the idea of the Messiah. Only in the king from Judah could the destiny of Israel as connected with that of the world be realized, to which his progenitors from the beginning of their leadings were referred. In this king Israel would be all-blessing and all-ruling. If we look at the history, it appears that it would injure the character of Moses as a Divine messenger, to attribute to him the view of a regal government as a necessary evil. The kingdom of God under the Old Covenant reached its highest splendour under David, and during the whole period of the kings, the religious condition, notwithstanding the

national degeneracy, was on the whole always better than during the time of the Judges. In Christ, at last, the regal government in Israel was arrayed in its full glory.

The correct solution is the following. Samuel's opposition was directed not against the regal government in itself, but only against the disposition with which the people sought for it. This disposition contained in two respects an element of impiety. (i.) They desired not a king instead of a judge *in abstracto*, but a king instead of Samuel, the Judge appointed and specially approved by God. It was the same as if the Israelites had required a king in the time of Moses or Joshua. They condemned themselves, since, by requesting that *Samuel* would give them a king, they recognised his dignity. If they had been truly godly, they would have perceived that *now* was not the time to make use of the permission that had been granted them—that a thing in itself good, was under these circumstances a sin. In the narrative itself there is a reference to this view of the transaction. The attempt is marked as an act of injustice towards Samuel, and therefore as a sin against the Lord who sent him. Compare for instance ch. viii. 7, 8, "And the Lord said unto Samuel, hearken unto the voice of the people in all that they say unto thee; for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them. According to all the works which they have done since the day that I brought them up out of Egypt, even unto this day, wherewith they have forsaken me, and served other gods; so do they also unto thee." (ii.) At the foundation of this longing for a king, there was the impious notion that God was powerless to aid them; the primary idea was not sinful, but there was a culpable notion that the regal government was auxiliary to the divine. This view of the transaction appears more frequently in the narrative than the former. Thus it is said, for example, in ch. x. 18, 19, "And (Samuel) said to the children of Israel, Thus saith the Lord God of Israel, I brought up Israel out of Egypt, and delivered you out of the hand of the Egyptians, and out of the hand of all kingdoms of them that oppressed you. And ye have this day rejected your God, who himself saved you out of all your adversities and your tribulations, and ye have said unto him, Nay, but set a king over us." Compare viii. 19, 20. But this point of view appears peculiarly in ch. xii. Samuel first

said to the people, that the Lord had always cared faithfully for them—had raised up for them deliverers and leaders, when they had been faithful, or returned to him with penitent hearts, so that they had no reason to fear before their enemies, unless from conscious guilt. He then goes on to say in ver. 12, “And when ye saw that Nahash, the king of the children of Ammon, came against you, ye said unto me, Nay, but a king shall reign over us; when the Lord your God was your king.” A regal government longed for with such dispositions was not the revealed form of royalty, but an opponent of it.

This solution has already, in its essential points, been given by CALVIN in his Commentary, p. 117. His exposition, which may serve to complete our own, we are more inclined to quote here, since his Commentary on the first Book of Samuel is among the least known of his writings, and is certainly in the hands of few of our readers. *Quaestio non levis occurrit, quomodo peccasse dicantur, qui ex Dei concilio regem petiisse videntur. Nam Deus, Dent. xvii. sic per Moses olim locutus erat etc. Respondemus, habendam illis fuisse rationem temporum et conditionis, quam Deus prescripserat, fore nimirum, ut tandem in populo regia potestas emineret. Quare licet nondum stabilita esset, debebant a Deo praefixum tempus patienter expectare; non autem suis consiliis et rationibus praeter Dei verbum locum dare. Non debuerunt igitur Dei consilium praevertere sed tantisper expectare, dum ipse Dominus non dubig signis ostenderet, tempus advenisse praefinitum, et consiliis ipsorum praeset. Porro licet Sam. prophetam cognoscerent, non modo ex eo non sciscitati sunt an regem habituri essent, necne; sed etiam suae voluntati illum in exsequendo hoc negotio voluerunt obedire. . . . Sane poterant illi quidem Samueli senium obicere, quo ad res gerendas minus aptus redderetur et filiorum avaritiam ac judiciorum corruptionem; deumque rogare, ut viros idoneos sufficeret, a quibus regerentur ejusque voluntati rem totam permittere. Quod si factum esset ab illis, minime dubium est, quin responsum a Deo gratum et sibi commodum accepturi fuissent. Sed de Deo invocando non cogitant, regem sibi dari postulant, aliarum gentium mores et instituta proferunt.\**

\* The correct view is also taken by QUENSTEDT, *Theol. did. pol.* p. iv. p. 426. Non improbat Deo per se postulatio regis, multo minus status et officium regium. . . .

It is of great importance that, besides perceiving that the *vox populi* objectively considered was also the *vox Dei*, we should not neglect to notice the sinful character of the demand made by the people, subjectively considered. As the people regarded the king, so he would regard himself. The correct view ought to be as it were settled at the threshold. In earlier times, Gideon, keeping in view the latter aspect of the transaction, had rejected the kingly dignity which was offered him in opposition to the Divine sovereignty; compare Judges viii. 22, 23, "Then the men of Israel said to Gideon, rule thou over us, both thou and thy son, and thy son's son also, for thou hast delivered us from the hand of Midian. And Gideon said unto them, I will not rule over you, neither shall my son rule over you; Jehovah shall rule over you." Samuel, on the contrary, complies with the desire of the people, since he knew that God's time was now come; but he likewise presents every consideration that might tend to convince the people of their sin.

If the view of our opponents were the correct one, that Samuel regarded the regal government in and for itself as incompatible with the theocracy, how very differently must he have acted! He must then, while all the people, terrified at his address, and the Divine signs by which it was confirmed, said, "Pray for thy servants to the Lord thy God, for we have added to all our other sins the wickedness of asking for a king," have insisted on the restoration of the earlier form of government without delay. Ch. xii. 19. But nothing seemed further from his thoughts. He rather admonished the people from this time to be faithful to the Lord; so would he glorify himself in them and their king.

The history that follows is also in harmony with our view. The people were destined to experience in the king whom they asked for, (Saul, whom CALVIN very aptly designates *filius abortivus*) that the regal government in itself, without God, was no blessing, and in David whom God in prevenient love bestowed upon them, that the regal government in itself was not opposed to the theocracy, but with God was a rich source of blessing.

---

sed *ex accidenti* quia procedebat ex principio pessimo et conjuncta erat cum pessimis accidentibus, quæ sunt *κακότητα* gentilium fastidium et contentus divinæ ordinationis, temeraria audacia in nova regiminis forma præscribenda.

It still remains to obviate the objection that the regal government was not in harmony with the whole Mosaic constitution. It is certainly a presumption against it that it must unavoidably be extended to the passages in Genesis, in which the setting up of the kingly government is represented as one of the greatest blessings of the future. We must also form an unfavourable judgment of it from the position taken by the most faithful friends of the Mosaic constitution towards the kingly government. If it was throughout favourable, regarding the founding of the kingly government as the greatest mercy that God could bestow on his people, then its contrariety to the theocracy must have been merely apparent. Compare for example Lamentations iv. 20, "The breath of our nostrils, the anointed of the Lord was taken in their pits, of whom we said, Under his shadow we shall live among the heathen." According to the view we are combating, the priests and prophets must rather have rejoiced at the overthrow of royalty.

But if we examine the assertion more closely, it will soon appear, that it rests on an extremely superficial acquaintance with the nature of the Mosaic constitution, on a confused mixture of theocracy and hierarchy, which we have noticed on so many other occasions. When it is asserted, that royalty stood in opposition to the Mosaic constitution, it is insinuated that it arrogated rights which belonged to the high priest. But of these rights that are assumed to belong to the high priest, not a trace is to be found in the Pentateuch; his position was not political, but purely and solely religious. Royalty trenched not on the priesthood, but on powers which were given to certain persons by the course of events, and not by the law, and who, in Samuel's time, from a sense of their inadequacy, were anxious for their partial limitation by the kingly power. The office of the high priest was to administer the service of the Lord, Exod. xxviii. 1; he had the oversight of the house of the Lord; Lev. xxi. 10. JOSEPHUS enumerates as the functions of Aaron, "to wear the vest that was sacred to God, to take care of the altar, and provide the sacrifices, and to offer up prayers for the people."\* HERWERDEN, *De pontif. max.* Grön.

\* ὡς οὗτος ἐνδύσεται στολὴν τῷ Θεῷ καθωστωμένην καὶ βωμῶν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔξει καὶ πρόνοιαν ἱερείων, καὶ τὰς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν εὐχὰς ποιήσεται πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. κ.τ.λ. Antiq. iii. 8, § 1.



1822, p. 8. Only a certain part of the judicial power is, in Deut. xvii. 2, 12, assigned to the high priesthood; but though this was not altogether foreign to it, since the religious code was also the civil code, yet it is expressly added, that this part was not necessarily so—that it also belonged to the judge, and therefore might be transferred to the king. “And the man that will do presumptuously, and will not hearken unto the priest that standeth to minister there before the Lord thy God, OR unto the judge, even that man shall die;” so scrupulously was the line drawn between the theocracy and the hierarchy, and so perfectly free was left the course of historical development. There was, independently of the priests and Levites, an organized court of judicature; compare Exod. xviii. 25, 26; Deut. i. 15. To these non-Levitical judges it is said, ver. 17, “You shall not be afraid of the face of man, for the judgment is God’s;” a plain proof that God could also have civil representatives and organs. The priests were in general only the teachers of the law, of whom the judges themselves might take counsel. To this Deut. xxi. 5, compare Lev. x. 11. They were, moreover, present at judicial transactions without taking any part in them, merely to heighten the solemnity; Deut. xix. 17, 18. If we look at the history, there are not wanting examples, indeed, of political influence on the part of the high priests, but this they exercised not *as* high priests. AARON did many things not as high priest, but as the brother and assistant of MOSES. ELI was at one and the same time high priest and judge, 1 Sam. iv. 18; as, at a later period, ABIATHAR was chosen by DAVID to be judge, 1 Chron. xxvii. 33, 34. It lay in the nature of the case, that the person who was invested with the highest spiritual dignity, acquired also a certain political influence, just as afterwards the civil position of the king gave him, in consequence, a certain ecclesiastical authority. But this political influence of the high priest might be lost without doing injury to his office, and moreover was not excluded by a kingly government; indeed, during the latter (for Samuel belonged not to it), more traces of it might be seen than before. In the whole period from Phinehas to Eli, not a trace is to be found of the high priest’s influence on civil affairs.

## GEOGRAPHICAL ANACHRONISMS.

It is asserted that such an accurate knowledge of the country in its physical peculiarities, its localities, and its historical and geographical relation, proves that the author of the Pentateuch must necessarily have been a native, and therefore that its composition by Moses, who never crossed the Jordan, must be a fiction. VATER, p. 647 ; HARTMANN, p. 707 ; VON BOHLEN, p. 59.

On this subject we shall first make some general remarks. Even where access to a particular branch of knowledge is difficult, a vivid interest will greatly aid its acquisition. It lets no opportunity pass unimproved, and anxiously seeks out every opportunity ; it invigorates the memory, so that a thing, when once heard, is never lost ; it stimulates the learner to be constantly occupied in digesting, sifting, and comparing the materials he receives from without, and in forming from the scattered features a finished likeness. But who will deny that Moses was animated by such an interest in reference to this subject ? Canaan was "the object of his thoughts by day, and of his dreams by night." To him it stood in the same relation as the heavenly Canaan stands to us. But how manifold were the sources which fed this interest ! Even when they went down into Egypt, the Israelites brought thither a considerable knowledge of the promised land, and that this was not lost in the course of time would be secured by that attachment to the promise which formed the heart of the nation's life. That the current representation of the secluded state of Egypt in ancient times is incorrect, that that country maintained a manifold intercourse with the neighbouring lands, has already been proved in vol. i. p. 424. During the long time that Moses dwelt among the Midianites, whose caravans were the medium of commercial intercourse between Asia and Africa, and during the forty years' sojourn in the wilderness, of which a considerable part was spent at Kadesh, close on the borders of the promised land (compare Deut. i. 46), a multitude of fresh particulars would come under his notice to render his knowledge more complete. The sending of the spies (Num. ch. xiii.) would produce an abundance of materials. Moses spent his last days in the country beyond Jordan, which possessed the same physical peculiarities as Canaan Proper, and from its

heights an extensive view was presented of a district inhabited by Canaanites. The passage (Deut. xi. 11) in which the most exact knowledge of the physical condition of Canaan is shown, is precisely in those discourses which he delivered in this district. In Deuteronomy also, those special ethnographical notices occur respecting the country beyond Jordan, and the statements of the different names of the localities in that part, &c.

If we now turn to particulars, our attention is drawn to HARTMANN'S assertion, that the description in Num. xx. 5, where the Israelites in the desert complain, "Wherefore have ye made us to come out of Egypt, to bring us in unto this evil place? It is no place of seed, or of figs, or vines, or of pomegranates; neither is there any water to drink"—is not what we should expect, an enumeration of the chief productions of Egypt, but of the most noted fruits of Palestine. We cannot help here indulging a suspicion of an attempt not altogether worthy of a man of sound learning, when we see that in the parallel passage, ch. xi. 5, ("we remember the fish which we did eat in Egypt freely; the cucumbers, and the melons, and the leeks, and the onions, and the garlick") exactly such productions are named (see vol. i. p. 410) which every one knows, Egypt, and especially that part of Egypt which was occupied by the Israelites, produced in perfection; see HARTMANN'S *Aegypten*, p. 180. This suspicion, on closer examination, becomes a certainty. Wheat and water, no one will deny, were to be found in Egypt. The water of the Nile was, and is, famed far and wide. Fig trees are now found in Lower Egypt (see SONNINI in ROSENMÜLLER'S *Allerth.* iv. 1, p. 292), and in ancient times figs formed one of the exports; BRUNS' *Afrika*, i. 99. Of the Egyptian pomegranates, ABDOLLATIPH says that they are excellent. SONNINI found pomegranates in the gardens about Denderah, and the Emir of Denderah sent a present of the fruit; compare ROSENMÜLLER, p. 275, and HARTMANN, p. 194, who mentions the Egyptian pomegranate trees as among those which are noted for their excellent fruit. Moreover, the Egyptian wine was highly valued by the ancients. That the vine was cultivated in Egypt from early times, appears from Gen. xl. 9, 10; Ps. lxxviii. 47; cv. 33. Even now, where, in consequence of the prohibition of drinking wine in the Koran, the cultivation of the vine is very much lessened, the vines flourish exceedingly. In ABULFEDA'S

time, the country round Alexandria was planted with vines ; and in the neighbourhood of the Lake Moeris, modern travellers have found the roots and stumps of vines that formerly grew there in abundance. Compare BRUNS, p. 99 ; HARTMANN, p. 187 ; ROSENMÜLLER, p. 219. Lastly, supposing that of the productions named, all were not peculiar to Egypt, but belonged in part to Palestine exclusively, what would that prove ? As in ch. xx. 5, the Israelites complained of the loss of what they formerly possessed, so might they not here complain of the withholding of what had been promised ? might they not on one occasion complain on account of what Moses had deprived them, and on another, of what he had not given them ?

It is further asserted, that in the Pentateuch the promised land is described according to the boundaries which it had long after the time of Moses, in the splendid era of David and Solomon. An appeal is made, on this point, to Gen. xv. 18, " In that same day the Lord made a covenant with Abraham, saying, Unto thy seed have I given this land, from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates." No one before David, it is asserted, could use such language, since he first had advanced as far as the Euphrates. But that this passage is not to be taken in a strictly geographical sense, is proved incontestably by the mention of *the river of Egypt*. That by this we are to understand the Nile, may now be considered as universally admitted. It can only be supposed to be the stream near Rhinocorura, if the appellation נַחַל מִצְרַיִם, which is certainly given to this stream, is confounded with נַהַר מִצְרַיִם, a mistake which JEROME has avoided, but into which all later writers fell (even IKEN, whom ROSENMÜLLER acquits of it) till FABER (on HARMER, ii. p. 223) exposed it.\* But at no period did the Israelites extend their boundaries to the Nile, and never even thought of doing it. And what is true of one boundary may also be asserted of the other. The tract between the

---

\* The mistake originated in neglecting to notice the rhetorical character of the whole. This plainly appears, for instance, in IKEN, *De finib. terrae prom.* dissert. ii. p. 98. Among the reasons for taking נַהַר מִצְרַיִם to be the stream near Rhinocorura, this holds the first place, " quod nunquam terra sancta, aut rectius loquendo regio aut imperium posterorum Jacobi ad Nilum usque extensa sit." Compare p. 101, Qui vero eos dem nunquam ad Nilum usque prolongatos fuisse ostendat, nae is nobis magum Apollo erit, p. 107. Neque unquam, ubi terra Isr. promissa ejusve termini describuntur, aut occupatio ejus memoratur, vel verbuo terrae Egypti ulliusve ejus partis mentio injicitur.

Euphrates and Canaan was as little thought of, since, for the most part, it was a barren waste. A second reason for a rhetorical element in the promise, lies in ver. 19-21; here, where the division of the promised whole into its parts follows, only the Canaanitish nations are mentioned. But these, according to the distinct and repeated statements of the Pentateuch, were as far from extending to the Euphrates as to the Nile. Moreover, in the Pentateuch, the Israelites are constantly spoken of as the successors of one race, the Canaanitish; therefore, even if ver. 19-21 were wanting, yet ver. 18 would only refer to them. Lastly, between the Nile and the Euphrates, nations such as the Ammonites and the Moabites dwelt, whose extinction or expulsion was expressly and strictly forbidden to the Israelites. It therefore appears that David's conquests in the direction of the Euphrates have nothing to do with this passage; and that only an accidental coincidence exists, by which, indeed, many of the earlier critics have been misled—yet not all. LE CLERC took the correct view. *Laxius* (he remarks) *nobilissimus fluvius terminus constituitur, quia ad deserta, quae ad eum extendebantur, pertinebat Israelitarum ditio.*

A second principal passage is Exod. xxiii. 31, "And I will set thy bounds from the Red Sea even unto the sea of the Philistines, and from the desert unto the river; for I will deliver the inhabitants of the land unto your hand, and thou shalt drive them out before thee." Here also scholars who were believers in Revelation have laid the foundation for rationalist attacks on the genuineness, since they have almost unanimously gone on the presumption that the limits were given with geographical exactness. Thus, one of the latest, VON RAUMER remarks (*Pal.* p 23), "This prediction obtained its fulfilment under Solomon. David had already taken Damascus and made the Syrians tributary, 2 Sam. viii. 6, but Solomon gained possession of Ezrongebert Elath on the Red Sea (1 Chron. ix. 26; 2 Chron. viii. 17), fortified Hamath-Zobah (probably Epiphania), built Tadmor (that is Palmyra) in the desert; 2 Chron. viii., in short, his dominion extended from Thipsah on the Euphrates (Thapsakus) to Gaza, 1 Kings iv. 24." But if the connection of the passage under consideration had been closely examined, persons would have been convinced that all those accessions of territory in later times had

nothing to do with it, excepting perhaps so far as they indicated that the Israelites stood at the head of the nations within the prescribed boundaries; but those later conquests were reactions against the attempt to rob Israel of this dignity. Previously only the Canaanitish nations had been spoken of, not of their being merely subject and tributary, as the people conquered by David were rendered, but of their entire expulsion, as in this verse itself. The exclusive reference to the Canaanites is also apparent in the following verses 32, 33, "Thou shalt make no covenant with them, nor with their gods. They shall not dwell in thy land, lest they make thee sin against me."

Having made good our interpretation so far, we shall at once perceive the meaning of the third principal passage in Deut. xi. 22-24, "For if ye shall diligently keep all these commandments, . . . then will the Lord drive out all these nations from before you, and ye shall possess greater nations and mightier than yourselves. Every place whereon the soles of your feet shall tread shall be yours, from the wilderness and Lebanon, from the river, the river Euphrates, even unto the uttermost sea, shall your coast be."

The *πρῶτον ψεύδος* in the current explanation of these and similar passages is, that it has not been perceived, that according to their nature as promises they *could* not be geographically exact. How, for example, would it strike us, if instead of the Euphrates, Salchah had been named, or "the point where the Nahar Amman falls into the Zerkah?" The promise can only bear the same relation to a strictly geographical statement, as a marble-block to a statue.

Had this been perceived, all the strictly geographical passages in the Pentateuch would have been investigated, in order to obtain from them a standard for measuring the rhetorical ones; especially since the measurements *ἐν πλάτει* are found not less in the simple historical narratives than in other parts of the Sacred Scriptures. Thus in reference to the current mode of stating the boundaries, *from Dan even to Beersheba*, RELAND says, p. 113—*Ultra Gazam et Bersaben se extendit terra Israelitarum ad austrum, sed a locis notioribus videntur fines Israelitarum ita dicti*. Thus it is said in 1 Chron. xiii. 5, "So David gathered all Israel together from Sihor (the Nile) of Egypt, even

unto the entering of Hamath." Compare 1 Kings viii. 65; 2 Chron. vii. 8.

But here we are met by the *locus classicus* in Num. xxxiv. 1-15, where directly *ex professo* as the prescription, by which the Israelites were to be guided, the boundaries of the Promised Land as it would be conquered and divided are laid down. To this passage, which only relates to Canaan in a narrower sense, ch. xxxii. 33-42, may be considered as an appendix or complement, in reference to the country already taken on the other side Jordan.

Now in these geographical sections not a word is said of the Nile, the Euphrates, or the Red Sea. They have only in common with the rhetorical passages, the western boundary, the Mediterranean Sea, and the northern boundary, Lebanon. The southern boundary, according to Num. xxxiv. 3-5, reach only to "the outmost coast of the Salt Sea," and not to the *river* (יַרְדֵּן) of Egypt, but only to the torrent נַחַל of Egypt, which empties itself near the ancient Rhinocorura, the modern El Arish (VON BOHLEN speaks of the torrent El Arish near Rhinocorura!!) On the other side Jordan no enlargement of the boundaries is mentioned beyond the territories of the two Ammonitish kings.

If we now keep in view these statements of the actual boundaries given in the Pentateuch, it certainly will appear, that in many points the promise contained in them first attained its complete fulfilment in the most flourishing period of the nation. Not till David's name were the Canaanites in the inland parts fully conquered. But how little we should be justified in drawing from these circumstances conclusions unfavourable to the genuineness of the Pentateuch, may be shown by numberless historical analogies,—cases in which for centuries claims have been asserted in vain, till at last they were realised by a conjunction of favourable circumstances. From a multitude of examples of which many will recur to every reader—to adduce only one—the Moabites founded a claim to its possession on the circumstance that the land between the Jabbok and the Arnon, which the Israelites had taken from the Amorites, had been taken from them by the latter. After centuries had passed by, a strenuous though vain attempt was made to realise it, in the time of the Judges; (see Judg. xi); that the Ammonites only came forward as advocates of the Moabites, the descendants of a common progenitor, appear from ver. 15. Finally,

when the Israelitish power was broken by the Assyrians, who carried away captive the tribes beyond Jordan, they succeeded in re-establishing themselves in the land to which they laid claim. ROSENMÜLLER I. iii. 52. That the case was really so, that the principle, the claim of right, which the Israelites made to the territory of the Canaanites in its whole extent, was already in operation in the Mosaic period, that the stream was then flowing in this channel, is evident from the tendency to gain possession of the whole of this territory, which pervaded the whole period from Moses to David. The Canaanites are everywhere the only people that were attacked without provocation; all other wars were only defensive. The conflict for Jerusalem, David's chief conquest, never ceased.

But there is a reason which makes it simply impossible that the boundaries as stated in the Pentateuch could be copied from the relations existing in the age of David and Solomon. For within the boundaries of the Promised Land, as stated in the Pentateuch, is the whole Phœnician territory. Compare RAUMER p. 22. ROSENMÜLLER ii. 78. But in reference to this, the promise of which the realisation depended on certain conditions, was *never* verified. In the period of David and Solomon these pretensions were for a long time given up, and were never reasserted. Had the standard been taken according to the times of David and Solomon, Tyrus and Sidon would have been mentioned rather than Damascus, which David captured, 2 Sam. viii. 5, 6.

VON BOHLEN (*Einleitung*, p. 59) thinks it of importance, that in the Pentateuch, Num. xxi. 13, it is said that Arnon formed the borders of the Moabites, which was not the case till after David's conquests. Such assertions should not be made at random. To those who are inclined to be deceived, a man may pass off counters for gold; but let him be sure that the parties he deals with are sufficiently credulous.

The assertion that David first made Arnon the northern boundary of the Moabites is perfectly gratuitous; there is not a word respecting it in 2 Sam. viii. 2, which contains the account of David's war. On the other hand, not only all the passages in the Pentateuch agree that Arnon, even in the age of Moses, was the southern boundary of the Israelites, (compare besides Num. xxi. 15; xxxii. 34; Deut. iii. 8, 16, iv. 48, and other places), but there



is the important testimony of the Book of Judges, of which the narrative in ch. xi. carries in itself the pledge of its credibility. In reference to the fact, that Arnon was, in the time of Moses, the southern boundary of the Israelitish territory, both parties—Jephthah and the Ammonites—are unanimous. That Israel took “Heshon and her daughters” away from the Ammonites, who had expelled the Moabites to the north of the Arnon, is stated by Jephthah as a fact undisputed by his enemies, ver. 27. The only debateable point was the *quid juris*. In Joshua xiii. 16, Aroer, a city on the banks of the Arnon, among the cities of the southern boundary of the tribe of Reuben. And thus we might adduce a multitude of counter-proofs, if those already given were not abundant almost to superfluity.

Among the alleged geographical anachronisms may be reckoned the assertion of HARTMANN, that the accounts respecting the land of the Moabites approximate so closely to those of Jeremiah in ch. xlvi. that no great interval of time can be imagined between them. With the same intention a parallel has been drawn between the names of the numerous places in Num. xxxii. xxxiii. and those mentioned by Jeremiah. Likewise the names of the towns which the tribes of Gad and Reuben, who, in the time of Moses, wandered about with their herds as nomads, according to Num. xxxii. 34–38, (“*so early!*”) must have built, borrowed in part from the latter reality, which Jeremiah likewise explains in the aforesaid chapter.

We deem it impossible that the originators of this argument could really feel confidence in its soundness. The agreement with Jeremiah only amounts to this, that there a very considerable number of towns are named, which also occur in the Pentateuch. But where in all the world is there a country in which the like is not to be found! and particularly the east, in which the ancient names of cities have been retained for the greater part to this day, and even their ruins yet remain! BURKHARDT and others have found, especially in the country beyond Jordan, a multitude of names of towns which occur in the Sacred Scriptures. And throughout the agreement in reference to the names is only partial. In Jeremiah a great number of cities are mentioned which do not occur in the Pentateuch, and of the towns

in the Pentateuch Ataroth is wanting in Jeremiah, which is nowhere found except in Num. xxxii. 3; Medebah also, which yet in his time must have been still in existence.

But with this unessential and easily explicable agreement, there is an essential difference, namely, that in Jeremiah, as also in Isaiah, ch. xv. and xvi., the same towns which in the Pentateuch are enumerated as belonging to the territory taken from the Amorites, appear, without any intimation that in respect a change had taken place in later times, as a constituent part of the Moabish territory. (ROSENMÜLLER II. i. p. 266). This renders it impossible to admit that the former are copied from the latter.

The suspicion cast on the account of the cities built by the tribes on the other side Jordan, may be easily proved to be unjust. The term *building* not unfrequently, when cities are spoken of that have been long built, receives from the connection the sense (the *sensus*, not the *significatio*) of *fortifying*. Compare for example, 1 Kings xv. 17, which is also very common in Syriac. That the word is used so here there can be no doubt. For the same places were before named as standing, and taken from the Amorites, ver. 3; so that the expression "they built," in ver. 34, is to be connected with "fenced cities" and "sheep-folds," in ver. 36. They restored the fortifications which had been injured when the cities were captured, (for they were previously fortified, see Deut. iii. 5, "All these cities were fenced with high walls, gates, and bars, besides unwall'd towns a great many,") in order that they might pass over Jordan with their brethren, without the apprehension of hostile surprisals. Their work might be accomplished in a very short time. The astonishment conveyed in the exclamation we have quoted, ("*so early!*") is therefore misplaced.

#### EDOM.

Our design is to collect every thing in the accounts of this people which has a reference to the investigations on the genuineness of the Pentateuch, not merely what relates most directly to that question—the pretended marks of a later age—but also the real traces of the Mosaic age, as well as the assumed contradictions; we shall begin with the latter.

I. We begin with the apparent contradictions which occur in Genesis in reference to the wives of Esau.

(i.) The father of his first wife is called, in ch. xxvi. 34, *Beeri*; in ch. xxxvi. 2, *Anah*. But the latter passage gives us, in ver. 24, the key for the solution of the contradiction, since it informs us of the event from which Anah obtained the surname of Beeri. It is there said, “this was that Anah that found *the warm springs*, בְּמַיִם חֹמֵם, (*mules*, Eng. Auth. Vers.) in the wilderness, as he fed the asses of Zibeon, his father.” All modern expositors agree that בְּמַיִם חֹמֵם means *warm springs*. The reasons drawn from the language for this interpretation are supported by facts. In the district inhabited by the Chorites, to the south-east of the dead sea, are the warm springs of Callirhoë, which have been described by LEGH in remarkable agreement with the account of the ancients, (JOSEPHUS, PLINY). This traveller speaks of the “enclosed situation of the place”—At the edge of a precipice was hewn out, a narrow zigzag path, which led to a thicket of reeds, thorns, and palms, growing out of the clefts of the rocks, and here bubbled forth the numerous warm springs which they sought, (see ROSEN-MÜLLER, *Alt.* II. i. 218). The peculiar locality accounts for the use of the word בְּמַיִם חֹמֵם. And if the treasure was so hidden, it is explained more easily why Anah, from the discovery, obtained the name of Beeri, בְּמַיִם חֹמֵם, *man of the springs*, (*fontanus*, GESENIUS), which indicated the value of the discovery—(JOSEPHUS says expressly that the waters were remarkable for sweetness)—and the high importance that was generally attached to springs; compare Gen. xxi. 19, xxvi. 18. In the narrative we find the name by which the man was commonly called by his neighbours ever after that most important event of his life, which, in a certain sense, formed its essence—whoever saw him was reminded of the warm springs; on the contrary, in the genealogy in ch. xxxvi., his proper name Anah appears, which, genealogically, could never be supplanted by any other. From this example we may learn how ill-advised it is precipitately to admit the notion of a contradiction. That short notice, which fully removes the appearance of contradiction, might have been wanting; the author, in communicating it, performed an *opus supererogationis*. And, in similar cases, it is too often not made use of, as even here; it is remarkable that it never occurred to any one to make use of that notice for remov-

ing the contradiction. Let it then be marked how the confirmation which the name receives by means of the notice, (without both being brought into connection by the author himself,) and which this again receives by the name, and at the same time by the nature of the locality, proves the author trustworthy in the smallest particulars, (even such as are most remote from his main object), and how his distinguishing between what belonged to the narrative, and what to the genealogy, is a proof of his attention and accuracy.

(ii.) Anah, called Beerî, is assigned to three different nations. According to Gen. xxxvi. 2, he was a *Hivite* (חִוִּי); according to ver. 2 of the same chapter, a *Horite* (חֹרִי); and according to xxvi. 34, a *Hittite* (חִתִּי). To obviate the first difficulty, CH. B. MICHAELIS (in his *dissert. de nomin. muliebr. in virilia versis*. p. 28) maintains, that the Anah in ch. xxxvi. 20, is different from the Anah in ver. 2. Against this violent supposition J. D. MICHAELIS (*Comm. de Troglodytis Seircis*, 195) remarks, that Anah in both passages has Zibeon for his father, and Aholibamah for his daughter; and it cannot be imagined why the author, contrary to his usual practice, should interweave the genealogy of the conquered and ruined people the Horites in the Edomite genealogy, when, in so doing, he would break the thread by which they were connected with Esau and his race. But an easy and unforced solution of the contradiction offers itself. Anah belonged to that division of the Canaanitish race the Hivites, who, from their dwelling places, obtained the name of Horites, or Troglodytes. Since the term Horites is manifestly appellative, and implies the existence of another name of the race; and since, certainly, we cannot so easily admit that the author would grossly contradict himself in a closely connected section, no one would scruple to adopt this method of reconciling the passages. At first sight, the reconciling of ch. xxvi. 34, and xxxvi. 2, appears more difficult. J. D. MICHAELIS felt this so strongly, that with every disposition to untie the knot, he seemed forced to cut it. In the latter passage, since the Hittites and Hivites are two different Canaanitish nations, he would for חִתִּי read חִוִּי. But on closer examination we may obtain here, also, a very simple solution. The name *Hittites*, like that of Amorites (see GESENIUS, p. 122), although originally it denoted a single Canaanitish nation, yet was likewise used *sensu*

*tiori*, to designate the whole race. Thus it is found in Josh. i. 4, where אֲרָץ הַחִיטִּיִּים (as GESENIUS acknowledges, *Theo.* p. 541) denotes all Palestine; 2 Kings vii. 6, where the Syrians speak of "the kings of the Hittites," אֲדָמֵי הַחִיטִּיִּים; and 1 Kings x. 29, where "all the kings of the Hittites" are spoken of, though the Hittites in a narrower sense probably had not, at that time, even *one* king, and certainly not several. Besides these three perfectly sure and demonstrative passages, Ezekiel xvi. 3, may be adduced in favour of a more general use of the name; "thy nativity is of the land of Canaan, thy father was an Amorite, and thy mother was an Hittite." The three general designations are here united. It appears, therefore, that one and the same man might properly be at once a Hittite and a Hivite. In the genealogy we find not only the proper name given, but also the more exact designation of the people; on the other hand, in the historical narrative, the latter is described in more general terms, since not the *species* but the *genus* was the important point; and of the more general designations this, which was relatively less common, was chosen, since the other Canaanitish wife of Esau, who also, in ch. 36, is described as a Hittite, was a Hittite in the narrower sense. That in this narrative, the Hittites could only be noticed as Canaanites, is most evident. After both his wives had been described as Hittites in ch. xxvi. 34, it is said in xxvii. 46, "And Rebecca said to Isaac, I am weary of my life because of the daughters of Heth; if Jacob take a wife of the daughters of Heth, such as these which are of the daughters of the land, what good shall my life do me?" That the repugnance here expressed was not specially directed against the Hittites, that they were only regarded as *pars pro toto*, is very apparent, and may be inferred also from the phrase used here as synonymous, בְּנֵי הָאָרֶץ. Thus also Isaac understood his wife (ch. xxviii. 1), "And Isaac called Jacob, and blessed him, and charged him, and said unto him, Thou shalt not take a wife of the daughters of Canaan." And thus Esau knew that his wives were disliked by his parents, simply as Hittites = Canaanites. Ch. xxviii. 8, "And Esau seeing that the daughters of Canaan were evil in the eyes of his father Isaac," &c.

(iii.) The wives of Esau have different names in different passages. The one who in ch. xxvi. 34, is called *Jehudith*, in ch. xxxvi. 2, is called *Aholibamah*; the one who in ch. xxvi. 34 is

called *Bashemath*, in ch. xxxvi. 2 is called *Adah*; his third wife, Ishmael's daughter, who in ch. xxviii. 9 is called *Mahalath*, in ch. xxxvi. 3, 4, 13, is called *Bathshemath*. It is here worthy of notice, that all three receive new names in ch. xxxvi. This allows us far less to seek for the cause of the difference in an uncertainty of tradition, than if there had been only two or one. We are led to conclude that all three received new names on their marriage, an event which, moreover, separated them from their kindred. It is well known what a strict connection subsists in the East between new circumstances and new names. Compare on the inconstancy and mutability of Oriental names, vol. i. p. 279. ROSENMÜLLER, *A. u. N. Morgenl.* i. 63. RANKE, p. 247. CHARDIN says, "The women change their names more frequently than the men. Women who marry again, or bind themselves to any fresh engagement, commonly alter their names on such changes." That the names in ch. xxxvi. are the later ones, lies in the nature of the case, since to the genealogy only those names belong which were peculiar to them as female ancestors, and is confirmed by ver. 41, where Aholibamah occurs as the name of a place. The place which received this name in honour of one of Esau's wives, would not be named after her maiden but her wedded name.

II. Under the category of contradictions belong also the historical errors which VON BOHLEN, p. 341, has tried to point out in the genealogy of Esau.

(i.) Anah and Aholibamah are at first spoken of as women; but the former is mentioned as a man in ver. 24. According to VON BOHLEN'S translation, such an unfortunate *quid pro quo* would certainly exist. He translates ver. 2, "Aholibamah, daughter of Anah, daughter of Zibeon the Hivite (according to p. 301) = who again was a daughter of Zibeon the Hivite." But this translation is palpably false. We must translate it, Aholibamah, daughter of Anah, daughter (grand-daughter) of Zibeon. Ver. 39 is quite analogous; as here the second בַּר is co-ordinate with the first, so in ver. 3 is אִשָּׁתָּא co-ordinate with בַּר; the meaning grand-daughter is, in the case of the second בַּר, determined by the connection.

(ii.) The sister of Lotan is Timna, ver. 22; on the contrary, according to ver. 40, Timnah was the district and residence of an Edomite sheick. But why should not the place have received

its name from his wife? How many analogies may there not be adduced for it! Tahpenes תַּחֲפֵנִיס, for example, is at once the name of a goddess, a city, and a queen; compare CHAMPOLLION, *Precis, tableau général*, No. 53, p. 6; GREPPO, *Essai s. le système hierogl.* p. 221, *sqq.* On the origination of names of places from names of persons, see SIMONIS, *Onomasticon*, p. 19.

(iii.) Timna, who, in 1 Chron. i. 36, is described precisely as the son of Eliphaz, is, at the same time, the concubine of Eliphaz, the son of Esau. Although this apparent contradiction between the Pentateuch and the Chronicles belongs, strictly speaking, not to this part of our work, but to the investigations respecting the latter, yet we are disposed to enter upon it here, particularly since some persons would find in our genealogy Timna, like Aholibamah, as a man's name; compare, for instance, ROSENMÜLLER on ver. 40, *Ceterum Thinnah hoc versu et תַּחֲפֵנִיס v. prox. vix dubium est esse virorum nomina non mulierum ut ver. 2, 5, 22.* It is (we would first of all notice) simply impossible that even the most ignorant Israelite could have used the name תַּחֲפֵנִיס, the 3 *fut. fem.*, from תַּחֲפֵנִי as the name of a man. We have, moreover, the *masculine* תַּחֲפֵנִי in 1 Chron. vii. 35. Timna means, *the coy one*. If we turn now first to the Chronicles, it appears that the exposition which would make it contradict Genesis must be false, since it is certain, that the author of the Chronicles took the genealogy from Genesis, in which there could not possibly be a misunderstanding. The "and Timna and Amalek" in Chronicles is equivalent to, "and besides of Timna, Amalek." This brevity was allowable, since Timna was *nomen femin.* besides, the design of the author was only a review; he had no intention to supersede the account in Genesis. The older commentators took the right view. KIMCHI says, "*Matrem cum filia brevitate causa hic conjunctam, quod nota satis res ex historia Geneseos esset.*" LAVATER, "*Ego in l. Paral. puto defectionem orationem esse, quae in sacris literis sunt crebrae huncque esse sensum; Timnah et Amalek h. e. ex Timnah etiam Amalekum sustulit, Haec enim verba ex Genesi interpretanda sunt, unde omnia, quae de familia Esau h. l. leguntur, videntur fere verbatim transcripta esse.*" In reference to the passage in Genesis, that in ver. 40-43, not the names of men, but of

places, are given, appears from the circumstance, that two female names, Timna and Aholibamah, appear in the list. Yet it might be proved on other grounds. The words in ver. 40, "these are the names" (that is, "this is the list," compare ch. xxv. 13) "of the princes of Esau, according to their families, their places, their names," וְאֵלֶּה שְׁמוֹת אֲלוֹתָיו עָשָׂו לְמִשְׁפְּחֹתָם לְמִקְוָתָם בְּשֵׁמֹתָם, by no means intimates, that, in what follows, all these things are specified, but only that the אֲלוֹתָיו had each one his particular tribe, dwelling place, and name. This is shown by the parallel passage in Gen. xxv. 13, "These are the names of the sons of Ishmael by their names, according to their generations;" then in ver. 16, at the end of the genealogy, "These are the sons of Ishmael, and these are their names, according to their villages, and their encampments," ("by their towns and by their castles," *Eng. Auth. Vers.*) (the villages and the encampments are not given, but only the bare names); ch. x. 5, "By these were the isles of the nations divided according to their lands, every one after his tongue, after their families, in their nations," ver. 20 and 31. Races and names were given in ver. 15. For these latter lists, nothing remained but the account of places. That these and only these are here noticed, is expressly said in the last clause, "These are the princes of Edom, according to their habitations," לְמִשְׁבְּתָם.

(iv.) The name of Mount Seir was transferred to the father of a tribe from whom descended the Horites or dwellers in caves; Lotan was his first son, and from him descended again Hori the Traglodyte. But nothing is more natural than that Mount Seir should receive its name from the first Canaanitish emigrant who occupied it, exactly as afterwards the same mountain was called the mountain of Edom (Idumea), from Edom; that Seir begat the Horites is not said; rather he was himself called the Horite; that among the Troglodytes one should receive the name of Troglodyte as *nomen propr.* (הֲרִי without the article) cannot be thought strange; the designation of the individual and of the whole tribe sprang from the same root. As for the rest, we remark, in order to obviate other similar objections, that the seven persons named in ver. 20, 21, were not considered by the author as the sons of Seir in a strict sense, but his descendants in various degrees of affinity, who raised themselves to the dignity of inde



pendent chiefs. This is supported by the following reasons: 1. No doubt can be felt, that the Zibeon and Anah in ver. 20 are identical with the Zibeon and Anah in ver. 2 and in ver. 24. How otherwise should they be found together in all the three passages? The Anah in ver. 25 can be no other than the Anah in ver. 20, otherwise the family of the latter would be altogether wanting, while it belongs to the author's plan to give it as he has done in the case of the other six. But equally must the Anah in ver. 25 be identical with the Anah in ver. 2, for, like the latter, he is said to be the father of Aholibamah, consequently he must be identical with the Anah in ver. 24; for the father of Aholibamah is, according to ver. 2, the son of Zibeon. Thus we evidently have in the list a father and son, and therefore only the sons of Seir in a wider sense can be intended. The one line through Ajah bore the name of his father Zibeon; Anah founded an independent family. 2. Timnah is, in ver. 22, called the sister of Lotan. If the seven had been brothers, she would have been the sister of all, and would have been so designated. But her name appears at the end of the list of Lotan's sons. 3. It is not conceivable that Timnah, the concubine of Eliphaz, was the daughter of Seir. The father (Esau) would then have married the great-grand-daughter, and the son the daughter.

(v.) In Gen. xxxvi. 21, the chiefs of the Horites are given, and they appear to have maintained their sovereignty down to the latest times near the Idumaeans in the southern mountain range of Seir. This is at variance with Deut. ii. 12, according to which the Horites were exterminated by the Edomites, and even in the time of Moses had ceased to exist. So VON BOHLEN, 172, 341. But Gen. xxxvi. furnishes no ground for supposing that the Horites continued for a long period after as an independent people. The genealogy of a tribe with which the Israelites never came in collision, and to whom they were not related, was solely introduced on account of Aholibamah and Timnah. Its latest members are contemporary with Esau and Eliphaz. About the time when Esau established himself in Seir, seven principal families existed there. Further the author tells us nothing, and nothing more could he intend to tell, in accordance with his object. But we may go further; Gen. xxxvi., so far from contradicting Deut. ii.

12,\* to which may be added ver. 22,† rather furnishes an express confirmation to its statements. Eliphaz had a female belonging to one of the principal families of the Horites as his concubine, while Esau had a Horite as his wife. The concubines whom we read of in the Pentateuch were of the class of handmaids, and that Timnah was a female slave appears particularly from the circumstance that her son is numbered in ver. 12, 15, with the sons of Adah. *Tribuitur Adae, ut dominae filius ancillae s. concubinae, ut supra. c. xxx. 6, 8. Dan et Naphtali, quos Bilha pepererat. filii Rachelis dicuntur.* ROSENMÜLLER. This fact, of which we are informed in Genesis, that a female of a governing family of the Horites was not esteemed worthy to be the wife (in the proper sense) of Esau's son, implies, that even then the powers of the Horites was completely broken, and that the catastrophe narrated in Deut. ii. 12 had already taken place. Let the reader notice the remarkable confirmation which the express statements of the Pentateuch receive from such undesigned notices, often in passages widely apart, which are only explicable on the supposition of their correctness. Also in Gen. xxxvi. the Edomites appear as the only possessors of the land; compare ver. 43. Nor let it be objected that the Horites could not have been exterminated till a time when Esau's family were multiplied. This objection could only be raised on the ground of a manifestly false representation, that the Edomites were all lineal descendants of Esau, as from a similar false representation objections have been raised against the increase of the Israelites in Egypt. Where then were the descendants of the four hundred men with whom Esau could march against Jacob? Moreover, we are to bear in mind that not the least trace afterwards appears of the Horites, which also militates against VON BOHLEN'S opinion that they were flourishing at a later period.

III. A number of apparent contradictions are presented in the accounts of the relation of the Edomites to the Israelites in their

---

\* "The Horims also dwelt in Seir aforetime (לְעִירֵיהֶם), but the children of Esau succeeded them, when they destroyed them from before them, and dwelt in their stead."

† "As he did to the children of Esau, which dwelt in Seir, when he destroyed the Horims from before them, and they succeeded them and dwelt in their stead, even unto this day."


march through the desert. We here present the tabular view in which VATER attempts to exhibit them.

In Deut. ii. 29, it is narrated that the Edomites and Moabites furnished the Israelites with food and water, for money, on their march from Egypt, and granted them a passage through their country.

In Deut. xxiii. 4-5, it is stated that the Ammonites and Moabites refused to supply the Israelites with bread and water on their march from Egypt. Of the Edomites, who are mentioned immediately afterwards, it is not said.

In Num. xx. 18, it is mentioned that the Edomites peremptorily refused a passage to the Israelites through their land, and in consequence they were obliged to make a great circuit. On the part of the Moabites, such a refusal is not mentioned in this book, nor of the Ammonites. Compare chap. xii. 11-24.

(i.) We begin with the contradiction between Num. xx. and Deut. ii., which GESENIUS also (*on Isaiah* ch. xxxiv. p. 904) regards as irreconcilable. In the first passage we are told that the Edomites refused a thoroughfare to the Israelites, and in the second that they granted it. ROSENMÜLLER, on Deut. ii. 29, (compare also *Alt.* liii. 68), attempts to obviate this contradiction in the following manner, *De quibus*, Num. xx. 14-21, *agitur Idumaei* אֲדוּמִי *diversi sunt ab iis qui hic memorantur filiis Esavi qui in Seire habitant. Hi igitur Esavitae, qui montani in australibus Palaestinae finibus hodie جبل dicta tenebant. Israelitis transitum concesserunt,* But this solution is quite inadmissible. In Gen. xxxvi. 31, there is not the slightest intimation that the kings ruled only over a part of Idumaea; the Edomites and the sons of Esau are everywhere the same. But the contradiction vanishes as soon as the difference of time and place is taken into account, and those illustrations of the localities are applied which modern travellers have furnished. LEAKE remarks, in his preface to BURKHARDT'S Travels, i. p. 23 (German translation), "The aforesaid people who opposed with success the advance of the Israelites through their strongly fortified western boundary with success, were now alarmed when they saw that they took a circuit and had reached the unprotected boundary of the land." They now therefore made a virtue of necessity, and tried to turn it to their advantage, by the sale of the necessaries of life, "in the same manner as now the caravans of Mecca on their pilgrimages are supplied by the inha-



bitants of the mountains." VON RAUMER (*Zug der Israeliten durch die Wüste*. Leipz. 1837. p. 44, 45) says, "Some hours from Akabah and from the ancient Ezeon Geber, a valley, Getum, (of which LABORDE gives the first certain account) opens into the Wady Araba. In this valley the caravans go up by Ameime, and so on to Maan, and thus come to the great desert of Arabia Deserta, which, as we have mentioned, lies 100 feet higher than the valley El Tih. Though the Edomite mountains fall with a precipitous deep descent westward towards Ghor and Wady Araba, yet on the eastern side they were but little above the Arabian desert. The Edomites might confidently meet in arms any attack of the Israelites from Ghor; but when they saw the host of Israel, after going round the mountains of Seir to the east, on the weakest side of their mountainous frontier, their courage failed them, and they gladly sold them food and water." In this manner the apparent contradiction is completely obviated. We only remark further, that the first refusal of the Edomites is mentioned in Judges xi. 16, &c., and would point out that in Deuteronomy it is by no means stated that the Edomites granted the Israelites a thoroughfare freely and kindly. It is on the contrary said in so many words, "Ye are to pass through the coast of your brethren the children of Esau, which dwell in Seir, and *they shall be afraid of you,*" Deut. ii. 4. Had the Israelites obtained the permission they asked for, they would have marched through the land of the Edomites, probably through the Wady Ghoeyr, the only one of the two narrow Wadys which intersect the Edomitish mountains from west to east, which affords a thoroughfare suited for a large multitude. (See LEAKE as above.) Afterwards they passed without entering through the eastern border. They did not enter the main part of the country. Indirectly the account of Num. xx. is contained also in Deut. i. Why, according to this passage, did the Israelites go round Mount Seir—a longer and more difficult route, if the Edomites had not refused to grant a thoroughfare? The way which the Israelites took is exactly the same both according to Numbers and Deuteronomy.

(ii.) It is urged, that in Numbers no intimation is given that the Ammonites and Moabites refused the Israelites a thoroughfare. But in Deuteronomy there is as little of anything of this sort. The way of the Israelites lay not through the Ammonitish terri-

tory. That the king of Moab actually refused to grant a thoroughfare, we see from Judges xi., according to which, the Israelites sent messengers from Kadesh, both to the king of Edom and the king of Moab. The refusal of the latter was of no consequence, and the whole embassy might have been passed over in silence. For if the Israelites could not pass through the land of Edom, the permission of the Moabites would have been of no service. It was only *eventualiter* that it was sought for. The transaction first comes to light in the Book of Judges, where, owing to circumstances, it obtains an importance which otherwise would not belong to it.

(iii.) In Deut. ii. 29, we are told, it is narrated that the Edomites and Moabites supplied the Israelites with bread and water; and in Deut. xxiii., that the Ammonites and Moabites refused to grant them either. But the apparent contradiction is resolved into harmony, when we look at the two passages more closely. In Deut. ii. 27, it is said in the embassy to Sihon, king of Heshbon, "Let me pass through thy land; I will go along by the highway; I will neither turn to the right hand nor unto the left. Thou shalt sell me *meat for money, that I may eat; and give me water for money, that I may drink, . . . As the children of Esau, which dwelt in Seir, and the Moabites, which dwelt in Ar, did unto me.*" In Deut. xxiii. 5, (4) it is said, "Because *they met you not* לֹא־מָצְאוּ־כִּי־יָבִיאוּ־בָּרֶזֶק־וּמַיִם־לְכַדְמֹנִיִּם with bread and water in the way, when ye came forth out of Egypt, and because they hired against thee Balaam the son of Beor of Pethor, in Aram Naharaim, to curse thee." Only let its proper force be allowed to קָדְמִי, and all will be right. The *purchase* of food and water for money, is so far from being inconsistent with *not being met with bread and water*, that it rather involves it. The Israelites desired from the tribes with whom they were connected by the bond of a common descent, the same kindly recognition of their affinity which they showed themselves. This recognition would, agreeably to the spirit of antiquity, of which we have an example in the conduct of Melchizedek, who brought out bread and wine to Abraham, have shewn itself by a hospitable entertainment of the hungry and thirsty. But the opportunity of evincing love was perverted into an occasion of gratifying selfishness, and thus even water was made an article of traffic. Isaiah's prophecy against the tribes of Arabia, in ch.

xxi. 13-17, very much elucidates this subject, especially as the expression  $\text{בָּרֵךְ אֶת הַלֶּחֶם}$  occurs in ver. 14.

The inhabitants of the land of Tema  
Brought water to him that was thirsty,  
They prevented with their bread him that fled.

Isaiah probably had Deut. xxiii. 5 in his eye. GESENIUS remarks on the passage, "The merchant caravans of the Dedanites, hitherto undisturbed on their peaceful journeys, were obliged to hide themselves in the woods from their enemies, and the other kindred tribes brought the fugitives food and drink for their refreshment," p. 670. And again, "This friendly tribe receives the fugitives, as Melchizedek formerly received the victorious Abraham; we may contrast with this the hostile conduct of the Edomites and Ammonites, &c., who refused the Israelites this duty of humanity." But would the Temaites have fulfilled their duty, would they not rather have violated it, if they had *sold* bread and water to their unfortunate brethren?

(iv.) According to Deut. ii., the Edomites, not less than the Moabites, violated the claims of hospitality towards the Israelites. How comes it to pass, that the same reproach is not cast upon them in Deut. xxiii.? The answer is as follows. That the same guilt is not charged on the Edomites in ver. 8, 9, is explained by the circumstance that theirs was only the smaller offence, which acquired importance first in connection with the greater, (which was not chargeable on the Edomites), that of hiring Balaam to curse Israel. In itself alone it was not fitted to break the bonds of relationship. Let it not be objected, that their bonds were declared to be broken in reference to the Ammonites, who had only taken a part in the smaller sin of omission, and not in the greater of commission. We cannot, with LE CLERC and others, refer the  $\text{בָּרֵךְ}$ , in Deut. xxiii., to the Moabites alone, so that only the first offence should be charged to the Ammonites with them. As in Judges xi., where the Ammonites themselves consider the cause of the Moabites without reservation as their own, so here the two nations are considered as one, as the descendants of Lot, and percisely on account of this inseparable connection, is the singular  $\text{בָּרֵךְ}$  used. If the unkindness which the Israelites suffered from the Edomites was not enough to break the bond of kindred love,

then it was not likely to be mentioned in this connection, when it was of importance to awaken the feeling of love. If conclusions are to be drawn from mere silence, then it may be inferred that the author knew nothing of all that the Egyptians had done to Israel; for to them, as well as to the Edomite, is the right given of admission into the congregation of the Lord, ver. 8, 9.

After thus disposing of the contradictions, we now turn to *the alleged traces of a later age*. These may be classified under the two heads of *historical* and *prophetical* anachronisms. We begin with the former. They are to be found in the genealogy of the Edomites, in Gen. xxxvi.

I. We begin with the grossest of all. The fourth Edomite king, says VON BOHLEN (p. 342), was a contemporary of Solomon, 1 Kings xi. 14, and since the historian is acquainted with several family details of Hodai as the last, without, at the same time, informing us of his death, it is natural to suppose that he was a contemporary, or that this account came down from that time. By this argumentation it is assumed as certain that the Hadad of Genesis (compare xxxvi. 35, "And Husham died, and Hadad, the son of Bedad (who smote Midian in the field of Moab), reigned in his stead; and the name of his city was Avith") was the contemporary of Solomon. But the following reasons lead to a different decision—(i.) The Hadad of Solomon was a king's son, but the Hadad of Genesis was not, for his predecessor was Husham, and he was the son of Bedad; besides, he was of a different city from his predecessor; not one of the eight Edomitish kings, whose names are given in ch. xxxvi., was the son of his predecessor. (ii.) The Hadad of Genesis was a king; the Hadad of Solomon merely an aspirant to a crown. For that his enterprise was unsuccessful, that he was only a thorn in Solomon's side, is evident from the silence of the author of the Books of Kings, who, agreeably to his object—to shew how Solomon was punished for his sins—would necessarily have mentioned the success of Hadad's attempt, had it occurred; of Rezon it is expressly said, that he was king over Syria. The difference between him and Hadad, in this respect, is distinctly shown in ver. 25. Moreover we find the Edomites, at a considerable later period, the vassals of Judah.

(iii.) It is said of the Mosaic Hadad, that he smote the Mi-

dianites in the field of Moab. But the Midianites, after Gideon's time, vanish from history. That the event could be at no very great distance from the Mosaic age, appears from Num. xxii., where we meet the Midianites as allies of the Moabites, who lived in their neighbourhood. The booty taken from the Midianites was brought together on the plains of Moab, according to Num. xxxi. 11, 12. How, too, can it be supposed, that, in Solomon's time, the country of Moab, an Israelitish domain, could be a battle-field for Midianites and Edomites? not to say that it is very improbable that the Hadad of the Books of Kings would seek for other enemies besides Solomon, and make war on his natural allies. (This notice shows that, with the whole line of kings, we cannot venture to go beyond the Mosaic age.) (iv.) The author expressly remarks, that all the kings mentioned by him had reigned over Edom before Israel had any kings. How then could the fourth among them be a contemporary of Solomon? (v.) As early as the Mosaic age, there were Edomite kings. Moses sent messengers to the king of Edom; Num. xx. 14. The kings in Gen. xxxvi. follow one another in an unbroken line; it is always said after the death of one king, "and ——— reigned in his stead." How then can the fourth king be brought down to the times of Solomon? These are the arguments *against* VON BOHLEN'S assertion; while *for* it, nothing can be urged beyond the identity of the name—a most futile ground, for, if it were valid, then we must set down the three Ben-hadads, kings of Syria, as one and the same person. Compare on the most usual names, YPEREN, *Hist. Edom. et Amalek.*, p. 69; GESENIUS, *Thes.* p. 218, 365.

II. Not to separate a notable pair of brothers, let us here take in hand another anachronism debated by VON BOHLEN. At the close of the genealogy, he maintains, p. 343, that the author, with self-satisfaction that Israel had conquered such a people, exclaims, *So great was Edom! Therefore* the genealogy must belong to the times of David! But it is VON BOHLEN who exclaims, *So great was Edom!* the writer of the genealogy says, *This was Esau the father of Edom.* הַיִּזְרְאֵלִים אֲבִי אֱדוֹם; and the ground and meaning of this concluding expression, on closer inspection, may be obtained with certainty. The 35th chapter ends with the words, "And Isaac gave up the ghost and died, and was



gathered unto his people, old and full of days; and his sons Esau and Jacob buried him." The position of the two names (Esau's first), points to the arrangement of the narrative that follows. It begins with Esau. "*Now these are the generations of Esau, who is Edom,*" Gen. xxxvi. 1. That the writer has done with him, and intends now to go on to Jacob, is what is meant by "*This is Esau, the father of Edom.*" Then follows in ch. xxxvii. 1, 2, "*And Jacob dwelt in the land wherein his father was a stranger, in the land of Canaan. These are the generations of Jacob.*" "*These are that Moses and Aaron,*" in Exod. vii. is a perfectly analogous expression. SEB. SCHMID *de Paschate*, p. 102, has pointed out similar comprehensive and concluding expressions in the doctrinal parts of the Pentateuch. Compare for instance Lev. iv. 21. "*This is the sin-offering for the congregation.*"  $\text{זֶה הוּא הַזֶּבַח הַחַטָּאת לְעֵדוּת הַקֹּהֵן}$  = Thus far relates to the sin-offering for the congregation. It follows immediately—"when a Ruler hath sinned," (Lev. i. 9, 13; ii. 6, 15).

III. At the first glance, it seems as if the transactions narrated in Gen. xxxvi., relating to the history of the Edomites, could not find a place in the interval between Esau and Moses. We shall state the difficulty that exists on this point, in the words of CH. B. MICHAELIS, who has ably endeavoured to remove it. (*De Antiquissima Idumaeorum hist.* reprinted in POTT'S *Sylloge* § 17). *Altera eaque haud dubie major difficultas est, quomodo Moses sua aetate in texenda historia Idumaeica primo integram 14, Idumaeorum duorum consecutionem, deinde 8 regum sibi invicem succedentium ordinem, tum vero rursus 11 duorum, qui rebus Idum. post reges praefuerunt, concatenatam scribere potuerit seriem.* We begin the removal of this difficulty with a review of the contents of Gen. xxxvi. In ver. 1-8, is an account of Esau's family during their residence in Canaan and their settlement. In ver. 9-14, is a sketch of Esau's family in the land of Seir. In ver. 15-19, are the names of the tribes of the Edomites, which, like the tribes of the Israelites, take their names from the nearest decendants of Esau, and each of which has its  $\text{אֱלֹפִי}$ , the *Alluph* of the tribe Teman, &c. In ver. 20-30, is the genealogy of Seir the Horite. In ver. 31-39, the Edomitish kings. In ver. 40-43, the localities of the Edomite Phylarchs. By this review, which agrees in the main with that of EWALD, *Compos.*

*der Gen.* 254, (only that in ver. 40-43, he thinks that overseers are intended, whom Esau himself placed over his widely extended possessions)—the chief difficulties are at once removed. The fourteen *Alluphim* who are named before the kings do not form a succession, but are contemporaneous; and after the kings, no new line of Phylarchs is given, but the localities of the Phylarchs who were before named. But the last vestige of difficulty vanishes, by the information that the kingly power among the Edomites was not raised on the ruins of the supremacy of the Phylarchs, so as to render it necessary to allow for the latter a considerable interval, at the close of which the first line of eight kings might begin—but both existed together. The Edomites had at the same time Phylarchs and Kings. For this view there are the following reasons. (i.) In the catalogue of the kings, it is always said, *N. N. "died," and N. N. "ruled in his stead."* Such phraseology forbids the notion of revolutions effected by force. A violent death would in any case be differently spoken of. How did it happen that in all cases the kings terminated their lives at the same time as their sovereignty? Every thing indicates an elective monarchy, besides the circumstance, that we do not find a king's son succeeding to the throne. But in an elective monarchy, there must needs be, besides the kingly, another estate which forms its foundation. Thus we are naturally led to the contemporaneous existence of אֱלִיפְתָּיִם along with the kings. Among the Idumaeans that same necessity early showed itself, which among the Israelites first obtained satisfaction under Samuel. The power of the hereditary chiefs sought support in the institution of a common superior, who might watch over the general interests, and repair the mischiefs which arose from splitting the nation into separate tribes. From the motive of self-preservation, they were impelled never to chuse a son in his father's stead. (ii.) On account of ver. 40-43, the contemporaneousness of the אֱלִיפְתָּיִם and the kings must be admitted. For what purpose is the list of the kings followed by an account of the localities of the אֱלִיפְתָּיִם, if they had been pushed off the stage by the kings? In that case this account must have stood before the list of the kings. (iii.) The co-existence of Phylarchs and kings during the journeyings of the Israelites through the desert is undeniable. The king of Edom appears in Num. xx. 4, the chief of the tribes in the Song of Moses,

Exod. xv. 15, where it is said that "fear and dread would fall upon them," when they heard of the passage of Israel through the Red Sea. (iv.) Even EZEKIEL speaks of the princes of Edom, with her kings, ch. xxxii. 29, מַלְכֵי־עֵדוֹם. That he did not use the term מַלְכֵי־עֵדוֹם, although he knew the thing intended by it, was probably not accidental. That this title was no longer current among the Edomites appears from Zech. ix. 7, xii. 5, 6, where the title originally given to the Edomite chiefs is applied to the chief of the chosen people. (*Christologie*, ii. 282.) It seems that such a change could not have taken place if the term had still been in actual use among a neighbouring people. According to the explanation we have given, the difficulty is entirely removed. From the death of Jacob (we do not know the year of Esau's death) to the departure from Egypt were 413 years; and to the time when Moses sent an embassy to the eighth king of Egypt, who, by ch. xxxvi. 39, appears to be still alive, 435 years. If we allow 200 years for eight kings in succession, or strictly for seven, as the eighth was still living (which is certainly a liberal computation, especially in an elective monarchy), there yet remains time enough for the increase of a family into a nation, while we must not forget Esau's four hundred men, and that Jacob, in relation to Esau, felt as an inferior towards a superior. Compare Gen. xxxiii. 1, &c., and on the original sole government of the *Alluphim*, see MICHAELIS, *Einleitung*, i. 161.

If, in this manner, the alleged *Historical* Anachronisms are fully disposed of, we shall approach the *Prophetical* ones with a very favourable opinion of the author. For since no one, without leaving the ground of historical criticism, can assume that the passages in question contained no prophecy, he must, as a necessary preliminary, shew that the author elsewhere, even in ordinary narrative, evidently views things from the position of a later age. The *Prophetical* Anachronisms are the following:—

I. In Num. xxiv. 17, 18, in the Song of Balaam, the conquest of Edom by the Israelites is spoken of, which is at variance with other representations of the Pentateuch, particularly Deut ii. 2–5, where Israel is forbidden to make war on Edom. Must not this song, at least in its present form, belong to the time of David, who had actually conquered Idumea? VATER, p. 637, 496; HARTMAN, p. 720, 721; BOHLEN, p. 265. Let us first remove

the contradiction which serves to support the anachronism. In Deuteronomy ch. ii. Israel is *commanded* not to fight against the Edomites; in Numbers ch. xxiv., it is *prophesied* that Israel shall one day conquer Edom. The two passages are easily reconciled. Israel was to hold sacred the bond of brotherhood; but if ever Edom, which hitherto he had not done, should wantonly break it asunder, then in the conflict that would ensue, the name of Israel would preserve its meaning. Israel is not to attack, but when attacked will be the victor. How little the prohibition of war with Edom was absolute—which would have been quite absurd—the proceedings against Amalek sufficiently show. Against that people, though the descendants of Esau, a strenuous opposition was made when they were the aggressors; and the promise of what would one day happen to the whole of Edom, had a firm foundation in what had already in part happened to them; at the same time, Israel was authorised to make war upon them in the future, and the promise of victory over them, a promise which, in its intention, applied to the rest of the Edomites, took effect in reference to them as soon as they practically evinced their hatred to Israel in the same manner. If we now view the pretended anachronism deprived of this support, we do not see how any one can maintain that Num. xxvi. 18—

“ And Edom shall be a possession,  
Seir also shall be a possession for her enemies”—

was not uttered before David's time, without also maintaining that Obadiah, ver. 17, 18,

“ But upon Mount Zion shall be deliverance,  
And there shall be holiness,  
And the house of Jacob shall possess their possessions.  
And the house of Jacob shall be a fire,  
And the house of Joseph a flame,  
And the house of Esau for stubble,  
And they shall kindle in them, and devour them,  
And there shall not be any remaining of the house of Esau.”

was not composed before the times of John Hyrcanus. It is flagrantly inconsequential, when particular passages are so treated; and when, on the other hand, it is attempted to explain away, with EICHORN, all predictions as veiled historical delineations. This consequence can only be avoided if the idea here expressed in in-

dividual distinctness, if the special circumstances of the conquest of Edom were sketched in agreement with the later history. But this is by no means the case. The announcement in ver. 17-21, is nothing but an application of the idea of the election of Israel, in which its whole dignity consisted, to existing relations. The victory of God's people over the world is the fundamental thought. The nations who here represent the world, the Moabites, the Edomites, the Amalekites, the Canaanites (as whose representatives the Kenites, who dwelt the nearest, appear), had already sufficiently manifested their hostile disposition against Israel. Ver. 17 refers not to any individual king, but to the supreme power which arose in Israel—the regal government, to which the development of Israel tended from the beginning of its existence as a nation. But the idea lying at the basis so completely pervades the Pentateuch, that it can be denied to belong to the Mosaic age only by destroying every historical foundation. What indeed would be left, if the idea of God's covenant with Israel, its election, its exaltation over the world, belonged only to a later age? Moreover, exactly that point in Balaam's prophecies, which at least is a simple deduction from the idea of Israel's election, which even the boldest criticism cannot refuse to the Mosaic age—the announcement expressed in ver. 24, that at a future day the West should be victorious over the East, lies beyond the historical horizon of the author, however late his age may be placed. If any one, on account of ver. 17, 18, would fix the date of the Pentateuch later than David, then much more on account of ver. 24, he must place it lower than the times of Alexander, through whom the anticipations there expressed began to be fulfilled. Generally the most remarkable predictions of the Pentateuch (such as, besides the one now before us, that of all the nations of the earth being blessed in the seed of Abraham, and that of Shiloh) are exactly those of which a more natural explanation could not be given, even if the later composition of the Pentateuch were maintained.

II. The declaration that Esau would one day throw off his brother's yoke in Gen. xxvii. 40, could not have been made before Joram, in whose reign the Edomites regained their freedom; compare GESENIUS on *Isaiah* xxxiv. p. 905; SCHUMANN on *Genesis*; BOHLEN, 265, and others. The point of the first importance here

is to determine the sense of the passage. This depends on the meaning of the verb  $\text{רָדָה}$ , "And by the sword thou shalt live, and shalt serve thy brother; and it shall come to pass  $\text{בְּאַשְׁפֵּי תִרִיד}$  thou shalt break his yoke." We translate  $\text{בְּאַשְׁפֵּי תִרִיד}$ , "Even as thou shalt shake," since we appeal to the Arabic *usus loquendi*, in which  $\text{رَاد}$  =  $\text{רָדָה}$  is used, *de motu reciprocatō, quo quid huc illuc agitatur ultro citroque mota fuit res*. The phrase is frequent  $\text{رَادِ الْقَصَبِ}$  *ultro citroque agitatus est ramus, quando vento huc illuc impellitur*. Compare SCHRÖDER *Obs. selectae ad origines Hebr.* p. 1, &c. In Hebrew, Kal occurs in the sense of *moving itself, moving about*, Jerem. ii. 31; Hos. xii. 1 (xi. 12). SCHRÖDER translates Gen. xxvii. 40, following the same meaning p. 8, *fiet autem prout huc vel illuc vagari amas, ut abrumpas jugum ejus de collo tuo*. But Hiphil is thus taken improperly in the sense of Kal. We take  $\text{תִרִיד}$  transitively, and refer it to the yoke. Also in Ps. lv. 3, Hiphil must be taken transitively, *to cause to move about* = to give the thoughts free course. It is hardly to be conceived how, after the rational treatment of the root, such as is found in SCHRÖDER, in the present day such crude empiricisms could again be practised upon it. Most modern expositors, appealing to the Arabic, give to  $\text{רָדָה}$  the sense of *desiring, wishing*. Only LETTE (in the *Symb. Brem.* iii. 576), has pointed out that this meaning, of which in the Hebrew no trace is found, is merely a secondary one in Arabic, which is still more clearly shown by SCHRÖDER. Having settled the meaning, it remains for us to make it appear that here also the announcement of the future had a basis in the present. That the Idumeans would make the *attempt* to regain their independence, might be foreseen without any special illumination. JOSEPHUS, (Bell. Jud. iv. 14) describes the Idumeans as  $\thetaορυβῶδες καὶ ἄτακτον ἔθνος, αὐεὶ τε μετέωρον πρὸς τὰ κινήματα καὶ μεταβολαῖς χαίρον$ , and this character of the nation, which the author of the Pentateuch already had before his eyes, is only a reflection of the character of their forefathers. (Compare, on the internal connection of national character with the individuality of the founders, MOHLER's excellent remarks, *Symbolik*. p. 362, 4th ed.) But as the attempt, so likewise its attainment, has a natural basis. The presentiment of it is the result of an insight into the covenant nature of God's relation to Israel,—(the dependance of the promises

on the faithfulness of the covenant), and into the character of Israel. That the backsliding of Israel formed the foundation of the necessity of Edom's undertaking was perceived by ONKELOS, who paraphrases the passage, *et erit cum transgressi fuerint filii ejus verba legis*. Who will deny that the idea which here is only expressed in individual application, is as old as Israel itself? In the Pentateuch it occurs in numerous passages, as for instance Lev. xxvi. 3, 7, and following verses, "If ye walk in my statutes, . . . ye shall chase your enemies, and they shall fall before you by the sword, . . . but if ye will not hearken unto me, . . . I will set my face against you, and ye shall be slain before your enemies; they that hate you shall reign over you, and ye shall flee when none pursueth you," Deut. xxviii. 1, &c. Balaam was quite aware that the only, but also absolutely certain method to reverse the relation of Israel to the heathen, was this, to seduce Israel into apostacy from the Lord, and this means he employed with success. That the history corresponded to the pre-announcement, is here, as elsewhere, a simple consequence of the fact, that Moses and even the Patriarchs had made themselves masters of the leading principles of the history.

III. The announcement of the dependence of the Edomites on the Israelites in Gen. xxv. 23, has also been treated as an anachronism. But this assertion is refuted by what has been already remarked.

We now pass on, after fully disposing of the apparent arguments against the genuineness of the Pentateuch which have been drawn from its notices respecting Edom, which, in case it had been spurious, would certainly not have been possible—to the *positive* arguments for the genuineness of the Pentateuch.

*First*, The position which the Pentateuch assigns to the Israelites in relation to the Edomites, forms a striking contrast to the relation actually existing and allowed by all the prophets, of Israel to Edom in later times. Two passages are here deserving of special notice. Deut. ii. 4-6, "And command thou the people saying, Ye are to pass through the coast of your brethren the children of Esau, which dwell in Seir, and they shall be afraid of you; take ye good heed unto yourselves, therefore. Meddle not with them, for I will not give you of their land, no, not so much as a foot breadth, because I have given Mount Seir unto Esau

for a possession. Ye shall buy meat of them for money, that ye may eat, and ye shall also buy water of them for money, that ye may drink." Also Deut. xxiii. 8, 9 (7, 8), "Thou shalt not abhor an Edomite, for he is thy brother; thou shalt not abhor an Egyptian, because thou wast a stranger in his land. The children that are begotten of them, shall enter into the congregation of the Lord in their third generation." It had been said just before in ver. 4-7 (3-6), "An Ammonite or Moabite shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord; even to their tenth generation shall they not enter into the congregation of the Lord for ever: Because they met you not with bread and with water in the way, when ye came forth out of Egypt, and because they hired against thee Balaam . . . to curse thee. . . Thou shalt not seek their peace nor their prosperity all thy days for ever." In how totally a different tone are the expressions of the prophets in reference to the Edomites! Compare, for instance, Amos i. 11, 12.

Thus saith the Lord,  
 For three transgressions of Edom,  
 And for four, I will not turn away the punishment thereof;  
 Because he did pursue his brother with the sword,  
 And did cast off all pity,  
 And his anger did tear perpetually,  
 And he kept his wrath for ever;  
 But I will send a fire upon Teman,  
 Which shall devour the palaces of Bozrah.

Here the Edomites are not merely reduced to the same level as the Moabites and Ammonites (whose later outrages almost cast into the shade their comparatively lighter guilt of former times), but even placed below them, and so in all the prophets. Edom is regarded by them as the strictly hereditary enemy, Israel's enemy *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, for which reason Edom is employed by them as a type of the enemies of the kingdom of God in general; compare Isaiah lxiii. This difference can be explained on no other principle than that, between the date of the Pentateuch and that of the remaining Books of the Old Testament, a series of historical developments had intervened, by which Israel's position towards Edom had been essentially altered.

*Secondly*, The regal government of Edom, as described in the Pentateuch, was elective. So far from the existence of a regal



race, even foreigners were called to the throne. But in later times the kingdom among the Edomites was hereditary. We learn this from 1 Kings xi. 14, "And the Lord raised up an adversary to Solomon, Hadad the Edomite; *he was of the king's seed in Edom.*" מִזֶּרַע הַמֶּלֶךְ הָיָא בְּאֲדוֹמִים. As Solomon's contemporary, Hadad, was of the royal race, the alteration from an elective to a hereditary monarchy must have taken place some time before. But the accounts of the Pentateuch necessarily belong to an age in which the alteration had not yet taken place. In the Edomitish state, as it is represented in the Pentateuch, no heir, nor pretender to the throne, could appear.

*Thirdly*, According to an express statement in Gen. xxxvi. 31, all the eight kings reigned at a time when Israel had, as yet, no king. We do not see what could induce a later writer not to continue any farther the line of Edomitish kings. The perplexity into which the opponents of the genuineness are thrown by this circumstance, may be perceived in VON BOHLEN'S assertion (p. 341), that the notice in Gen. xxxvi. 31, by no means conveys the idea that eight kings had ruled in succession before the establishment of the regal power in Israel. Yet this is just what is asserted in the clearest and most express terms.

*Fourthly*, It is very evident that the eighth Edomitish king was a contemporary of the author. MICHAELIS has remarked on this point (p. 254), *Hadarem qui octo illorum Idumeae regum postremus fuit, eo tempore quo Moses Pentateuchum suum absolvit, adhuc vexisse, tum ex eo cognoscitur, quod Moses quadragesimo post exitum ex Aegypto anno legatos ad regem quendam Idumeae misit, tum ex hoc quod antecedentium quidem regum omnium commemoravit mortem, de ultimi vero hujus regis morte silet, quam proin scribente Mose nondum evenisse oportet.*" Though his death is not mentioned (in *Chronicles* it is added "and he died"), there is mention of his wife, and of her father and grandfather, "And Baalhanan, the son of Achbor, died, and Hadar reigned in his stead; and the name of his city was Pai, and his wife's name was Mehetabel, the daughter of Matred, the daughter (grand-daughter) of Mezahab." (This explanation is the only correct one; compare ver. 2, and BECK *on the Targum*. 1 Chron. i. 50.) No other satisfactory explanation besides the contemporaneousness of the author can be given for this exactness

in stating the domestic relations of the last king. Now, if we admit Moses to be the author, the eighth king might reasonably have been his contemporary, as we have already shown. On the contrary, the admission of a later authorship only involves us in inextricable difficulties. That in the Mosaic age the regal government was founded among the Edomites, is rendered probable from the analogy of the surrounding nations. Already in this age we find kings among the Midianites, Num. xxxi. 8; the Moabites, Num. xxi. 26; xxii. 4; and even among a tribe of Edomitish origin, the Amalekites, Num. xxiv. 7; to say nothing of the Egyptians and Canaanites. In addition, there is the express statement of the Pentateuch in Num. xx. 14, that Moses sent messengers to the king of Edom; also ver. 17, where the great Edomitish road is called *the king's highway*, מִדְּבָרִים אֶל־עֵדֹם, whence it follows that the regal government was not then altogether new, but already firmly established. But even if persons are not disposed to acknowledge the authority of the Pentateuch, it may be concluded with certainty from Judges ii. 17, that the regal government existed in Edom in the Mosaic age. Now, if the *terminus a quo* of the reigns of eight (more properly seven) kings can in no case be placed lower than the Mosaic age, or must rather be placed higher than the Mosaic age, we should reach with the succession only the first half of the period of the Judges, to which no one has ever yet transferred the composition of the Pentateuch.

*Fifthly*, It is remarkable that the most considerable city in later Idumaea, SELAH or PETRA (compare ROSENMÜLLER, *Act.* iii. p. 76; HITZIG on Isaiah xvi. 1) is not mentioned at all in the Pentateuch. This silence leads us to infer that it was not then in existence. For there were not wanting opportunities for mentioning it. How many cities are named besides in the genealogy! If Selah already existed, and was as important a place then as it was afterwards, could no king be taken from it—did no Phylarch reside there? The place was situated in the immediate vicinity of the region which the Israelites touched, close to Mount Hor (compare RELAND, p. 930; ROSENMÜLLER, 82; VON RAUMER, p. 184). That EZIONGEBER in the Mosaic age was not a city, appears from Num. xxxiii. 35, where it is mentioned as a station of the Israelites in their journeyings through the wilderness. But the encampments were in general not inhabited places, but like the

encampments nowadays of the caravans—spots in the desert suited for the purpose by their fountains and a few trees, &c. See VON RAUMER'S *Der Zug der Israeliten*, p. 38. Consequently the later maritime town EZIONGEBER, where Solomon built his ships, according to 1 Kings ix. 26, 2 Chron. viii. 17, 18, and Josephus too, was as yet unknown to the author of the Pentateuch.

*Sixthly*, The exact notices respecting a tribe of whom, subsequently to the Mosaic age, no traces can be found, the Horites—the occasional pieces of information such as, that Anah found the warm springs in the desert—that Hadad the son of Bedad smote Midian in the field of Moab—the certainty with which the author traces the first origin of the Edomitish people—all this will not suit an author of a later age.

## AMALEK.

We shall here collect together everything by which it has been attempted to prove the unhistorical character of the accounts of the Pentateuch respecting this people, whether traces of a later age or contradictions.

I. "In Gen. xxxvi. 12, 16, an Amalek appears as a grandson of Esau, and chief of an Arabian tribe, and according to all probability must be regarded, in conformity with the design of the genealogies, as the father of this people. But this is contradictory to the account in Gen. xiv. 7, according to which the Amalekites, at the time of the expedition of the confederate kings from inner Asia, appeared on the field of history and suffered a defeat from them." Thus GESENIUS in ERSCH and GRUBER'S *Encyclopaedia*, iii. 301, and many others. To remove this difficulty several critics have assumed that this Amalek had nothing to do with the Amalekites. Thus J. D. MICHAELIS, following the example of LE CLERC, maintains (*Spicil.* i. 171) very decidedly, that we might as well term Hermann Augustus FRANKE the father of the Franks, as Amalek the father of the Amalekites. He states the question very unfairly, as if the connection between Amalek and the Amalekites had nothing more in its behalf than the agreement of the name, the importance of which, even if it stood alone, ought certainly to be rated higher than is done by him. There is in

addition, the identity of residence—(in 1 Chron. iv. 42, 43, the Amalekites are removed precisely to Mount Seir, so that in a wider sense Amalekitis was reckoned as forming a part of Idumaea)—and the improbability that a people who acted so distinguished a part, and even in the Mosaic age stood in such important relations to the Israelites, could be ἀγενεαλόγητος, contrary to the whole plan of the Pentateuch; lastly, also, the necessity of some intimation by which the two Amalekites might be distinguished from one another. These arguments cannot be countervailed by what may be adduced in favour of the distinction. It has been remarked, (i.) That the Amalek in Gen. xxxvi. could not be the father of the Amalekites, because in Balaam's prophecy they are described as the most ancient of nations, Num. xxiv. 20. But the question arises whether the interpretation according to which Amalek is there described as the most ancient of nations, be correct. Amalek is there styled רֵאשִׁיטָה גֵּיטָה. רֵאשִׁיטָה has always in the Pentateuch (compare Gen. xlix. 3; Deut. xi. 12, and elsewhere) the meaning of *beginning*. But in what respect Amalek is called the *beginning of nations*, must be determined by the connection. Now the subject of the context is the hostile disposition of the heathens towards Israel. Now if we add to this that the Amalekites were really the first heathens who attacked Israel in open fight, after the Lord had purchased them for his own heritage (Exod. xvii.), there can be no doubt that the most ancient interpretation is also the correct one. ONKELOS translates רֵאשִׁיטָה גֵּיטָה by *principium bellorum Israelis*. JONATHAN and JERUSALEM have, *principium populorum, qui instruxerunt bellum contra domum Israel*. JEROME, *primi gentium qui Israelitas oppugnarunt*. JARCHI and the other Jewish expositors explain it in the same way. (ii.) An appeal has been made to the different position which the Israelites assumed towards the Idumaeans and towards the Amalekites. *Cum Idumaeos, LE CLERC* remarks on Gen. xiv. 7, *bello petere vetiti sint Israelitae Hamalakitibus intulerunt, quo fit ut aliunde oriundos putem Hamalikitibus, quanquam Idumaeis vicinos*. But that the Israelites assumed a different position towards the Amalekites from what they did towards the other Edomites, was simply owing to the different relation in which the two parties stood towards the Israelites. And however sacred in the law the bond of kindred

was, yet it was not absolutely indissoluble. This is shown by the position which the prophets took towards the Idumaeans, and equally also towards the Moabites and Ammonites. In the Mo-saic age, the other tribes of the Edomites, although they had not shewn themselves friendly towards the Israelites, had perpetrated nothing which would entirely dissolve their brotherhood. Only the Amalekites had assailed the Israelites with bloody hatred and bitter malignity. What now was more natural, than that they should be separated from the kindred tribes? Thus much at least is certainly correct, that the Amalekites in the Pentateuch, and in the later Books of Scripture, do not appear as a particular section of the Edomites, but rather as a separate people. That they undertook a war alone against the Israelites leads to the same conclusion. But this does not exclude their descent from Esau. They might very possibly have separated themselves in the course of time from their kindred tribes, and have been formed into an independent people.

We therefore disclaim unconditionally a method of explanation which is rendered suspicious by the late period at which it has been brought forward. LE CLERC was about the first who thought of a double Amalek. In ancient times only one was known. JOSEPHUS throughout regards the Amalekites as an Edomitish race. (*Antiq.* ii. 1, 2; iii. 2 § 1).

If it had been said in Gen. xiv. that the kings smote the Amalekites, the contradiction would have been palpable, and the admission of a prolepsis would be simply inadmissible. But if we look at the text more closely, every difficulty vanishes, and the apparent proof against the credibility changes at once into its opposite. It is said in ver. 7, "And they returned, and came to En-mishpat, which is Kadesh, and smote *all the country of the Amalekites*, and also the Amorites that dwelt in Hazezon-tamar." It is striking that here only the *country* of the Amalekites is spoken of,\* while in all other cases the *people* are noticed—the Rephaim, the Surim, the Emims, the Horites on their Mount Seir, and the Amorites. This is certainly not by mere accident. It rather conveys an intimation that the Amalekites had not, at

---

\* MARK observes (*Comm. in Pent. part. praecc.* p. 569), "Tantum percussi agri Amalekitarum meminit, sic satis prolepticam appellationem adhiberi arguens."

that time, appeared on the field of history, and that by "*the country of the Amalekites*" we are to understand the country which the Amalekites afterwards occupied, and this prepares us for the direct information in ch. xxxvi. respecting the origin of the Amalekites. Thus the closer examination of the text, in which not a word is placed unadvisedly, gives a death-blow to the assumed contradiction, as well as to the attempts at the solution which have been made on other grounds. We have only to obviate one objection, raised by J. D. MICHAELIS against our interpretation—" *Si per prolepsin,*" he says, "*ager Amalecitarum dicitur, omnino non opparet, qui homines, cujus gentis victi aut caesi sunt. Id vero non solum sua sponte est bono historico indignum, sed et a reliquo totius narrationes scopo abludivit, non situs modo locorum, sed et nomina gentium victarum indicantis.*" But we cannot infer from the design of the author, that he was necessitated, always and without exception, to name the conquered nations; and besides he gives us, not obscurely, to understand to what nation the inhabitants of the country afterwards occupied by the Amalekites belonged. That they were Canaanites is shown by the position of their residence between the Canaanitish Horites and Amorites.

(ii.) It is objected that to the Amalekite king Agag, in 1 Sam. xv. 8, there is a reference in Num. xxiv. 7, where in Balaam's prophecy it is said—

And his [Israel's] king shall be higher than Agag,  
And his kingdom shall be exalted.

The supposition that Agag was a common name of the Amalekite kings, is only a desperate effort. Therefore Num. xxiv. was not written till after Samuel's death. Thus BLEEK, in ROSEN-MÜLLER'S *Repertorium*, i. 35; HARTMANN, 716; VON BOHLEN, *Einl.* p. 135. But the notion that the Pentateuch, in reference to this *one* point, rests on 1 Sam. xv., is inadmissible, because, as we shall afterwards prove, 1 Sam. xv. is evidently independent throughout of the Pentateuch. Even from our opponents' point of view, Agag cannot be taken as *nom. propr.* For how should the author, who otherwise well knew how to play his part, betray himself here so awkwardly? But what is the main point, the assumption that the name Agag belongs to a single Amalekite

king, is at variance with the essential character of Balaam's prophecies. Their complexion is throughout ideal. Nowhere else is an individual named. In such a connection an isolated individual reference would be altogether unsuitable. If the author had wished to introduce any thing of that sort, it would have been much more natural to have brought in by name Saul or David. Why should he insert the name of the conquered, and not of the conqueror? The last prediction of Balaam crowns the whole. It is far more definite and individual than the former. But there, in ver. 20, only the overthrow is announced which Amalek would receive from Israel. Moreover, the opinion that Agag was a *nom. dign.* of the Amalekite kings, has a number of analogies in its favour. Such *nomina dignitatis* were used in most of the neighbouring nations. The Egyptian kings had the common name *Pharoah*, the Philistines that of *Abimelech*,\* alluding to the hereditary nature of their regal government, in contrast to the elective, like that of the Edomites; the kings of the Jebusites were called Melchisedec or Adonizebec; compare Gen. xiv. 18, with Jos. x. 1-3. The kings of Hazor had the standing name of JABIN, *The Intelligent*; compare Josh. xiv. 1 with Judg. iv. 2. AGAG assorts with these names so much the more because, in its meaning, it is highly suitable as a *nomen dignitatis*. The root אגג has in Arabic, to which we are here directed first of all, the meaning *arsit, flagravit, cucurrit, celeravit gradum*, hence the adjectives أجوج

\* Compare GESEN. *Thes.* p. 9, *nomen complurium regum in terra Philistaeorum, ut regis Geraritici tempore Abrahami, Gen. xx. 2, et Isaaci, Gen. xxvi. 1, item regis urbis Gath tempore Davidis, Ps. xxxiv. coll. 1 Sam. xxi. 12, ubi idem Achis appellatur. Commune fere illud regum horum nomen tituluse fuisse videtur, ut Pharae regum priscorum Aegypti, Caesar et Augustus imperatorum Romanorum.* VON BOHLEN maintains, p. 220, that the later inscription in Ps. xxxiv. introduced the Abimelech that occurs elsewhere so often. In the same manner STUDER (*z. B. d. Richter*, p. 98) tries to take away from Jabin its character as the standing name of the king of Hazor, when he asserts that the *Jabin* of Joshua's time arose from that in the period of the judges, that the name was carried back from the later period to the earlier. But this hypothesis, which, if the case was isolated, would have some probability, is annihilated by the multitude of analogies, particularly since all these names, according to their meanings, are *nomina dignitatis*. It was otherwise with names which evidently refer to personal and accidental qualities, as, for example, *Balak* and *Eglon*. Compare on the standing names of kings among the Arabians. R. v. L. *Zur Gesch. der Araba vor Mohammed*. Berl. 1836, p. 217; and on *Syennesi* among the Cilicians, BÄHR on *Herodotus*, i. 74.

and <sup>س</sup> <sup>ع</sup> <sup>ا</sup> <sup>ج</sup> <sup>ا</sup> <sup>ج</sup> <sup>ا</sup>, *valde ardens, rutilans, splendens*; compare FREYTAG, s. v. *The Fiery One* would certainly be a most suitable name for the Amalekite king. To AGAG, as the general name of the Amalekite royal race, we are led by the designation of Haman as the Agagite, אגג, in Esther iii. 1, 10, since it is more probable that his family was thus referred back to that of the Amalekite kings, than to that single individual in Saul's time. From these remarks, any one may decide whether the opinion that AGAG was the *nom. dign.* of all the Amalekite kings, is a mere make-shift, which even the more moderate among our opponents do not venture to maintain; for WINER explains Agag as the *nom. propr. regum Amalekitarum*, and GESENIUS, in his *Thesaurus*, after remarking that Num. xxiv. *perhaps* refers to 1 Sam. xv., adds, *nisi Agagi nomen Amalekitarum regibus fere commune fuisse dicas, ut Abimelechi nomen Philistaeorum regibus*. It would indeed be strange if precisely in the Pentateuch, in a prediction, a proper name should appear, when here, in the history, almost throughout, the *nomina dignitatis* are used; the Egyptian kings always bearing the name Pharaoh, and those of the Philistines the name of Abimelech. Finally, in 1 Sam. xv. the title and not the proper name of the Amalekite king is designedly used. The account respecting the fulfilment was to approach in form, as near as possible, to the prediction. This view is in conformity with the general relation of 1 Sam. xv. to the Pentateuch.

(iii.) The decree of extermination against the Amalekites in Exod. xvii. 14, which is repeated in Deut. xxv. 17, 19, could not have been in existence in Samuel's time. For Samuel, in 1 Sam. xv. 2, 3, says not a syllable respecting such a divine command; nor, even afterwards, when his intense displeasure against Saul breaks forth in ver. 16. Thus HARTMANN. But how came Samuel, if that command did not exist in the law, to command the extermination of the Amalekites? In all the later history of the Israelites, nothing similar occurs. In his own time there was no adequate cause. There were far greater enormities in other nations. In the Mosaic age, on the contrary, we find sufficient reasons for such a command. The Amalekites were *the first* who manifested hostility to Israel, a circumstance to which great



weight is attached in Num. xxiv. 20. It took place under very aggravating circumstances. The Lord had already declared that Israel was his people, and that he was Israel's God; Exod xv. 14, 15.

The people hear it—they tremble—  
 Quaking seizeth the dwellers in Philistia;  
 The chiefs of Edom are frightened;  
 Trembling seizeth the rams of Moab;  
 Dread and fear fall on them;  
 By the greatness of thine arm they shall be still as a stone.

Amalek, more hardened than Pharaoh, is determined to vent his hatred on the Israelites, to try his strength upon them, precisely because they are the people of God. He attacks God himself in his people. Amalek laid his hand on the throne of God; wherefore the Lord declared war against Amalek to all generations. Exod. xvii. 16. There was in addition the cruel malignity and spite with which the Amalekites acted towards Israel. Great stress is laid upon this in Deut. xxv. 18, "How he met thee by the way, and smote the hindmost of thee, all that were feeble behind thee, when thou wast faint and weary, and he feared not God." Consequently, though, in 1 Sam. xv., there were no express references to the decree of extermination, or generally to the Pentateuch, yet it might be regarded as certain, that Samuel in his acts was guided by the Pentateuch, or at least by its substantial meaning.

But it is scarcely conceivable how any one can overlook the evident references in 1 Samuel xv. to the Pentateuch, and especially to the decree respecting the Amalekites.

These references begin at the close of ch. xiv. It is there said in ver. 47, 48, "So Saul took the kingdom over Israel, and fought against all his enemies on every side; against Moab, and against the children of Ammon, and against Edom, and against the king of Zobah, and against the Philistines, and whithersoever he turned himself, he vexed them. And he gathered a host" (wrought powerfully, *Eng. Marg. R.*) וַיִּגְדַּל סָוּל, &c. then follows, after some notices respecting Saul's family, the command (xv. 1) to exterminate the Amalekites. Now, let it be compared with Deut. xxv. 19, "Therefore, it shall be, when the Lord thy God hath given thee rest from all thy enemies round about, in the land

which the Lord thy God giveth thee for an inheritance to possess it, that thou shalt blot out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven; thou shalt not forget it." Evidently, the author by this reference designed to intimate, that the time notified by the Lawgiver had now arrived, and therefore to give the reason why Samuel exactly at this time laid the injunction on Saul. The expression, "against Moab," &c. in 1 Sam. xiv. 47, is mere individualising. That the agreement is only accidental will scarcely appear probable, if we notice that the language in 2 Sam. vii. 1 is almost literally borrowed from Deut. xxv. 19, "And it came to pass, when the king sat in his house, and the Lord" (as he promised in the law) "*had given him rest round about from all his enemies.*" Thus also the notion, that perhaps the reverse was the fact, that the words in Deuteronomy were borrowed from Samuel, is excluded. The phrase וַיֵּשֶׁב ה'ל marks the fulfilment of the promise in Num. xxiv. 18, וַיִּשְׁפָּט אֱלֹהֵי ה'ל, which is followed in ver. 20 by the threat of the destruction of Amalek; compare Ps. lx. 14 (12), בְּאַלְהֵים יִנְשָׁא-ה'ל; cviii. 14 (13), where a similar reference to Num. xxiv. 18 occurs.

In 1 Sam. xv. 2, "I remember that which Amalek did to Israel, how he laid wait for him in the way when he came up from Egypt;" the reference cannot be mistaken to Deut. xxv. 17, "Remember what Amalek did unto thee by the way, when ye were come forth out of Egypt." The agreement is verbal, excepting the third person instead of the second, and נָפַח instead of נָפְחָה.

According to ver. 6, Saul said to the Kenites, "Ye showed kindness to all the children of Israel, when they came up out of Egypt." The Kenite Jethro, or Hobab, Moses' father-in-law (Judges i. 16), had been eyes to the Israelites in the wilderness, (Num. x. 31, "Thou knowest how we are to encamp in the wilderness, and thou mayest be to us instead of eyes,") and in return all good things had been promised to him. "And it shall be, if thou go with us, yea it shall be that what goodness the Lord shall do unto us, the same will we do unto thee." If the *kindly* conduct of Saul was determined by the contents of the Pentateuch, what can be more natural than to suppose that his hostile conduct had a like foundation?

In ver. 7, "And Saul smote the Amalekites from Havilah, until thou comest to Shur that is over against Egypt." אֲשֶׁר-עַל-יַדְּנִי מִבְּנֵי-מִצְרָיִם

the boundaries are given not merely verbally, but to the very letter, from Gen. xxv. 18, "And they" (the sons of Ishmael) "dwelt from Havilah unto Shur that is before Egypt." The reference to Genesis is so much the more undeniable, since, whichever among the different localities Havilah may be supposed to be (see Gese-  
nius, *Thes. s. v.*), it is very improbable that Saul would have penetrated into this district. "From Havilah to Shur" can be no ordinary geographical designation, and the author must have had another reason besides the fact itself, to choose this in preference to any other. Although the reference to Genesis is plain, still the deeper reason for making it is concealed. Perhaps the author meant to intimate, that the Amalekites had settled in the inheritance which, according to the sacred books, belonged to the sons of Ishmael. The expression, "he smote the Amalekites from Havilah to Shur," is, however, equivalent to "such of the Amalekites as were between Havilah and Shur."

In ver. 21, Saul says to Samuel, "And the people took of the spoil, sheep and oxen, *הַבְּרִיּוֹת*, *the firstlings of the Cherem*, (*הַחֵרֶם*) to sacrifice unto the Lord thy God in Gilgal." It is deserving of notice, that, in Deuteronomy, the ordinance respecting the presentation of the first fruits (xxvi. 1) *הַבְּרִיּוֹת* immediately follows the command for the extermination of the Canaanites (xxv. 19). The very quarter whence Samuel drew his accusation furnished Saul, it seems, with the materials of apology.

In ver. 29, Samuel says, "The Strength of Israel will not lie nor repent; for he is not a man that he should repent." Compare this with Num. xxiii. 19,

"God is not a man that he should lie,  
Neither the son of man that he should repent."

If the reference here is undeniable, (as if he had said, "Rememberest thou not the words which the prophet of the Lord said to Balak, when he thought to change the counsel of the Lord,") so also the coincidence of "it repenteth me," *נִחַמְתִּי*, in ver. 11, with Gen. vi. 6, 7, cannot be accidental. The relations are essentially the same here, on the small scale, which were then exhibited in larger proportions. There, "it repenteth me that I have made men;" here, "it repenteth me that I have set up Saul to be king."

And if the references to the Pentateuch, with all their importance, are often only slight and suggestive, it will not be thought far-fetched if we consider the expression in the same verse, "and hath not performed my commandments," לֹא־הֵקִים, as coinciding with Deut. xxvii. 26, "Cursed be he that confirmeth not the words, לֹא־יִקְרִים אֶת־הַדְּבָרִים הַאֵלֶּה, of this law to do them." Compare the undoubted reference to this passage in Neh. v. 13, לֹא־יִקְרִים אֶת־הַדְּבָרִים הַאֵלֶּה.

It is ascertained, therefore, that 1 Sam. xv., without an express citation, has a manifold relation to the Pentateuch generally, and specially to the ordinance against the Amalekites. Nor should we neglect to draw from this result some general conclusions respecting the kind and style of the references to the Pentateuch in the remaining books of the Old Testament. Especially in the writings composed by the prophets, which, in the historical parts, never forego their peculiar character; to demand direct and express citations would be quite unreasonable. The law had become to them thoroughly internal, and thus the references to the Pentateuch of the kind in question originated, always breathing its spirit, but not servilely adhering to its phraseology.

#### THE OTHER SIDE JORDAN.

HARTMANN remarks, 706, "The author speaks of '*the other side Jordan*,' although, if his work was committed to writing before the invasion of Palestine, the expression '*this side Jordan*' must have been used; for instance, in Num. xxxv., the three cities '*on the other side*' אֲרָבֶּה (this side, *Eng. A. V.*) Jordan are distinguished from '*the three cities in the land of Canaan*.'" The narrator also transports himself into Palestine, in Deut. i. 1, "These be the words which Moses spake unto all Israel *on the other side Jordan*;" also iii. 8. In the same chapter, ver. 20, &c., where taking possession of the promised land is spoken of, the expression בְּעֵבֶר takes its proper place, and, at the same time, shows that our first argument is well founded.

This difficulty is not one of modern invention. ABEN EZRA had remarked it; NICOLAS DE LYRA enumerates it among the grounds on which some persons denied that Moses wrote the Pentateuch; SPINOZA and PEYRERIUS attached importance upon it;

in short, it forms a standing article in the older treatises both for and against the genuineness of the Pentateuch.

The advocates of the genuineness endeavour to meet the objection, by maintaining that  $\text{בַּעֲבֹרֵי}$  and  $\text{בְּעֵבֶר}$  equally mean *this side* or *that side*, and in order to avoid the awkwardness of combining two exactly opposite meanings, have tried to trace both to a general primary meaning.  $\text{בַּעֲבֹרֵי}$  was originally either *at the side*, or *across*, and only by the connection acquires the special meaning of, *this side* or *the other side*. Thus, for instance, among the older critics, GOUSSET remarks (*Lev.* p. 1099),  $\text{בַּעֲבֹרֵי}$  *significat id, quo spatium aliquod terminatur, quodque adeo transgredi oportet, ut ex illo spatio in vicinum transeat* . . . *Quia autem simpliciter notat terminum spatii ac oram rei, ideo cum aliquid aliud corpus apponitur, non designat cui orae et quo modo apponitur, sed id circumstantiae docent*; CARPZOV, RICH. SIMON, and generally, all who have noticed it among the moderns, MOVERS (*ueber die Chronik.* p. 240), KÖNIG, (*ueber Josua,* p. 106), DRECHSLER, (against VON BOHLEN and VATKE, p. 149), who modifies the view in a peculiar manner, yet without essentially giving it up—and others.

Were we obliged to choose between two opinions,—were no third supposition conceivable, we should unhesitatingly decide for the latter. For the difficulties of the former are so great, it is so evident that  $\text{בַּעֲבֹרֵי}$  and  $\text{בְּעֵבֶר}$  are not always used for the Trans-jordanic region, but many times for the Cis-jordanic, that even the opponents of the genuineness are obliged to see, that this argument must be given up. Thus VATKE remarks on Deut. iii. against GEDDES, (who considers this passage as demonstrative against the Mosaic authorship, and maintains that no passages can be pointed out where  $\text{בַּעֲבֹרֵי}$  means on this side); that  $\text{בְּעֵבֶר}$  in Num. xxi. 13, xxxii. 19, 32, xxxiv. 15, xxxv. 14, plainly means *on this side*; likewise  $\text{בַּעֲבֹרֵי}$  in Jos. i. 15. There is also evidence for it, (besides the highest antecedent probability, that Deut. iii. must have been spoken by Moses on the east of Jordan;) in Deut. iii. 8. On  $\text{בַּעֲבֹרֵי}$  therefore no weight can be laid. VON BOHLEN (p. lx.), after he had resolved to torture the phrase  $\text{בְּעֵבֶר יַרְדֵּן אֶרֶץ יְהוּדָה}$  by interpreting it “from the opposite shore of Jordan even to the sea,” is forced to admit that  $\text{בְּעֵבֶר}$  may signify *this side* and *the other side*, so that no reason can remain to refuse this meaning to  $\text{בַּעֲבֹרֵי}$ .

To the assumption that עבר, בעבר, ניגבר always refer to *the other side*, from the speaker's or writer's point-of-view, an insurmountable obstacle is presented by several passages in the Books of EZRA and NEHEMIAH. Nehemiah at Susa, requests letters from the Persian king to the governors אֲזָרָה הַתְּיָדָה (ch. ii. 7), and in ver. 9, he narrates that he "came to the governors עבר הנהר and gave them the king's letters," *Cum literas petebat*. GOUSSET remarks, *versans in Babylonia, duces illi erant eo respectu ultra fluvium, nempe erant in Judaea aut regionibus adjacentibus, sed cum eas reddidit Nehemias, jam iidem duces respectu ejus tunc in Judaea vel prope Judaeam agentis erant citra ipsum flumen*. *Ita*—he goes on to say—c. iii. 7, *notat in ipsa Hieros. sede thronum עבר בנהר ducis citra fluvium, cum et thronus et dux in eodem loco non interposito sane fluvio existerent*. In the Book of EZRA, עבר הנהר refers to the region which, from the writer's point-of-view, was *on this side* of the Euphrates; iv. 10, 11; v. 3, 6; vi. 6, 8; viii. 36. As little, on this supposition, can the passage in 1 Chron. xxvi. 30, be satisfactorily explained, where "Israel לנגבר לירדן *on the westward of Jordan*" is spoken of, therefore evidently the region which, from the writer's point-of-view, lay *on this side* Jordan, is described as לנגבר לירדן. The passages in the Book of Joshua, in which בעבר evidently means the region which to the writer was *on this side* Jordan, will be noticed when we state the positive arguments for our view.

But the supposition that בעבר and ניגבר sometimes mean *this side*, sometimes *the other side*, has to combat with great difficulties. Its insertion would then be altogether superfluous; one does not see why it should not be altogether left out, since its precise force would depend entirely on its adjuncts. And what can be done with the numerous passages in which these adjuncts are entirely wanting, and yet manifestly a definite meaning must be affixed to the term? And from this point-of-view, there is no possibility of explaining why the use of בעבר and ניגבר לירדן for the Cis-jordanic region should be confined almost to the Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua.

To both these untenable positions we shall now oppose what we deem the correct view. עבר, בעבר, and ניגבר, everywhere and without exception mean *the other side*, but *this side* or *the other side* may be used from a two-fold point-of-view, either that of the individual speaker or writer, or that of general and standing geo-

graphical designations. The latter phraseology is everywhere employed, where *בַּעֲבֵר הַיַּרְדֵּן* or *בַּעֲבֵר הַיַּרְדֵּן* appears to have the meaning of *this side Jordan*, or has called forth the remark that the author of the Pentateuch had forgotten his part.

That for the latter use of *this side* and *the other side*, a great number of examples may be adduced from other quarters, may be readily anticipated. We need only think of the *Tras os Montes* in Portugal, *Abruzzo ulteriore* and *citeriore* in the kingdom of Naples, the *Transpadine*, *Cispadine*, and *Cisalpine* Republics, in the time of Napoleon, the *Gallia citerior* and *ulterior* of the Romans—appellations which suffer no change in the mouths of those who found themselves in *Gallia ulterior*, in *Transmarisca* in Moesia, or *Cisplatina* in South America. Lower Hungary is divided into the *Cis-Danubian* circle and the *Trans-Danubian* circle; Upper Hungary into the *Cis-Tibiscan* circle *on this side* of the Theiss, and the *Trans-Tibiscan* circle, *on the other side* of the Theiss, and thus many other countries. But the Scriptures themselves furnish us with the closest analogy in the passages already quoted, in which, by writers who wrote westward of the Euphrates, the country between them and that river is called, *בַּעֲבֵר הַיַּרְדֵּן*; passages to which 1 Kings v. 4, (iv. 24), may be added, where it is said of Solomon, “He had dominion over all *עַבְרַת הַיַּרְדֵּן* from Tiphseh even unto Azzah (Gaza) over all the kings *בַּעֲבֵר הַיַּרְדֵּן*.” Who does not see, that in these passages, the situation of the places is determined by their relation to the central point of the Chaldee-Persian Empire, without regard to the writer’s personal point-of-view?

In the case of Palestine, a fixed application of the phrase *בַּעֲבֵר הַיַּרְדֵּן* to the Trans-jordanic region, independent of the personal relations of the speaker or writer, might be more early formed, as the Cis-jordanic region came to be regarded as the main of the promised land, to which the Trans-jordanic was a mere supplement or appendage. In the Pentateuch the Cis-jordanic land frequently takes the name of Canaan, and on all occasions the Trans-jordanic appears as standing to it in the same relation as the suburbs to a city. From this national relation of the two divisions to one another, arose the latter geographical designation, ΠΕΡΑΙΑ, πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου. Therefore, when we hear of the country *on the other side Jordan*, we are not to consider whether it stands in that

relation to us, but must transport ourselves at once to the centre of the country.

The preceding remarks show that there is nothing that directly opposes our view. We would now, by an examination of the most important passages, prove, that in many cases, it is absolutely required, and is every where suitable.

In Gen. i. 10, 11, it is written, "And they came to the threshing floor of Atad, which is *בְּעֵבֶר הַיַּרְדֵּן*, and there they mourned with a great and very sore lamentation, and he made a mourning for his father seven days. And when the inhabitants of the land, the Canaanites, saw the mourning in the floor of Atad, they said, This is a grievous mourning to the Egyptians; therefore the name of it was called Abel-mizraim, which is *בְּעֵבֶר הַיַּרְדֵּן*." MOVERS considers this passage as the strongest proof for his assertion that *בְּעֵבֶר* means also *this side*. He thinks that if it were not so, Joseph's funeral procession from Egypt to Hebron must have been taken by a strange route across the Jordan. But this route is certainly not strange, for we might call any one so in which a circuit is necessarily made. The Egyptians took their way not through the land of the Philistines, for the same reasons that they did not enter into Canaan. On account of the warlike escort they took their way through the wilderness; this remained behind on the borders of Canaan, while the peaceful procession of Joseph's corpse, with his brethren and their attendants, advanced undisturbed on their way to Hebron. But the meaning "*on this side*" is quite inadmissible. *אֶפְרַיִם בְּנֵי* in ver. 13 forms the evident contrast to the *בְּעֵבֶר הַיַּרְדֵּן*. The Egyptians conducted the funeral to the region on the other side Jordan; Joseph's sons brought it to Canaan in the stricter sense. There is exactly the same contrast in Num. xxxii. 32, xxxv. 14. And why was the phrase *בְּעֵבֶר הַיַּרְדֵּן* used at all, if it can equally mean *this side* or *the other side*? For what reason is *this side* Jordan mentioned? If they took their way through the land of the Philistines, they would not come near it. *This side* would be altogether superfluous, for that would at once occur to every one. But as little can *בְּעֵבֶר הַיַּרְדֵּן* here mean *on the other side*, taken from the personal position of the writer; it must rather mean *on the other side* in an objective sense. The author has not marked his own point-of-view, but without that he could not, in reference to it, speak either of *this*



*side or the other side.* The proper ground is the contrast to Canaan.\*

In Num. xxii. 1, "And the children of Israel set forward and pitched in the plains of Moab, *מעבר לירדן* by Jericho." *מעבר* can only mean *on the other side*, for only thus is it more definite than the *על*, which stands after words in the repetition of the geographical formula. But if *the other side* be taken in an objective sense, there is evidently no necessity for doing violence to the text.

Num. xxxii. 19 demands particular notice, in which the Trans-jordanic tribes say to Moses, "We will not inherit with them *on the other side* Jordan," *מעבר לירדן*, "because our inheritance is fallen to us *on the other side* Jordan, towards the East," *מעבר לירדן מזרחה*. It is inconceivable that *מעבר* should be used here in a breath, in directly opposite senses, first *this side*, then *the other side*. It

---

\* We wish to take this opportunity of relieving the author of the Pentateuch from a reproach which it has been attempted to cast upon him on the strength of this passage. "The place," VON BOHLEN remarks, according to this passage, was also called *אבל מצרים* threshing-floor, meadow, grass-plot of the Egyptians, perhaps from some earlier encampment, since they often made war in Palestine. Several places are found of which the names are compounded with *אבל* such as *אבל השנים*, Num. xxxiii. 48, and *אבל כרמיה*, Judges xi. 33. The historian wished to explain the name, and interpret it according to the unpointed writing by *אבל* mourning; and to favour this view transports the scene to the country east of Jordan, which the procession designed for Hebron would never enter." We maintain, on the contrary, that *אבל מצרים* cannot signify the grass-plot of the Egyptians, however widely spread that interpretation has been. For the meaning of *אבל* *locus graminosus, pascuum, pratium*, GESNIUS adduces (*Thesaurus*, p. 14), besides the *nomm. propr.*, only 1 Sam. vi. 18, but considers the passage as very doubtful both as to the reading and meaning. J. H. MICHAELIS, and other old expositors, have correctly given it, *usque ad lapidem illum magnum*; ver. 14. *qui a luctu acerbissimo qui*, ver. 19, *describitur Abel dictus fuit* *אבן* is changed into *אבל* just as *אֵלֶּמְנוּתָי* his widows, for *אֵמְנוּתָי* his palaces, in Isaiah xiii. 22. See other examples in Vol. i. p. 89. That *אבל* therefore has here no other meaning than the usual one, *mournful*, as the meaning of *mourning* prevails in the Hebrew, both in the root and derivatives. The passage points to the formation of proper names with *אבל*, and stands in this respect parallel with the one before us. The *nomm. propr.* have collectively the meaning *mournful*; and the additional names serve to distinguish them from one another—*Abel, Beth Maachah*; that is, *Abel*, near *Beth Maachah*. According to the analogy of the rest, our *Abel Misraim* should not be as it otherwise might be, translated by *mourning Egypt*, but, *Abel of the Egyptians*. If it be settled that the name can be only thus explained, so far from testifying against the credibility of the account, it rather serves to confirm it. The name alone is a pledge to us that a spot in the Trans-jordanic land, which the Egyptians certainly did not frequently visit, had been a place of mourning for the Egyptians, and the narrative only adds time and occasion. Had the author transposed, at his pleasure, the scene in the country east of Jordan, his evil conscience would certainly have impelled him to give reasons for the singularly circuitous route.

rather means in both cases *on the other side* ; first, subjectively, then objectively. The phrase “ towards the East ” is not intended, according to the explanation given by MOVERS of this and similar expressions to determine that here *מִיַּעַב* means “ *on this side,* ” but it is used as a fixed geographical designation, independently of the position of the speaker. By this passage both the current opinions are negatived. Here it is impossible to deduce the application *מִיַּעַב* to the Trans-jordanic regions, from the author’s forgetfulness of his relative position. Could he, at one and the same instant, remember and forget his actual point-of-view ?

In ver. 32 of the same chapter it is said, “ We will pass over *מִיַּעַב* armed before the Lord, into the land of Canaan, that the possession of our inheritance *לְיַדְדֵּךְ מִיַּעַב* may be ours.” Here it is evident that the region on the other side Jordan was regarded only as an *accessorium* to Canaan. We see how the *מִיַּעַב לְיַדְדֵּךְ* became a standing geographical designation. In the verb *בַּעַב* lies the *בַּעַב* in the appellative meaning *the other side*.

Num. xxxiv. 15, “ The two tribes and the half tribe have received their inheritance *לְיַדְדֵּךְ מִיַּעַב* near Jericho, eastward, toward the sunrising.” The author could not here have forgot himself ; this is shown by the explanatory clauses, which serve to remove any indistinctness which the *πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου* might have in relation to Perea.

Num. xxxv. 14, “ Ye shall give them three cities *לְיַדְדֵּךְ מִיַּעַב* and three cities shall ye give in the land of Canaan.”

In Deut. i. 1, “ These are the words which Moses spake unto all Israel *בַּעַב הַיַּרְדֵּן*,” the meaning *on this side* will not suit *בַּעַב*. GOUSSET remarks, *Non est quod Moses dicat, se esse citra fluvium. Nam loquens ad quamcunque ripam sit, semper est in ceteriori respectu sui.* And here, least of all, can the phraseology be attributed to forgetfulness. The author, who certainly intended to be considered as Moses, would here collect his thoughts at the introduction ; nor would he be likely to commit himself by such puerile inadvertence at the very threshold. This passage should suffice to make our opponents acknowledge the use of *the other side* in an objective sense in the Pentateuch ; and, at the same time, to prevent their attributing henceforward any importance to *בַּעַב* in the investigations respecting the genuineness of the Mosaic writings.

In Deut. iii. 8, "And we took at that time out of the hand of the two kings of the Amorites, the land אשר בעבר הירדן from the river of Arnon unto Mount Hermon;" ver. 20, "Until the Lord have given rest unto your brethren as well as unto you, and they also possess the land which the Lord your God hath given them בְּצִדְדֵי הַיַּרְדֵּן;" ver. 25, "I pray thee let me go over, and see the good land that is בְּצִדְדֵי הַיַּרְדֵּן." How unnatural is it to suppose that the author forgot himself in ver. 8, but not in ver. 20, 25; nor less so that בעבר in ver. 8 means *this side*, and in ver. 20, 25, *the other side*; while how easy and natural that בעבר in all the passages means *on the other side*, but in ver. 8 is taken objectively, and in ver. 20, 25, subjectively.

Deut. iv. 41, "Then Moses severed three cities בְּצִדְדֵי הַיָּרְדֵּן, *towards the sun-rising*;" ver. 46, "בְּצִדְדֵי הַיָּרְדֵּן in the land of Sihon;" ver. 47, "Two kings of the Amorites which were בְּצִדְדֵי הַיָּרְדֵּן, *toward the sun-rising*;" ver. 49, "All the plain אֶרֶץ הַיָּרְדֵּן *eastward*." How came these repeated explanatory clauses here, if the author forgot himself? Josh i. 14, 15, "Your wives, your little ones, and your cattle, shall remain in the land which Moses gave you, בְּצִדְדֵי הַיָּרְדֵּן, but ye shall *pass over* תַּעֲבִירִי before your brethren armed. . . . until the Lord have given your brethren rest as he hath given you, . . . then ye shall return unto the land of your possession, and enjoy it, which Moses the Lord's servant gave you בְּצִדְדֵי הַיָּרְדֵּן toward the sun-rising." Here also must the author of the Book of Joshua have forgot himself, since he describes the land as being *on the other side*, which, in respect of his own personal position, was *on this side*—he, who immediately speaks of passing over, and who by the added clause, "*toward the sun-rising*," shows that he had chosen the geographical designation with due deliberation?

Jos. v. 1, "And it came to pass when all the kings of the Amorites which were בְּצִדְדֵי הַיָּרְדֵּן westward;" xii. 1, "Now these are the kings of the lands which the children of Israel smote, and possessed their land בְּצִדְדֵי הַיָּרְדֵּן toward the rising of the sun;" ver. 7, "And these are the kings of the country which Joshua and the children of Israel smote בְּצִדְדֵי הַיָּרְדֵּן toward the west." Ch. xx. 8, "And בְּצִדְדֵי הַיָּרְדֵּן by Jericho eastward;" ch. xxii. 7, "Now to the half of the tribe of Manasseh, Moses had given possession in Bashan; but unto the other half thereof gave Joshua among their

brethren מִן־הַיַּמִּי מִן־הַיַּבֵּשׁ westward." For what purpose are the terms "eastward," "westward," repeated, if "on the other side" was perfectly free from ambiguity; and why not merely "eastward" and "westward," if בַּעֲבֹר had in itself no definite meaning?

Josh. ix. 1, "And it came to pass, when all the kings which were בַּעֲבֹר Jordan . . . heard," is gladly adduced by the advocates of the two-fold meaning \* of בַּעֲבֹר as evidence for the meaning "on this side," while those who maintain that it always means "on the other side" in a subjective sense, infer from this passage as well as from v. 1, xii. 7, and xxii. 7, that the book was written after the people were carried away into captivity. Both opinions are alike arbitrary. "The other side" is to be explained by the circumstance that the Israelites had not yet gained a firm footing "on this side" Jordan; and therefore the designation, which strictly speaking was only suitable for them as long as they had not crossed over Jordan, still continued in frequent use. They had still their fixed position on *the other side* Jordan, so that what was outwardly taken *on this side*, was inwardly taken still on the other side for them.

That almost all the instances in which בַּעֲבֹר occasions any difficulty, are found in the Pentateuch and Joshua, appears, according to our view, quite natural. For when the occupation of the land was completed, the personal point-of-view coincided with the general.

#### UNTO THIS DAY.

עַד־הַיּוֹם.

The passages of the Pentateuch of which it is said that such or

---

\* They also appeal to 1 Sam. xxxi. 7, but where there is no reason for giving up the common meaning maintained also by the LXX. and Josephus. "And when the men of Israel that were *on the other side* of the valley, and they that were on the other side Jordan, saw that the men of Israel fled, and that Saul and his sons were dead, they forsook the cities and fled, and the Philistines came and dwelt in them." We must only think of those who were on the other side Jordan, with a limitation that arises out of the nature of the case, that they were those who lived near the field of battle, whose cities could be reached by the Philistines in a few hours. Mount Gilboa stretches near Bethshan (RAUMER, p. 38), and Bethshan is only two hours' distance from the Jordan (p. 117). Bethshan itself, on whose walls the Philistines (ver. 10) hung Saul's body, is an instance of a city on the other side of the valley.

such a thing is "*to this day*," have long ago been taken into consideration in the treatises on its genuineness. Among the later opponents VATER conducts himself with tolerable moderation (p. 634); the passages in Genesis he gives up, remarking that this expression could have been used by Moses, since the events themselves were earlier than himself; also Deut. x. 8, where it is said, "At that time the Lord separated the tribe of Levi, to bear the Ark of the Covenant of the Lord, to stand before the Lord, to minister unto him, and to bless in his name, *unto this day*," he will not urge, since "after some thirty years it might be so said." But Deut. iii. 14, he considers to be perfectly in point. "Jair the son of Manasseh took all the country of Argob, . . . and called them after his own name, Bashan-havoth-jair, *unto this day*." This event belongs, according to this passage, to the time immediately before the death of Moses, and this therefore could not have been spoken in his farewell discourse. But the latest opponents have again, without any distinction, founded their objection on all the passages where the phrase "*unto this day*" occurs. Thus VON BOHLEN remarks (*Einl.* p. 68), "He frequently makes use of this phrase "*unto this day*," which always refers to a distant time, and on account of which JEROME makes it a question where Ezra did not revise the Pentateuch." Compare also HARTMANN, p. 689.

It is certainly not difficult to inclose the opponents of the genuineness of the Pentateuch within the bounds which Vater (though indeed only by compulsion) had set himself, and to confine the whole discussion to a single passage, Deut. iii. 14. In Genesis, "*unto this day*" is throughout said of facts which were separated from the age of Moses by several centuries; compare ch. xix. 37, "The same is the father of the Moabites *unto this day*;" ver. 38, "The same is the father of the children of Ammon *unto this day*." Ch. xxii. 14, "As it is said *to this day*, in the Mount of the Lord it shall be seen." Ch. xxvi. 33, "Therefore the name of the city is Beersheba, *unto this day*." Ch. xxxii. 33, (32), "Therefore the children of Israel eat not of the sinew which shrank . . . *unto this day*." Ch. xxxv. 20, "And Jacob set a pillar upon her grave; that is the pillar of Rachel's grave *unto this day*." Ch. xlvi. 26, "And Joseph made it a law over the land of Egypt *unto this day*." The same

remark applies also to Deut. ii. 22, "The Lord drove out the Horites before them the (sons of Esau); and they dwelt in their stead, even *unto this day*." The interval is shorter in Deut. x. 8, but yet quite long enough for the remark to be made with propriety.

We turn immediately to the passage in Deut. iii. 14, especially since our remarks upon it will be equally suited to set at rest whatever doubts may remain in reference to the others. It is there said, "Jair called them (the cities of Bashan) after his own name, Bashan Havoth-Jair, unto this day."

I. The first point to be determined is, the time of Jair's taking possession of these cities, and calling them after his name. According to Numbers xxxii. 39-42, it seems that Machir and Jair made their conquests not till after the defeat of Og and Sihon, after the country on the other side Jordan had been apportioned by Moses to the two tribes and a half. But, on further consideration, it appears that only the formal investiture belongs to that time, but the taking possession and giving the name to an earlier period. Here only the circumstance is repeated, that Machir and Jair specially effected the conquest which, in ch. xxi. 35, is ascribed, in general, to the children of Israel. This will be evident if we take into account Deut. iii. 4-6 (3-5), ("So the Lord our God delivered into our hands Og also the king of Bashan, and all his people; and we smote him until none was left to him remaining. And we took all his cities at that time, there was not a city which we took not from them, threescore cities . . . fenced with high walls, gates, and bars . . . and we utterly destroyed them, as we did unto Sihon king of Heshbon") compared with ver. 14, "Jair the son of Manasseh *took* all the country of Argob . . . and called them after his own name," &c. Here can be no doubt, that the conquest made by the Israelites and by Jair was one and the same. And as here ver. 4, &c. is related to ver. 14, so is Num. xxi. 35 to xxxii. 39-42. But the same fact is contained in Num. xxxii. 39, &c. itself. It is said, ver. 39, 40, "And the children of Machir the son of Manasseh went to Gilead, and took it, and dispossessed the Amorite which was in it. And Moses gave Gilead unto Machir the son of Manasseh; and he dwelt therein." According to this passage, Machir's investiture took place after his conquest, not the reverse.

From analogy, the same may be concluded of Jair and Nobah in ver. 41, 42. If thus far we have made our ground good, then the fact of which the continuance is remarked was not so very near the present time of the writer. All that occurred from Num. xxii. to the end lay between.

II. The assertion that the phrase "*unto this day*" is always used respecting an objectively distant time must appear absurd, previous to any special examination. It is self-evident, that the length of time under consideration cannot be an absolute but only a relative duration. It depends entirely on the character of individual objects, whether they are subject to alteration in a longer or shorter time. The objectively short time may be relatively long; so that it may be more natural to notice it of an object continuing to exist after the lapse of a few months or even days, than of another which has lasted for centuries. LE CLERC (*De Scrip. Pent.* No. 7) has given examples of the use of such phrases in other works besides the Scriptures, where a very short time (objectively considered) lies between the object and the writer. Thus Jerome says, "*Priscillianus, Abilae episcopus . . . usque hodie a nonnullis Gnosticae, i.e. Basilidis et Marcionis, de quibus Irenaeus scripsit, haereseos accusatur, defendentibus aliis non ita cum sensisse, ut arguitur*;" although Priscillian had been dead only seven years. Examples from the New Testament are found in Matt. xxvii. 8, xxviii. 15. KÖNIG (*on Joshua*, p. 95) has collected examples from the Old Testament with great care. Thus in Joshua's address to the Trans-jordanic tribes (Joshua xxii. 3), "Ye have not left your brethren these many days *unto this day*;" although these tribes had only for a short series of years taken part in the wars of the Lord on this side Jordan. Thus Joshua says in ch. xxiii. 9, "For the Lord hath driven out from before you great nations and strong; but as for you, no man hath been able to stand before you, *unto this day*." If these and so many other examples show, that the phrase in the writings of the Old Testament is very far from being always used respecting a distant period, there are other facts which indicate, that it lost among the Hebrews much of its force, and was employed with very little exactness. How otherwise can we account for its being employed so often in writings which are wholly *sine die et consule*? In these it can only be intended to say, that certain

transactions had not a merely transitory character. To the same result we are led by observing, that, in the Books of Kings and Chronicles, the phrase "*unto this day*" not unfrequently occurs relative to transactions which, from the nature of the case, could not have lasted to the time when these books were composed; compare the instances in *MOVERS*, p. 98. It is commonly taken for granted, that the writers transferred this remark without scruple from more ancient documents; but how could they do this without extreme thoughtlessness, unless, in the current language, it had a more indefinite value, the character of a standing phrase which was employed with little exactness?

III. But we need not lay very great stress on our last observation—the fluctuating character of the phrase. From the nature of the fact, in connection with which it here occurs, we are able to show that the objectively short time was here not unimportant, and hence the expression "*unto this day*" was properly introduced. Nothing is more common than names which do not remain fixed to their respective objects. Num. xxxii. 38 furnishes an example. Here we are told, that the Israelites gave another name to the city of Nebo. But it could not maintain its hold. Even in the times of the kings, the city bore its ancient name. But all depends on a name finding its way into general use. When this happens, it is generally sure of the future. It was therefore worth while, in reference to the name Havoth-Jair, to remark, some months after it was first applied, that it was still in use; for this being the case, it had passed the crisis of its fate. And it is to be observed, that here is not merely an indication of the continuance of the name as such, but also of the fact on which it rested. If the enemy had wrested his possessions from Jair, or Moses had not confirmed his right to them, the name and the fact which occasioned it would both have vanished together. So it was, for instance, with Hormah; after a few months, the phrase "*unto this day*" could no longer be applied to it.

IV. We ought not to overlook the larger connection in which the phrase "*unto this day*," in the passage before us, stands. LE CLERC and J. H. MICHAELIS surmised something of the kind when they remarked, *Ex hac locutione quidem colligunt haec verba non esse Mosis; sed vide quod hoc ipso capite sexies legitur; tempore illo, quod nobis remotius quid sonare videtur,*



*sine dubio tamen hic de rebus imperrime gestis dicitur.* But they pursued the matter no farther. That a new great section begins with Deuteronomy is indicated by the new and very full introduction. To this *present*, all that went before, whether near or afar off, forms a collective contrast, confronts it as the *past*. The phrase “*at that time*,” *בְּהַיּוֹם הַהוּא*, recurs in the recapitulation of former transactions, without taking into account whether they happened months, or years, or half-a-score years before. It is set in contrast with *this day*, or *now*. In reference to the more distant past, compare, for instance, Deut. i. 9, where “*that time*” relates to the time when the Israelites sojourned at Horeb, ver. 16, 18 ; iv. 14 ; ix. 20 ; x. 1 ; in reference to the nearer and nearest past ; ch. iii. 4, “*And we took all his cities at that time.*” Ver. 8, “*And we took at that time out of the hands of the two kings of the Amorites the land,*” &c. Ver. 12, “*And this land which we possessed at that time.*” Ver. 18, “*And I commanded you at that time, saying, The Lord your God hath given you this land to possess it ; ye shall pass over armed before your brethren.*” In this last passage, the phrase *בְּהַיּוֹם הַהוּא* occurs in reference to events which stood immediately on the threshold of the time to which the discourses in Deuteronomy belong ; compare Num. xxxii. 20, 21. Thus also in ver. 21, 22, “*And I commanded Joshua at that time and said, Thine eyes have seen all that the Lord your God hath done unto these two kings ; so shall the Lord do unto all the kingdoms whither thou passest. Ye shall not fear them : for the Lord your God he shall fight for you.*” Compare Num. xxvii. 16, &c. Lastly, ver. 23, “*And I besought the Lord at that time, saying, . . . let me go over, and see the good land ;*” compare Num. xxvii. 12 ; then follows, in ch. iv. 1, “*And now* *שְׁמַע*, O Israel, unto the statutes and the judgments.” So that the phrase “*at that time*” in Deuteronomy loses the singularity of its application to events that were outwardly near, by the internal difference of the two periods ; and the phrase is to be judged of quite differently here, from what would have been correct, had it stood at the close of the Book of Numbers, even in reference to the very same events.

But if we have arrived at the result that among the passages in the Pentateuch where the phrase “*unto this day*” occurs, only one apparently indicates a post-Mosaic age, and not one

really, we may pass from the defensive to the offensive. If the Pentateuch were not composed till centuries after Moses, this would have appeared in the use of this formula. How natural it would have been, on a multitude of occasions, to make a comparison of the present with the past. So much at least must be granted us, that the omission of this phrase on occasions where it would not have been suitable in the Mosaic age, is explicable only on the supposition that the later authors wished to palm their work on Moses. But a *Moses personatus* would many a time have involuntarily betrayed himself. Let it also be observed, that the phrase "*unto this day*" occurs frequently in Genesis, never in the three middle books, and in Deuteronomy only once. We find, therefore, the phrase used exactly as we should anticipate, on the supposition of the Mosaic authorship. It will be very difficult for our opponents to explain this relation of the books to one another, which certainly cannot be the result of accident.

#### THE THREATENING OF EXILE.

This is asserted very confidently by our opponents to be the mark of a later age, and an argument against the genuineness of the Pentateuch. VATER, p. 639; BERTHOLDT, 794; HARTMANN, 804; VON BOHLEN, p. 71.

We begin with remarking, that either this argument must be given up, or it must be applied much more extensively than it has been. An appeal is commonly made only to the last chapters of Deuteronomy, and to Lev. xxvi., while yet the threatening of Exile, and the warning respecting it, go through the whole, from beginning to end. Like the history of the loss of Paradise, in Gen. ii. 3, it has a prophetic character. It is only necessary to trace back the special conduct of God to general principles, and at once a prophecy is evolved. This significance of history has been acknowledged in all ages by the prophets; compare the proofs in the *Christologie*, iii. 653. The same may be affirmed of the narrative of the flood, and of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, ch. xviii. and xix., of which the prophetic import was evident to all the prophets; compare the *Christologie*, ii. 516.

In Gen. xv. 16, God said to Abraham, when he explained to him the reason why Canaan must still remain for him the land of *promise*, not of *possession*, "for the iniquity of the Amorite is not yet full." The idea, which is here presented with a special application, is this, that the nations held these countries of God only as a feudal tenure, and would be deprived of them as soon as their rebellion against their Lord and God had reached its height. The threatening of Exile is a mere conclusion from this idea. Even the decalogue contains the germ of the threatening—"Honour," it is said, "thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee." In the same way as the promises in the Sermon on the Mount belong to each individual beatitude; as the benedictions of Jacob and Moses for the individual tribes, are for the most part only special applications of the general blessing, so is this, "that thou mayest live long in the land," &c., not something intended merely for individual Israelites, but for Israel at large; and in reference to the other commandments, it is to be recollected how it is connected in a considerable number of passages with other commandments, for instance, Deut. iv. 26, 40; v. 30; vi. 3; xxii. 7; xxv. 15. All these passages, from this point-of-view, must be regarded as proofs of a later age, which is so much less admissible since the phrase לְעוֹלָם וָעֶד is properly speaking peculiar to the Pentateuch. In the later books it occurs only scattered here and there, and always in such a way that its application evidently rests on the Pentateuch. It is never found but in connection with the observance of the law, and always so that it may be regarded as a quotation. We must also mark all the numerous passages in the four last books, in which (as in Deuteronomy ix. 5, "for the wickedness of these nations the Lord thy God doth drive them out before thee") the expulsion of the Canaanites is represented as the consequence of their sins. For those who refuse to Moses the view of a second expulsion of the inhabitants, must also deny that he contemplated the first, as he actually did, and especially since the expulsion of the Canaanites at that time is so often expressly marked as a prophecy of the future expulsion of the Israelites; compare for instance, Deut. viii. 19, 20. "And it shall be, if thou do at all forget the Lord thy God, and walk after other gods, and serve them, and worship them, I

testify against you this day, that ye shall surely perish. As the nations which the Lord destroyeth before your face, so shall ye perish." Equally must all passages be considered as traces of a later age, in which the unbelief of the Israelites is distinctly stated to be the cause of their forty years' sojourn in the wilderness; for, if they could not enter into the promised land, if even Moses and Aaron could not, on account of it, cross its borders, it is self-evident that unbelief must, at last, expel them from the possessions that were at last won. If the history is true, so also is the prediction. Such is the view that Moses takes when, in Deut. iv. 3, he speaks in a tone of warning: "Your eyes have seen what the Lord did because of Baal Peor; for all the men that followed Baal Peor, the Lord thy God hath destroyed them from among you." In short, all the passages must be attacked in which Moses expresses his acquaintance with the deep sinfulness of the Israelites, and in which its outbreaks are historically described. For, if Moses knew this, and at the same time possessed a knowledge of God's punitive justice, (which is shown all through the Pentateuch), how could he do otherwise than look with an anxious heart on the future destinies of his people? Thus, from all sides we are led to the threatening of the Exile, we meet every where with its germ, and therefore it can only be made to tell as an argument against the genuineness, by denying any Mosaic element whatever in the Pentateuch.

The assertion that the threatening of the Exile could not proceed from Moses, on nearer examination, strikes us as excessively absurd. The bias from which it proceeds must, if consequentially carried out, end in a gross materialism. Without at all considering in what relation the announcement stands to the idea, people pass their judgment upon it, as if the subject of Moses' predictions had been what kind of weather it would be some centuries after his death.

The threatening of the Exile is the necessary product of three factors (i.) The experimental acquaintance with the depravity of the people; this is always laid as a foundation by Moses himself. How fearfully it would manifest itself in the future, he infers from its outbreaks in the present, which in so many respects gave omen of what would follow: "*if these things are done in a green tree, what shall be done in the dry?*" Compare for instance

Deut. ix. 6, 7, "Thou art a stiff-necked people. Remember and forget not, how thou provokedest the Lord thy God to wrath in the wilderness; from the day that thou didst depart out of the land of Egypt, until ye came unto this place, ye have been rebellious against the Lord." Then follows an enumeration of particulars. Lastly, in ver. 24, he sums up the whole by saying, "You have been rebellious against the Lord, from the day that I knew you." Compare other passages, which show how deeply Moses was acquainted with human and Israelitish depravity, (vol. i. p. 443). (ii.) The knowledge that God, the possessor of all countries, divides, bestows, and takes them away, according to his own will; compare Deut. ii. 5, "Meddle not with them; for I will not give you of their land; no, not so much as a foot-breadth; because I have given Mount Scir unto Esau for a possession." 10-12 and other passages. (iii.) The conviction that the possession (as, in a certain degree, that of all countries, but here according to a more elevated standard, founded on the relation of God to Israel) was conditional, determined only by the steady fidelity and obedience of the people. Compare Num. xxxv. 33, 34; Deut. vii. 1, &c.

It must not be overlooked, that the prediction of the captivity is expressed throughout in terms more general than those of the most ancient prophets. The idea had as yet so little mastered its future substratum, that the author was obliged to confine himself to the earlier. He announces a return to Egypt, exactly as Zechariah does to Sinar, though, as may be gathered from other passages, with the clear consciousness that Egypt only occupied the place of an unknown quantity, (*die stelle eines unbekanntenen X*). Compare vol. i. p. 123.

If persons venture to speculate thus crudely, what must become of all the predictions of the prophets? Even EICHHORN's style of criticism, who considers the prophecies for the most part as veiled historical sketches, would not be thorough-paced enough. Nay, even words like the well-known expressions of NIEBUHR respecting the troubled future that awaits us, could only be considered as genuine, till they were actually fulfilled!

"Sin is the destruction of the people," and "wheresoever the carcase is, there will the eagles be gathered together."—The man who knows these truths *vitally*, can prophesy; for he is in pos-

session of the laws by which history is governed. "The sins of the Italians," says SAVONAROLA (RUDELBACH'S *H. Savonarole und seine Zeit.* p. 309), are enough to make all men prophets if there was no other prophecy;" and again, "Truly, it is not I who prophecy against you, but your sins' prophecy against you."

It remains to be noticed, that precisely the portions that have been assailed, the last chapter of Deuteronomy and Lev. xxvi., are those which have received the greatest confirmation from the quotations of later writers. They form, in fact, the foundation of the whole prophetic structure, and their originality is testified by all the prophets from the earliest times without exception. Many things belonging to them have been brought forward in vol. i. several more in the *Christologie*, particularly in vol. iii.; but we shall take another opportunity for their complete illustration.

#### THE PROPHETS.

Among LE CLERC'S eighteen doubtful passages, one is (p. 27) the frequent occurrence of נָבִי in the Pentateuch, which appears to contradict 1 Sam. ix. 9, where it is said, "Before time in Israel, when a man went to enquire of God, thus he spake, Come, and let us go to the seer; for he that is now called נָבִי was before time called נִסֵּי." If, accordingly, the name *Nabi* was not in use in the beginning of Samuel's time, then the passages of the Pentateuch where נָבִי occurs, must be regarded, it would seem, as so many anachronisms. Yet LE CLERC does not attach much weight to this difficulty. He remarks on Gen. xx. 7, briefly and well: *temporibus Mosis usitata erat; judicium tempore desiit, inde iterum renata est.* Yet VATER revived it, though somewhat doubtfully. But HARTMANN went farther. Apart from the *names*, all the passages in which the prophetic order is mentioned, appeared to him as so many proofs of a later age. For the accredited history shows us the first traces of the prophetic order in Samuel's age. But as to this latter point, what right have we to conclude, that because the prophetic order in Samuel's time made, in some sort, a fresh beginning, it had no existence in the Mosaic age? On the contrary, the flourishing of the prophetic order in Samuel's time, leads us to expect with certainty something similar

in the Mosaic age. The prophetic order meets us in the history of Israel at all the cross-ways, at all the great critical periods. It is inseparably connected with every fresh revival of the theocratic principle in the national mind—on the one hand as its highest ornament, Joel iii. 1, on the other hand, as the means by which the Lord called it into action, Joel ii. 1; Malachi iii. 1, 23. Hence every separate manifestation of the prophetic spirit, may be regarded as a prediction of all that were to come, as far, that is, as there was a recurrence of similar circumstances. Isaiah, in the time of Hezekiah, points us to Jeremiah in the time of Josiah; the existence of Malachi is a pledge of the appearance of John the Baptist. Even so we may with certainty draw conclusions respecting the earlier from the later. We cannot conceive of the Mosaic age as destitute of any manifestation whatever of the prophetic spirit, since it was the original stock which contained the germ of all later developments. To take away entirely the prophetic order from the Mosaic age, would be to annihilate the historical existence of Moses. For reject and suspect as many single facts as we please in his history, what is left behind will always give evidence of his prophetic character. And where a spiritual gift in an individual is put forth with such potency, a circle of other individuals always gathers round in whom the same gift is manifested in lower degrees. Thus, as the existence of a LUTHER was a pledge of the existence of a MELANCTHON, a JONAS, a BUGENHAGEN, as we cannot conceive of a SAMUEL, or an ELIJAH, otherwise than as surrounded by a choir of prophetic pupils, so the prophetic powers of MOSES brought in their train those of MIRIAM, the *seventy* ELDERS, and many more of whom history is silent. But setting aside the Pentateuch, how can any one maintain that the accredited history of the prophets began with the times of Samuel? Does not the period of the Judges present us with manifold examples of prophetic agency—connecting links of the prophetic chain between the age of Moses and of Samuel? The whole objection rests on a most unspiritual view of the nature of prophecy. There is no perception of its necessity—of its intimate connection with the whole constitution of the kingdom of God under the Old Covenant; it is treated as a discovery, a mechanical invention—as an external and accidental peculiarity of a certain age; SAMUEL, in relation to the prophetic gift is thought

of, like Sir FRANCIS DRAKE in relation to the culture of the potato. We ought to be above such mean notions.

As to the passage in 1 Sam. ix. 9, it must be interpreted (as HÄVERNICK has done, *Eint.* li. p. 56) in connection with the whole character of the age to which it belongs. The phraseology was not accidental; it was founded on facts. The key is given in 1 Sam. iii. 1, "The word of the Lord was scarce in those days, no prophecy was spread abroad." In the age preceding Samuel, prophecy had lost its true importance; here and there the prophetic gift manifested itself, but scattered, and without a proper connection with the kingdom of God. Saul's example shows what was then sought for from the men of God; from which we may conclude what was *not* sought. Under these circumstances, it was in the nature of the case that the *נביא* must give way to the *רֹאֶה*; this does not involve an absolute unacquaintedness with the former, but only a neglect, somewhat as the days of prevailing rationalism, when the clergy undertook not only the general care of souls, but the duties of military chaplains, and were only shepherds in a peculiar, or rather an improper sense, so that the no longer distinctive term *pastor* began to give way to *preacher* or *teacher*. The term *רֹאֶה* relates merely to the form in which their knowledge was imparted to the man of God; *נביא*, on the contrary, denotes a fixed position in the kingdom of God, and is always used in reference to it. All *נביאים* were *רֹאֶים*, but not the reverse; as at an earlier, by a revolution in the national mind, the term *נביא* had been expelled, so now, by a fresh revolution in Samuel's time, the *רֹאֶים* were again become *נביאים*, and were reinstated in their rights.

#### THE ALLEGED ABSTRACT UNHISTORICAL CHARACTER OF THE MOSAIC POLITY.

VATKE (p. 204) has urged this as an argument against the genuineness of the Pentateuch. A close examination, he asserts, makes it evident that the legislation of the Pentateuch could not be the foundation of a political constitution, nor even of a hierarchy, but only an enlargement in some special departments of a state of legislation and morals already existing. The Mosaic



polity could only exist by means of a supplement, which it really had at a later period, since it perfected itself. There wanted a legislative power, and equally a determining one, "since Moses, the priests, the chiefs of the tribes, and the elders, on the one hand, and the congregation on the other, stood in no organic relation." The judicial power formed no comprehensive organism—the executive power was altogether wanting. As the Pentateuch contained so many prescriptions in detail, respecting the rights of private persons, the ritual, the revenues of the priests, and such-like, it appears inconceivable that Moses should have done so little for carrying out these laws; that he did not perceive that the whole state must fall into anarchy—that, in short, his state, without this ruling power, would be no state. Besides the idea of an effective ruling power, there was wanting to the Mosaic state the higher unity, and the whole sphere of public justice. The famed systematic unity of the Mosaic theocracy refers itself, when closely viewed, only to the abstract general theocratic principle, and such consequences as might be immediately deduced from it, and not to the unity of an actual political constitution. All the powers of the state are attributed to God, so that God had in his own hand the legislative, judicial, and executive power; and all the organs clothed with official authority were only dependent instruments. There was no form of polity, in the common sense of the words, but rather a religious exhibition, a result and abstraction of moral relation already formed, and more fitted to purify and elevate the moral and religious condition of the people, than to regulate their judicial and social relations. If, on isolated occasions, the Divine sovereignty appointed earthly representatives, there was nothing in the way against appointing such substitutes on all occasions. But to the Mosaic state, the conception of human authority, and of the obedience it involves, was altogether wanting; for the government was entrusted neither to the priests nor to the chiefs of the tribes. (!) The result is, that the whole legislation of the Pentateuch formed the basis of no political constitution, nor was it intended for that purpose, but had rather for its object only the partial improvement of individual sections, and *hence must have originated in a state already existing.*

On this argument, which it is evident belongs to one of the

pretended traces of a later age in the Pentateuch, we offer the following remarks :—

FIRST, That the Pentateuch presupposes an already existing legal and social condition is correct; but the assertion is false that such a condition was not already existing in the age of Moses. It is founded on a notion of the perfectly rude state of the Israelites, which we already proved to be inconsistent with facts (vol. i. p. 406–411). The constitution of the Israelites had certainly its important defects; but it would appear to us much more as a closely connected organism if we possessed records which would furnish a complete exhibition of the civil life of the Israelites. But we have only a view of their sacred history, in which the civil only so far appears as it comes into contact with the religious. Nothing can be plainer, than that the fragmentary quality of the history has been transferred to the facts, especially since a neglect of the distinction between sacred and civil history (the parent of innumerable mistakes), has extended so widely. The appearance of defect in the constitution of civil relations has been greater, because Moses and Aaron, by the voluntary surrender of authority to them in acknowledgment of their extraordinary Divine mission, and afterwards Joshua, exercised those functions in a dictatorial manner, which would have been otherwise divided. To a superficial observer these transactions appear as so many proofs that in these cases there was a want of continuity in the civil organism. But how little reason there is for such a conclusion appears from the examples of the judicial functions. These had been accumulated on Moses, since the confidence which the people had placed in him on religious grounds was transferred to this department, and those who would naturally have been judges, from a sense of his spiritual superiority, willingly retired to the back-ground. But when the evils arising from this state of things became sensible, Moses did not arbitrarily take a certain number of judges from the mass of the people, who might appear by their personal qualities to be suited for this office, but reinstated the natural overseers and judges in their suspended functions. That the constitution could not be so unformed as VATKE assumes, is at once settled by the circumstance, that it maintained itself for centuries under not very simple relations, and continued during the residence of the Israelites in Canaan, for several centuries, without any

alteration in essential points. This is also shown if we descend to particulars, and follow them out. That each tribe possessed an internal government of its own is as clear as day. (MICHAELIS *Mos. Recht*, i. § 46.) It was less liable to change, since all the official persons, from the highest to the lowest, attained to their dignity by birth, and were thus the *natural* representatives of the people. Nor was the national unity wholly wanting, though this was certainly the weak side of the constitution. The hereditary representatives of each tribe formed together the council of the nation, which, on emergencies which affected the whole, exercised the supreme powers (MICHAELIS, § 45), the legislative, after Moses, not less than the rest; for the assertion that the legislation closed with Moses, must necessarily be limited to the department of religion and morals. Even in Egypt, Moses and Aaron, when they were to deliver their commission to the people, knew at once to whom they must address themselves. They called together all the elders of the people, Exod. iv. 29. When an extraordinary event took place on their march through the wilderness, "All the rulers of the congregation (כְּלֵי-יִשְׂרָאֵל הַזֵּה) came and told Moses." If the bond of union between the tribes was, and continued to be, a loose one, yet it is not to be overlooked that as God effected for the present a unity by the mission of Moses and Aaron, and for the period immediately succeeding by the election of Joshua; so also, for later times, Moses always proceeds on the supposition that God would send extraordinary helps for extraordinary situations and emergencies; that he would raise up judges, religious and political directors for the people, which actually happened, as often as the people turned with sincere hearts to the Lord; while in case of their unfaithfulness, the defects of their constitution would necessarily be felt heavily and painfully.

SECONDLY, Moses certainly did not hand over the government to the chiefs of the tribes, &c.; for, in order to do this, he must have previously wrested it from them like a downright demagogue; nor did he admit their authority as an element in his state; how could he do this when he himself foresaw that at a future period the existing constitution would give way to royalty? Whoever attempts to link the unchangeable with the changeable, draws it down to his own destruction. But Moses recognised the existing Magistracy as one which, for the present, until under God's guid-

ance a new development made its appearance, did honour to the supremacy of God and to justice, and from which obedience could not be withdrawn without great criminality. It is said in Exod. xxii. 27 (28), "Thou shalt not revile God, nor curse the ruler of thy people;" which is tantamount to, "Whoever curses the ruler who bears the image of God, curses God." The sentiment is here designedly expressed in general terms, so that it might suit the future not less than the present, but by this general character it would be more impressive for the latter, than if the then existing magistracy had been specially named. It is exactly the same as in the words of the Apostle, *πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἐξουσίαις ὑπερεχούσαις ὑποτασσέσθω. οὐ γάρ ἐστὶν ἐξουσία εἰ μὴ ἀπὸ θεοῦ, αἱ δὲ οὖσαι ἐξουσίαι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τεταγμέναι εἰσίν*, Rom. xiii. 1; the general principle is laid down which should regulate men's conduct towards their rulers. The actual condition is treated as the lawful one, and all subjective argumentation is suppressed. VATKE endeavours to elude the force of this passage by remarking, that it is evidently a reference to later times, because the law does not sanction worldly dominion. But this evasion would, at the most, be only allowable if the passage stood quite isolated. But all the cases in which Moses calls the rulers of the people to a consultation, contain a recognition of it, and stand parallel to this law. Moses invited the twelve chiefs of the tribes, and the other natural representatives of the people, to important conferences which had a political aspect. Thus, for example, at the numbering of the people, Num. ch. i., where it is said, after enumerating the twelve chiefs of the tribes, "These were the called from the congregation, princes of the tribes of their fathers, heads of the thousands of Israel." Thus also at the sending of the spies, Num. xiii. The partition of the land by Joshua and Eleazar was to be undertaken with their concurrence, Num. xxxiv. 16. According to Num. xxxii., "the children of Gad and the children of Reuben came and spake to Moses and to Eleazar the priest, and *unto the princes of the congregation.*" In Num. xxxvi. 1, it is said, "And the chief fathers *בְּיָדֵי הַיְהוָה* of the families of the children of Gilead . . . came near and spake before Moses, and before the princes, the chief fathers of the children of Israel." The position which Moses assumes in this reference, at once allowing and securing the right of the present, and of the future historical

development, showing that he knew how to unite intimately the State and the Church, and yet how to separate them, is truly worthy of admiration.

THIRDLY, It is a strange requirement that Moses should throw aside the whole existing constitution, and appoint new earthly representatives in its stead. Persons must really be very much governed by the great principle of subjectivity, if they would apply to a Divine messenger the standard of a demagogue and constitution-maker. Even on the principles of prudence how could Moses act otherwise than he did? Had he disturbed the existing order of things, the instance of the rebellion of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, shows what would have been the consequence. If an insurrection of such great extent and energy was formed against the pre-eminence which Moses, strictly keeping himself within his own peculiar bounds, the spiritual department, had conferred, without taking away existing rights, which in this department were almost non-existent—what would not have been the consequence, if, intruding into the political department, he had ventured to pull up or to plant according to his own will, to alter relations which were most intimately and deeply interwoven with the national life? But granting that he might for the instant have succeeded, how soon would the national life have freed itself by a violent reaction from the constitution imposed upon it, and at the same time from religion? Certainly, a prudent man would not risk everything for the sake of (proportionably) so small a gain! Still more must every thought of such an enterprise be set at rest by Moses' sense of justice and his piety! It has been of old usual to deduce the duties towards rulers, from the command to honour parents, and the most absolute justification for this inference is to be found in the constitution of the Israelites in the time of Moses. The state was then nothing more than a large family. How could Moses himself wantonly violate the first commandment which had a promise? The objection that Moses had newly installed earthly agents for some specialities of the theocracy, is of no force, partly because these specialities had hitherto had no peculiar agents, partly because they were not political but religious. Nor is it of more importance, if an appeal be made to the very numerous detailed prescriptions respecting the rights of private persons. For private

right has a moral and natural basis, and cannot equally well be settled in this way or that way. What depends on changeable relations, is also here left undetermined. The constitution, on the other hand, held itself in a state of indifference towards religion and morals. Whoever were the judges, the persons who came before them appeared before God, Ex. xxi. 26 ; xxii. 7. It was the same in all the other public relations. The assertion, that either Moses did not give so many laws, or by a transformation of the constitution, must have been in fear for their execution, attributes to Moses the design to fabricate a kind of *perpetuum mobile*, to found a work that had in itself the guarantee of its continued duration. But this view was very far from entering his thoughts. Moses rested the hope of the permanence of his work on the living God, whose sovereignty in Israel was to him no abstract idea, no *titulus sine re*, but the most real of all realities. It stood in perfect clearness before his eyes, that shameful transgression awaited the laws, but instead of opposing to this transgression the petty bulwark of political institutions, which in no age has withstood a vigorous assault, he directed his eye to the great Reformer in heaven, who must watch over his own laws, which are the expressions of a will that emanates from his own nature.

The preceding remarks will perhaps contribute to render more conspicuous the error of the common representation of the absolute unity of State and Church under the Old Covenant. Not Christ alone, but Moses could say, *τίς με κατέστησε δικαστὴν ἢ μεριστὴν ἐφ' ὑμᾶς* ; Luke xii. 13, although certainly the relation of a national church to the state, must be closer than that of one which embraces all people and tongues on the whole earth.

THE  
 C O N T R A D I C T I O N S  
 OF THE  
 P E N T A T E U C H .

---

IT is the unavoidable fate of a spurious historical work of any length, to be involved in contradictions. This must be the case to a very great extent with the Pentateuch if it be not genuine. It embraces a very considerable period; the same facts are frequently touched upon in different places, and the same subjects of legislation. If the Pentateuch is spurious, its histories and laws have been fabricated in successive portions, and were committed to writing in the course of centuries by different individuals. From such a mode of origination, a mass of contradictions is inseparable, and the improving hand of a later editor would never be capable of entirely obliterating them. From these remarks it appears that freedom from contradictions is much more than the *conditio sine qua non* of the genuineness of the Pentateuch.

We shall here only subject that to examination which really requires it, and has not already been fully settled by the earlier vindicators of the genuineness, and, as far as our abilities extend, endeavour to exhaust the subject. On Genesis, particularly on the first eleven chapters, we shall bestow less attention than on the remaining books. It may be thought, that Moses, in the history of ancient times, found contradictions, and repeated the tradition without removing them, just as he received it, a view which Licentiate BAUER has very lately attempted to establish. On the contrary, where Moses narrates what he himself spoke, did, or saw, there every real contradiction becomes a witness against the genuineness. In important things, his testimony is decisive; and

also in little things,\* it must always be outweighed by more weighty reason *for* the genuineness.

#### CHRONOLOGICAL CONTRADICTIONS.

1. VON BOHLEN remarks (p. 338) on Gen. xxxv. 26, Isaac was sixty years old when Jacob and Esau were born, Gen. xxv. 26. Esau married at forty, and after this marriage Jacob went to Mesopotamia (Gen. xxvi. 34), where he stayed twenty years; at the time of his leaving Chaldea, he was therefore (!) sixty, and Isaac 120 years old; the latter died (Gen. xxxv. 26) when 180; and therefore, from Jacob's journey from Haran to his father's death, there were sixty years. In Chaldea, the history of the family begins, and there Joseph was born; consequently he was now about sixty years old; Jacob is 120, and lives altogether 147 years, (Gen. xlvii. 28); he stands when 130 before Pharaoh (Gen. xlvii. 9), and spends the last seventeen years of his life in Egypt; consequently, between his going down to Goshen and the present point of time, there are ten years; and between Isaac's death and the memorable years of plenty and famine, only a single year, which is to be filled up with Joseph's imprisonment, since already nine years are gone by, when Joseph brings down his family to Egypt, (Gen. xlv. 6). On the other hand, there are the most distinct statements, according to which, Joseph was brought down to Egypt in his seventeenth year, and is described as a handsome youth exposed to seduction. At thirty, he stands before Pharaoh (Gen. xli. 26), and therefore twenty-two years are allowed between his being carried away and Jacob's settling in Goshen."

---

\* Those persons who confidently assert the spuriousness of the Pentateuch at every semblance of an unimportant contradiction, might learn from RANKE'S example to practise a little more modesty. That writer remarks, in his *History of the Popes*, iii. 328 (Mrs AUSTIN'S Transl. vol. iii. *Appendix*, p. 129), in answer to the question, whether the *Vita Sixti V. ipsius manu emendato*, was really revised by that Pope—"Tempesti, amongst other things, points out the fact (p. 30) that Graziani describes the Pope's first procession as setting out from St Apostoli, whilst in fact it set out from Araceli. An error certainly more likely to have escaped a man arrived at the dignity of the Papacy, and occupied with the business of the whole world, than the Padre Maestro Tempesti." But we are not reduced to the plight of seeking this moderate indulgence for Moses.



If we compare what this writer says on Gen. xxvii. (p. 274), we find quite a different computation, according to which, Esau and Jacob, when the latter went to Mesopotamia, were from 90 to 100 years old. Of what he has written there, the author here seems to know nothing. Truly we must pity any one who chooses such a writer for his guide, and follows him with blind confidence, as LÜTZELBERGER does in his “*die Gründe der freiwilligen Niederlegung meines geistlichen Amtes.*” Nürnberg. 1838, p. 88, &c.

Every thing depends upon the year in which Jacob went to Mesopotamia. If this year be correctly determined, all difficulties will at once vanish.

It is the unanimous opinion of the older critics (with the exception of BEER, *Abh. z. Erläut. der alten Zeitrechnung und Geschichte*, p. 114, whose assertion that Jacob spent forty years in Mesopotamia has been universally rejected as absurd, compare HARTMANN, *Chronologia*, p. 91), that Jacob began his journey when seventy-seven years old. If this opinion did not rest on a firm foundation, such unanimity respecting it would not have obtained.

The opinion is grounded on the following computation: Joseph was thirty years old when he stood before Pharaoh. When Jacob removed to Egypt, seven years of plenty and two years of famine had already expired, so that then Joseph was thirty-nine years old. But Jacob was then 130 years old. According to this, Joseph was born when Jacob was ninety-one. But he was born in the fourteenth year of Jacob's residence at Padan-Aram. Consequently Jacob left his father's house for Mesopotamia when he was seventy-seven.

With this result, the description of Isaac's condition in ch. xxvii. 1 (ver. 19, according to which he was bed-ridden), agrees extremely well. This description much better suits one in his 137th year than in his hundredth. It was enough that he still protracted his existence some forty years. LIGHTFOOT (*Opp. i.* 19) remarks—“*Isaac jam ad illam aetatem perrenit, qua frater ejus Ismael ante annos 14 obiit, nempe annum 157. Neque abludit a vero, meditationem mortis illius hac aetate subjecisse Isaaco cogitationem de fine proprio.*”

Against this opinion, and in favour of the other, that Jacob

when he journeyed to Mesopotamia, was about forty years old, no argument of the least validity can be alleged. VON BOHLEN and LUTZELBERGER take for granted that Esau's marriage, when the two brothers were forty years old, could not be separated by any long interval from Jacob's departure. But why not? It might as well be asserted, that between Joseph's death and Moses' birth there could be only a short interval. HARTMANN'S remark against this very crude conclusion is worthy of notice. *Eam vero conclusionem ipse textus sacer rejicit, qui docet dudum ante benedictionem Jacobi multam ab uxoribus Esavi jam Isaaco et Rebecca excitatam fuisse tristitiam*, p. 91. Compare Gen. xxvi. 35; xxvii. 46; xxviii. 8.

Then VON BOHLEN thinks (p. 274) that both the brothers in the account of their endeavours to obtain the blessing, are regarded as youths, and that Jacob acts under his mother's guidance. But there is not a syllable to intimate that the brothers were still of a youthful age, and he who would be under his mother's guidance at forty, would probably be so still at seventy-seven. The influence of this relationship was deeply seated in Jacob's individuality (compare Gen. xxv. 27), as well as in the similarity of mental conformation which subsisted between himself and his mother. Esau, even as early as ten years old, would certainly have refused to be led by his mother.

If any person would assert, that, since Esau married at forty years old, it may be supposed that Jacob was not much older when he took his wives, this analogy is opposed by others of much greater force, taken from the history of the *chosen* race. Among them things were much later. Isaac and Abraham married indeed at an ordinary age, but it was late before they had children. Jacob married late, and had children late. The clinging affection for his mother kept Jacob, it would seem, from thinking of matrimony; compare what is said of Isaac, Gen. xxiv. 67. As long as he had a mother he felt little need of the conjugal relation. Besides, from the first, it seems fixed in his own mind and his mother's, that he ought not to take a wife from among the Canaanites. He was deterred from doing this by a reference to the promise—by the example of Isaac—and by mournful experience in Esau. But when Jacob was directed to his distant relations,

it must have cost him a severe struggle. A catastrophe such as the one described, was needful in order to tear him from the paternal roof and his mother's arms.

Lastly, if persons maintain that on physical grounds it is inconceivable that Jacob should defer marriage to so advanced an age, let them recollect that he must be measured by his own, not by our standard. Our life lasts seventy years, and is reckoned long if it reach eighty. But Jacob lived to one hundred and forty-seven, and therefore, when he obtained Rachel, was little past middle life.

2. "Within seven years Leah bore seven children, one after another, and, nevertheless, makes a considerable pause, in which her handmaid and Rachel's had children." We must indeed ask, how this came to pass? Must here also recourse be had to miracles? LÜTZELBERGER, p. 90. But in all this everything was perfectly natural. That the first four sons of Leah followed one another with the shortest possible delay (compare Lev. xii. 2, 4) appears from Gen. xxix. 35, and after the birth of the fourth son a pause ensued. Gen. xxx. 3. But this pause, on account of the hitherto regular succession in child-bearing, must have been striking to Leah, and might soon lead her to suppose that no further blessing of the kind was intended for her, and therefore induce her to adopt the expedient in Gen. xxx. 9. Leah's last three children again came in quick succession, the last at the close of Jacob's residence in Paden-Aram. Thus we obtain for the interruption a period of sufficient length.

But it would be very erroneous to suppose that this interval must be so great as to comprehend the four successive conceptions and births which are narrated in Gen. xxx. 1-13. Leah, according to ver. 9, adopted the expedient of giving Zilpah to Jacob, when "she saw that she had left bearing." If we take into account her whole position in relation to her sister, her passionate excitement, it will appear incredible that Bilhah had already born two sons for Rachel. The Futures, with Vau conversive at the beginning of ver. 1, 9, 14, do not connect the individual facts with the preceding, but with the whole section, as in numberless instances; for example, Ex. ii. 1, "And there went וַיֵּצֵא a man of the house of Levi, and took a daughter of Levi. And the woman conceived and bare a son." But the birth followed the edict mentioned in ch. i. 22. Under this class are most of the instances

enumerated in the older grammarians, in which the future with *Vau* conversive must be taken in the sense of the Pluperfect. A succession is certainly expressed, but only in general terms. Bilhah's first son was not *born* before Leah's fourth. After Jacob's connection with Bilhah followed that with Zilpah. Zilpah's second son was born before the first of Leah's second series. But Bilhah conceived for the first time, before Leah left off bearing, and Leah's fifth pregnancy was parallel in part with Zilpah's second.

Whoever is disposed to enquire further into this subject, may read the remarks of the acute and accurate PETAVIUS (*De doctr. temp.* ix. 19), who answers the objections against the occurrence of so many births in a period of seven years (which had been already stated by USHER far more pointedly than by the adversaries of Revelation), by presenting a complete computation. See also HEIDEGGER, *Hist. Patr.* ii. 353.

3. VON BOHLEN remarks (p. 327), that the author in Gen. xxxiv. is strikingly at variance with the chronology, "since Jacob's daughter could scarcely be more than six or seven years old—as the Patriarch obtained Leah after seven years' service—Dinah was Leah's seventh child, and Jacob stayed only twenty years with Laban. It is true, between his leaving Mesopotamia and his coming to Isaac, there are sixty years; but the children, by whom only the youngest could be meant, Dinah and Joseph, are called "tender" (Gen. xxxiii. 13), so that the event (in ch. xxxiv.) cannot be placed long after Jacob's separation from Laban." LÜTZELBERGER repeats this statement, "The two boys Simeon and Levi," he adds, "the one between eleven and twelve, the other between ten and eleven years old, fell upon the city!"

But the chronological relations of the section in ch. xxxiv. are simply as follows. According to ch. xxxvii. 2, Joseph was seventeen years old when he was sold. If now Joseph was born at the end of the fourteen years' service for Laban's daughters, and was six years old on the return from Mesopotamia, then the event narrated in ch. xxxiv., which happened before the completion of his seventeenth year, must have also been before the eleventh year after the family left Haran. But on the other hand, the event could not have happened long before this time. For in the two places to which Jacob came on his journey, he must necessarily

have stayed a long time,—in Succoth, for he not merely pitched his tent there, but “*built him an house,*” Gen. xxxiii. 17, and in Shechem, for there he formally established himself, purchased a field, and built an altar, circumstances from which AUGUSTIN infers (*quaest.* 108 *in Gen.*) that he remained there a long time. There is no weight at all in LÜTZELBERGER'S objection against a long residence in Shechem—“Dinah, in truth, did not wait several years till she longed to get acquainted with the daughters of the land.” The expression, and “Dinah went out” in Gen. xxxiv. 1, is tantamount to “once upon a time she went out.” We must as well infer from this passage that Dinah went out then for the first time, as from ch. xxv. 29, “and Jacob sod pottage.” (*Und (einst) kochte Jacob ein Gericht,* DE WETTE) that Jacob never dressed lentils before. Within the limits we have noted, we are at full liberty to fix on any point for the event, which may appear most suitable. Certainly the opinion of PETAVIUS comes nearest the truth (iii. 286), that the event happened ten years after the return from Mesopotamia, of which two were spent at Succoth, and eight at Shechem, when Dinah was sixteen years old. But how is the appeal to ch. xxxiii. 13, to be met? Did not the objector know, or did he wish not to know, that the long residence in Succoth and Sichem was posterior to the time at which the children are here described as “*tender?*”

4. VON BOHLEN remarks (p. 364) on Gen. xxxviii., “First of all, the author contradicts his own chronology, and it is only a weak make-shift, to say that he did not fix it so exactly, or to place the event earlier, perhaps, (with ROSENMÜLLER) shortly before the departure from Haran; for here *בַּעַת הַהִרְאָה* cannot be taken generally, but is expressly understood of Joseph's being carried away. But, between this point of time and Jacob's removal to Egypt, there are only twenty-two years, (compare Gen. xxxvii. 2, with xlv. 6), and yet, in the meantime, Judah had three sons, who married and died before Pharez and Zarah were born to him. Pharez had, moreover, two sons (ch. xlvi. 12), so that fifty years, at least, are required for these three generations.” Again, on ch. xliii. (p. 395), he says, “Benjamin, in this section, is spoken of as still very young (ver. 29, xlv. 20, 30, &c.) and he is so in relation to the specified age of Joseph; but, farther on, the author again returns to his early chronology, and gives

Benjamin, in the year immediately following, ten sons, whom he takes with him into Egypt, Gen. xlvii. 21." LÜTZELBERGER, (p. 94) here follows his master most faithfully, like his shadow.

These difficulties, which IGEN (*Urkunde*, 417), among the opponents of the genuineness, first strongly urged, and, after him, DE WETTE, (*Krit.* 165) were known by the ancients, from Augustin, in their full extent. Also the right method of solution has been almost unanimously adopted by the ablest critics, as PETAVIUS, HEIDEGGER, HARTMA, VENEMANN (*Hist. Eccl.* i. 121), but with whose investigations not one of our opponents has been acquainted. KANNE, who in his *Bibl. Unterss.*, ii. 33, &c., has occupied himself very zealously with the removal of these difficulties, is very inferior to his predecessors.

Every thing turns on this point—whether, in the belief of the author, the individuals named in Gen. xlvi. 8, &c., all went down into Egypt, or whether part of them were born there. For, as to what concerns Judah's family, all that is narrated in ch. xxxviii. might very possibly take place in the space of twenty-two years, and the only difficulty is, that, according to ch. xlvi., the two sons of Pharez, Hezron and Hamul, appear to have been born when Jacob and his family went down into Egypt; and the assertion that Benjamin at that time had also ten sons, is founded entirely on this genealogy.

The following reasons may be assigned for believing that the author did *not* intend to name only those who were born at the time of going down into Egypt—(i.) Reuben, when Jacob's sons wished to take their last journey to Egypt, had no more than *two* sons. This is evident from ch. xlii. 37, "*Slay my two sons*, רֵעִים אֶת־בְּנֵי־רְעִי (several have incorrectly translated, *two of my sons*) if I bring him not to thee." Had he had several, he would have made the offer of several. But in Gen. xlvi. 9, *four* sons of Reuben are enumerated. Two of these must, therefore, have been born in Egypt. (ii.) The representation of Benjamin as a youth is so fixed and constant, that it could not enter the thoughts of an Israelite, that on his going down into Egypt he had ten sons; compare for example, xliii. 8, xliv. 30, 31, 33, where he is called רֵעִי, and xliii. 29, where Joseph calls him his son. (iii.) The author appears specially to indicate, respecting Hezron and Hamul, that they were a kind of compensation for

Er and Onan, and that they were not born in the land of Canaan; compare v. 12, "But Er and Onan died in the land of Canaan, and the sons of Pharez were Hezron and Hamul." VENEMA remarks, "*Filiorum Pharezi licet in Aegypto natorum mentio fit, quia duobus Judae filiis in Canaan mortuis substituti sunt, quod diserte tradit historicus, qui cum expresse addit eos in Cananaca obiisse, haud obscure innuit filios Pheresi ipsis suffectos ibi non fuisse natos.*" (iv.) Immediately before the genealogy, it is said in ch. xlvi. 5, "And the Sons of Israel carried Jacob, their father, and their little ones,  $\text{פָּרָז}$ , in the waggons." Also, according to ch. xliii. 8, the family consisted of Jacob, his sons, and their little ones. But in the genealogy, Jacob's grandchildren are mentioned as having children. It cannot, therefore, have been the author's design, to restrict himself exactly to the point of time when the children of Israel entered Egypt. (v.) In Num. xxvi. not a single grandson of Jacob's is mentioned besides those whose names are given in Gen. xlvi. But this can hardly be explained if, in Gen. xlvi., the going down into Egypt is taken precisely as the *terminus ad quem*. Were no other sons born to Jacob's sons in Egypt? (vi.) The author, in Gen. xxxvii. 1, announces the genealogy of Jacob,  $\text{הַגֵּזֶרֶת יַעֲקֹב}$ . The *sons* of Jacob had been already enumerated in the  $\text{הַגֵּזֶרֶת יִצְחָק}$ , the genealogy of Isaac. It still remained for him to mention the sons' sons, and perhaps some of their grandsons, who had obtained peculiar importance. If the author wished to fulfil the promise given in ch. xxxvii. 1, he would not take notice of the accidental circumstance, whether the sons were born in Canaan or not, but exhibit them all fully. Besides, a second genealogical review must follow on the increase which the family of Jacob would receive in Egypt. But such a one is not extant. At the same time, the author, if he had cut off every thing which was subsequent to the going down into Egypt, would have injured the genealogical plan, which he had constantly followed from the beginning of his work, and which had been already marked as regulating the whole by the subscription, "*This is the Genealogy,*" &c.

These are the arguments to prove that it could not be the design of the author merely to name those individuals who were born at the going down into Egypt. Thus supported, we say

with HARTMANN, (p. 94)—*Quid ergo? Est hic catalogus recentio omnium familiae Jacobi masculorum, qui geniti vel in Mesopotamia, vel in Canaan, vel in Aegypto sunt, quique vel sine haeredibus mortui, vel capita seu principes familiarum posteritatis Jacobi facti sunt, quod et ex coll., Num. xxvi. 5, 599, abunde apparet. Quosnam vero ex filiis suis suscepit nepotes in Canaan, quosnam praeter filios Josephi in Aegypto, hoc quidem, Gen. c. xli., non docetur.*

But, against this result, the express declaration of the author himself appears to militate. When, in ver. 26, he says, "All the souls that came with Jacob into Egypt, which came out of his loins, besides Jacob's sons' wives, all the souls were three score and six"—he seems as decidedly as possible to exclude the view that we have advocated. According to it, also, it seems that the contrast made (ver. 26 and 27) between the souls who came to or with Jacob into Egypt, on the one hand, and Joseph and his sons on the other, is not to be explained.

We maintain, however, that the appearance here is deceptive; that the author regarded those who were born in Egypt as coming in the person of their fathers with Jacob into Egypt. Our justification of this opinion, by which the contrast between ver. 26, 27, (which can only be destroyed by admitting a pure *a potiori*), will remain complete, is supported by the following reasons.

(1.) It is said in ver. 27, "All the souls of the house of Jacob, which came into Egypt, are seventy." Now, since here Joseph's sons are numbered with the souls which came down to Egypt, because they, although born in Egypt, yet came in their father thither—with equal propriety, among the souls that came with Jacob into Egypt, might those grandchildren of Jacob be reckoned who came thither in their fathers. This reason is irrefragable. (2.) The fifteenth verse deserves to be noticed—"These be the sons of Leah, which she bare unto Jacob in Padan Aram, with her daughter Dinah; all the souls of his sons and his daughters were thirty-three." By the term "sons" here, and in ver. 8, we may either understand sons in a strict sense, or admit that it is used in a wider signification. In both cases, the sons appear as appurtenances (*Pertinenz*) of their



fathers, as in them already existing and born. The same remark applies to ver. 18—"These are the sons of Zilpah, whom Laban gave unto Leah, his daughter; and these she bare unto Jacob, sixteen souls." Either she bare in the two (Gad and Asher) the sixteen, or she bare these sixteen in the two; compare also ver. 25. (3.) In Deut. x. 22—"Thy fathers went down into Egypt with (*in* ?) threescore and ten persons," Joseph's sons at all events are considered as having come down in their father to Egypt. (4.) This mode of viewing family connections, so foreign to our notions, may be easily detected in a multitude of other places, especially in Genesis. We only refer to the instance in ch. xlvi. 4—"I will go down with *thee* into Egypt, and I will also surely bring *thee* up again."

But it may be asked, if the author gave the names not merely of those who were already born when Jacob went down into Egypt, how was it that, not content with naming them, he also states their number? When he states the aggregate of Jacob's family to be seventy souls, it seems to indicate that all the persons named were already born.

We reply, the author's object in making this computation is, to show from how small a quantity of seed so rich a harvest was produced. This we learn from Exod. i. 5—"And all the souls that came out of the loins of Jacob were seventy souls, . . . ver. 7, and the children of Israel were fruitful, and increased abundantly, and multiplied, and waxed exceeding mighty, and the land was filled by them." Also Deut. x. 22—"Thy fathers went down into Egypt with (*in*) three score and ten persons; and now the Lord thy God hath made thee as the stars of heaven for multitude." A counterpart to this enumeration is the account of the number of Israel at the departure from Egypt, in Num. i., and before their entrance into Canaan in Num. xxv. Here is the seed—there the harvest.

For this object it was perfectly indifferent to the author whether the numbers were 40, 50, 60, or 70. The contrast between these numbers and the hundreds of thousands remains the same. The author, who must be measured by the standard of a sacred historian, not of a writer on statistics, could hence follow his theological principle, which recommended to him the choice of the number *seventy*. SEVEN is the signature of the covenant rela-

tion between God and Israel, the special theocratic number. Compare BÄHR, *Symbolik des Mos. Cultus.* i. 193). By fixing on the covenant *number*, the author intimated that the increase was the covenant *blessing*.

The number 70 itself leads to the conjecture that some members were either left out or interpolated. If the author's aim had not been to complete the number, he would not, in contradiction to the principle which he elsewhere always follows, have included Dinah, and Serah, the latter of whom had no more right than all the rest of Jacob's female grandchildren to a place in the genealogy. That he did this, and inserted a number of the members of the family who were born in Egypt, is accounted for on the same principle.

Similar modes of computation are found in other parts of Holy Writ. Thus, MATTHEW (ch. i. 17), numbers fourteen (twice *seven*) generations from Abraham to David; fourteen from David to the Babylonish captivity; fourteen from the Babylonish captivity to Christ. To obtain these numbers, he makes several sacrifices; he leaves out, for instance, between Joram and Uzziah, three members, Ahaziah, Joash, and Amaziah; between Josiah and Jechoniah, Jehoiakim.

#### CONTRADICTIONS IN REFERENCE TO THE PASSOVER.

Before entering into particulars, we must first point out, in what relation the various passages of the Pentateuch respecting the Passover stand to one another, not one of which forms a mere repetition, but each later one is connected with the preceding as complementary. A multitude of false constructions will thus be at once set aside, and we shall obtain a foundation for subsequent special deductions.

First of all, the fundamental law is given in Ex. xii. 1-18, containing the declarations respecting the object and significance of the Paschal sacrifice—the slaying of it—the rites to be observed in serving up and eating it—and the seven days eating of unleavened bread. Then in ver. 43-49, the persons permitted to partake of it (only the circumcised) are positively and negatively described. In ch. xiii. 2-10, the ordinance respecting the un-

leavened bread, which hitherto had been only given by God to Moses, is communicated to the people.

In Exod. xxiii. 15, it was not the author's design to state a new important fact in reference to the Passover, but he mentions it only for the sake of the general survey in the סֵפֶר הַבְּרִייתָה, the *brevis conspectus* of the laws to be observed by Israel, which was delivered to the people before the ratification of the covenant. There is an express reference to the earlier and more complete law.

Also in Ex. xxxiv. 18, where likewise the complete ordinance is referred to, the Passover only appears in a review which was necessarily made on the renewal of the covenant with the people in consequence of their infraction of it. The whole section in which the Passover is mentioned, has the character of being incidental, and must be regarded as an episode.

In Levit. xxiii., the Passover appears in the calendar of the feasts; the account of the מִנְחָה. Particular directions are here given respecting the קָדְשֵׁי קָדְשֵׁי "the holy convocations" at the Passover, ver. 4-8. Then the ordinance respecting the presentation of the first fruits in ver. 9-14.

In Num. ix. 1, &c., is a supplement to the former law (occasioned by a particular incident), respecting the Passover to be kept by the ceremonially unclean. The design of communicating this regulation is the only cause why the celebration of the second Passover is mentioned, as is shown by the chronological position of the section. Compare SCHMIDT *de Paschate*, p. 153.

In Num. xxviii., in the catalogue of offerings, those that were to be presented at the Passover are given.

Lastly, in Deut. xvi. it is fixed *where* the Pasover was to be celebrated, by the whole nation at the place of the sanctuary.

We shall now apply ourselves to explain the alleged contradictions in the ordinances respecting the Passover.

#### THE TIME OF THE PASSOVER.

HITZIG maintains (*Ostern und Pfingsten in Zweiten Decalog.* Heidelb. 1838. p. 91), that according to a number of passages, (Ex. xii. 6, 17; Lev. xxiii. 5; Num. ix. 2; xxviii. 16; xxxiii. 3), the departure from Egypt and the Passover belong to the

evening of the fourteenth day of the first month ; that, on the contrary, according to other passages, the Passover falls on the new moon of the same month.

If this difference really existed, it would be decisive against the genuineness of the Pentateuch. It will therefore well repay the trouble, to investigate the matter closely. We wish to subject all the passages in which, according to HITZIG, the Passover is appointed to be kept on the New Moon of the first month, to a careful examination.

I. This is expressly attested, HITZIG maintains, in Ex. xxxiv. 18, “ The feast of unleavened bread shalt thou keep ; seven days shalt thou eat unleavened bread as I commanded thee לְמִנְעֵד הַקֶּשֶׁת הָאֲפִיב ; for בְּדֹרֶשׁ הָאֲפִיב thou camest out from Egypt” with which Ex. xviii. 15, perfectly agrees in essential points. The words בְּדֹרֶשׁ הָאֲפִיב must be translated, *the new moon of Abib*. For what had been the work of a day would be more suitably referred to a day than to a whole month. If the author intended the 15th day, why did he not say so ? To the current interpretation according to which, by מִנְעֵד the whole month is understood, the meaning of מִנְעֵד is opposed, which always mean a point of time, and stands only for a very short time.

But this argument, by which HITZIG, to favour a random suggestion, endeavours to set aside the current interpretation, really proves nothing. For (i.) why the day is not named is self-evident, if the words are allowed to stand which HITZIG would quite arbitrarily strike out, and the more so, since they are found in *both* passages, “ seven days shalt thou eat the unleavened bread, as I command thee.” The object of the command is a feast of seven days, and this could not be referred to one day. Let the reference to Exod. xii. 15, xiii. 6, be allowed to stand, and the more exact statement of the time is unnecessary. This reference is altogether agreeable to the character of that section which appears throughout as an abstract. Even in the words which HITZIG allows to stand, there is an indirect reference to the earlier command, “ THE feast of unleavened bread shalt thou keep ;” this expression is not suited to a passage which is to be regarded as the *locus classicus* respecting a festival.” How very different is Exod. xii. 15, xiii. 6, “ seven days shall ye eat unleavened bread.” (ii.) To refute his assertion respecting the מִנְעֵד, it is sufficient to refer to Gen. i. 14.

Here the *moadim* are divided into *days* and *years*. Compare SCHUMANN on the passage. The feasts, even of seven days, are *moadim*; Ex. xiii. 10; Lev. xxiii. 2, 4, 37, 44. In Deut. xxxi. 10, the whole "year of release" is described as מוֹעֵד שְׁנַת הַשְּׁמִטָּה. *Moed* is an appointed time, whether long or short. Whether it denotes a *point* or a *space* of time, can only be decided by the connection. In the circle of seven years, for example, the year of release is the *moed* for the reading of the law, and in the year of release, the *moed* is the feast of tabernacles. So the *moed* for the celebration of the feast of unleavened bread in the year is Abib, and in Abib, the 14-21 day. So also here, as in ch. xiii. 3, the month Abib itself is the *moed*. The general designation could only appear strange if the more exact had not preceded. But here this was not only the case, but the author distinctly adverts to it.

From the defensive we now pass on to the offensive. Against the translation "*the new moon of Abib*," the following reasons are decisive: (i.) The indirect and the express reference to the former law, according to which, the Passover would indeed fall in the month Abib, but not at the new moon. (ii.) A seven days' feast might be assigned to the month, but not to the day. (iii.) הַרְבֵּשׁ in the Pentateuch never means *new moon*, but always *month*. New moons are רָאשֵׁי הַחֳדָשִׁים; compare Num. x. 10; xxviii. 11. Num. xxviii. 14, וְזֶאת עֹלֹת הַקֹּדֶשׁ בְּחֻדְשֵׁי לְחֻדְשֵׁי הַשָּׁנָה ought not to be translated, as it has been by DE WETTE, "This is the burnt-offering of the new moon for every new moon of the new moons of the year;" but, "This is the burnt-offering of the month for every month among the months of the year;" compare the הַרְבֵּשׁ הַשָּׁנָה in Ex. xii. 2, as rendered correctly by VENUSI. The sacrifice relates to the whole month. That it was to be presented at the beginning of the month had already been said. So in Num. xxix. 6, where the offering of the month and the daily offering are placed together. Ex. xix. 1 is not to be translated as, by GESENIUS (*Thes* p. 449), "on the third new moon," but "on the third month since the departure of the children of Israel from Egypt, on this day;" that is, "on the day when the month began; otherwise the words בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא would be superfluous. Let any one only compare the chronological data in xvi. 1; xl. 17; Num. i. 1, &c. which form a continued series as nearly as possible alike, and he will be convinced that there is no more propriety in attributing

another meaning to **הַדָּשׁ** in this passage than in all the rest. And in the other books of the Old Testament, **הַדָּשׁ** never means *new moon*, but only monthly feast, which may be considered as an abbreviation in the same manner as *Passover*, so the meaning *month* is, strictly speaking, the only one throughout the Old Testament. If persons attempt to find a support in the etymology for the meaning *new moon*, which, as we have shown, is utterly useless, then they must also maintain that **שִׁנָּה** (properly *change*, as **הַדָּשׁ** *newness*) which invariably has the meaning of *year*, denotes also *the change of the year*, or *new year*, and that this meaning was the original one. (iv.) Even were it allowable to translate **הַדָּשׁ** by *new moon*, **הַדָּשׁ הָאֲבִיב** could not mean *the new moon of Abib*; for **הָאֲבִיב** cannot denote *the month Abib*. Even HITZIG acknowledges that this does not agree with the current interpretation of **אֲבִיב**. But he maintains that (p. 28) the meaning of the *ears-of-corn-month* (*ährenmonat*) was introduced at a later period; *ears-of-corn-month* should rather be **הַדָּשׁ הָאֲבִיבִים**. It was probably only a Hebraized form of the name of the Egyptian month *Ἐπιφύλι*. The objection which is brought against the usual meaning of the word **אֲבִיב** falls to the ground as soon as that is somewhat differently modified, as it has been by several of the old expositors. That **אֲבִיב** does not denote the single ear of corn is evident from the two passages, Lev. ii. 14, “Thou shalt offer **אֲבִיבִים קֵלִיִּים** *green ears of corn* dried by the fire,” and Exod. ix. 31, **הַשֵּׁעִרָה אֲבִיב**, “the barley was *in the ear* ;” also from the fact that **הַדָּשׁ הָאֲבִיבִים** never occurs. In behalf of this meaning, nothing can be alleged. It is strictly an adjective, as the LXX. have correctly taken it in all places. Ex. xiii. 4, *ἐν μηνὶ τῶν νέων* ; compare Ex. xxiii. 15 ; Deut. xvi. 1 ; Ex. ix. 31, *ἡ γὰρ κριθὴ παρεστηκυῖα*, Lev. ii. 14, according to the *Cod. Alex. ἀπαλόν*. For the modified current translation of **אֲבִיב** and against that of HITZIG, there are the following reasons : (a.) *Abib* cannot be the *nom. proprium* of a month, since all the other months in the Pentateuch have no names, but all merely denoted by numbers. (b.) *Abib* would not, then, in connection with **דָּשָׁה**, always have the article. (c.) **אֲבִיב** occurs in the Pentateuch itself as *appellativum*, and, apart from the compound phrase, **הַדָּשׁ הָאֲבִיב** ; Ex. ix. 31 ; Lev. ii. 14. It is to be observed (d.) that **הַדָּשׁ הָאֲבִיב** never occurs but where the departure from Egypt, and the *Passover* celebrated in consequence of it, are spoken

of—a fact which cannot be explained on HITZIG's view. Besides, the same month bears the name of the *first* month, and so appears under the same denomination as the rest; compare, for instance, Ex. xl. 17; Num. ix. 1; xx. 1. It only bears the name **הַחֹדֶשׁ הָאֲבִיב** with reference to the sheaves that were to be presented at the Passover. In the designation of the month as **הַחֹדֶשׁ הָאֲבִיב** in Ex. xiii. 14, there is an allusion to the ordinance respecting the presentation of the sheaf of first fruits, which is first given in Lev. xxiii. 9.

II. Also in Deut. xvi. 1, (“Observe the **הַחֹדֶשׁ הָאֲבִיב** and keep the Passover unto the Lord thy God; for **בַּחֹדֶשׁ הָאֲבִיב** the Lord God brought thee forth out of Egypt by night,” **לַיְלָה**), HITZIG remarks that the *Chodesh Abib* is, *the New Moon of Abib*. *This night* is everywhere a definite expression; it must be so here if we translate the words in question, the *New-Moon-day of Abib*. But the objection against the received translation has only weight on the supposition that the Passover law of Deuteronomy stands there unconnected with the rest, and independent; but from this fact, the incorrectness of this supposition is evident. The relation in which one passage stands to the earlier laws in which the time is distinctly determined, is equivalent to a direct reference. SCHMIDT (*de Paschate*, p. 170) has remarked: *Nihil difficultatis habet hic versus, si nota sit historia Ex. xii. de exitu filiorum Israel ex Aegypto*. The same writer paraphrases the passage in Exod. xii. thus: *Si itaque evolvatur, sic habebit textus; observa mensem Abib, ut facias (in nocte ejus decima quinta) pascha Jehovae deo tuo; quia in hoc mense eduxit te Jehova deus tuus ex Aegypto nocte (eadem)*. The positive reasons against HITZIG's interpretation may be gathered from the foregoing remarks.

III. In Exod. xiii. 4, it is said, “This day came ye out **הַחֹדֶשׁ הָאֲבִיב**.” When, asks HITZIG, is *this day*? In the preceding context it is nowhere given; for we cannot go back to ch. xii. 37, and so it is not told at all. The clause, moreover, “in the month Abib,” would be lame and remain so, if even to determine “this day,” we were disposed to go back to xii. 37, where there is a perfectly different document; it remains so, since the month in which that important day fell, would thereby gain nothing in importance, and would never be celebrated. Mani-

festly, he infers, must the clause *בהרש האביב* define the indefinite *היום*; and the *הרש* must be a day, not a month, which is thus palpably shown by the *היום* standing there.

But that the *היום* does not oblige us to impose a false meaning on the *בהרש האביב*, the following remarks will show. That the Passover Lamb was to be slain by the whole congregation of Israel on the fourteenth day of the first month, is declared by God to Moses in Ex. xii. 6, "And they shall eat the flesh in that night," ver. 8, the death of the first-born of the Egyptians is foretold, ver. 12, and this was to be followed by the departure of the Israelites. *This day* was to be continually observed by the Israelites as "a feast to the Lord," ver. 14, for in this self same day *היום הזה* the Lord brought the children of Israel out of Egypt, ver. 17. To these specifications of time, ver. 29 refers. "And it came to pass that at midnight the Lord smote all the first-born in the land of Egypt." Then ver. 41, "And it came to pass at the end of the four hundred and thirty years, even the self same day it came to pass, that all the hosts of the Lord went out from the land of Egypt *בפעם היום הזה יצאו כל-צבאות יהוה מארץ מצרים*. In this latter passage particularly the reference is undeniable to ver. 17, with which it agrees strikingly in expression, "and ye shall observe the feast of unleavened bread," for *בפעם היום הזה הוצאתי את-צבאותיכם מארץ מצרים* (Compare Gen. vii. 13, where *בעצם היום הזה* refers to ver. 11; xvii. 23, 26, where it likewise refers to the day marked in the preceding context). To this day the author returns at the end of the chapter in ver. 51, after the connection of the narrative had been interrupted by the ordinance respecting the Passover—"and it came to pass *the self-same day* the Lord did bring the children of Israel out of the land of Egypt, by their armies." With this, ch. xiii. 1, is connected, "And the Lord spake unto Moses (on the self-same day), sanctify me all the first born, &c. ver. 3, and Moses said unto the people (on the same day), Remember this day, in which ye came out from Egypt, ver. 4, This day came ye out," *בתקופת האביב*.

Even the *היום* shows, that we have not before us a compilation from a variety of written sources. Only if the connection be arbitrarily broken, the *היום* becomes indefinite, and requires to be more exactly determined, which has been attempted by a forced exegesis of *בהרש האביב*.



Also in other respects the closest connection is apparent, so that we are perfectly justified, in going back even to ch. xii. 17, in order to determine "*this day*," as yet, that part of the ordinance respecting the Passover, which God imparted to Moses in ch. xii. 1-20, had not been communicated to the people; the communication to the elders in ver. 21-28, contains nothing of it, and that the reason of this must not be sought for in a mere design to abridge, appears from ver. 33, 34, according to which the people, without as yet knowing anything of the command of unleavened bread, by the pressure of circumstances were prevented from leavening their dough; exactly as afterwards the *practical* institution of the Sabbath, by the failure of the manna, preceded the *verbal* one. Thus, when we have read through the section contained in ch. xii. 1-28, we find ourselves referred to an account of the promulgation of the ordinance concerning unleavened bread in the following. But equally as this section points forwards, ch. xiii. 3 points backwards. Why was the ordinance respecting unleavened bread, as well as that of the consecration of the first-born, first communicated by God to Moses, then by Moses to the people, in the regular course of legislation? Why is the account of the communication of the ordinance respecting the unleavened bread placed between God's command to Moses respecting the consecration of the first-born, and the command of Moses to the people? How can this be explained otherwise than thus, that Moses, before he promulgated the new command, made known to the people the earlier command that had not yet been promulgated, the communication of which presupposed facts, which not till just at that time had transpired.

That בַּחֹדֶשׁ הָאֲבִיב even apart from general grounds, cannot be translated, *on the new moon of Abib*, is shown by ver. 5, which is closely connected with ver. 4, "And it shall be when the Lord shall bring thee into the land of the Canaanites, &c, a land flowing with milk and honey . . . that thou shalt keep this service *in this month*." Would HIRTZIG also here translate בַּחֹדֶשׁ הָאֲבִיב "*at this new moon?*" But the reference is to a seven days' eating of unleavened bread, and this may be assigned to a month, but not to a day.

The reason of the addition of בַּחֹדֶשׁ הָאֲבִיב lies in the relation of ver. 4 to ver. 5. Since the latter treats of a seven days' feast,

which belongs to the month, the month must be named in ver. 4, to which the day of the departure belonged. That this month is called *חֹדֶשׁ הָאֲבִיב*, and not, as it is repeatedly elsewhere, the *first* month, is for the purpose of conveying an allusion to the presentation of the first-fruits of the harvest, which took place in the seven days of unleavened bread, and to which the mention of the fruitfulness of the land naturally led; compare Lev. xxiii. 10. Precisely that the feast, beside the historical blessing (*Geschichtswohlthat*), might have for its object the natural blessing (*Naturwohlthat*) based upon it, God had so ordered it that the redemption of Israel was effected in this month.

IV. The fourth passage to which HIRTZIG appeals is that in Exod. xii. 40, 41. "Now the sojourning of the children of Israel, who dwelt in Egypt, was four hundred and thirty years. And it came to pass at the end of the four hundred and thirty years, even the self-same day it came to pass, that all the hosts of the Lord went out from the land of Egypt." "The author's meaning cannot admit of a doubt," says HIRTZIG; "there is no room for a two-fold interpretation." (Certainly not!) "He says on the same day on which the 430 years had expired, therefore on the first day of the four hundred and thirty-first year, they went out."

The data for setting aside this notion are contained in what has been already said. Only a word or two more is needed. If the passage means exactly the day on which the 430 years were completed, the new year's day could not be meant, but only the day on which the Israelites entered Egypt. If any one should say, such an event happened ten years after my entrance on office, on the self-same day, who would understand new-year's day to be intended? The passage, therefore, will prove nothing for HIRTZIG. What day this was must be ascertained from what goes before. It would have been a different case if it had been related in Genesis that the entrance into Egypt was on the first of Abib.

Not to mention that *עַבְדֵי* in the Pentateuch always refers to a day named in the preceding context (compare, on this point, besides the passages already quoted, Lev. xxiii. 14), how can any one imagine that *here* *בְּעֵצְמֵת הַיָּמִים הַהֵם* can mean any thing else than it does in ver. 17? Observe especially that very peculiar expression, "*the hosts of the Lord,*" in ver. 17, 41, 51.

After the text has revenged itself on all the passages which HITZIG adduces in favour of his unfortunate vagary (and therefore on him), we cannot read his words in p. 21 without smiling, "If I am now pleased to translate the word (the *הַדֵּשׁ* in *הַדֵּשׁ הַזֶּה*) by *new-moon-day* (*Neumondstag*), who will contradict me?"

HITZIG endeavours (p. 27), in an amusing manner, to solve what is for him a very difficult problem—how the Passover should be transferred from the new moon (to which it originally belonged) to the fourteenth day of the month. *הַדֵּשׁ* had been erroneously explained to mean *ears of corn*, and now *הַדֵּשׁ* cannot be retained in the sense of *day of the new moon*. Thus there being no longer any particular day, the middle one of the month is arbitrarily seized upon.

As the problem has been proved to be a nonentity, it would not repay the trouble to show at length that this solution of it is altogether untenable. One's olfactory nerves need not be very delicate to perceive that it smells of the lamp. It shows, by a memorable example, how closely modern criticism shuts its eyes on real life. It is a mighty achievement to misplace the most important feast. But a whole nation will never suffer itself to be regulated by the pedantry of a few literati, least of all a nation of such religious pertinacity as the Israelites. Only think of the controversies respecting Easter in the Christian Church!

## UNLEAVENED BREAD, AND THE PASSOVER.

HITZIG maintains (p. 32) that in Ex. xxiii., which contains the same Pascal law as ch. xxxiv., and, without doubt, the oldest, that the feast is not called the Passover; it is the feast of Unleavened Bread (*מַצֵּי*), and originated in the historical fact mentioned in Ex. xii. 37-42. The clause "thou shalt eat unleavened bread seven days, as I commanded thee," in this passage, was inserted by later editors. The seven days' eating is a circumstance not in accordance with tenor of the narrative. We meet it everywhere, where the feast happens in the middle of the month, and here the feast is already a double one—the Passover and the Unleavened Bread; and therefore it was arranged that,

instead of the Unleavened Bread, the Passover fixed itself, at the supposed point of time when the departure from Egypt took place, and the Unleavened Bread was removed farther to the 15th, and following days. Lev. xxiii. 5, 6 ; Num. xxviii. 16, 17. At a later period, the unimportant accident that the Israelites had not leavened their dough, gave the precedence to the exemption of the first-born of the Israelites. "On this account a special feast of unleavened bread, Ex. xii., Num. ix., is not recognised ; and in Num. xxviii. 17, *הַמַּזְבֵּחַ* is placed after the *הַגֵּז*. Although the unleavened bread was to be eaten seven days (Exod. xii. 15, Num. xxviii. 17), it forms (Exod. xii. 8, Num. ix. 11) only a sort of garnish to the Paschal Lamb, and is not otherwise related to it. Deut. xvi.

Therefore, in Exod. xxiii. and xxxiv. there is no Passover, only a feast of Unleavened Bread, then a double feast, the Passover and Unleavened Bread ; in the latest passages there is only a Passover, and no feast of Unleavened Bread. The eating of unleavened bread at first coincided with the time of the departure from Egypt, but afterwards was transferred to the following day.

First of all, the assertion is false that Exod. xxiii. and xxxiv. contain the oldest law of the Passover. That these are not the fundamental passages on the Passover is apparent, even without the special reference which HITZIG quite arbitrarily explains as introduced later. The eating of unleavened bread is enjoined without a reason, and yet in the fundamental passage we should expect a reason. But the principal point is that ch. xxiii. 18 is absolutely unintelligible without the reference to the fundamental passage in ch. xii. Without it no one can tell what *the sacrifice of God* *κατ' ἑξοχὴν* is ; no one can tell what to do with the concise expression *וְעָלֶיךָ*, and as little what kind of feast is intended by "the feast of Jehovah," *κατ' ἑξοχὴν*. The indefiniteness of the last expression is only removed by the parallel passage in ch. xxxiv. 25.

That the feast in Exod. xxiii. and xxxiv. is not called the Passover, lends no support to HITZIG's whim (it does not deserve the name of a hypothesis.) The true reason of this fact is very evident. The whole *seven days' feast* was to be designated ; now for this, the only suitable name was *the feast of Unleavened Bread*. The name *PASSOVER* is never applied in the Pentateuch

to the whole feast. This has been noticed by SCHMIDT, *de Paschate*, 277. *Pesach* פֶּסַח always stands only for the Paschal sacrifice and feast; the whole feast is always called the feast of Unleavened Bread. For one and the same reason, the feast is called the feast of Unleavened Bread, and is assigned to the month, not to a particular day. From the latter circumstance we are warranted to infer that the words "*seven days shalt thou eat*," &c. are not a later interpolation. If a feast of several days had not been intended, the day would have been given.

We can offer conclusive reasons that the *nature* of the Passover was known to the author of Exod. xxiii. and xxxiv., and that therefore the omission of the name cannot be on the ground alleged by HRTZIG. In ch. xxxiv. 18, 19, the command respecting the redemption of the first-born is annexed to that respecting the feast of Unleavened Bread. This shows that the exemption from death of the first-born of the Israelites was known to the author; and if this were the case, he could not regard the Passover as a mere feast of Unleavened Bread. If he knew the fact which formed the basis of the Passover, he also knew the Passover. But ch. xxxiv. 25 is peculiarly important, "Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leaven, neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of the Passover be left unto the morning," compared with xxiii. 18, "Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leavened bread (the CHALDEE *non mactabis super fermento sanguinem Pesach mei*, *i.e.*, says RIVET, *non immolabis victimam paschalem, donec fermentum omne ex domibus expurgatum sit*), neither shall the fat of my sacrifice remain until the morning." Before the slaying of the Paschal Lamb all leavened bread was to be put away; a compendium of ch. xii. 15, 20; xiii. 6. nothing was to be left till the morning—a compendium of ch. xii. 10. The Paschal Lamb is in both passages the sacrifice of God. *κατ' ἐξόχην*. In ch. xxiii. 18, the Paschal Lamb is considered so much as the substance of the feast that "*the fat of my feast*" חֵמֵי הַזֶּבֶחַ stands for "*the sacrifice of my feast*." Thus, therefore Ex. xxiii. and xxxiv. contain, in a compendious manner, all the three points of importance which appear in the peculiar law of the Passover. (i.) The Paschal sacrifice. (ii.) The unleavened bread. (iii.) The dedication of the first-born.

HRTZIG tries indeed to give a meaning to Ex. xxiii. 18, "Nei-

ther shall the fat of my feast remain until morning," which would render it useless for our purpose. According to him it contains the general regulation, not to let the fat of the sacrifice remain till the morning, that it might not putrify and become offensive. Such a general law might be expected here; it stands among matter of a similar kind, and is closely connected with what goes before, since they both, and only they, refer to the sacrificial ritual. The author of Ex. xxxiv. had mistaken this law, and referred it to the Passover.

But this exposition is altogether untenable. (i.) It excites a very unfavourable prejudice against it, that HITZIG is obliged to explain ch. xxxiv. 25 as a mistake. The meaning which this passage gives the words, ought certainly not to be relinquished except on the most stringent grounds. (ii.) With evident design HITZIG slurs over the first half of the verse. That he would give that also a general reference is clear. But RIVET (Opp. I. *Rotterod.* 1651, p. 1085) has long ago shown that this will not suit the passage. Lev. c. ii. *habetur generalis regula, omnis oblatio, quae offertur Domino, absque fermento fiet, nec quidquam fermenti aut mellis adolebitur in sacrificiis domini. Sed hoc intelligendum est de oblationibus quae offerebantur domino ex rebus inanimatis (בְּיָהוּדָה) maxime quae fiebant ex simila, in qua misceri poterat fermentum. Hic autem cum non agatur de oblatione ex simila, sed de ea, quae sanguinem habebat, aliud oportet esse, quam id, quod in oblatione similiae prohibetur. Non legimus aliquando cum sanguine victimae fermentatum panem aut non fermentatum fuisse mixtum, sed quid sub his verbis intelligatur ex ch. xxxiv. xxxv. &c. Quod in aliis sacrificiis necessarium non erat, in quibus Ebraei agitantibus convivia ex carnibus sacrificiorum poterant uti pane fermentato.* (Compare the לֶחֶם in Ex. xii. 8; Num. ix. 11; Deut. xvi. 2, "Thou shalt eat no leavened bread with it; seven days shalt thou eat unleavened bread therewith, the bread of affliction," which so far differs from the passages we have been considering, that *here* it is commanded to put away the leaven before the slaying of the Paschal Lamb, and *there*, to eat no leavened bread during the whole feast—all which is perfectly consistent. Now if the first half of the verse refers to the Passover, it is most natural that the second in parallelism with it should refer to the Passover. Com-

pare Deut. xvi. 2-4, where likewise both the eating of unleavened bread, and the not leaving any portion of the Paschal Lamb till morning, are connected together. Also in reference to the more distant context, the law is laid down in a manner perfectly suitable to our explanation, first in ver. 14-17 of the three feasts in general, then in ver. 18 two regulations in reference to the first and principal feast are indicated, to which we must supply an *et cetera*. (iii). Considered in themselves, the words before us allow of no other reference but to the Paschal Lamb. HITZIG entirely passes over in silence the  $\text{למחר}$ , and translates the passage, without hesitation, as if it were "*my sacrifice.*" The direction that nothing of it (*the fat* is mentioned in our passage as *pars praeicipua*) should be left till morning, is altogether peculiar to the Paschal Lamb. Our passage cannot have the same object as the law in Lev. xix. 6, where it is said of the *Shelamim*, "It shall be eaten the same day ye offer it, and on the morrow, and if ought remain until the third day it shall be burnt with fire." Compare Lev. vii. 16, 17. For here a longer terminus must be given. Lastly, the  $\text{לילה}$  contains an implication that the sacrificial feast was to be at night. Otherwise it would have been said, until the morning of the following day.  $\text{לילה}$  forms the antithesis to night.

Having shown on such striking grounds that the passages which, according to HITZIG, have nothing to do with the Passover, have been misapplied, it will not be worth while to enlarge upon the subject, as it is inconceivable that the whole festival should be limited to the rite of unleavened bread, especially according to the crude notion of it, as a mere memorial of a fact, that in itself was insignificant, and symbolised no idea.

Having, in this manner, settled the main point, we now turn to the remaining contradictions which HITZIG professes to discover.

It is a mere fancy that the eating of the unleavened bread was at first confined to a single meal, but afterwards extended to seven days. Wherever the *Mazzoth* is mentioned, there we also find the term of seven days. Indeed, if HITZIG's view of the institution of this rite were correct, we could not account for its being kept seven days. By his view the undeniable connection of the prohibition of  $\text{לחם חמץ}$  at the Passover, and the  $\text{במזוזה}$ , is entirely broken.\*

\* Compare Lev. ii. 11—"No meat-offering which ye bring unto the Lord shall be made with leaven; for ye shall burn no leaven, nor any honey, in any offering of the

The true significance of eating the unleavened bread, may be best learnt from 1 Cor. v. 6. The unleavened bread typifies the *εἰλικρίνεια* and *ἀλήθεια*, which the redeemed are habitually to practice, which we can here only hint at, and shall enlarge upon at another opportunity.

We never find two feasts, the Passover and that of Unleavened Bread; never is the beginning of the feast of Unleavened Bread transposed to the day after the Passover. If in Levit. xxiii. 5, 6 ("In the fourteenth day of the first month, at even, is the Lord's Passover. And, on the fifteenth day of the same month, is the feast of Unleavened Bread unto the Lord—seven days ye must eat unleavened bread"), the Passover is assigned to the fourteenth, and the beginning of the feast of Unleavened Bread to the fifteenth, it is to be understood that the evening which follows the fourteenth may be considered as belonging to it, forming its close, or as belonging to the fifteenth, forming its beginning. The first happens in reference to the Paschal Lamb, since this was slain  $\text{בֵּין הָעֶרְבָּיִם}$ ; the second, in reference to the Unleavened Bread, since the eating of it began after the fifteenth was actually entered upon, and the days were numbered from the fifteenth to the twenty-first. If the Unleavened Bread, according to Ex. xii. 18, was to be eaten "on the fourteenth day of the month, at evening, until the one-and-twentieth day of the month at evening," the eating of it, since (according to the common division of time) the day began in the evening, strictly speaking, belonged to the fifteenth. The arguments which prove that the evening of the fourteenth day, on which the Passover was to be eaten, did not begin but conclude the fourteenth day, and, therefore, strictly belonged to the fifteenth, have been stated by SCHMIDT in his treatise *De Paschate*, p. 396—"Neque enim," he remarks, "*quando in scriptura mentio fit vesperae alicujus deci, ita ut vespera ista distinguatur a nocte, putamus nusquam inveniri ullum locum, ubi intelligatur vespera diem terminans.*" The opinion advocated by RAUCH, that the Passover was eaten at the beginning of the fourteenth (see DE WETTE's counter-remarks, in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1834, p. 939), is opposed by the expression  $\text{בֵּין הָעֶרְבָּיִם}$ . If the Passover evening formed the beginning of the

Lord made by fire." BAAL TURIM: *Quia fermentum corruptionem hominis vel pravam concupiscentiam, mel autem improbam ejus dulcedinem s. voluptatem denotat.*



fourteenth, then the *בֶּן הַתְּעִיבִים* must belong to the thirteenth. The defect here also has been, that persons have neglected to determine the later passages by the earlier—the recapitulation by the *locus classicus*. The same remark applies to the second passage, to which HITZIG appeals, Num. xxviii. 16, 17. We nowhere meet with a feast of Unleavened Bread in contradistinction from the Passover. The feast of Unleavened Bread denotes the whole, including the time peculiar to the Passover. In Levit. xxiii. and Num. xxviii., two distinct festivals are not given in juxtaposition, but only the beginning and chief component part of the festival, and the whole of it.

## DEUT. XVI. 2.

In this passage it is said—“Thou shalt therefore sacrifice the Passover unto the Lord thy God, of the flock and the herd, in the place where the Lord shall choose to place his name there.” This has given rise, in former times, to frequent discussion (SCHMIDT, *de Paschate*, p. 170). Lately, HITZIG has remarked in reference to it, that it is opposed to the legislation of Leviticus, by the direction that the smaller cattle (goats as well as sheep) and the larger were to be offered as the Passover of Jehovah.

But we have already learnt from Lev. xxiii. 8, that besides the Paschal Lamb, there were other sacrifices at the Passover. The directions respecting their quality and number we find in Num. xxviii. 19–26. They consist of *זֶבַח* and *זִבְחֵי*. These are burnt-offerings and sin-offerings. Shelamim are not mentioned

The difference is only this—that in the passage under consideration, *זֶבַח*, denotes the Passover generally, not the Paschal sacrifice, *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. Also by *זִבְחֵי*, the Paschal Lamb alone is not to be understood. That the author must have stated the distinction between the two, can only be maintained from a false view of his object. His only concern was with the place of the presentation. In reference to this, all ambiguity and indefiniteness must be avoided, and truly here the author is minute and exact enough; he constantly returns to it negatively and positively. Every thing, besides, is mere embellishment, or has not a legislative, but a parenthetical character. This supplement, in reference to the Passover, stands in close connection with the

special design of Deuteronomy, in reference to which DE WETTE (*Beitr.* i. 283), remarks—"Almost all the peculiar laws in our book refer to the residence in the land of Canaan." The same also is the case with the two other great feasts. Here also the author has only the *place* in his eye. That he only occupied himself with those feasts which were to be celebrated at the place of the sanctuary, shows that he meant not to treat of the feasts in general, but only with one special reference.

So much for the alleged contradictions in reference to the Passover.

EXOD. XVII. 1, &c. ; NUM. XX. 1, &c.

The events narrated in these passages, it is said (VATER, p. 490 ; compare HARTMANN, p. 196), wear a striking resemblance. In both places, the Israelites murmured on account of a want of water ; in both places they received water from a rock, and both times the place obtains the same names from the event. It is probably one and the same event, which, in the course of time, by the uncertainty of tradition, was assigned to two different places. The collector of the Pentateuch found a twofold narrative different in subordinate circumstances, and inserted both in the works. That both narratives proceeded from one and the same author cannot be admitted, on account of the difference of phraseology. In Exodus we find  $\text{קָדֵשׁ}$  and  $\text{מֵרִיבָה}$  ; in Numbers  $\text{קָדֵשׁ}$  and  $\text{מֵרִיבָה}$  ; in Exodus,  $\text{בַּרְזִי}$  ; in Numbers,  $\text{קָדֵשׁ}$ .

We begin with a rectification of the matter of fact. The assertion is false, that the place received both times the same name. The first place obtained the names of Massah and Meribah ; the second, those of Kadesh and En Mishpat. The occasion of the error lies in Num. xx. 13, "This is the water of *strife* ( $\text{מַיִם מֵרִיבָה}$ ), because the children of Israel strove ( $\text{מָרָוּ$ ) with the Lord, and he was sanctified in them." Not a word is said here about giving the name Meribah to the place. Elsewhere, only the waters of strife at Kadesh are spoken of. That the author uses the expression *waters of strife* is intentional. The repetition of the designation, which, on the former occasion, became a *nom. propr.*, here serves as an allusion to it, and therefore sets in a more conspicuous light the unbelief of the people and of their leader. Equally false also are the observations on the language from which a diver-

sity of authorship is attempted to be proved. The narrative in Exodus ch. xvi. begins with the words, " And all the congregation of the children of Israel " (בְּכָל־עַמֵּי־יִשְׂרָאֵל), which stands in the closest connection with ch. xvii. ; compare especially ch. xvii. 3 with xvi. 3 ; both עָלְמָה and עָלְמָה, the latter several times. That only in Exodus the elders are mentioned is easily explained, if we consider that here the miracle was wrought only in the sight of the elders ; there, before all the people. That in Exodus צַד is used, and in Numbers בָּנִי, is owing to a real difference in the things spoken of, for the words are certainly not synonymous.

If we now keep in view the settled matters of fact, we cannot avoid the conviction, that the whole objection proceeds from an obscure and unconscious dread of the miraculous. If a natural relief had occurred twice, no one would have found any difficulty in it. The want of water in a barren desert was a trial continually recurring, the greatness of which we are assisted in conceiving by the accounts of modern travellers. In Exod. xv. 22, at an earlier period, we are told that the people murmured for the want of water that was fit to drink at Marah, and the bitter water was changed into sweet. And, after the event narrated in Num. xx., the same complaint was again renewed, ch. xxi. 4, 5, " And they journeyed from Mount Hor, by the way of the Red Sea, to compass the land of Edom, and the soul of the people was much discouraged, because of the way. And the people spake against God, and against Moses, Wherefore have ye brought us up out of Egypt, to die in the wilderness ? for there is no bread, *neither water.*" If the distress was similar, we might beforehand expect to find that the Divine aid was repeated, and so much the more, since it had even a second time been the lot of the new generation, with which the Divine leadings had begun afresh. As soon as we understand that the spiritual Rock followed the Israelites, that they constantly drank of the spiritual water which proceeded from that Rock (1 Cor. x. 4), we shall be in a position to perceive, that the outwardly supernatural was the inwardly natural ; in the first event we shall find a prediction of the second, which would certainly be fulfilled on a recurrence of the same circumstances. Our opponents should, therefore, so far understand themselves, that they direct their attack no longer against the twofold event, but twice against the miraculous character of the event, and even against this not in its iso-

lated state, but only on the ground that Israel, in his journey through the desert, was not under the special guidance of his God—that the whole relation to him was only imaginary. But they are too much inclined to affect a transfer of the conflict from the field of dogmatical to that of historical criticism.

Yet it must be admitted that some ground of suspicion will, after all, be left—if both events had not their peculiar physiognomy—if they were so alike, even as to place and time, that one might, without hesitation, transpose the narrative in the Book of Exodus to the Book of Numbers, and the reverse. But this can be asserted only by very superficial observers. The deeper we go, the more distinctly the very opposite becomes apparent.

The unbelief of Moses and Aaron is peculiar to the Book of Numbers. Moses said to the people, with mingled doubt and irritation, “*Hear now ye rebels, must we fetch you water out of this rock?*” *An rem, quae fieri nequit, a nobis postulatis?* MICHAELIS. He struck the rock twice in haste and perturbation, uncertain of the result. This transaction stands in causal connection with the death of Moses and Aaron. Therefore, the most important particular is peculiar to the second event. It is of a kind that could not have been thought of at the first. Here is a weariness of spirit, such as we might expect after years of trial. Never till this time had Moses lost his self-command in the presence of the people. In ver. 3, the words, “*Would to God we had died, when our brethren died before the Lord!*” there is an allusion to a fact which had not transpired at the time of the first event. So also in ver. 6, “*And Moses and Aaron went from the presence of the assembly unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation;*” while in Exod. xvii. 4, it is merely said, “*And Moses cried unto the Lord.*” In the interval between the two events, the tabernacle had been erected. Then ver. 9, “*And Moses took the rod from before the Lord (וַיִּקַּח מִלְּפָנֵי יְהוָה) as he commanded him.*” The rod was now kept in the sacred tabernacle. So exactly does the narration tally with the course of the history, so little is it like a detached leaf, which accident had blown into its present position.

Contrary to the supposition of our opponents, that the two narratives were penned by different authors, are the allusions to the former which occur in the latter. In Num. xx. 8, it is merely said with striking conciseness, “*Take the rod;*” so that several

have supposed that it was Aaron's rod. This conciseness, as we find frequently in the Pentateuch, points to a fuller description, which was given before on a similar occasion. This we find in Exod. xvii. 5, "And thy rod, wherewith thou smotest the river, take in thine hand." In Numbers also, the words, "*Thou shalt smite the rock,*" are to be supplied from Exodus. How necessary the additions from Exodus are, for understanding the broken narrative in Numbers, is shown by a mistake of KANNE'S, ii. 105, and others, which is merely occasioned by supposing that the passage in Numbers is self-explanatory. They think that Moses ought, on this occasion, to have taken his miraculous rod with him indeed, but only to have spoken to the rock. The weakness of his faith was shown in the fact, that, mistrusting the efficiency of merely speaking, he struck the rock.

How little we have here to do with a dubious and fluctuating legend, is shown by the sure and certain references to these events, and the sharp distinction between them, when they are spoken of in the Pentateuch. Two passages are worthy of special notice—Num. xxvii. 12–14, "And the Lord said unto Moses, get thee up into this mount Abarim . . . . And thou also shalt be gathered unto thy people, as Aaron thy brother was gathered. For ye rebelled against my commandment, in the desert of Zin, in the strife of the congregation, to sanctify me at the water before their eyes; *that is the water of Meribah in Kadesh, in the wilderness of Zin;*" and Deut. xxxii. 51, "Because ye trespassed against me among the children of Israel, at the waters of the strife at Kadesh, in the wilderness of Zin, because ye sanctified me not in the midst of the children of Israel." The exactness of the geographical description was plainly with a view to the former passage, to distinguish the event in Numbers from that in Exodus. The implication that there were *other waters of strife* may be plainly discerned. To the first passage there is a reference in Num. xxxiii. 14, "And they encamped at Rephidim, where was no water for the people to drink;" also in Deut. viii. 15, "Who led thee through that great and terrible wilderness . . . where there was no water; who brought thee forth water out of the rock of flint;" the author had the second clearly before his eyes before he gave an account of the second. In Gen. xiv. 7 it is said, "They returned, and came to En-Mishpat, which is Kadesh." It is evi-

dent, and should not have been passed over by KANNE (ii. 107), that *both* these names were taken from the event recorded in the Book of Numbers; En-Mishpat accompanying the *nom. propr.* rather as an appellative, so that its meaning remains always fresh and palpable, and Kadesh being strictly the *nom. propr.\** The original name, indeed, is not here given. The event made such a deep impression on the people that the new name very soon became permanent. Only in some few passages, Deut. i. 2, 19, the original name Barnea בַּרְנֵה appears in connection with Kadesh,† while the place commonly is called simply Kadesh; compare Num. xxxiv. 4; Deut. ii. 44; Josh. x. 42. Also, the wilderness in which Kadesh Barnea was situate, must have exchanged its earlier name, Zin, for Kadesh, or at least have taken the latter as a surname; compare Num. xxxiii. 36, “they pitched in the wilderness of Zin, which is Kadesh,” with Num. xxvii. 14, “the water of Meribah in Kadesh, in the wilderness of Zin.”

An incontestable witness for the historical truth of both events is furnished by the names Mispah, and Meribah, and Kadesh, which they originated. The Hebrew etymologies, and the allusion to the events in question, are so palpable, while of the names Barnea and Zin it is difficult to fix on any probable Hebrew etymology.

---

\* VATER quotes (p. 633) Gen. xiv. 7, among “the passages with explanatory additions, especially to names of places, such as would not be expected in the time of Moses.” But with what propriety one does not perceive. That one and the same event give rise to a double name, according to different associations connected with it—*Fountain of judgment* (עַיִן מִשְׁפָּט) on account of the judgment on Aaron and Moses (Num. xx. 12), and Kadesh (קָדֵשׁ) because the Lord there *sanctified himself* to the Israelites; (*quia prostrata eorum improbitate et petulantia sanctum suum nomen a contentu vindicaverat*; CALVIN) can only appear strange to those who do not recognise the intimate connection between names and things in the earliest ages. Compare Gilead and Mispah in Gen. xxxi. 48, 49. The passage proves nothing more than that GENESIS in its present form could not have existed before the event recorded in Num. xx.

+ The supposition of a double Kadesh by RELAND (p. 114) and others, rests on unacquaintance with localities that have been since ascertained. RELAND’S remark, p. 115) in reference to Kadesh Barnea: *certe in sacro codice nunquam urbs appellatur hoc nomine*, is exactly the opposite of the fact. Kadesh Barnea is always the name of a place, never of the wilderness. The wilderness is called Zin, with the addition of Kadesh.

## EXODUS XXIII. 16, AND XXXIV. 22.

HITZIG (*Ostern und Pfingsten*, p. 15) remarks, "What in Exod. xxxiv. 22 is called 'the wheat harvest,' is called in ch. xxiii. 16, 'thy labours which thou hast sown in thy field.'" We have, therefore, in ch. xxiii. a feast of first-fruits generally, in which the first-fruits of grain are to be offered. At the feast in ch. xxxiv., the first-fruits of wheat were to be offered. But the harvest generally took its beginning with the barley harvest. The feast in ch. xxiii. is, therefore, one of the first-fruits of the barley; and it follows that in ch. xxiii. the celebration of the feast must be so much earlier than in ch. xxxiv., as the time that elapsed from the beginning of the barley harvest to that of wheat harvest.

Let us first quote at length the two passages—Ex. xxiii. 16, "And (thou shalt keep) the feast of harvest, the first-fruits of thy labours, which thou hast sown in thy field; and the feast of ingathering which is in the end of the year, when thou hast gathered in thy labours out of the field;" xxxiv. 22, "And thou shalt observe the feast of weeks, of the first-fruits of wheat harvest."

On applying ourselves to remove the difference urged by HITZIG, which he represents as "lying pretty much on the surface," the first question that arises is, are we to consider "the feast of harvest," *הַחַג הַשְּׂבִיעִי* as one which was celebrated at the beginning of harvest, or at its close? That there was no third time, that a celebration of the harvest between the beginning and end is not to be imagined, even HITZIG acknowledges. This writer supposes that the feast was celebrated at the beginning of the harvest, and that the first ripe ears of barley were taken for presentation. But the contrary is the correct view. *The feast of ingathering* connected with the harvest feast was celebrated after the complete ingathering. The first-fruits of what was sown in the fields, which were presented at the harvest feast, consisted, according to the parallel passage in Lev. xxiii. 16 (which must be regarded as the special *sedes doctrinae* on this subject), not of ears of corn, but of bread. Hence it follows that the harvest feast was not celebrated before the beginning of the harvest, and it is certain also that it must have been immediately after its close. LAMPE on John iv. 35, remarks, *Nec enim manipulus spicarum, quae cum*

*virides adhuc essent, torreri antea debebant, in Pentecoste efferebatur, velut fiebat in festo Paschatis, quando incipiebat messis hordeacea, sed panes de tritico qui supponebant messem jam aliquot saltem diebus antea institutam et tantum saltem temporis, quantum ad demetendum, siccandum, trituran- dum, pinsendum, frumentum requirebatur.*

If now the harvest feast in ch. xxiii. was a festival for returning thanks for the completion of the harvest generally, it might be held after the end of the wheat harvest, and, therefore, scarcely earlier than the feast in ch. xxxiv. The difference might, therefore, only consist in this, that the feast in ch. xxiii. related to the harvest generally, but the feast in ch. xxxiv. merely to the wheat harvest.

But even this difference vanishes on a closer examination. In ch. xxxiv. it is by no means asserted that the Pentecostal feast was merely the feast of the wheat harvest, but only that the first-fruits of the wheat harvest were to be presented at that time. From its being contrasted with the feast of ingathering קציר, it rather appears that it was a feast of thanks for the harvest generally. This also is spoken of at the close of the preceding verse. It was the harvest feast generally, and, at the same time, the feast of the first-fruits of the wheat harvest—the feast at which the first-fruits of the wheat harvest were presented.

Since with the first-fruits of the wheat-harvest, the first-fruits of the whole harvest were presented, so also it was the feast of presentation of first-fruits of all kinds of grain, in the form of bread. That this *species* should be chosen as representative of the *genus*, was perfectly natural. For, though barley bread was eaten, it was only the food of the poor. Compare STUDER (*on Judges*, p. 203.) All the bread, &c., presented to the Lord was made of wheaten flour.

If, as HRTZIG has done without any good reason, the harvest-feast in ch. xxiii. is changed into a feast of the first-fruits of barley, it occasions the impropriety of putting the wheat in the background, which is always celebrated as the principal of God's gifts. Compare Deut. xxx. ii. 14, where "the fat of the kidneys of wheat" הַלֶּבַב בְּלֵימֵי הַשֶּׂה appears as the most precious of the Divine bounties, while the other kinds of grain are not mentioned; Deut. viii. 8, in the list of the productions of the promised land, *wheat*



stands first as the noblest ; “ a land of wheat and barley, and vines, and fig-trees, and pomegranates, a land of oil, olive, and honey.”

A second contradiction which HITZIG, p. 17, would find between Exod. xxxiv. and xxiii., is removed in and with this first. For it rests on the supposition that the harvest-feast in ch. xxiii. and xxxiv. formed the beginning of the harvest ; and moreover, that the harvest-feast in ch. xxxiv. was only the feast of wheat harvest, suppositions of which we have already pointed out the nullity, so that it is not worth while to quote HITZIG'S assertion.

#### THE TWO TABLES OF THE LAW.

I. According to Exod. xxxiv. 2-4, and Deut. x. 1-4, it is asserted God wrote the two tables. On the contrary, according to Exod. xxxiv. 28, they were written by Moses. This apparent contradiction, which in the older commentators has been a regular topic of remark, has been already urged, particularly by HARTMANN (p. 227). But the simple solution is this, that in the אֲשֶׁר in Exod. xxxiv. 28, “ And he was there with the Lord forty days and forty nights, he did neither eat bread, nor drink water ; and HE wrote upon the tables the words of the covenant, the ten commandments (words),” not Moses, but JEHOVAH, is the subject. Against this view nothing can be objected, since in the Pentateuch nothing is more frequent than such a change of the subject without any express indication of it, in case it can be otherwise determined, which can undeniably be done here, since the author only wrote for those who would previously have read ver. 1-4. Compare for instance, Gen. xxiv. 32 ; xxix. 3 ; there are also the following arguments in its favour. (i.) The analogy of the first tables. It was sufficient punishment for the people that the materials had been provided by Moses. (ii.) The connection between God's writing and God's speaking. If the second table had been written by Moses, the difference between the decalogue and the rest of the laws, grounded on the fact that the first was written by God, and the latter promulgated by Moses, would have been taken away. (iii.) Ch. xxxiv. 1-4. Even in the most indifferent writer, it could only be admitted in an extreme case that

in so short a space he could so grossly contradict himself. Whoever supposes anything of this sort in such a work as the Pentateuch, only gives evidence of his own incapacity. (iv.) The place in which they were written. *Supposito*—remarks J. F. MICHAELIS (in his *Dissert. de tab. foed. poster.* § 8)—*Mosen posteriores foederis tabulas scripsisse, quaestio movetur quare Moses tabulis non in eodem loco, ubi easdem dolavit, decalogum inscripserit.* (v.) Moses was alone upon the mountain. He could therefore in writing them, not make use as in hewing them of the assistance of others. But is it probable that he himself possessed the capability of engraving the writing on stone?

II. According to Deut. x. 3 (“And I made an ark of Shittim wood, and hewed two tables of stone like unto the first, and went up unto the Mount, having the two tables in my hand,”) the ark was made before the two tables of stone; but according to Exod. xxxvii. 1, the ark was not made till Moses had come down from the mount. Thus VATER, p. 492, but this apparent contradiction he has borrowed from older writers; compare GERHARD on *Deuteronomy*, p. 609. We have here to do with a simple *Hysteronproteron*. The inaccuracy which occurs in the passage of Deuteronomy, would not be excusable if the representation had a purely historical object, and if the author had not elsewhere represented the purely historical course of things. But here the history is subordinate to a purely hortatory object, and for this purpose it was a matter of no moment whether the tables of the law were first made, or the ark. But in the preceding commands of God it is plainly enough intimated that the ark was made after the tables. In ver. 1 it is not said, “Make the ark and then hew the two tables;” but “Hew thee two tables of stone, like unto the first, and come up unto me into the mount, and make thee an ark of wood.” Here, as well as in Exodus, the going up into the mountain, where the commandments were written on the tables, intervened between the making of the tables and of the ark.

III. According to Deut. x. 1, the same decalogue was written on the second tables as on the first; but according to Exod. xxxiv. the second tables contain a totally different set of Ten Commandments which are there stated, ver. 12–26. Thus HIRTZIG writes (*Ostern und Pfingsten*, p. 40), to whom the exclusive

honour must remain of having discovered this "Second Decalogue." In reply, we offer the following remarks. (i.) According to Exod. xxxiv. 1, the same words were to be written on the second tables as on the first. Now, it would be strange if these words were not communicated till the occasion of the second tables. They must rather have been contained in the preceding portions, and if they were 10, then the decalogue is different from ver. 12-26. (ii.) The law which was written on stone, can only be the fundamental law. Now, it is simply impossible that an Israelite could have supposed the commands in ver. 12-26, to be the fundamental law. This objection, which must occur to every one, HITZIG tries to parry by remarking: "He excluded all the commands which might be more or less understood of themselves, or were of equal validity among other nations; there is not one exclusively moral law, none that relates to the administration of justice; the collection includes the chief distinctive doctrines of the Hebrew faith (*des Hebraismus*)." But this remark only serves to show more plainly the unsoundness of the hypothesis. What was a more distinctive doctrine of the Hebrew faith, than the doctrine of the unity and ideality of God, the command to serve Jehovah alone, and to make no image of Him? In what part of the Old Testament is the department of the moral law considered as common to Israel with the heathen? Where can the view be found that the law of Moses contained merely supplementary articles? (iii.) The tables of the law in Exod. xxxiv. 29, are called the two tables of Testimony עֲדוּתַי, an appellation which has, we have already shown, and shall show elsewhere, so far suited the law as it was a testimony against sin. Now this appellation will not correctly apply to the commands in ver. 12-26, on account of their preponderating positive form, while it is perfectly in unison with the preponderating prohibitory form of the real decalogue. In the internal character also these commands do not comport with the idea of עֲדוּתַי. They could all be performed without any painful sense of constraint, without coming into collision with the corrupt tendencies of the heart. If these were the עֲדוּתַי then no עֲדוּתַי מֵרַחֵם *mercy-seat* would have been needed, and yet both stand in the strictest relation to one another, as will be shown in the section, *On the Theology of the Pentateuch*. (iv.) The analogy of ch. xx. in relation to ch. xxi. xxiii. requires

a second collection of commands written down by Moses, besides the decalogue written with the finger of God. The renewal of the law is closely connected with the first giving of it. If then there was a two-fold *genus*, so also there must be now. (v.) This two-fold *genus* is also here expressly distinguished. The words of the Covenant, THE TEN WORDS, God himself would write, ver. 1, and ver. 28, we are informed, "the Lord himself wrote upon the tables the words of the Covenant, the Ten Commandments;" on the other hand, the commands which were communicated in ver. 12-26, Moses was ordered to write down, "Write thou these words," ver. 27. (vi.) To explain how it came to pass that the author of ch. xxxiv. formed a new decalogue, although he was acquainted with the preceding portion which contains the true decalogue, HIRTZIG asserts that it is never said in the preceding part, that the decalogue in ch. xx. had been written on the two tables; and what their contents consisted of, remains undetermined. But this is totally false. In ch. xxiv. 12, it is said, "And the Lord said unto Moses, Come up to me to the mount, and be there: and I will give thee tables of stone, and a law, and commandments, which I have written for their instruction." Now, since in the preceding part, a double set of laws had been communicated, one which God himself delivered to the people, and another delivered by Moses, it is self-evident that only the first could form the contents of the tables. For the words spoken by God, and the writing, correspond to one another. That the author finds it unnecessary expressly, to remark, that the decalogue was written on the tables, shows how natural it was to understand this, and that no one for centuries before HIRTZIG even thought of doubting it.

The number of the commandments, *ten*, in ver. 12-26, HIRTZIG maintains, betrays that, in the opinion of the author, they were written on the tables. It unquestionably appears that the commandments in ver. 12-26, are *ten*, which is almost the only valuable thought such as it is, in HIRTZIG'S two letters to IDELER, and to SCHWEIZER. But what does it prove? The number *Ten* is the symbol of the perfect, of what is complete in itself. By its being employed here, the second collection of laws, the secondary lawgiving, is set in contrast to the former as a whole to a whole.

## THE LEVITES' AGE OF SERVICE.

In Numbers ch. iv. (it is said), the age of the Levites at the entrance on their service is fixed throughout at thirty years; on the contrary, in ch. viii. 24, it is written, "This it is that belongeth unto the Levites from twenty and five years old and upwards: they shall go in to wait upon the service of the tabernacle of the congregation. The two passages can be reconciled by nothing but a violent alteration of the text, as the LXX have done throughout ch. iv. by changing thirty into twenty-five. Only in fragments by different authors could there be such a difference in the contents of the prescription. VATER, p. 453. HARTMANN, p. 231.

It cannot be denied, that the various solutions of the contradiction from MAIMONIDES, which assumes a five-years' training to KANNE, who asserts, that, in the former passage, an arrangement was made for the present exigency, and, in the second, a regulation for the future—are collectively met by HARTMANN'S objection; the question always remains unanswered why the author does not give the slightest intimation that such was his meaning.

But, on the other hand, at the outset, it is certainly not probable, that exactly in reference to this point, such a glaring contradiction should be found in the Book of the Law, not even from our opponents' point-of-view. Nor can we admit a contradiction on account of the exact and verbal agreement in expression, which hardly leaves room to suppose a variety of authors.

A closer examination will discover, that the appearance of contradiction has been occasioned by a superficiality of exposition, common to both friends and foes. The author is not to bear the blame if his readers identify what he has clearly enough distinguished. Ch. iv. relates, solely and alone, to the service of the Levites at the tabernacle of the congregation, to carrying it until the time when the Lord would choose a fixed place for the dwelling-place of his name. On the contrary, in ch. viii., the subject is the service of the Levites *in* the tabernacle of the congregation. For the first service, the greatest bodily vigour was required; hence the greater age. This view we shall endeavour to establish by a consideration of particular passages.

In ch. iv. 3, it is said, "From thirty years old and upward,

even until fifty years old, all that enter into the service לְזָבָח (*host*, Eng. A. Vers., *Dienste*, H.) to do the work *at* the tabernacle of the congregation," בְּאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד ought not to be translated "*in* the tabernacle of the congregation;" for what follows relates to carrying the tabernacle, and not to the other services of the Levites. The numbering relates entirely to one single employment of the Levites. If it were not so, why is there not a word said in the whole chapter respecting the rest of their duties? Thus, too, in ver. 4, "This shall be the service of the sons of Kohath at the tabernacle of the congregation, about the most holy things." In ver. 5-14, directions are given how Aaron and his sons were to pack all the parts of the tabernacle and its appurtenances; then in ver. 15 it is said, "And when Aaron and his sons have made an end of covering the sanctuary, and all the vessels of the sanctuary, as the camp is to set forward; after that the sons of Kohath shall come to bear it, but they shall not touch the sanctuary הַקֹּדֶשׁ, lest they die; this is the burden of the sons of Kohath at the tabernacle of the congregation," (בְּאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד); ver. 19, "Aaron and his sons shall go in, and appoint them (the sons of Kohath) every one to his service, and to his burden." And as ver. 4-20 treat of the family of Kohath, so do ver. 21-28 of the family of Gershon. In ver. 23, it is said, "All that enter in to perform this service, to do the work at the tabernacle of the congregation;" ver. 24, "This is the service of the families of the Gershonites, *to serve and for burdens*," לְעֵבֶד וְלִבְרָאָה. In ver. 25 and 26 is stated what they were to carry; ver. 27, "At the appointment of Aaron and his sons shall be all the service of the sons of the Gershonites, in all their burdens and in all their service; and ye shall appoint unto them in charge all their burdens." Then again, in ver. 29-33, the service of the sons of Merari is allotted; ver. 31, "And this is the charge of their burden, according to all their service at the tabernacle of the congregation." At the close of the whole, the object of this numbering of the Levites is very distinctly shown; ver. 47 and 48, "All those that were numbered . . . from thirty years old and upward, even to fifty years old, every one that came to do the service of the ministry and *the service of the burdens* at the tabernacle of the congregation," &c. "they were numbered . . . according to his service and according to his burdens."

How we are to understand the expression, "they shall come and take their place in the service of the tabernacle of the congregation,"\* in the second passage, Num. viii. 24, whether of the service in the widest extent, or specially of service in the tabernacle, must be determined by the preceding context. But here the only subject mentioned is the service of the tabernacle (compare ver. 15), so that we cannot venture to say that the employment mentioned in ch. iv. forms an exception. Both regulations stand perfectly independent beside one another.

According to 1 Chron. xxiii. 25, 26, David made an arrangement that the Levites should be engaged from the age of twenty years in the service, especially since they were now released from one of their earlier chief employments, the carrying of the sanctuary as it had now been permanently fixed. He allowed himself, therefore, in the spiritual interpretation of the law, a lighter and longer service to be tantamount to one shorter but heavier. The service of the Levites also under Hezekiah began at the age of twenty years, 2 Chron. xxxi. 17; and after the return from the captivity, Ezra iii. 8. If the modern view of the origination of the legislation of the Pentateuch were correct, the law would certainly have been modelled by the existing practice. We should not have found such very ample directions respecting the bearing of the sanctuary, which, in David's time, had lost all their applicability.

## JOSHUA—HOSHEA.

VATER remarks (p. 490), "Num. xiii. 17, *יְהוֹשֻׁעַ*, first receives this name on the occasion there stated, and yet in Exod. xxxiii. 11, he already bears the same name."

KANNE (*Bibl. Unters.* ii. 100), has taken notice of the occurrence of the name JOSHUA in Exod. xxiv. 13 and Num. xi. 28. To these we add Exod. xvii. 9.

This apparent contradiction, which, as early as the times of JUSTIN MARTYR, was a topic of discussion, and is noticed at some

\* That DE WETTE, after LE CLERC's example, has incorrectly translated *צבא* in the phrase *צבא צבא* by *Host (Heer)* instead of *service (Dienst)*, is shown here very plainly. He felt himself obliged to leave it out.

length by that father, has been attempted to be solved in a variety of ways. *First*, by the admission of a *prolepsis*, for which so many analogies may be brought from the Pentateuch. *Secondly*, by supposing that Moses only renewed the name Joshua, on that occasion when he was afresh to verify his title to it. *Thirdly*, by the supposition that, in Num. xiii. 27, a statement is made of what had taken place a considerable time before either when HOSHEA entered the service of Moses, or before the engagement with the Amalekites. In its ordinary form, in which, for instance, it appears in ROSENMÜLLER, EICHHORN (iii. 302), and KANNE, who take the future with *Vau conversive* as a Pluperfect, *et vocaverat*; this supposition is certainly inadmissible. But it needed only a modification in order to be free from objection in a grammatical respect. "These are the names of the men whom Moses sent to spy out the land; and then or so (after he had at a former period borne the name HOSHEA) he called him JOSHUA. The Future with *Vau conversive* "expresses a consequence of the second from the first, a necessary advance from the first to the second, and consequently an internal reference of the second to the first," EWALD'S *Sm. Gram.* § 610; (NICHOLSON'S *Transl.* p. 374). In the expression, "These are the names of the men," it is implied that these were originally the names of the men.

A perfectly certain decision between these three methods of solution cannot be given. But the third is that which has most in its favour. It is against the first and second that in the passage before us no sufficient motive is stated for giving afresh his sacred name to JOSHUA, to say nothing of its then being given for the first time. And we can scarcely suppose that Moses could have looked forward to this time with the change of name, since he had already, by Joshua's victory over the Amalekites, obtained so strong an inducement for bestowing it.

That the author here first mentioned that he whom he had hitherto called simply JOSHUA originally bore the name HOSHEA, was not without good reason. What had been hitherto related of JOSHUA, belonged to him as a servant of God; the sacred name was, therefore, properly employed. But here HOSHEA must stand, for he went "to spy out the land," not as the servant of Moses, but as one of "the heads of the children of Israel" (Num. xiii. 3), one of the plenipotentiaries of the congregation.



## HOREB AND SINAI.

In the whole of Deuteronomy, VATER remarks (p. 494), the place where the Israelites received the law is frequently and invariably called Mount HOREB; in the preceding books it is usually called Mount SINAI, excepting in Exod. iii. 1, xvii. 6, xxxiii. 6, where HOREB occurs. This difference argues against the identity of the author of Deuteronomy, and of the remaining books. GESENIUS (in his translation of BURKHARDT'S *Travels*, p. 1078) is not disposed to acknowledge the validity of this argument; in his opinion, the "somewhat remarkable" circumstance loses its importance if HOREB was the specific name of one of the mountain summits, and SINAI the general name of the whole range; and with this solution ROSENMÜLLER satisfies himself (*Alterthumskunde*, I. iii. 115). But we do not consider it sufficient. Why should the general name be used in the first three books, and the special one in Deuteronomy?

The correct solution can only be obtained by means of a more exact determination of the matter of fact. This, therefore, we shall first of all attempt. Until the narrative advances to the sojourn in the wilderness of SINAI, only HOREB is spoken of. In Exod. iii. 1, it is said, "And he came to the mountain of God, to HOREB," a passage which shows how far VATER was correct in asserting that none of the passages in which Horeb occurs (excepting in Deuteronomy) stands in relation to the giving of the law. On account of the giving of the law was HOREB, indeed, the mountain of God. This is clear from ver. 12, in which, on account of its allusion to ver. 1, only Horeb can be intended—"When thou hast brought the people out of Egypt, ye shall serve God upon this mountain." *Quia accipietis legem super hoc monte.*" JONATHAN. HOREB also is found in ch. iv. 27, "And he went and met him in the mount of God, and kissed him." In ch. xvii. 6, Moses resorted with the elders to HOREB. In ch. xviii. 5, Horeb is referred to ("And Jethro came unto Moses into the wilderness, where he encamped at the mount of God") on account of ch. iii. 4, and because in the preceding context only Horeb has been spoken of.

With ch. xix. 2,\* begins the use of the name of SINAI, "For they were departed from Rephidim, and were come to the desert of Sinai, and had pitched in the wilderness: and there Israel encamped before the mount." Compare ver. 11, "For the third day the Lord will come down in the sight of all the people upon Mount Sinai." With the exception of ch. xxxiii. 6, where HOREB appears in the midst of a Sinai context (*in Sinaitischer Umgebung*), a circumstance which of itself shows that the difference cannot be explained by a diversity of authors, but imperatively requires an explanation from the facts of the history, the use of the name SINAI continues uninterruptedly down to the point where the children of Israel break up their encampment in this district. Num. x. 12, "And the children of Israel took their journies out of the wilderness of SINAI." Compare Exod. xix. 18, 23; xxiv. 16; xxxii. 15; xxxiv. 29, 32; Lev. vii. 38; xxv. 1; xxvi. 46; xxvii. 34; Num. i. 1; iii. 1, 14. SINAI also recurs in the list of the encampments, Num. xxxiii. 15, "And they departed from Rephidim, and pitched in the wilderness of SINAI." In Exod. xxiv. 13, SINAI, exactly as HOREB before, is called "the mount of God." הַר הָאֱלֹהִים.

After the Israelites had left those parts, HOREB is used without exception, and the name of Sinai is never again mentioned. Deut. i. 2, "There are eleven days' journey from HOREB unto Kadesh Barnea." Ver. 6, "The Lord our God spake unto us in HOREB." Ver. 19; iv. 10, 15; v. 2; ix. 8; xviii. 16; xxviii. 69 (xxix. 1). All the events which in these passages we briefly touched upon as having happened on Horeb, are more fully related in the other books (a circumstance which it would be difficult to explain on the hypothesis of a variety of authors), and are there transferred to Sinai, or to the wilderness of Sinai.

If we survey these facts, it will at once appear that they can lend no support to the hypothesis of a variety of authors, but rather exclude it. One and the same author has, for definite reasons we see plainly, even before we know what these reasons are, used here one and there another of these two names. What is shown relative to great objects in the use of JEHOVAH and ELOHIM is here shown in reference to those of less importance.

\* Ch. xix. 1, "The same day came they into the wilderness of SINAI."—[TR.]

Design and proportion are visible in these Books, even to the minutest particulars.

But it is not so very difficult to ascertain these definite reasons. If the facts are ascertained with precision and exactness, the reasons are obvious. Never, in the whole composition, does HOREB appear as a single mountain in contrast to Sinai. Sinai, on the other hand, is always a single mountain. Before the children of Israel reached the district, and after they left it, the general name of the mountain Horeb always stands in contrast to Egypt, the plains of Moab, &c. During their stay there, the particular is made a distinct object from the general; the mountain of SINAI and its wilderness are distinguished as the theatre of events that took place in the district of HOREB. But in Exod. xviii. 5, the general term is used—the whole of HOREB is still the mountain of God; which designation, nevertheless, is only applicable to the whole, on account of what transpired on part of it, SINAI.

The exact observance of the distinction would certainly be attended to more by an eye-witness than by writers who lived some centuries later. The later sacred writers speak almost always of HOREB only; Ps. cvi. 19, "They made a calf in Horeb," according to Exodus "in the wilderness of Sinai," 1 Kings, viii. 9; xix. 8; 2 Chron. v. 10; Mal. iii. 22 (iv. 4.)

#### THE PLAINS OF MOAB AND THE LAND OF MOAB.

Among the proofs for a different author of Deuteronomy, from that of the other books of the Pentateuch, VATER (p. 494) adduces the following. In Num. xxii. 1 עֲרַבְיֹת מִיַּזְבֵּי, *the plains of Moab* designates the place where the children of Israel were at that time encamped, and is very frequently repeated throughout the Book of Numbers. The discourses of Moses recorded in Deuteronomy were according to the two superscriptions, ch. i. 1, &c.; iv. 45, &c., delivered in exactly the same place. But in Deuteronomy it is always said אֶרֶץ מוֹאָב, *in the land of Moab*; compare i. 5; xxviii. 69 (xxix. 1); xxxii. 49; xxxiv. 5; only in xxxiv. 1, 8, עֲרַבְיֹת מִיַּזְבֵּי is used.

But here the coarse, external explanation of the fact (which certainly requires an explanation, and cannot be referred to acci-

dent), on closer examination is seen to be totally inadmissible. Correctly explained, this fact forms a part of the series of proofs for the unity and harmony of the Mosaic writings.

Not merely the appellation *עַרְבֵי מִזְבֵּחַ* is peculiar to the Book of Numbers, but the whole formula *בְּעַרְבֵי מִזְבֵּחַ עַל-רֵגְלוֹ הַיְמָנִית* or *מִזְבֵּחַ*, the latter only in ch. xxii. 1, at the beginning of the whole section, and doubtless on purpose, as more definite. By *מִזְבֵּחַ* it is said once for all how the more general term *עַל* is to be understood, by Jordan, namely on its eastern side. As the formula stands at the beginning of the connected section ("And the children of Israel set forward and pitched in the plains of Moab, beside the Jordan, near Jericho,") so it is placed at its end, which likewise forms the conclusion of the whole book. Ch. xxxvi. 13, "These are the commandments and the judgments which the Lord commanded by the hand of Moses unto the children of Israel in the plains of Moab, by Jordan near Jericho." Thus also it occurs in the middle portion, namely wherever in a single section in the larger whole, begins or closes. Compare ch. xxvi. 3, "And Moses and Eleazar the priest spake with them in the plains of Moab, by Jordan near Jericho;" ver. 63, "These are they that were numbered by Moses and Eleazar the priest, who numbered the children of Israel in the plains of Moab, by Jordan near Jericho;" xxxiii. 50, "And the Lord spake unto Moses in the plains of Moab by Jordan near Jericho;" xxxv. 1, "And the Lord spake unto Moses in the plains of Moab," &c. That the author always uses exactly the same formula, though by no means the only appropriate one—that he employs none of the manifold variations which offered themselves to him, nay which he could only avoid by a designed adherence to the phrase he had once chosen, cannot possibly be accidental. Rather we should infer that the author by this absolute sameness in his designation of the locality, meant to point out that all the events contained in the section formed *one connected whole*.

If this be settled, it must also be admitted that the use of the formula cannot go beyond the end of the Book of Numbers. For it is evident that at the beginning of Deuteronomy, a new group (*complexus*) of events is formed. By a change of phraseology it is indicated that here such a transition is made. As the uniformity of expression formerly served to bind the fruits together, so

it must cease where a separation is intended to be marked. This will be the more obvious, since the two designations border close on one another. Sufficient care was taken that the difference in the designation might not mislead or obscure the identity of the locality. In Deut. i. 1, **בְּעֵבֶר** precedes the **בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם** in ver. 5; both together are in fact = **עִיר־בְּיָמֵינוּ**.

## PRIESTS AND LEVITES.

I. In the first books, DE WETTE asserts (*Kritik*. p. 335) the Levites are distinguished from the proper priests, the sons of Aaron, and are only the servants and watchmen of the sanctuary; in Deuteronomy, on the contrary, the Levites and priests are synonymous, **הַכֹּהֲנִים הַלְוִיִּם** (ה) commonly stand together. Thus the distinction of the family of Aaron, as the proper priestly family is taken away, and the whole tribe of Levi is represented as a tribe of priests. VATER (p. 500) remarks, that in Deuteronomy the phrase **הַכֹּהֲנִים הַלְוִיִּם** (ה) does not occur with a ו between, but as if both words meant the same persons. "Even if the question was not of a difference of arrangement, and merely of a difference of expression, . . . it must be very striking to find here constantly this addition, and in the preceding books as constantly the addition **בְּנֵי אֶהֱרִיץ** to **כֹּהֲנִים**" (p. 501.) The same assertions have been lately repeated and amplified by GEORGE (*die Jüd. Feste*, p. 45.)

But that the author of Deuteronomy did not know, or did not admit, the distinction between priests and Levites, cannot be inferred from the expression **הַכֹּהֲנִים הַלְוִיִּם**, which only tells us that all the priests were Levites, but not that all the Levites were priests. On this point the Book of Joshua furnishes us with a striking proof. No one will maintain that the authors of this book did not know how to distinguish between priests and Levites; the contrary is sufficiently shown in ch. xxi. And yet even in this book we find the phrase **הַכֹּהֲנִים הַלְוִיִּם** first of all in ch. iii. 3. The Vulgate translates it well, *sacerdotes stirpis Leviticae*. DE WETTE falsely "*and the priests and the Levites;*" according to the reading of several MSS. the LXX. Syr. and Chaldee, which have **וְהַלְוִיִּם**.\*

\* "וְהַלְוִיִּם" k, 1, 174, 187, 198, 225, 475; pr. R. i. 4, 187; pr. 226, 305. Bibl. Soc., Brix, et Phœn. Soc. 1486, LXX. Syr. Chald. Ar.—JAHN, *Bibl. Hebr.*—[Tr.]

This reading has no authority. We may see at once how it was formed. In the whole section the priests are spoken of solely and alone as bearers of the ark; the reading *הכהנים הלויים* is ascertained by the parallel passages. In ch. viii. 33, it is said, "And all Israel, and their elders and officers (*Shoterim*) stood on this side the ark and on that side before *the priests the Levites, which bare the ark* of the covenant of the Lord." In ch. xxi. 1-3, the priests are included under the general name of Levites. In ver. 4 they are called "the sons of Aaron the priest, *of the Levites* *הַלְוִיִּם*." This is a paraphrase of the *הלויים* in other passages, and shows how it is to be taken. So also ver. 9.

But even from Deuteronomy, we can bring evidence that the expression *הכהנים הלויים* must not be taken as it is by our opponents. The author knew very well how to distinguish between priests and Levites. (i.) In ch. x. 9, there is an express allusion to Num. xviii. 20, a chapter in which the distinction between priests and Levites is most fully made. (ii.) According to ch. x. 6, Eleazar, the son of Aaron, "ministered in the priest's office in his stead." According to this passage, at least, the high priesthood belonged only to the family of Aaron. (iii.) If priests and Levites were the same, what an idle tautology would there be in ch. xviii. 1, *הכהנים הקדושים כל-שבת לוי*. Evidently the author passes on from the part first named, because to that the special regulation related which he was about to introduce—to the whole; "the priests, the Levites, yea all the tribe of Levi." (iv.) A distinction is made between the priests and Levites in ch. xviii. 3-8. First of all, a supplementary regulation in reference to the priests is given, ver. 3-5; then, in reference to the Levites, ver. 6-8. (v.) The Levites (without the prefixed *וי*) are mentioned in xii. 12, 18, 19; xiv. 27, 29; xvi. 11, 14; xxvi. 11, 12, 13. In all these passages they appear as the objects of benevolence, in connection with widows, orphans, and strangers. If Levites and priests are identical, why should they never be called *הכהנים הלויים* instead of Levites, in the injunctions to treat them with a provident benevolence? How can it be imagined that those who were thus recommended to the tender-heartedness of the people, are identical with the Levitical priests who, in all the passages in Deuteronomy where they are mentioned, occupy a very important position? Let its due weight be given to this consideration; it

is sufficient by itself to decide the question. (vi.) In Deuteronomy no function is assigned to the כהנים הלויים which, according to the other books, belonged to the mere Levites. For the opposite opinion DE WETTE (p. 336) appeals to Deut. xxxi. 9, "And Moses wrote the law, and delivered it to the priests, the sons of Levi, which bare the ark of the covenant of the Lord." "Therefore," he remarks, "these are the proper Levites of the earlier books, who now appear in a subordinate capacity." But the carrying of the ark belonged *principaliter* to the priests, and only *materialiter* mostly to the Levites. Compare Num. iv. 4, &c., and especially ver. 19. For this reason, on peculiarly solemn occasions the ark was also carried *materialiter* by the priests. Thus it was at the passage through the Jordan, Joshua iii. 3, 6, 8; at the taking of Jericho, Josh. vi. 6; at the removal of the ark to Solomon's temple, 1 Kings viii. 3, 6. The mere Levites never dared to carry the ark into the sanctuary nor out of it. Let it be observed also that here, according to the connection, the main point is the *principaliter*, and not the *materialiter*. In the words "who bare the ark of the covenant of the Lord," the reason is given why the book of the law was committed to the priests along with the elders. (vii.) When the priestly functions are spoken of in Deuteronomy, the simple term Levites is never used, or only when preceded by the more exact designation of הכהנים הלויים.

It is therefore settled that it cannot be inferred from the expression כהנים הלויים that no distinction is made in Deuteronomy between priests and Levites. How could any one think of maintaining this assertion? The whole Israelitish history does not present an interval in which the difference between priests and Levites appears either as not yet existing, or as abolished.

But the mere difference of expression, that in the preceding books of the Pentateuch the priests are commonly spoken of as *sons of Aaron*, and in Deuteronomy as *Levites*, can be of little service to our opponents. That in the first four books the priests are designated *sons of Aaron*, is perfectly natural. The priests, whom the regulations in these books concerned, were first of all really *sons of Aaron*, and, as long as their father lived, this characteristic was prominent. At that time there was a mere family of priests. The regulations are, for the most part, personally directed to Aaron. Let any one compare Exod.

xxviii. 29 ; Lev. xiii.—x. ; Num. xviii., and he will be convinced that here we are to look for the ground of the designation. The legislation of Deuteronomy, on the contrary, is prophetic ; it has no longer to do with *a family* of priests, but with *an order* of priests ; the designation *sons of Aaron*, is therefore not suited to its purpose.

II. According to the former books of the Pentateuch, and particularly according to Num. xviii., the firstling of the cow was allotted to the priests ; on the contrary, according to the clear directions of Deuteronomy, the firstling of the cow was made a sacrifice, and then a sacred feast. Compare Deut. xii. 17, 18—“ Thou mayest not eat within thy gates the tithe of thy corn, or of thy wine, or of thy oil, *or of the firstlings of thy herd or of thy flock*, nor of thy vows which thou hast vowed, &c.,” . . . “ but thou must eat them before the Lord thy God, in the place where the Lord thy God shall choose ;” ch. xv. 19, “ All the firstling males that come of thy herd, and of thy flock, thou shalt sanctify unto the Lord thy God ; thou shalt do no work with the firstling of thy bullock, nor shear the firstling of thy sheep. Thou shalt eat it before the Lord thy God, year by year, in the place which the Lord shall choose, thou and thy household.”

This contradiction has been long ago noticed, but the attempts to remove it have not been fortunate. AUGUSTIN, *Quaest.* 18, *in Deut.*, states it, but gives no solution. ABEN EZRA and JARCHI suppose that the address in ch. xv. is directed to the priests. GERHARD on Deut. xii. (p. 769), where other arbitrary solutions may be found, remarks—*Simplicissime respondetur, agi hoc loco de primogenitis faemineis*, a supposition which a single glance at ch. xv. is sufficient to disprove. J. D. MICHAELIS (*Mos. Recht.* § 193), who is followed by JAHN (*Arch.* iii. 415), and BAUER (*Gottesd. Verf.* i. 289), supposes that a double first-born was given—that the first-born, in a strict sense, was allotted to the priests, and what came next of all to the first-born was to be used in a sacrificial feast. This supposition bears on its forehead the marks of its origin. How can we conceive that the second-born, without any further designation, should be called the first-born ? EICHHORN (iii. 235), assumes a mistake on the part of Moses in Deut. xii. and xv. Nothing is



more conceivable (!) than that the author was hurried away by his rapid eloquence at the mention of the first-born.

Such being the state of the question, it excites no surprise to find that the opponents of the genuineness of the Pentateuch (VATER, iii. 246, 500; DE WETTE, *Krit.* 331), have laid great stress on this contradiction.

Let us now proceed to investigate the subject. That according to Deuteronomy, the firstlings of beasts were to be appropriated to sacrifices and sacred feasts, is perfectly clear. But, is it equally clear that, according to the preceding books, the firstling was allotted wholly to the priests?

Very much depends on Num. xviii. 18, the *only* passage which appears decidedly to state that all the flesh of the firstling was allotted to the priests. It is there said—"And the flesh of them shall be thine (the priests), as the wave-breast, and as the right shoulder are thine." "Their *flesh*" is put in contrast to the *blood* and *fat*, in the preceding verse, which were devoted expressly to the Lord. It is easy to perceive the implication—the flesh, as far as it belongs to the Lord, and not to the offerers. This limitation arises from the very nature of the case, and yet is expressed by the additional clause, "as the wave-breast," &c., which is tantamount to saying, as the parts of flesh that belong to the Lord in all remaining זֶבֶחַ שְׁלֵמִים. The words, "as the wave-breast," &c., allude to the law in Lev. vii. 28, by which this whole verse is illustrated. If this law had been consulted, the whole misunderstanding would never have existed. The parts which God received from the זֶבֶחַ שְׁלֵמִים, are, according to this passage, the blood and the fat, which were presented to the Lord—the breast which was first consecrated to the Lord, and then given to the priests, as well as the right shoulder. Also here the same contrast exists between the blood and the flesh, the breast and shoulder. Compare also Exod. xxix. 27, 28, according to which the children of Israel were always to present to the Lord, for Aaron and his sons, the wave-breast and the heave-shoulder of their זֶבֶחַ שְׁלֵמִים; likewise Lev. x. 14, 15. Those who suppose the meaning of our passage to be, that *all* the flesh must fall to the priests' share, know not what to do with the clause, "as the wave-breast," &c. We arrive at the same result in another way. There were

altogether only three classes of sacrifices זֶבַח שְׁלֵמִים-עֹלֹת-חֹטֵאת וְאִשָּׁם, OUTRAM, *de sacrif.* p. 98. That the firstling was presented as a sin-offering cannot be admitted, without contravening the whole meaning of the dedication of the first-born, which was rather an act of gratitude, nor can the firstlings belong to the burnt-offerings, for in these none of the flesh was eaten. The offering of the firstlings belongs to the class of שְׁלֵמִים. But it belonged essentially to the idea of the שְׁלֵמִים that the offerers should not eat of them. Now, in the case of the offering of the firstlings, not the priests, but the owners, were the offerers. This is evident, from the expression לֹא יֵאָכְלוּ in Exod. xiii. 15.

III. In reference to the tithes, a remarkable diversity exists in the Pentateuch. According to Num. xviii. the Levites received the tithes, and from these gave again a tithe of these (ver. 26) to the priests. On the contrary, through the whole of Deuteronomy, not a word is said of that revenue of the Levites, which is more remarkable, since, in Deut. xviii. 1-4, we have a regulation respecting the maintenance of the priests, by which merely a share in the offerings of animals, and the first fruits, and "the first of the fleece" is promised them. Nay, it is not merely that nothing is said in Deuteronomy of tithes for the Levites. They are expressly appropriated in a different manner. According to the following passages, xii. 6, 7, 17-19; xiv. 22, &c.; xxvi. 12, 15, the tithes were to be brought yearly to the sanctuary, then to be consumed in feasts of joy, to which the Levites were to repair; but the tithes of the third year were to be shared at the dwellings of the owners among the Levites, strangers, widows, and orphans. Of these tithes, there is as little notice in the earlier books as in Deuteronomy of the Levitical ones. Such diversities in legislation are irreconcilable. VATER (iii. 247), DE WETTE (*Krit.* 331).

On closer inspection, this difference will be found to rest entirely on a mere *argumentum e silentio*; as to a contradiction, strictly so called, there is nothing of the kind. The Levitical tithes and the tithes of Deuteronomy could very reasonably co-exist. Why should they not be compatible with one another in the book of the law, since they were not incompatible in actual life? Compare Tobit i. 7, "The first tenth part of all increase I gave to the sons of Levi, who ministered at Jerusalem; another

tenth part I sold away, and went and spent it every year at Jerusalem; and the third part I gave unto them to whom it was meet.”\*

But we can prove that the *argumentum e silentio*, which in general is an extremely uncertain one, has *here* no force whatever. It may be shown most convincingly, that the author of Deuteronomy, though he does not mention the Levitical tithes, was nevertheless acquainted with them. (i.) In Deut. xviii. in ver. 1 and 2, in the general introduction to the special regulation that follows, which furnishes the ground on which it rests—the point-of-view from which it must appear as equitable—besides the Levitical priests who are here especially concerned, the whole tribe of Levi is named, as having no inheritance among their brethren, because the Lord was their inheritance. “The priests, the Levites, and all the tribe of Levi, shall have no part or inheritance in Israel; they shall eat the offerings of the Lord made by fire, and his inheritance. Therefore shall they (the tribe of Levi) have no inheritance among their brethren, the Lord is their inheritance as he hath said unto them.” Compare ch. x. 9. Now since, in the regulation itself, there is no account taken of the Levites, but only of the priests, the passage expressively indicates the existence elsewhere of directions respecting the income of the Levites, and since they are not to be found in Deuteronomy, we are sent back to the preceding books in which tithes are assigned to the Levites as their only income. The revenues which are assigned to the priests in ver. 3–5, are certainly inadequate. If they received nothing more, the assertion that the Lord was their inheritance, would have been a bitter insult. Of the *Shelamim* they were to receive the shoulder, the two cheeks, and the maw, besides the first fruits of corn, wine, and oil, and the first of the fleece. A pitiful livelihood truly! and the same book, which so contracts the revenues of the priests, must yet advance their power and influence. According to DE WETTE (*Einl.* § 156), “Deuteronomy had a homeless, destitute, but powerful, priestly tribe.” Into such paradoxes men fall, when they do not take things as they

---

\* πάντων τῶν γεννημάτων τὴν δεκάτην ἐδίδουν τοῖς υἱοῖς Λεὺι τοῖς θεραπεύουσιν εἰς Ἱερουσαλήμ, καὶ τὴν δευτέραν δεκάτην ἀπεπρατιζόμεν, καὶ ἐπορευόμεν, καὶ ἐδαπάνων αὐτὰ ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις κατ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν, καὶ τὴν τρίτην ἐδίδουν οἷς καθήκει.

actually lie before them. The passage in Deut. xviii. evidently contains not a full statement of the revenues of the priests, but a mere supplement to the passages that relate to this subject in the earlier books. The first fruits of corn, wine, and oil, which had already been mentioned in Num. xviii. 12, are introduced again here only to add to them the "first of the fleece," which does not appear there. (ii.) In Deut. xviii. 6-8, it is enjoined that the Levite who, from an internal impulse, "with all the desire of his mind," בְּקִלְיוֹתָיִם נַפְשׁוֹ should come from his own city to the place of the sanctuary, should be maintained like the rest, without regard to his private means of subsistence. This implies that the Levites had regular incomes, and since these are not assigned to them in Deuteronomy, we must necessarily resort for information to the preceding books. (iii.) In Deut. x. 3, ("Wherefore Levi hath no part nor inheritance with his brethren; the Lord is his inheritance, according as the Lord thy God promised him"), there is an explicit reference to the *locus classicus* on the Levitical tithes in Num. xviii; compare ver. 20, "And the Lord said unto Aaron, Thou shalt have no inheritance in their land, neither shalt thou have any part among them; I am thy part and thine inheritance among the children of Israel;" ver. 23 and 24, "It shall be a statute for ever throughout your generations, that among the children of Israel they (the Levites) have no inheritance. But the tithes of the children of Israel, which they offer as an heave-offering unto the Lord, I have given to the Levites to inherit: therefore I have said unto them, Among the children of Israel they shall have no inheritance. (iv.) All the passages in Deuteronomy which recognise the existence of the tribe of Levi, are proof also of the Levitical tithes. For these tithes are the foundation of the existence of the Levites, their *only* income, the compensation for their inheritance and the wages for their service; compare Num. xviii. 21-24. Let it not be objected that the exhortation in Deuteronomy to shew benevolence towards the Levites implies their poverty. This implication was also founded on the existence of the law of tithes. The presentation of tithes appears in the Pentateuch as a religious duty, to the fulfilment of which no one was held by any outward constraint. All was left to conscience. Compare MICHAELIS (*Mos. Recht.* iv. § 192). Under these circumstances only those who feared God would be faithful in the

presentation of tithes, and that these would form the minority, is implied throughout the Pentateuch, and in Deuteronomy is repeatedly and strongly expressed. The author, therefore, might very consistently be acquainted with the law of tithes, and yet exhort to deeds of charity. On the contrary, it is inconceivable that he should make the existence of a whole tribe to depend merely on the hospitality which might be shown to its members at the times of the sacrificial feasts. (v.) The silence of Deuteronomy respecting the Levitical tithes could only be deemed of importance, if a period in the history could be pointed out, in which these tithes were not presented; if, in short, it could be shown, that their presentation was not customary at the very time when this book (it is allowed) was composed. But this cannot be done. On the contrary, only in times of religious degeneracy was the presentation of the Levitical tithes neglected; we can prove positively in reference to a later period, that the Levitical tithes were presented. In 2 Chron. xxxi. 4, &c. Hezekiah commanded, at his reformation, that the children of Israel should give the portion of the priests and the Levites. In consequence, they brought the first fruits of corn, wine, and oil, &c. and "*the tithes of all things abundantly.*" In Neh. x. 36, it is commanded on the ground of the prescriptions of the law, that every one should bring the first fruits of the land and of the trees, the first-born of man and beast, to the priests at Jerusalem; the tithes were to be given to the Levites, and they again were to give "*a tithe of the tithes*" to the priests. In Nehem. xiii. 5, "*the tithes of the corn, the new wine, and the oil, the allowance* מַדְבָּרִי (das Deputat) *of the Levites,*" is mentioned. Modern criticism has here involved itself in a singular contradiction. It assigns Deuteronomy to the times of the finished construction of the hierarchy, and yet this is precisely the book which knows nothing of the Levitical tithes! It would much better suit the view it takes of the relation of Deuteronomy to the rest of the Pentateuch, if Deuteronomy alone was acquainted with the Levitical tithes.\* We have therefore

---

\* Against those who maintain that the regulations given in Deuteronomy were later than the rest, we remark, that an extract from the confessions in Deut. xxvi. 5, is found in Hosea xii. 13, 14; (compare vol. i. p. 132), and a reference to the triennial tithes of Deuteronomy in Amos iv. 4, (compare vol. i. p. 142).

established by a succession of proofs (what would be from the first certain to those persons who correctly perceive the relation of Deuteronomy to the preceding books; on which subject compare RANKE, p. 145) that the author of Deuteronomy was acquainted with the Levitical tithes. It still remains to be proved, that the four first books recognise the two tithes. The reasons for these are certainly not so striking as for the position proved above. Yet they are sufficient to render nugatory a mere *argument e silentio*.

MICHAELIS (*Mos. Recht*. ii. § 73) has found a reference to the double tithes in Gen. ch. xlvii. In Egypt, he remarks, the lands belonged to the king, and the peasantry were not proprietors of the lands which they cultivated, but tenants, who were bound to give the king a fifth, Gen. xlvii. 19-34. Just so Moses declares that God, who conferred on the Israelites the honour of calling himself their King, was the only sovereign possessor of all the fields of the promised land, in the possession of which he placed them by his special Providence; but that the Israelites were mere tenants who could not alienate the lands for ever; Lev. xxv. 22 (compare ver. 42 and 55). In fact, they were bound to give God two tithes, as the Egyptians gave Pharaoh, &c.

This view has been advocated by LEO (*Jüd. Gesch.* p. 100), with the modification, that he supposes that the author invented the legend about the origination of vassalage in Egypt, in order to lay a legal foundation, according to the ideas of human justice, for the position of Jehovah, as the priests desired to represent it. VON BOHLEN agrees with LEO, (p. 422.) In the whole narrative, he remarks, there is an apologetic tendency in order to present the Levitical system and the offering of tithes in a more favourable light.

Indeed, the copiousness of the account in Gen. xlvii. must awaken the suspicion of an ulterior object; and, if we compare Lev. xxv., it can scarcely be doubtful, that the exhibition of the relation in which Egypt stood to its visible king had a reference to the relation of the Israelites to their invisible King—that King, who was, at the same time, their God.

Moreover, we find in Genesis an analogy for both tithes; for the Levitical in the tithes which Abraham gave to Melchizedek, Gen. xiv. 20; (VON BOHLEN, p. 176, finds here an intentional

anticipation of the law respecting the tithes to the Levites and priests, which, according to him, must be contained in Deut. xii. 17 ; xiv. 28, 29 ; xxvi. 12, &c.!!) and for those enjoined in Deuteronomy in Gen. xxviii. 22, where Jacob vows that he would give to God a tenth of all that God would give him. Here there can be no allusion to the tithes of the priests.

But if it be asked, why, in Deuteronomy, the first tithes are not expressly mentioned, nor the second in the other books, the answer in reference to Deuteronomy is not difficult. It passes over the point which had been sufficiently settled in the preceding books, particularly in Num. ch. xviii., which DE WETTE super-scribes "*the priesthood and its rights*," and in reference to which it had no supplementary matter to furnish. As to the ground of the silence in the other books respecting the second tithes, we can only offer conjectures. MICHAELIS has inferred, from the manner in which these tithes are spoken of in Deuteronomy, and also from Gen. xxviii. 22, that they existed at an earlier period. If this were the case, it would only be of importance to determine the place where these tithes were to be consumed. But to determine the *place* of sacred rites is a business which the author has chiefly reserved for Deuteronomy. That the regard to *place* in the regulations of Deuteronomy preponderates is very apparent. In Deut. xii. the tithes are mentioned *only* in reference to the *place* where they were to be eaten. In ch. xiv. 22, the author returns to the subject of tithes, in order to state that they were to be turned into money (v 25) if the sanctuary was too distant, and likewise, that every third year the tithes were not to be eaten at the place of the sanctuary, but be consumed at home in hospitable entertainments. Also the prevailing tone of sentiment in Deuteronomy is such, that the account of these second tithes devoted to hospitality is inserted in it with peculiar propriety.

We only remark further, that Jewish expositors have never found any difficulty in determining the relations of the two tithes to one another. That the two tithes were co-ordinate has been, at all times, acknowledged. Let us only compare the LXX. Deut. xxvi. 12 ; (ἐὰν δὲ συντελέσης ἀποδεκατῶσαι πᾶν τὸ ἐπιδέκατον τῶν γεννημάτων τῆς γῆς σου ἐν τῷ ἔτει τῷ τρίτῳ (after the presentation of the Levitical tithes) τὸ δεῦτερον ἐπιδέκατον δώσεις τῷ λευίτῃ καὶ τῷ προσηλύτῳ κ.τ.λ.), and all later exposi-

tors. ABEN ESRA on Deut. xiv. 22 mentions, indeed, persons who held the first and second tithes to be identical; (compare HOTTINGER *de dec.* p. 149.) But he terms them *נוכזשים*, *liars* or *apostates*, and in doing so, indicates that he considers their exposition as altogether erroneous. The case is very different in reference to the regulations respecting the second and third tithes, which, in Deuteronomy, stand close to one another. Here not a few are of opinion, that, in the third year, both were presented together, and therefore three in the whole (HOTT. p. 194), although the view that the third tithes superseded the second is the most prevalent. (HOTT. p. 201). This, too, shows that the difficulty is merely artificial. If the regulations had been really incompatible, it would not have been found so easy at all times to reconcile them.

#### JUDGES.

##### DEUT. i. 9-17, COMPARED WITH EXOD. xviii.

First of all, it has been asserted that these passages, which manifestly refer to the same transaction, are chronologically contradictory to one another. In Deuteronomy, the choice of Judges is placed in the time immediately preceding the departure from Horeb; in Exodus, on the contrary, it occurs before the arrival of the Israelites at Sinai. VATER, p. 499; DE WETTE, *Stud. und Krit.* 1830, p. 354. This objection is founded on taking the words *בְּעֵת הַהִיא* in too definite a sense, in Deut. i. 9. The expression "*about this time*," is not intended to fix a point of time during the sojourn at Mount Horeb, but presents this time in its whole extent by way of contrast to a later period. The narrative of the choice of the Judges stands in close relation to the preceding summons to enter upon the march to Canaan. GERHARD (*Comm. in Deut.* p. 30) remarks—*Hactenus recensuit Moses prius dei beneficium populo Israelitico praestitum, quod est vocatio ad possessionem terrae Canaan apprehendendam; sequitur posterius, quod est politicae Mosaicæ constitutio.*" Moses reminds the people how, at the time when this summons was issued, their internal relations were already so arranged as would



be suitable for a residence in the promised land, where the centralization was still less practicable than in the desert.

Another difficulty is more important. "The Judges," VATKE remarks, "were appointed on the decimal system, as overseers of 1000, 100, 50, 10, which would lead to a subordination of one under the other, and to a complicated administration of justice. The whole relation of one part to another is obscure, since the decimal division was little suited to judicial arrangements, and must have created an immense number of Judges. In the prophetic laws it is always implied that the administration of justice was in the hands of the Judges and Elders of each separate town."

The difficulty arises from the circumstance that the author assumes the existence of a commentary on his representation, which is wanting to us. As the institution of which he speaks was immediately put in practice, and struck its roots deep, it was sufficient for the original readers, not merely those of the Mosaic age, but also those who lived some centuries later, to point out how existing institutions arose; the farther changes in its constitution it was needless to state. *We* must be content, if we succeed, by bringing together the scattered hints, in obtaining a tolerably clear conception of the nature of the institution.

This object appears to us attainable. The whole institution was formed in the following manner:—Already in Egypt the natural jurisdiction, as it was given to the Israelites with the patriarchal constitution, fell into desuetude, so that only a shadow of it remained. It was for the interest of their oppressors to destroy to the utmost the internal organization of the people whom they held in bondage. The Judges wanted power to carry their decisions into effect—those who were amenable to their jurisdiction found ready support in the Egyptians. The dissolution of the judicial constitution is exhibited to us in what occurred when Moses took on himself the office of a judge between two contending parties (Exod. ii. 11), evidently because no justice was to be obtained in an ordinary way. At the departure from Egypt, the stream might have returned unhindered into its ancient channel. But the erroneous religious zeal of the people who wished to receive justice as immediately as possible from God, moved them to concentrate in Moses the whole judicial authority which, under a certain aspect, had become a *res nullius*. He at first lent himself

to this zeal, but soon the inconveniences of centralization became so apparent, that it was necessary to apply a remedy. Moses now wished, not without hesitation, to restore the ancient judicial constitution, and as little also to invent a new one on his own responsibility. It was desirable that the institution should proceed from the mind of the people, in order that it might more easily take root among them. He, therefore, issued the summons, Deut. i. 13, "*Take your wise men, and understanding, and known among your tribes, and I will make them rulers over you.*" The people answered to this summons. Judges were chosen, probably in conformity with the advice of Moses, according to the gradations of the tribes, greater and smaller families. Among these Judges a natural subordination existed. The heads of the tribes were the presidents—the heads of the greater and smaller families the assessors, with greater or less right of voting. It hardly need be observed, that if they were capable, the natural superiors were chosen Judges; and, therefore, on the whole, the choice was only an acknowledgment of natural relations. The persons thus chosen were then confirmed in their office by Moses; Deut. i. 15, "*So I took the chief of your tribes, wise men, and known, and made them heads over you, captains over thousands, and captains over hundreds, &c., and Shoterim among your tribes.*" These judges possessed the jurisdiction in its whole extent, only that in cases of peculiar difficulty they were to consult Moses—certainly only in reference to the *quid juris*, which, before the completion of the giving of the law, was far more difficult to determine than afterwards. To confirm this view we make the following remarks:—

*First*, The supposition of a decimal division, which is so very opposite to the spirit of the ancient world, is grounded merely on the numbers 1000, 100, &c. But that this is not a valid reason is clear, from the following circumstances. The מֵאָה, *a thousand*, frequently occurs as the designation of a tribe, because its highest number commonly reaches to thousands; compare Num. i. 16, where it is said of the princes of the twelve tribes, "*they are heads of thousands in Israel*;" also Num. x. 4; Josh. xxii. 14, 21; Judg. vi. 15; 1 Sam. x. 19. Now if the "*thousands*" marks a tribe, why should not the "*hundreds*" and the "*tens*" mark a larger and a smaller family, either natural or artificial, the latter

of which was formed by the union of such persons as were not of themselves sufficiently numerous to form a family; compare an example in 1 Chron. xxiii. 11, where it is said of four brothers, that "*they had not many sons*" and on that account "*were in one reckoning for their father's house,*" לְבֵית אָב, which implies that the division of families was connected with certain numerical relations. Compare MICHAELIS *Mos. Recht.* § 48. In Arabic also, the word for *family* عَشِيرَةٌ, is derived from the numeral *ten* عَشْرَةٌ.

*Secondly,* The passage in Deut i. 13, 15, will not sanction the notion of a rude decimal division. According to this, the whole organism of the judicial power was closely connected with the division into tribes ("according to your tribes" לְטֵבֵיטְרֵיכֶם ver. 13); the chief of thousands, hundreds, &c., were, at the same time, "*chiefs of the tribes,*" ver. 15, רְאִשֵׁי טֵבֵיטְרֵיכֶם. How could both be otherwise combined unless the subdivision of the tribes were determined by numerical relations, and that the numbers 1000, 100, &c., are to be taken as round and approximating.

*Thirdly,* We are perfectly justified in including among the laws belonging to this judicial constitution those that concerned the Israelites as resident in Canaan. For Exod. xviii. does not contain a syllable which would imply that the institution formed on this occasion by Moses was merely provisional; in Deuteronomy the opposite appears from ver. 11, where it is said that the great increase of population that was to be expected hereafter render a complicated system of justice still more necessary. That the institution was peculiarly adapted for the Israelites when settled in the promised land, may also be gathered from its immediate connection with the summons to pursue their march to Canaan. Otherwise it would not be easy to explain why precisely here the details of the institution are given. But these prophetic laws constantly imply, or directly determine, that in every city a Court of Elders or Judges was to be formed. This is incompatible with a rude decimal division; for, as J. D. MICHAELIS remarks, men do not dwell together in round numbers. Compare, for instance, Deut. xvi. 18, "*Judges and officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates, which the Lord thy God giveth thee, throughout thy tribes;*" xix. 12; xxv. 8.

## THE SPIES.

Deut. i. 20–23, it is asserted (VATER, p. 497, DE WETTE, *Eint.* § 156) stands in contradiction to Num. xiii. 1, 2. In Numbers, God gave the command at once to Moses; in Deuteronomy, on the contrary, the people acquainted Moses with their plan, and God approved of it. It may be supposed that this discrepancy is no new discovery—it has been thoroughly canvassed; compare GERHARD on Deut. p. 53.

That the contradiction is only apparent is clear from Num. xiii. 26, “*And they went and came to Moses and Aaron, and to all the congregation of the children of Israel, unto the wilderness of Paran, to Kadesh; and brought back word unto them, and to all the congregation.*” Since those to whom the answer was brought back must be identical with the persons who sent out the spies, it appears from this passage that not merely Moses and Aaron, but also the congregation, had a share in giving the commission. The author, therefore, cannot intend to deny this, when, in ver. 1 and 2, he refers the matter to God. The evidence of ver. 26 will appear more striking if we compare it with Deut. i. 22, “*And ye came near unto me and said, every one of you, We will send men before us, and they shall search us out the land, and bring us word again.*” וַיִּשְׁיבוּ אֵלַי דָּבָר in Numbers xiii. 26, וַיִּשְׁיבוּ דָבָר which also occurs in Deut. i. 25, in the account of the return of the spies.

Further, it lies in the nature of the case, it is self-evident, and must necessarily have been so understood by the writer of Num. xiii., that the first movement for sending out the spies proceeded from the congregation, for this undertaking presupposes the unbelief, or at least the weak faith, of the people.

But let it also be observed, that, even according to Deuteronomy, not mere leave or permission on the part of God was granted. Many expositors erroneously maintain (for instance GERHARD, p. 54) that God gave permission in his wrath. In that case, it would not have been said in the Book of Numbers so plainly, “*And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Send,*” &c. JARCHI’s paraphrase, *Mitte, si vis, ego non praecipio tibi*, gives every one the impression of something arbitrary and forced. The opposite is decidedly expressed in Deut. i. 23, “*And the saying pleased*

me (Moses) well; and I took twelve men of you." How irreconcilable these words are with the idea of a mere permission, is evident from the gloss by BECHAI, *sed non in oculis Dei, quamvis permetteret*, while manifestly the matter was good in Moses' eyes, because it pleased God.

The sending of the spies was strictly a part of God's plan, and hence was expressly commanded by him, as soon as its indispensable condition, the proposal on the part of the people, had taken place. For one thing, it would ensure to the well-disposed a strengthening of their weak faith. On a special point, the fruitfulness of the land, God's word would receive a visible confirmation—the spies would be obliged to testify, Num. xiii. 17, xiv. 8, "*The land floweth with milk and honey;*" the same terms which God had made use of to describe its fruitfulness in his own promises—and thus it would be easier to trust his simple word in reference to another principal point—the conquest of their enemies. This part of the Divine purpose has been clearly acknowledged by CALVIN—*Minime absurdum est*, he remarks, *Mosen fecisse populi ragatu, quod deus simul praecepit; quia videbat hoc stimulo indigere, qui pigri alioqui erant vel minus ad peragendum alacres. Proposita igitur teorae dulcedine, quae ipsas alliceret, voluit eorum accendere studia ad peragendum. Nam si sincere officio suo functi essent exploratores, adductus quodammodo fuisset populus in rem praesentem; quod optimum erat compendium tollendis omnibus remoris.*

On the other hand, it formed a part of God's design, that the evil disposed should take occasion by this undertaking to manifest their unbelief, and be ripened by it for judgment. This design we learn from the result, which can never be contrary to the design.

If the Divine purpose was the essential point, and the proposal of the people the mere *conditio sine qua non* of its being carried into effect, it will be easily understood how the latter might be passed over in silence in the Book of Numbers, although, as we have already seen, it is presupposed.

After what has been remarked, CALVIN'S view of the mutual relation of the two passages will clearly appear to be the correct one. *Secunda narratio plenior, ubi altius repetit Moses, quod prius omiserat; nempe factum esse timiditate populi ac pusillis ani-*

*mis, ne mox festinaret, quo deus vocabat; nam si simpliciter obscuri essent, nulla mora interposita potiti fuissent terra hostium; verum inducias sibi dari postulaverunt.*

#### THE AMORITES AND AMALEKITES.

DE WETTE remarks. (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1830, p. 355), "In Deut. i. 44, those are called *Amorites*, who in Num. xiv. 45 are called *Amalekites*." That no real discrepancy exists, will at once be seen by merely looking at the passages in juxtaposition.

NUMBERS.	DEUTERONOMY.
<p>"Then the Amalekites came down, and the Canaanites which dwelt in that hill, and smote them, and discomfited them, even unto Hormah."</p>	<p>"And the Amorites which dwelt in that mountain, came out against you, and chased you, as bees do, and destroyed you in Seir, even unto Hormah."</p>

Any one may perceive at a glance, that the Amorites of Deuteronomy do not correspond to the Amalekites of the Book of Numbers, but to the Canaanites.

The real difference, as was long ago noticed by earlier expositors. (compare for instance GERHARD *in Deut.* p. 67), consists in two things; that in Deuteronomy, (i.) the Amorites are named instead of the Canaanites; (ii.) and the Amalekites are left out.

But that there is no sort of contradiction here will be evident, if we consider,

*First*, That according to the four first books, by the Canaanites of the book of Numbers, the Amorites are specially to be understood. Compare Gen. xiv. 7, according to which the Amorites and the Amalekites were near neighbours.

*Secondly*, That the Amalekites took part in the battle is hinted, though not expressly mentioned in Deuteronomy. The "*in Seir*" of Deuteronomy is tantamount to the notice of the Book of Numbers, that the Amalekites joined in attacking the children of Israel. Since Seir was the seat of war, which is noticed only in Deuteronomy, it is self-evident, that the attack did not proceed solely from the Canaanites. According to 1 Chron. v. 42, 43, the Amalekites dwelt in Mount Seir, on whose descent from Esau compare what has been already said. From Gen. xiv. 7, it ap-

pears that Kadesh lay in the territory of the Amalekites, or at least near it. B'ne Jaakan in the district of Kadesh was situated in Seir, Deut. x. 6. Kadesh was not within the territory of the king of Edom; it is described in Num. xx. 16, as a city close upon his borders, קִדְשׁ בְּעֵבֶר הַיַּרְדֵּן. If it lay in Seir, and yet belonged not to Edom, it must have been in the possession of the Amalekites.

When DE WETTE remarks (p. 354), "קִדְשׁ in Deut. i. 44, is possibly an erroneous addition to Num. xiv. 45, since the scene appears to be at a considerable distance from Seir," he only lets his readers see that he is at fault in his geography. The Israelites on their arrival at Kadesh had reached the mountain-range of the Amorites, Deut. i. 19, 20, ". . . and we came to Kadesh-barnea; and I said unto you, ye are come unto the mountain of the Amorites." Here Moses called upon them to press forward into the promised land; "*Behold the Lord thy God hath set the land before thee; go up and possess it,*" ver. 21. If the Israelites were on the borders of Canaan, where could they be but in Seir? And if they were driven back and pursued, where would this happen but in Seir?

## SIHON.

DE WETTE remarks (*Stud. und. Krit.* 1830, p. 356), "In Deut. ii. 24, Jehovah promises the Israelites the conquest of the land of Sihon, and encourages them to make war upon him. "*Behold I have given into thine hand Sihon the Amorite, king of Heshbon, and his land: begin to possess it, and contend with him in battle.*" This is contradictory to Num. xxi. 21, where it is stated, that Moses requested this king to grant a peaceful passage through his territories. And even in Deut. ii. 26, Moses sends "*messengers with words of peace*" to Sihon; so that the author contradicts himself and represents Jehovah's command as nugatory."

It is somewhat strange to present a difficulty as newly discovered, which centuries ago underwent the severest scrutiny. Compare CALVIN on the passage.

The notion of a contradiction is founded on the assumption

that the embassy could have no other object than to induce Sihon to grant the thing requested.

But that this assumption is false, is evident from the analogous case of Pharaoh. There would be equally good reason for saying, in reference to him, that there was a contradiction between the declaration that he would not let Israel go, and the summons addressed to him before every plague to do so.

Sihon did not stand on the same footing as the rest of the Canaanites. His territory was originally a possession of the Moabites. Had it not been so, this embassy of peace would not have been sent to him. What was offered him must have been in itself allowable. *Magnae temeritatis fuisset*, CALVIN remarks, *promittere quod divinitus negatum fuerat*. In the embassy to Sihon (Num. xxi. 21), his land is expressly distinguished from "*the land which the Lord our God giveth us.*" A similar mission to the country "*on this side Jordan*" would have been a practical denial of the Divine promises, and base hypocrisy. There such language as "*If thou wilt let me pass, then I will not do so and so,*" would have been totally out of place. No such embassy was sent to Og, whose country stood under quite a different relation to the Israelites.

But nevertheless Sihon's destruction was decreed by God, and the object of the embassy was no other than to show how necessarily the completion of it followed the Divine purpose. The guilt of the Amorites was full—the execution was to begin with them, in order that the inevitability of the Divine judgment might be visible—that it might be clearly acknowledged that God's purposes are not dependant on the determination of a pitiful *homuncio*; the way is opened for him, by which, if he were disposed, he might escape his fate; but he cannot be so disposed. His deliverance is placed in his own hands, but he must fling it away and blindly rush on his own destruction. The proposal was designedly made as humbly and persuasively as possible, but he could not but reject it with disdain.

That this was the object of the embassy, plainly appears from Deut. ii. 30, "*But Sihon king of Heshbon would not let us pass by him, for the Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might deliver him into thy hand.*"

This language is not used of a *moral* hardening; it was not



Sihon's duty to let the children of Israel pass through. It refers only to the confirmation in his foolish resolution not to grant the thoroughfare. A child might see that in this he did evil; but he saw it not, for God closed his eyes.

*Omissis ergo, puerilibus nugis*, CALVIN remarks, *tenendum est eum arcano instinctu sic movere, formare, regere ac trahere hominum corda, ut etiam per impios quidquid statuat exequatur.*

To impress this truth on the minds of men, which for the people of God is so full of improvement and consolation, was the object of the embassy. The victory over Sihon's heart was a greater proof of God's almightiness and grace, than the victory over his arms.

## THE PUNISHMENT OF MOSES.

DE WETTE (*Stud. und Krit.* 1830, p. 356) remarks, "In Deut. iii. 26 (compare i. 37), it is given as the reason why Moses was not permitted to enter the land of Canaan that God had been wroth with Moses on account of the Israelites; while in Num. xxvii. 14, and even in Deut. xxxii. 51, the misconduct of Moses himself is named as the reason."

We are ready to present this in a still stronger light. Besides Deut. i. 37; iii. 26, the blame is also laid on the people in Deut. iv. 21, "*Furthermore the Lord was angry with me for your words* (עַל־דִּבְרֵיכֶם) which never means simply "*for your sakes,*" as is shown by the more exact consideration of the passages quoted by GESENIUS (*Thesaurus*, p. 317), for this meaning; namely, besides the one before us, Jerem. vii. 22; xiv. 1; Ps. vii. 1, in which עַל־דִּבְרֵי not only *may* but *must* mean *on account of the words or speeches*) and *ware that I should not go over Jordan, and that I should not go unto that good land, which the Lord thy God giveth thee for an inheritance.*"

But even according to the Book of Numbers, did not the guilt and punishment of Moses proceed peculiarly from the people? Only compare the principal account in ch. xx. 1-13. The guilt of the leader is here manifestly recognised as a result of the guilt of the people. Without the unbelief of the latter, there would not have been weakness of faith in the former. Exhausted by the

long struggle of opposition, it was at last in a moment of weakness carried away by the torrent of popular excitement. But how little, even according to the Book of Numbers, was his error, compared with that of the people; may be best learned from the circumstance that it has been disputed wherein it consisted. As to the punishment, God would certainly have pardoned the comparatively small error of the leaders of the people, if he had not wished to produce an effect on the people by their punishment. This is shown in the continuance of God's gracious relation to Moses and Aaron. Their punishment was a practical call to repentance for the people. Those sins must be hated which excluded their leader from the promised land.

We conclude that there is no contradiction here, strictly speaking. Is it not evident that in the Book of Numbers one side of the subject is brought forward, and another in Deuteronomy? Let it be noticed that in Num. xx. 12, 23, 24; xxvii. 14, God speaks to Moses and Aaron; on the other hand, in the passages adduced from Deuteronomy, Moses speaks to the people; and let the object be noticed for which Moses mentions the transaction. Only as far as it was their fault, would it answer this object.

The correctness of this explanation we have given, is evident from the circumstance, that in Deuteronomy, where God speaks to Moses, his own offence is made conspicuous. Let any one compare Deut. xxxii. 50, 57, "*Die in the mount whether thou goest up, and be gathered unto thy people; as Aaron thy brother died in Mount Hor, and was gathered unto his people. Because ye trespassed against me among the children of Israel at the waters of strife at Kadesh; because ye sanctified me not in 'the midst of the children of Israel.'*"

DEUT. X. 6, &C.

This passage has from early times been a source of perplexity. It is as follows—ver. 6, "*And the children of Israel took their journey from Beeroth B'ne Jaakan, (from Beeroth of the children of Jaakan, Eng. A. Ver.) to Moserah; there Aaron died, and there he was buried, and Eleazar his son ministered in the priest's office in his stead;*" ver. 7, "*From thence they journeyed*

unto Gudgodah, and from Gudgodah to Jothbath, a land of rivers of waters; ver. 8, *At that time the Lord separated the tribe of Levi to bear the ark of the covenant of the Lord, to stand before the Lord to minister unto him, and to bless in his name unto this day;* ver. 9, *Wherefore Levi hath no part nor inheritance with his brethren; the Lord is his inheritance, according as the Lord thy God promised him."*

To several critics (CAPPEL, *crit. sac.* c. 7, § 11, p. 987; DATHE, ROSENMÜLLER, and others), the difficulties appear so great, that, despairing of untying the knot, they take refuge in supposing an interpolation; but by this means the reason which they borrow from the sudden use of the third person, is reduced to nothing by the expression, "*as the Lord thy God promised him,*" in ver. 9. Yet even those who possess more courage, cannot, with all their attempts, obtain a feeling of perfect security and agreement with one another.

The difficulties are the following—(i.) The passage appears to stand out of its proper connection. (ii.) The setting apart the Levites appears to be transferred here to the period after Aaron's death in the fortieth year of the journey to Canaan, while, according to the Book of Numbers i. 1, and iii. 1, it had taken place in the second year after the departure from Egypt. The following we state in the words of BUXTORF (*antic.* p. 933). (iii.) c. x. 6, *Aharon dicitur mortuus in Moserah at Num. xxiii. 38. Aharon dicitur mortuus in Hor monte, qui locus septem mansionibus distat a Moserah, inter quas numerantur duo sequentes Gudgod et Jothbah.* (iv.) *Ibid. Israelitae dicuntur movisse castra sua ex Beeroth B'ne Jahacan Moseram. At Num. xxxiii. 30, ubi singulae mansiones accurate et ordine enumerantur, dicuntur castra movisse ex Moseroth et venisse in B'ne Jahacan.* We will canvass these difficulties in their order.

I. The theme of ch. ix. and x., is expressed in the words (ix. 6)—"*Understand, therefore, that the Lord thy God giveth thee not this good land to possess it for thy righteousness, for thou art a stiff-necked people.*" Moses led the people to recollect how the Lord, notwithstanding all their sins, had still remained the same in his grace. He had given them—though they had rendered themselves unworthy of this blessing by the

worship of the golden calf—the Ark of the Covenant, with the new tables of the law therein. ch. x. 1–5. In connection with this gift of his grace, he had instituted the high-priesthood, and allowed it, after Aaron's death, to be transferred to his son Eleazar, ver. 6 and 7. He had separated the tribe of Levi to serve him, and to bless the people in his name, thus making it a medium of his grace, ver. 8 and 9. In short, he had omitted nothing that might serve to place Israel in full possession of the dignity of the people of God. This train of thought, which would be too recondite for a mere writer of glosses, is only somewhat interrupted by ver. 7, which may be regarded as a parenthesis; with one of the two stations here named an important circumstance belonged, which was connected with the author's main object; he mentions it on account of the *בְּהַלְלֵי-מַיִם*, “*the water brooks*,” an illustration, in passing, of the Divine goodness. To this the mind of the author is always directed, and here the parenthetical mention agrees very well with the special object of the discourse.

II. The choice of the Levites is only transferred to the time after Aaron's death, in appearance. The *בְּצֵאת הַהוֹיָא*, is rather to be referred to the time when Moses laid the tables in the Ark, ver. 5, “*And I turned myself, and came down from the Mount, and put the tables in the Ark which I had made; and there they be, as the Lord commanded me*”; then ver. 8, “*At that time the Lord separated the tribe of Levi, to bear the Ark of the Covenant of the Lord.*” As soon as the Ark was made, it was necessary to appoint persons to carry it. The same time is also spoken of in ver. 10, without any change being indicated. The reference to the time of the sojourn at Sinai runs through the whole section, and is only departed from parenthetically; compare ch. ix. 22–24. To this time the *בְּצֵאת הַהוֹיָא* in ver. 1 refers. And the contrast between *בְּצֵאת הַהוֹיָא* and *עַד הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה* could hardly be made, if no longer interval had elapsed between the time when the Levites were chosen, and that of the discourse. The contents of ver. 6 and 7 refer also to this time. For that the superintendance of the sanctuary was intrusted to Aaron, and that he was called by God to this mediatorial office, is presupposed—the connection requires it—it is as if Moses had said, And the Lord separated Aaron to be high priest, and after his death, at the place here named, Eleazar his son was made priest in his stead. Moreover a con-

tradition to the Book of Numbers is so much less admissible, since ver. 9—“*Wherefore Levi hath no part nor inheritance with his brethren, the Lord is his inheritance,*” alludes directly to Num. xviii. 20—“*And the Lord spake unto Aaron—Thou shalt have no inheritance in their land, neither shalt thou have any part among them; I am thy part and thy inheritance among the children of Israel.*”

III. That any material discrepancy should exist in reference to such an event as the death of Aaron, is certainly not antecedently probable. Even our opponents must join us in quest of a solution. That Aaron died on Mount Hor is stated in this book, as plainly as in Num. xx. 22, and xxxiii. 37, 38; compare Deut. xxxii. 50—“*And die in the mountain whither thou goest up, and be gathered unto thy people; as Aaron thy brother died in Mount Hor, and was gathered unto his people.*” A comparison of these two passages with one another will show how firm and distinct was the historical belief in reference to the time and place of Aaron’s death. We here assume what can be fully established in the following pages, that Moserah was situated in the district of Mount Hor. Only let this be admitted, and the difficulty is easily removed. Israel was encamped in the מִדְבָּר, there lay Moserah. In Num. xx. and xxxiii., the station of the Israelites is named after the place of Aaron’s death; here it is reversed. But it is worth while to observe that it is not said here abruptly, that Aaron died at Moserah. If the children of Israel had not been mentioned just before, Hor would have been named. That the children of Israel were not encamped on Mount Hor, but under it, lies in the nature of the case, and it is expressly said in Num. xx. 25—“*Take Aaron and Eleazar his son, and bring them up unto Mount Hor;*” compare ver. 27, “*and they went up into Mount Hor, in the sight of all the congregation.*” But, to justify our assumption that Moserah was in the neighbourhood of Mount Hor, we need only remark (after GERHARD, *Comm. in Deut.*, p 629, and LILIENTHAL, *Gute sache der offenb.* vii. 650), that Bene-Jaakan, according to Num. xxxiii. 31, and according to the passage before us, the nearest station to Moserah, certainly was situated in that district. For Akan or Jaakan, after whose descendants the place was named, appears in Gen. xxxvi. 27, and 1 Chron. i. 42,

among the descendants of Seir the Horite, of whose land the Israelites took possession. Therefore, Bene-Jaakan and Moserah must be situated on the borders of Idumaea.

IV. But the most important point to be determined is—Whether the passage in Num. xxxiii. 30, and following verses (ver. 30—“*And they departed from Hashmonah and encamped at Moseroth.* Ver. 31, *And they departed from Moseroth and pitched in Bene-Jaakan.* Ver. 32, *And they removed from Bene-Jaakan and pitched in Hor-hagidgad.* Ver. 33, *And they went from Hor-hagidgad and pitched in Jotbathah*”), be really parallel to Deut. x. 6, 7, and relates to the same route, or not. The determination of this point must depend on the investigations respecting the whole catalogue of stations in Num. xxxiii; and these investigations must be preceded by determining, from accounts given elsewhere, the line of march along which the various stations are to be distributed; with these, therefore, we begin.

According to the narrative in the Book of Numbers, the Israelites marched twice from the Red Sea to the southern border of Canaan, and from the southern border of Canaan to the Red Sea. The first time, in the second year of the Exodus, they journeyed from Sinai to that border, and in consequence of what happened in reference to the spies, they were condemned to retrace their steps. To this first return Num. xiv. 25 relates, “*To-morrow turn ye, and get you into the wilderness by the way of the Red Sea.*” In the first month of the fortieth year, the people came again to the southern border of the promised land, and encamped in Kadesh. This was their second march. From Kadesh Moses sent messengers to the king of Edom, Num. xx. 14. But Edom would not grant Israel a thoroughfare; ver. 21. Now was the second return to the Red Sea; ver. 22, “*And the children of Israel, even the whole congregation, journeyed from Kadesh, and came unto Mount Hor.*” There Aaron died, xxi. 4, “*And they journeyed from Mount Hor, by the way of the Red Sea, to compass the land of Edom.*” With this account, Deuteronomy exactly agrees. Deut. i. 40 relates to the first return after their misconduct relative to the spies, “*But as for you, turn you and take your journey into the wilderness by the way of the Red Sea;*” and ch. ii. 1–3 to the second return, “*Then we turned*

*and took our journey into the wilderness by the way of the Red Sea,"* (after coming again to Kadesh in the fortieth year), "*as the Lord spake unto me, and we compassed Mount Seir many days. And the Lord spake unto me, saying, Ye have compassed this mountain long enough, turn you northward."*

It will assist our enquiries if we here quote the geographical comment which LEAKE (in BURCKHARDT'S *Travels*, i. 22) gives on this passage, which relates to the second return, and has been first set in a clear light by recent geographical discoveries. Since the Edomites refused to grant them a thoroughfare, nothing remained for them but to march through the vale of El Arabah in a southern direction, towards the extremity of the Red Sea. On the mountain of Hor, which rises with a steep ascent from this valley, on the borders of the land of Edom, Aaron died. The Israelites then marched from Mount Hor to the Red Sea, so that they went round the land of the Edomites, "*through the way of the plain from Elath and from Ezion-gaber,*" until "*they turned and passed by the way of the wilderness of Moab,*" and came to the brook Zered. Probably they marched over the mountain-ridge south of Ezion-geber. They then came to the great table-land behind the two Akabas. Here they received the command, "*Thou art to pass over through Ar,*" &c.; they were now on *the weak* boundary of the land of Edom.

Let us now turn to the catalogue of the stations. Num. xxxiii. 30-32, "*And they encamped at Moseroth. And they departed from Moseroth, and pitched in Bene-Jaakan,*" refers to the first arrival in the desert of Zin, in the second year of the Exodus. That Moserah or Moseroth was situated at the foot of Mount Hor we have already seen; Bene-Jaakan nearer the southern border of Canaan must have been situated somewhere about the district of Kadesh, subsequently mentioned. All the stations from ver. 16-30 lie between the departure from the desert of Sinai and the first arrival at Kadesh. Ver. 33-36 relate to the time from the misconduct respecting the spies to the first month in the fortieth year, on the *first return* to the Red Sea, in accordance with the command in Num. xiv. 25 and Deut. i. 40, and *the second arrival* at Kadesh. That the reference cannot be to the first journey to Kadesh from Mount Sinai is evident, among other things, from this, that, in ver. 36, it is said, "*And they removed from Ezion-*

*geber and pitched in the wilderness of Zin, which is Kadesh,"* for the long distance between Ezion-geber, on the Red Sea, and Kadesh on the southern border of Canaan, no intermediate stations are named, conformably to the author's design, never to name the same stations twice. That here the name Kadesh should first occur, during the first sojourn of the Israelites in this district of Bene-Jaakan, is perfectly natural, since the name Kadesh was first given to the place from the events that occurred during this second sojourn. Now follows *the second return from Kadesh*, ver. 37, "And they removed from Kadesh, and pitched in Mount Hor, in the edge of the land of Edom." There Aaron died, ver. 38, &c. Thence they again marched back first to the western side of the Edomite territory towards the Red Sea, then to the eastern side of the Edomitish territory to the eastern border of Canaan; ver. 41, "And they departed from Mount Hor, and pitched in Zalmonah," ver. 42, "And they departed from Zalmonah, and pitched in Punon;" ver. 43, "And they departed from Punon, and pitched in Oboth;" ver. 44, "And they departed from Oboth, and pitched in Ije-abarim, in the border of Moab." Here also the author follows his own plan, not to mention again places that have been already mentioned. This is evident, (i.) Because none of the earlier places of encampment return again; yet the Israelites must have passed long distances on the same road as before, as far as Ezion-geber. (ii.) The second encampment, Punon, is situated on the eastern border of Edom, and near its northern extremity, not far from the southern extremity of the Dead Sea. JEROME, in his *Locis Hebr.* remarks, "*Fuit quondam civitas principum Edom nunc viculus in deserto, ubi aerum metalla damnatorum suppliciiis effodiuntur, inter civitatem Petram et Zoaram.*" (iii.) The fourth encampment, Ije-abarim, lies on the eastern border of Moab; compare ch. xxi. 11.

All difficulties are now easily removed. At the first sojourn on the western border of Moab, in the second year, the children of Israel marched first from Moserah or Moseroth (= Hor) to Bene-Jaakan, in the district of Kadesh. Then they turned back after their condemnation, and marched over Hor-hagidgad or Hagud-god to Jotbathah. Such is the statement in the Book of Numbers. On their second arrival, in the fortieth year from the Exodus, they marched from Bene-Jaakan down to Moseroth,



thence to Gudgod, and thence to Jotbathah. In the Book of Numbers, the route first goes upwards, then downwards; in Deuteronomy, from the first it goes downwards. Hence the two last stations, since the direction of the route was now the same, are, in both cases, Gudgod, and then Jotbathah.

	NUMBERS.	DEUTERONOMY.
Moseroth	Bene-Jaakan	Bene-Jaakan
	Hor-Gidgad	Moseroth
	Jotbathah	Gudgod
		Jotbathah

Cases such as that before us are well adapted to teach us modesty, and, at the same time, to infuse confidence and perseverance in unravelling even the most intricate and dubious questions. He who has formed them has also given the means of solving them. Everything depends on the faithful use of these means. It is evident that the defence of our opponents has here changed into the strongest attack against them. How could a mythical history come forth victorious from such attacks? According to the view of our opponents, the Pentateuch would stand on about the same level as SAXO GRAMMATICUS, who wrote the ancient history of his people from oral traditions. Who could extricate this writer from the plight into which he has been brought by DAHLMANN? The strange anachronisms and discrepancies which occur in his work, when once exposed, remain for ever. The strongest bias in his favour, the warmest patriotism, cannot rescue him. The more closely he is examined, the more strongly does the legendary character of his narrative appear. How very different here! The appearances of contradiction and of inaccuracy are only on the surface, and for those who never look below it.

#### THE SABBATICAL AND JUBILEE YEAR.

I. It is striking, VATER remarks (p. 499), that in Deuteronomy no mention is made of the year of rest that is enjoined in Lev. xxv., nor of the Sabbatical year there ordained, but merely of the year of release, of which the law is given at length in Deut

xv. 1-11 ; " must not these two different forms of sanctifying the seventh year be exclusive of one another ?"

II. DE WETTE (*Krit.* p. 285) says, it is striking that in Exod. xxiii. 10, 11, nothing is said of the year of jubilee. This seems almost to point to a gradual formation of this law, so that at an earlier period they knew nothing of a year of jubilee. The same thing is indicated by the circumstance, that in the whole of Deuteronomy nothing is said of the year of rest and of jubilee, but merely the year of release is mentioned. Perhaps only this latter was brought into actual practice since Deuteronomy manifestly contains a later legislation."

III. GEORGE (*die Jüd. Feste.*, p. 28) has enlarged on these suggestions. But nothing deserves notice except the assertion expressed in p. 30, that Leviticus places the release of the bondsmen in the seventh year, but gives for it the year of jubilee, which so far agrees with the year of release in Deuteronomy, inasmuch as it assigns to it the release of the bondsmen.

We wish to examine these assertions in order. That nothing is said of the year of jubilee in Deuteronomy, can only appear strange to persons who fail to perceive the object and character of that book. The simple reason for distinguishing the seventh year, not as the year of rest, but as the year of release, is, that Deuteronomy does not treat fully of the things to be observed in the seventh year, but only of one single point, which had been before passed over—the release or the respite of debtors, the confirmation of which peculiarly agrees with the whole tendency of Deuteronomy. So far from there being any opposition between the year of release and the year of rest, the same idea predominates in both. By both institutions the sentiment was impressed on the people, that none of their possessions were, strictly speaking, their own, but that all they had belonged to the Lord.

But we are able to combat the treacherous *argumentum e silentio* by other far more important considerations in reference to the year of rest. (i.) If every seventh year a feast was celebrated, it is inconceivable that it should be confined merely to the release or respite of debtors. Every one sees immediately that this is only one use, which has its foundation in a larger scheme, and must be explained by it. According to the analogy of the seven days, and the seven months, in which these feasts fell, the celebra-

tion of the seventh year cannot have been confined to this alone. (ii.) What is said in Deut. xxxi. 10, of the year of release, that in it the law was to be read to the assembled people, shows that it must have been intended for some other purpose than merely the relinquishment of claims on debtors. Between the release of debtors, thus separated from its connection, and the reading of the law, there is no internal connection. *Hic annus*, MARK observes on this passage, *erat in hanc lectionem aptissimus tanquam respondens non modo Sabbathis hebdomadariis in majori temporis spatio, sed et a mundanis curis et laboribus Israelitas magis liberos praestans*. Nor let it be objected that the seventh year is not here called also the year of release. This name, even in Deut xv., relates not alone to the remission of debts. It marks the year in general as one in which every thing was left to take its own course. Let it be observed that the verb שָׁמַט is applied in Exod. xxiii. 10, 11, to the seventh year in reference to allowing the land to lie fallow—"And six years thou shalt sow thy land, and shall gather in the fruits thereof: but the seventh year הַשְּׁמִינִי thou shalt let it rest and lie still." (iii.) Deut. xiv. 28, 29, distinctly indicates that the author knew the seventh year to be the year of rest. Immediately before the regulation in reference to the release to be given in the seventh year, it is here prescribed that the triennial tithes were always to be given to the poor every third and sixth year. The *terminus a quo* can here only be the seventh year, for no other is at our command; compare HOTTINGER *De decimis*, p. 193. By this reference to the seventh year as a solemn one, before he mentions the remission of debts which was to be observed in it, the author shows that the celebration of the seventh year would not consist merely in that act. But still more important is the regulation established by him, that the year of tithes could never coincide with the seventh year. This regulation remains inexplicable if the seventh year was merely a year of release, but is explained at once from its character as a Sabbatical year. Since it was such, no tithes could be given in it. The land was not cultivated; and what grew of itself belonged to the poor as much as to the owners—it was common property.

IV. That nothing is said of the year of jubilee in Exod. xxiii., is not more singular than that nothing should be said of the Sab-

batical year in the decalogue. It can only appear strange to those persons who fail to perceive the true character of Exod. xxi.—xxiii., which contains only a *brevis conspectus* of subjects to be enlarged upon afterwards.

V. In Exodus and Deuteronomy, as little as in Leviticus, is the manumission of Hebrew slaves assigned to the Sabbatical year, or year of release. According to Exod. ch. xxi., the bondsman, in the seventh year after he was purchased, was to be released. To this regulation an addition is made in Deut. xv. 12–18. The master was not to let the bondsman go away empty, but to make him a present (“furnish him liberally” פָּרַעַתְּ אֶת־הָעֶבֶד) of sheep, fruit, oil, and wine, wherewith to begin housekeeping afresh. This new addition forms the peculiar object of the regulation. By this circumstance, the observance of the law already given was rendered more impressive. The regulation respecting the release of the bondsmen in Deut. xv. 12–18, is joined to the law of the year of release in ver. 1–11, not because the release followed in the Sabbatical year, but because both regulations proceeded from a tender consideration for the poor and the suffering.

#### THE RELEASE OF BONDSMEN.

1. The regulation for the release of bondsmen in the seventh year, is common to Deuteronomy and Exodus. But in Deuteronomy, the maid-servants are mentioned in the law, and placed exactly on a level with the men-servants; but in Exodus special and exclusive regulations are laid down for them. Thus GEORGE remarks (*Die Jüd. Feste* p. 29.)

If we look superficially at the passages, Exod. xxi. 7, “*If a man sell his daughter to be a maid-servant, she shall not go out as the men-servants do;*” and Deut. xv. 7, “*And also unto thy maid-servant thou shalt do it likewise;*” they certainly appear to contradict one another. And if this were the case, we could not satisfy ourselves with the opinion held by several defenders of the genuineness of the Pentateuch (MICHAELIS, *Mos. Recht.* § 127; JAHN, ROSENMÜLLER, on the passage in Exodus, HÄVERNICK), that Moses had himself subsequently altered the law, and advanced a step further.

But on nearer consideration, the solution of the apparent dis-

crepancy is readily obtained. In Exod. xxi. 7, &c., Hebrew maid-servants generally are not spoken of (to them is to be applied analogically what is said in ver. 1-6 of men-servants, as is implied in the particular case in ver. 7, and is expressly asserted in Deuteronomy), but a special case is stated, namely, when a father sells his daughter to be a maid-servant. How any one could overlook the fact, that the reference is here to one peculiar case, is almost inconceivable. That a maid-servant should be reduced to servitude by a voluntary act of her father, was certainly not a common occurrence. It lay in the nature of the case that this would not happen, except when she was likely to become a wife of the second rank, and that her being thus sold was only with this object in view, is implied throughout in what follows. This case therefore only constitutes an exception to the general rule. Either the daughter was not to be released, or she was to be released without waiting for the beginning of the seventh year. The first happened when a man either took her himself to wife, or gave her in marriage to his son, and when the one or the other really fulfilled the duties of a husband towards her. The second alternative took effect, when either the purchaser was faithless to her, and broke his promise of marriage, or when, according to the marriage entered into either with himself or his son, the one or the other would not any longer fulfil the duties of a husband. Compare the justification of this interpretation, as far as it requires to be justified, in VITRINGA, *Obs. s. lib.* III. ch. xiv. p. 697. The correctness of the points in which we differ from him will be self-evident.

How easy and natural our opinion is, that what is said in Exod. xxi. 1-6 of the man-servant, is equally to be understood of the maid-servant, may be learnt from comparing that passage with Deut. xv. 12, &c. The manner in which the maid-servant is here mentioned is so perfectly incidental, that we may see that the author considered it as a matter of course, that if the man-servant was free so also would be the maid. "*If thy brother, an Hebrew man (or an Hebrew woman), be sold unto thee, and he serve thee,*" &c. In the four following verses only the bondman is spoken of; not till we come to ver. 17 is the maid-servant again mentioned.

2. DEUTERONOMY and LEVITICUS both contain regulations

respecting the release of bondmen: DEUTERONOMY places it in the seventh year, LEVITICUS, on the contrary, in the fiftieth. Thus GEORGE remarks (p. 32). But this discrepancy has long ago been adjusted in a very satisfactory manner; compare especially MICHAELIS, *Mos. Recht.* § 127. The law determined two periods in which the bondman might become free—the seventh year, that is, from the time when he was sold; and also the fiftieth year, or the year of jubilee. The bondman was ordinarily free after six years of servitude; but if he had been sold a few years before the year of jubilee, he did not wait for the seventh year, but his freedom was restored in the year of jubilee, and with it his land that had been sold. Let the following particulars be noticed. The first regulation respecting the manumission of bondmen stands at the head of the shorter code, Exod. xxii.—xxiii. In this passage lies the foundation of the law. It refers to the declaration in ch. xx. 2, “*I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage.*” An immediate consequence was, that in Israel no permanent slavery could exist. The bondmen of the Lord could not be made the bondmen of men. Constant bond-service would have been a practical denial of the Lord’s sovereignty. In Leviticus xxv. 42, this fundamental principle of the law is emphatically expressed; “*for they are my servants which I brought forth out of the land of Egypt; they shall not be sold as bondmen!*” Such being the principle of the law by which its tendency is so unequivocally expressed in Lev. xxv. that in Israel there should be no slavery, it was impossible for the year of jubilee to be the only arrangement by which the idea might be realised in actual life. Moreover, in Lev. xxv. 39, &c., it is always implied that the Israelitish slave would reach the legal term of release the year of jubilee; compare for instance ver. 41, “*And then shall he depart from thee, both he and his children with him, and shall return unto his own family, and unto the possession of his fathers.*” But if the year of jubilee was the only legal term, there would be no ground for such an implication. To encourage a man’s hopes from such a source, would sound like mockery. It would be reducing manumission to a thing of little worth. To condemn a man to fifty years’ captivity, or to be a captive for life, would be very much the same thing.

## CITIES OF REFUGE.

VATER remarks (p. 458), "In Deut. iv. 41-44, we are told that Moses set apart on the east side of Jordan, three cities of refuge for persons guilty of manslaughter, and ch. xix. contains a law for the constitution of such cities in Canaan Proper, which as good as exclude every reference to an earlier establishment of such a provision, and yet is so copious, that account must have been taken of the existence of these cities of refuge on the east side of Jordan, if they had been already mentioned in the same book."

The whole difficulty arises from a misconception of the words in Deut. xix. 9, "*then thou shalt add three cities more for thee, besides these three.*" This does not mean three in addition to the three mentioned in the preceding verses—but rather three new ones (those mentioned before) to those already existing; the three to which reference would at that time be made, and which, according to ch. iv., had been constituted in the country beyond Jordan. Ver. 8 and 9, contain no addition to ver. 7, but are only an amplification of its contents. Thus the reference is found which VATER supposed to be wanting to the cities of refuge that had been previously set apart.

And ours is the only consistent interpretation. For (i.) everywhere only six cities are mentioned. (ii.) The three cities in ver. 1-7, could not be the three beyond Jordan, but only those on this side Jordan, since they were to be set apart in the land that yet remained to be conquered. (iii.) The enlargement of territory spoken of in ver. 8 ("*And if the Lord thy God enlarge thy coast as he hath sworn unto thy fathers, and give thee all the land which he promised to give unto thy fathers*"), can only refer to the Cis-jordanic region. For this enlargement was to be a fulfilment of the promise given to the fathers. But this promise (with the exception of the Trans-jordanic portions of territory already conquered) referred merely to the Cis-jordanic region.

Thus the most beautiful harmony exists between the passages of the Pentateuch, which treat of the cities of refuge. (a) Six cities of refuge in all were to be set apart, Num. xxxv. 14, "*Ye*

shall give three cities on this side Jordan, and three cities shall ye give in the land of Canaan, which shall be cities of refuge." (b) Three cities of refuge had been set apart. Deut. iv. 41-43. (c) Three cities of refuge were still to be set apart, Deut. xix.

DE WETTE (*Crit.* 383), further asserts that Deut. iv. 41 contradicts the Book of Joshua, which states that these cities were first set apart by Joshua. But this assertion may be regarded as having been already disposed of by MAURER *On Joshua*, p. 165.

#### ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

VATER, p. 496, remarks, that according to Numbers xxxv. 24, 30, the קָהָל (*Congregation*, Eng. A. V.) was to judge the homicide, and condemn only on the testimony of two witnesses. On the contrary, according to Deut. xix. 12, the elders of the city (of the homicide) were to fetch the man who had committed the murder from the city of refuge, and deliver him over to the avenger of blood that he might be put to death. And the Judges שֹׁפְטִים were to sift most diligently the evidence of the witnesses, ver. 18. In ch. xxi. 2, זִקְנֵיהֶם and שֹׁפְטִים are joined together in the investigation of a murder. We therefore find different representations of the administration of penal justice in the different books. Thus also De WETTE, *Einl.* § 156.

But no contradiction really exists here. That the people as such exercised the administration of justice, no trace whatever can be found, and thus by the קָהָל in Num. xxxv. we can only understand the natural representatives of the קָהָל, the קְרֵיאי הַקָּהָל Num. i. 16, xxvi. 9, the elders from whom the judges were taken. Compare the section on Exod. xviii. with Deut. i. 416. How little the elders form a contrast to the קָהָל appears from Josh. xx. According to ver. 4, the homicide had to do with *the elders* of the city in which he had taken refuge. According to ver. 6 and 9, he was brought before the קָהָל of the city in which the murder had been committed.

So much for THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE PENTATEUCH.



THE  
THEOLOGY OF THE PENTATEUCH

IN RELATION TO ITS

GENUINENESS.

---

THE design of this section has already been explained in vol. i. p. 64, 65. We here give cursorily only the *negative* side of the investigation, the answers to the attacks on the Pentateuch which are founded on its Theology. It needs scarcely be said, that not every asserted imperfection of the Israelitish religion, as it is exhibited in the Pentateuch, can be made the subject of discussion. Only those imperfections come under consideration which are not at the same time relative perfections—only that which threatens to rob the Pentateuch of the character of a record of *true* religion, not of *absolute* religion, to which it never lays claim; or rather almost expressly disavows, and points beyond itself, since, by a special law, it laid the people under obligation to give ear to the future organs of God, and in its often-repeated announcement of a blessing on all nations, presents an object, for the attainment of which, it does nothing itself, but leaves it to a new stage of revelation to realise.

The accusations which it is our business to repel, are the following. The *spirituality* of God, it is said, is injured in the Pentateuch by its numerous Anthropomorphisms—the *holiness* of God by Anthropopathies, making God the author of sin in the hardening of Pharaoh's heart; the mutability attributed to God in his conduct towards Balaam; the command attributed to God for the extermination of the Canaanites; the obtaining by fraud the vessels of the Egyptians at his alleged command; the unholiness of those who are represented as his chosen, and the organs of his revelations; the *righteousness* of God is impugned by the exten-

sion of the punishment of transgressors to their innocent posterity ; and the *love* of God, by his partial regard (*Particularismus*). The *legislation* of the Pentateuch, it is asserted, could not be from God, since it does not put in action the true moral motive—the doctrine of immortality—but, on the contrary, labours to give force to an immoral motive, that of temporal reward—since it wears throughout the character of outwardness—since, by its ceremonial ingredients, it contradicts the worship of God in spirit and in truth ; and lastly, on account of the hierarchical spirit with which it is imbued.

#### THE ANTHROPOMORPHISMS OF THE PENTATEUCH.

The Deists on this topic are lavish of contemptuous expressions on the Old Testament generally, and the Pentateuch in particular. It is impious, BOLINGBROKE, for instance, maintains, (LELAND, *View of Deistical Writers*, vol. ii. letter 12), to assert the Divine origin of writings in which God employs the language of men, judges, thinks, repents, as men are wont to do, allows himself to be animated by human affections, appeals to human knowledge, and performs acts which can only be done by the organs of the human body. And thus all the rest ; (compare TINDAL in LILIENTHAL iv. 788).

The antideistical apologists were not properly in a condition to ward off this attack. They were not able to rise higher than PHILO'S point-of-view, who explained and justified this mode of representation on the principle of condescension to the capacities of a rude multitude ; compare the collection of his expressions in GERÖRER i. 95. And even REINHARD (*Dogm.* 93), avails himself of the insufficient plea, that it was allowable in common discourse to speak of God in images, which are borrowed from material objects, and human weaknesses.

In modern times a healthful impulse has led to a deeper investigation of the nature of Anthropomorphisms, by JACOBI, who, in his *Essay on Divine things* (*Works* iii. p. 418), comments on his own pregnant expression. “*God in creating, theomorphises man ; man, therefore, necessarily anthropomorphises God ;*” and concludes with the words, “*We confess ourselves, therefore to have*

the conviction, that man bears in himself the image of God—an indissoluble Anthropomorphism, and maintain that, apart from this Anthropomorphism, what has hitherto been called Theism, is no better than Atheism or Feticism."

What JACOBI has remarked in favour of Anthropomorphisms in general, DE WETTE has allowed to be applicable to those contained in the Scriptures; (*Bibl. Dogm.* § 55, 57, 102). He explains the Anthropomorphisms of the Old Testament as mere images, and says that they have their corrective in the literal and purely spiritual representations that are combined with them, and in the express injunctions against material representations of God, but especially in the idea of the Divine Holiness. But TWESTEN (*Dogm.* ii. 16), penetrates much deeper into the subject than DE WETTE, who after all regards Anthropomorphisms as a kind of necessary evil, and is not always consistent with himself in his judgment on Anthropomorphisms of Scripture. Still, there are not wanting those who adhere entirely to the ancient point-of-view. We could expect nothing but this from HARTMAN, VON BOHLEN, and other writers of that stamp. But we are surprised to find assertions in such a writer as SCHOTT (*Opun.* ii. 95), which almost go beyond those of BOLINGBROKE and TINDAL in grossness. To quote only one specimen; in p. 116, he says, "*Persuasissimum mihi habeo Hebræos antiquissimos, ad deum humana transferre solitos, de causa et natura venti ita judicasse, ut halitum esse dei existimarent.*"

The foundation on which the use of Anthropomorphisms rests, is, as JACOBI has rightly acknowledged, the truth, that man is created in the image of God. Whoever denies this, as BOLINGBROKE does in the remarkable words quoted by LELAND, "that we resemble God no more in our souls than we do in our bodies; and that to say his intellect is like ours, is as bad as the Anthropomorphites," (*View of Deistical Writers, letter 12.* ii. 438, Lond. 1755); it is of no use to dispute with him. But whoever acknowledges it, cannot make it consist merely in the spirit of man, but must recognise in the human body a worthy substratum for the representation of the Deity. That the human body is not framed altogether without reference to the image of God, and so placed on a level with that of the brutes—has been acknowledged by AUGUSTIN (*De Gen. ad lib. c. xii.* in GERHARD iv. 271).

*Quod homo dicitur factus ad die imaginem non secundum corpus, sed secundum intellectum mentis accipiendum est, quantum et in ipso corpore habeat quandam proprietatem, quae hoc indicet, nimirum quod erecta statura factus est, ut hoc ipso admoneatur, non sibi terrena esse sectanda velut pecora, quorum voluptas omnis ex terra est, unde in alvum cuncta pecore prona atque prostrata sunt.* While this writer dwelt too much on particular points, the schoolmen advanced to a more general conception. They said (compare GERHARD) *in corpore hominis non proprie esse imaginem dei, cum deus sit incorporeus, esse tamen in eo ut in signo, vel argutive et significative.* The human body is the image of the image of God, and as the original image is reflected in it, so it is suited to be a medium of representation for it.

Anthropomorphisms, therefore, are, for the reasons assigned, not merely permitted, they are absolutely necessary. Without them, nothing positive can be asserted of God. God himself has referred us to them. He who would get rid of them, loses God entirely, while he tries, as much as possible, to purify and refine his conceptions of him, and loses all reverence, by the illusion of excessive reverence. His position towards God becomes, of all others, the most untrue and unworthy. He falls from Anthropomorphism into Nihilism. The nearest becomes to him the farthest—reality is changed for him into shadow.

But even the grosser Anthropomorphisms we cannot altogether dispense with, as perhaps unfallen man might have been able to do. We are so much involved in the visible, that we must, as it were, prepare a body for God, if he is not to be entirely excluded by the visible, and vanish from us. He must assume flesh and blood, if we are to have his aid in our conflict with flesh and blood. For the mere “naked idea” of him, will leave us unprotected when we most need it. The thought of God may be deposited in the intellect, but will not be interfused with the feelings, inclinations, and passions.

The best justification of Anthropomorphisms, the best proof of their necessity, lies in the incarnation of God in Christ, which is impugned, consciously or unconsciously, by the opponents of Anthropomorphisms. That a connection between both must exist, appears from the fact that *almost* all the grosser

Anthropomorphisms of the New Testament (which occur much seldomer than in the Old), contain an express reference to the Old Testament, and are taken from it; *the finger of God*, in Luke xi. 20, from Exod viii. 15; *the bosom of God*, in John i. 18, from Prov. viii. 30; *a sweet smelling savour to God*, in Eph. v. 2, from Lev. i. 9, &c. When the necessity which Anthropomorphisms partially and provisionally relieved, had been fully and definitively satisfied by the incarnation of God in Christ, the other necessity, which always accompanies it, the highest possible spiritualization of God, who is a Spirit, now became prominent. But where, on the contrary, before Christ's appearance, as among the Hellenistic Jews and the Samaritans, and without Christ, as in Deism, we find an effort to set aside, or to avoid Anthropomorphisms, a want of vitality in religion is always connected with it, and appears as its source.

Before Christ there was a twofold indissolubly connected criterion of the true religion. (i.) It possessed the greatest fulness of Anthropomorphisms; and (ii.) the most decided corrective of them in the doctrine of God's true Divinity; by which Anthropomorphisms were kept in a perpetual flux, and preserved their quality as mere media of representation. Wherever one of these two requisites is wanting, religion is attacked in its vitals. Let the first be absent, and God becomes distant, lifeless, heartless; let the second be absent, then the living and the near one becomes an idol, and, therefore, cannot be truly living and near—a mere shadowy image of the true God, and a potentized man.

The Israelitish religion satisfied the second requisite, as completely as the first. The humanity of God had its corrective in the doctrine of his true Divinity, by which it was infinitely exalted above all heathenism. Their God was called and was Jehovah, and before the beams of this sun all the mists of false Anthropomorphism were dispersed, and were unable to withstand its effulgence.

There are two classes of Anthropomorphisms—first, those in which the human forms, limbs, corporeal qualities, and actions are transferred to God—anthropomorphisms in a narrower sense; then those in which human affections are attributed to God, or anthropopathisms.

Those of the first class have their special corrective in the doctrine of the spirituality of God. This meets us in lines most distinctly traced, at the very threshold of the Israelitish religion, in those fundamental laws which it is impossible to dispute. In Exod. xx. 4, it is branded as a crime to form a material image of God; the "*sursum corda*," the "*Schwing dich über die Natur*," there resounds aloud. If God had the human form, it must also be allowable to worship him under the form of the human figure. That this was forbidden, that it was marked as a heinous crime, shows that all Anthropomorphisms can only be vanishing images. No image of God was to be made, because he is invisible, incorporeal—because he is SPIRIT. This only conceivable *ratio legis*, is distinctly brought forward in Deut. iv. 15. There the prohibition against making any image of God, begins with the human figure, and descends to that of the inferior creatures—"For ye saw no manner of similitude on the day that the Lord spake unto you in Horeb, out of the midst of the fire." Compare ver. 12—"Ye heard the voice of the words, but saw no similitude." No form was to be made, because God had no form; in order to shew that he has no form, he took no form at this original revelation.

The THEOPHANIES of the Old Testament have been frequently noticed, as being in contradiction to the spirituality of God, and DE WETTE, to whom such a contradiction is not conceivable, and who yet would not remove it, or knew not how to do it, has allowed himself in the erroneous assertion (*Bibl. Dogm.* § 101), that the Theophanies were only to be regarded as a conscious fiction, which merely symbolised the sentiment of the Deity revealing himself in the world. But, between the Theophanies considered as real, and the spirituality of God, there is no more contradiction than between *ΠΝΕΥΜΑ 'Ο ΘΕΟΣ* and *'Ο ΛΟΓΟΣ ΣΑΡΞ 'ΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ*. As God in Christ assumed the human nature permanently, so he appears in the Theophanies under a light vesture of corporeity, in a transiently assumed human form. The Theophanies rest on the same basis as the Anthropomorphisms, to which they invite, and which they legitimate. They are the preludes and surrogates of the incarnation. The more distinctly in the Old Testament the doctrine of the spirituality of God is formed, with so much less danger would that craving of the

heart be met, for which the Theophanies were designed. With God's infinity, glory, and majesty, the depth of his condescension went hand in hand. Where the latter is not known, there the acknowledgment of the former will be a mere semblance. *Because* God is a Spirit, he would not despise our poor flesh and blood; he must veil himself therein, in order that our weak eyes may recognise him under this veil. Only to the most superficial consideration can it appear, as if in no nation the Theophanies ought to have been so rare as among the Israelites, and likewise the Anthropomorphisms. Deeper consideration will prove exactly the opposite. JOHN says, i. 18, θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακε πώποτε· ὁ μονογενὴς υἱὸς, ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς, ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο; and PAUL, in 1 Tim. vi. 16, describes God as φῶς οὐκ ὄν ἀπρόσιτον, ὃν εἶδεν οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ ἰδεῖν δύναται. And yet these two apostles, as no one now will deny, were acquainted with the Theophanies of the Old Testament, and believed them; but they never suspected a contradiction. That the corporeity in which God appears in the Theophanies of the Pentateuch was only assumed, is supported, especially by those passages in which, with an evident design, *the glory of the Lord* is substituted for *the Lord*; compare Lev. ix. 4, "for to-day *the Lord* will appear unto you;" ver. 6, "and *the glory of the Lord* shall appear unto you;" ver. 23, "and *the glory of the Lord* appeared unto all the people;" Exod. xvii. 7, xxix. 43, xl. 34, 36; Num. xiv. 22, passages on the basis of which the Chaldee paraphrasts rightly speak of the *Shechinah of Jehovah*, where in the Hebrew text merely Jehovah stands; compare DANZ in MEUSCHEN, *N. T. ex Talm. ill.*, p 703. Then Exod. xxxiii. 17 is to be considered, where Moses, when he prays the Lord as if for something not yet granted to him, that he would show him his glory, thereby distinctly implied that the earlier forms of the Lord's appearance were only forms, and that of a subordinate kind. "*Deum vult,*" says CALVIN, "*sibi proprius et evidentiore forma, quam ante manifestari.*" If the corporeity had been fixed, and not merely assumed, there could have been only one kind of Divine appearance. Lastly, it is also to be observed, that God, in the Theophanies of the Pentateuch, made himself known in the most different forms; in the human form, as in Gen. xviii.; in the fire of the burning bush; in the pillar of cloud. These forms

of manifestation annihilate one another, as soon as they would be something else than mere forms of manifestation. Only where a clear perception existed of their accidental quality could they co-exist. Something very similar occurs, in reference to Anthropomorphisms. They not unfrequently contradict one another, and thereby make known their figurative character.

The special corrective for the Anthropomorphisms of the second class, is the doctrine of the holiness of God. A religion over whose portal is inscribed in letters of flame, "I AM HOLY," can without risk represent God as angry, jealous, mourning, repenting. Scrupulosity under such circumstances is the sign of an evil conscience.

After these general remarks, we wish to occupy ourselves with some Anthropomorphisms of holy writ that have been particularly assailed.

#### THE REPENTANCE OF GOD.

Great offence has been taken, because in Gen. vi. 6, 7, it is said, "*It repented the Lord that he made man on the earth.*"

But let it be kept in view, that the name of JEHOVAH alone, God as the pure BEING, thus denoting his absolute unchangeableness, forms an impenetrable shield against all such attacks. Let it be observed that in the Pentateuch itself, Num. xxiii. 19 ("*God is not a man that he should lie, nor the son of man that he should repent,*") repentance is represented as altogether foreign to God. And if it be thought that between two passages so far apart, a contradiction might reasonably exist, let it not be forgotten that elsewhere in the Old Testament, in one and the same chapter, it is said—God had repented—and God never repents—a certain proof that where repentance is attributed to God, degrading conceptions of God ought not to mingle with the assertion. It is said in 1 Sam. xv. 11, "*It repenteth me that I have made Saul to be a king, for he is turned back from following me.*" On the other hand, in ver. 29, we read, "*The strength of Israel will not lie nor repent; for he is not a man that he should repent; compare Hosea xiii. 14, where God says, 'Repentance is hid from mine eyes.'*"



When in Gen. vi. it is said, "*God repented that he made man,*" it is apart from the consideration that God is glorified, although not *in* men, yet by means of men. Merely with regard to the destiny of man, God is to be glorified voluntarily. If this were the sole, as it is the original, destiny, then must God repent that he created degenerate man. What God would do, if merely this *one* consideration were taken into account, is here described as his own act, in order to impress men's minds deeply how far they have fallen short of their original destiny, how great their corruption, and how intense God's abhorrence of sin. This unrefined mode of expression strikingly shews how very much we are disposed to deceive ourselves in reference to the greatness and desert of our sins. *Quia aliter percipi non potest*, CALVIN remarks, *quantum sit odium peccati in deo et quanta detestatio, ideo se spiritus ad captum nostrum ferat. . . Nempe ut sciamus deum hominem, ex quo tantopere corruptus est, non censere inter creaturas suas acsi diceret; non est hoc opus meum, non est homo ille, qui ad meam imaginem formatus et tam egregis dotibus a me ornatus fuerat; hunc degenerem et adulterinum pro meo jam agnoscere dedignor. Haec tam paterna bonitas et indulgentia non parum retrahere nos debet a peccandi libidine, quod deus, ut efficacius penetret in corda nostra, affectus nostris induit.* These last words show how very much CALVIN had gained the right point-of-view in reference to Anthropomorphisms. In his esteem they formed a glorious ornament of holy writ. How totally different the apologists since the times of Deism! One remarks, on all occasions, how gladly they would dispense with Anthropomorphisms. They try to be satisfied only with that which they cannot alter.

## THE JEALOUSY OF GOD.

Among the standing charges which are brought against the theology of the Pentateuch, this is one, that it speaks of God as a jealous God. Thus SPINOZA, *Tract. theol. pol. c. 15, ed. Paulus i. 352. Forte addet, nihil in scriptura repervii, quod rationi repugnet. Verum ego insto, ipsam expresse affirmare et docero, deum esse zelotypum, nempe in ipso decalogo et Deut.*

iv. 25, *et pluribus aliis locis* (*Opera*. ed. Bruder. iii. 200) Lips. 1846.

Here we must first of all remark that זַלְזָל is not to be *jealous*, but *zealous*. In the term *jealous* that morbid feeling is indicated which ardent love always has more or less, when it occurs among men.

But only that person can regard *zeal* as unworthy of God, who malignantly parodies in his heart the sentiment, "Enjoy what God assigns thee, cheerfully dispense with what thou hast not." "Enjoy what I assign thee," &c., whose heart is full of adulterous desires. The accusation against holy writ changes into an accusation against him who raises it, and against the age in which it finds acceptance.

To deny zeal to God is the rudest Anthropomorphism. If God is truly God, he must lay claim to our undivided love, and must be indignant at every attempt to withdraw that love from him wholly or partially. A God who would allow himself to be bribed, to be put off with fair speeches, is an idol. If in God there was no zeal, we could not venture to confide in his love to us. What he desires, and what he gives, stand in the most intimate connection with one another.

Let it not be asserted that the aversion to God's jealousy is justified by the New Testament. The expression which in Deut. v. 24 ("For the Lord thy God is a consuming fire, even a jealous God,") is placed as parallel with זַלְזָל, is found also in the New Testament, ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν πῦρ καταναλίσκων. Heb. xii. 29.

The older theologians have very ably justified *zeal* as worthy of God. CALVIN says (*Instit.* ii. 8, 18), *Conjunctio, qua nos sibi devincit, dum in ecclesiae sinum recipit, sacri cujusdam conjugii instar habet, quod mutua fide stare oportet. Ipse ut omnibus fidelis ac veracis mariti officii defungitur, ita vicissim a nobis stipulatur amorem et castitatem conjugalem; h. e., ne animus nostris Satanae, libidini, foedisque carnis cupiditatibus stuprandus prostituamus. . . . Ergo ut maritus, quo sanctior est ac castior, eo gravius accenditur, si uxoris animum ad rivalem inclinare videt; ita Dominus, qui nos sibi in veritati desponsavit, ardentissimam zelotypiam esse testatur, quoties, neglecta sancti sui conjugii puritate, scelestis libidinis conspurcamur.*

And GERHARD remarks, *U. th.* v. 297—*Zelotypia est affectus per se honestus et laudabilis, quo maritus ob violatam conjugii fidem uxori adulterae irascitur. Tantum abest, ut deum hic zelus dedeeat, ut a falsis gentilium diis eum potius discernat. Gentium dii cultoribus suis sine ulla indignatione peccant, ut quosvis alios una cum ipsis colant, perinde ut lenones uxores suas aliorum libidini prostituunt.*

## THE WRATH OF GOD.

There is scarcely any objection against the Old Testament, and especially against the Pentateuch, more current than this, that it represents God as a wrathful being, while the God of the New Testament is the loving father of mankind.

This charge, if traced to its source, will be found to arise from the misapprehension so deeply rooted in our age, of the heinousness of sin. When man himself is not displeased with sin, when it assumes to him the appearance of a "bagatelle" ("*peccatilio*"), he no longer perceives any reason for regarding it as an essential interruption of the relation of God to man.

But let men at last give over asserting that the wrath of God is peculiar to the Old Testament and foreign to the New, and make up their minds to direct the objection against the whole of holy writ. Such passages as Rom. i. 18; ii. 8; Col. iii. 6; Eph. v. 6 (on the inadmissibility of explaining *ὀργή* by *punishment*, see HARLESS on the passage), 1 Thes. i. 10; v. 9, speak plainly on the subject. The judgment of the world is an effect of the wrath of God; and the highest proof of God's love, namely, the death of Christ, is at the same time the strongest evidence of his *wrath*, which must by no means be confounded with *hatred*; on this point see MEYER *Glaubensl.* p. 174. To Christ, who is the image of God, *wrath* on account of the insensibility of the human heart, is attributed in Mark iii. 5 (compare THOLUCK, *Auslegung der Bergpredigt*, 170); and what are the heavy woes on the Pharisees in Matt. xxiii. but an overflowing of his wrath?

Men say a great deal about the wrathful God of the Jews, as if the God of the Old Testament, and especially of the Pentateuch, appeared *merely* as wrathful. But nowhere in the Old Testament

is *wrathful* attributed to God as a constant predicate. In Exod. xxxiv. 6 (compare Num. xiv. 18) God describes his essential character in the words, "*Jehovah, Jehovah God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth.*" Everywhere, in Deuteronomy especially, there is a manifest endeavour, by the exhibition of the love of God, to kindle love to him in return. If God were merely wrathful, the command, "Thou shalt *love* the Lord thy God," &c., could not be so often repeated. The love of God corresponds with the love to God, as God's wrath with the fear of God. We have the practical proof of God's love in his relation to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. In Abraham's history, almost nothing is to be perceived of the wrath of God. If it appears stronger in the four last books of the Pentateuch, yet Genesis shows that it has its foundation only in the character of the depraved race who were to be prepared to be objects of the Divine love by the manifestations of wrath. By the prophet the Lord spake to Israel, "*Yea I have loved thee with an everlasting love; therefore with loving-kindness have I drawn thee,*" Jerem. xxxi. 3; and the Psalmist says, "*The Lord is my Shepherd—I will love thee, O Lord, my strength;*" Ps. xxiii. xviii. Such fruits do not flourish in the soil of a wrathful God.

Instead of being shocked at the thought that God is wrathful, we should rather ask *with whom* and *for what*? A God without wrath, and a God who is wrathful on other accounts than for sin, is not a God, but an idol. The wrath of God is the necessary product of the collision of his holiness with sin. Very far from constituting an objection against the Scriptures, it rather belongs to the evidences of their Divine origin.

It is self-evident that in the passages of the Pentateuch in which the Divine wrath is conspicuous, the dogmatical contents must be distinguished from the representation and drapery. The latter are calculated to strike and move the insensible human heart to produce a lively impression of God's abhorrence of sin. Human wrath, in its passionate expressions, must here lend the colours. This kind of language so far being perverted into a ground of complaint against the Scriptures, ought rather to serve for our humiliation.

## THE VENGEANCE OF GOD.

We are prepared to find that the passages in the Pentateuch which speak of the vengeance which God will take on his enemies (Lev. xxvi. 25, Deut. xxxii. 35, 41, “*And I will bring a sword upon you, that shall avenge the quarrel of my covenant;”* “*To me belongeth vengeance and recompense;”* “*I will render vengeance to my enemies;”* ver. 43, “*For he will avenge the blood of his servants, and will render vengeance to his adversaries*”) have not been forgotten by our opponents. Compare, for instance, VON BOHLEN, *Einkl.*, p. 105.

Our opponents err, likewise, in asserting that God is described in the Pentateuch as vindictive, as eager for vengeance. The exact reverse of this is conveyed in the predicate  $\text{בְּרֵעַ אַף}$ , *slow of anger*; vindictiveness is hasty.

But if persons will consider vengeance as unworthy of God, the reproach of crude representations of God falls back in a lamentable manner on those who raise it. Take away vengeance from God, and he is placed on a level with man—he is lowered to a finite individual—goodness and the moral order of the world are separated from him.

The question whether the attributing of vengeance to God in the Pentateuch must be regarded as a faulty anthropopathism—the product of a corrupt disposition which sees the reflection of its own vindictiveness in God—or whether it rests on most exalted and purest conceptions of God, that God is Jehovah, may be answered at once, when it is settled whether in the law vengeance among men is called good or bad. But this decision is not difficult. A glance at Lev. xix. 18 is sufficient, “*Thou shalt not be vindictive (rachsüchtig), nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.*”

It is attended with the most destructive consequences, when vengeance is taken away from God. The dread of sin then vanishes; in fact, sin is no longer spoken of as sin. In this respect the vengeance of God is alluded to in Heb. x. 30, 31—*οἶδαμεν γὰρ τὸν εἰπόντα· ἐμοὶ ἐκδίκησις, ἐγὼ ἀνταποδώσω, λέγει κύριος, καὶ πάλιν κύριος κρινεῖ τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ. φοβερόν τὸ ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς χεῖρας θεοῦ ζῶντος.* And then, whenever God is no longer

acknowledged as an avenger, vindictiveness has increased. The best safeguard against this, is faith in the control of a holy Providence, which reacts against every violation without its being necessary for the individual in whose person justice has been violated to stir himself. Every one must exercise this faith who is tempted to vindictiveness. Other much lauded arguments against this spirit, however beautiful they may appear, will not maintain their ground. Hope of a change of disposition in the person who commits the injury, vanishes at once with the first vindictive emotions. It can only be entertained where these emotions are previously stifled by looking to God the avenger.

As a preservative against vindictiveness, the Divine vengeance is exhibited in several passages of holy writ; a certain proof that faith in the Divine vengeance cannot grow in the same soil with vindictiveness. It is said in Prov. xx. 22, "*Say not thou, I will recompense evil; wait on the Lord and he shall save thee;*" in Prov. xxv. 21, 22, "*If thine enemy be hungry, give him bread to eat, and if he be thirsty, give him water to drink, for thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head, and the Lord shall reward thee;*" Ps. xxxviii. 14 (13), "*But I, as a deaf man, heard not; and I was as a dumb man that openeth not his mouth. For in thee, O Lord, do I hope; thou wilt hear, O Lord my God;*" in 1 Pet. ii. 23, ὃς λοιδορούμενος οὐκ ἄντε λοιδορεῖ, πάσχων οὐκ ἠπέιλει, παρεδίδου δὲ τῷ κρινοντι δικαίως. On this passage CALVIN remarks, *Addit autem hoc Petrus ad peorum consolationem, quod si patienter ferant impiorum probra et violentiam, deum habituri sint vindicem. Esset enim istud valde durum subjici nos improborum libidini et deo curae non esse nostras miserias.* Lastly, Rom. xii. 19, 20, μὴ ἑαυτοὺς ἐκδικοῦντες ἀγαπητοὶ, ἀλλὰ δότε τόπον τῇ ὀργῇ· γέγραπται γὰρ· ἐμοὶ ἐκδίκησις, ἐγὼ ἀνταποδώσω, λέγει κύριος, ἐὰν οὖν πεινᾷ ὁ ἐχθρὸς σου, ψώμιζε αὐτόν, ἐὰν διψᾷ, πότιζε αὐτόν· τοῦτο γὰρ ποιῶν ἀνθρακας πυρὸς σωρεύσεις ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ. Here it is said that, whoever earnestly wishes to be avenged on his enemy, must abstain so entirely from all self-revenge upon him, that he must not withhold from him acts of kindness, which would be an indirect kind of vengeance. Many expositors have in vain tried to substitute another meaning to the words τοῦτο γὰρ ποιῶν—αὐτοῦ. That the expression, "*Thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head,*"

is equivalent to, "Thou shalt prepare for him a painful punishment," appears from comparing it with the original passage in the Proverbs, where the parallelism so plainly requires this sense, that it cannot properly be misunderstood. That the apostle meant to contradict that passage is still less conceivable. But the passage, considered by itself, leads to the same result. For the relation of ver. 20 to ver. 19, necessarily requires us to refer the *ἄνθρακας πυρὸς σωρεύσεις* to the Divine punishment. For as the *ἐὰν οὖν*—*πότιξε αὐτὸν* corresponds to the *μὴ ἑαυτοὺς*—*τῇ ὀργῇ*, so the *τοῦτο γὰρ*—*κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ* corresponds to the *γέγραπται γὰρ*—*κύριος*. "Avenge thyself not on thine enemy, for, according to the Scriptures, God hath reserved vengeance for himself; for if thou avengest not thyself, thou wilt set the Divine vengeance in motion." Also ver. 21, *μὴ νικῶ ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἀλλὰ νίκα ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸ κακόν*, is to be referred, according to the connection, not to the doubtful influence which a generous disposition will exact on the evil mind of an adversary, but to the infallible effect which the extinction of all vindictiveness so far brings with it, as God, who has in no degree been forestalled, must now interpose.

It has, indeed, been thought that such a remedy applied to the spirit of revenge is much worse than the disease itself; that it would rather tend to aggravate than expel it. But let any one attempt so to act, and he will find that he will no longer indulge the spirit of revenge. The vengeance which is truly and not merely in appearance committed to God, is altogether different from what man takes himself. Then real injustice at once separates itself from what is only apparent, the injury of the person from the injury of justice; all passionate over-estimate of the injustice committed vanishes. To use CALVIN'S words, man speaks with quiet calmness to God: *Tu domine animum meum nosti, ut salvos optem, qui me perditum volunt. Si conversi fuerint, illis gratulabor, quodsi obstinati in malitia perstiterint, quia scio te excubare pro salute mea, causam tibi meam relinquo.*

Lastly, if man takes away vengeance from God, he at the same time takes it from God's servant, the magistracy, which carries the sword of vengeance over evil-doers. Punishment then sinks down into a mere instrument of correction and security, a view the injurious consequences of which we sufficiently see before our eyes.

## ON THE HARDENING OF PHARAOH'S HEART.

It has been objected to the Old Testament, and especially to the Pentateuch, that the religious representations are so gross, that God is made the author of sin. In proof of these assertions an appeal is made to the history of the plagues of Egypt, in which the observation is seven times repeated, that Pharaoh's heart was hardened. Ex. vii. 13, 22; viii. 11, 15, 28, (15, 19, 32) ix. 7, 34, and as many times it is remarked that God had hardened Pharaoh's heart iv. 21; vii. 3; ix. 12; x. 1, 20, 27; xi. 10. The equality of the numbers is not accidental. It indicates that Pharaoh's hardening himself corresponded to God's hardening, as the effect to the cause. It is also not accidental, that the hardening is attributed to God in the announcement, and in the summing up. Pharaoh's hardening is enclosed by God's, and is thereby marked as conditioned by it. It also appears to proceed from design, that the hardening at the beginning of the plagues is attributed, in a preponderating degree, to Pharaoh, and towards the end to God. The higher the plagues rise, so much the more does Pharaoh's hardening assume a supernatural character, so much the more obvious is it to refer it to its supernatural causality. The number SEVEN indicates that the hardening rested on God's covenant with Israel, of which this number was the token, and that it belongs not less to Pharaoh's hardening than to God's hardening; it leads us to consider the former not as independent of the second, but as its product. These remarks, which collectively serve to strengthen the force of our opponents' attack, may show, at the same time, how little we have cause to be afraid of it.

The older Lutheran theology had already prepared this attack. Carrying its opposition to the doctrine of predestination too far, it believed that the co-operation of God for evil must be limited to permission alone; and it forced the idea, which is altogether foreign to the Scriptures, on all those passages which contained something more. Thus, for example, PFEIFFER'S *decisio*, in reference to the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, is thus expressed in his *Dubia vex.* p. 229—*Deus dicitur cor Pharaonis indurare, permissive, permittendo scilicet justo judicio, ut ille, qui se emolliri non patiebatur, sibi permissus durus maneret in*



*propriam perniciem.* The rationalist theology suited the rationalism of the orthodox more readily, since the co-operation of God for good had already not extended itself beyond permission. But when the Scriptures appeared no longer as the word of God, it ceased to attach the idea of permission to the passage in question; first of all only to those in the Old Testament, and afterwards to those in the New, when reverence for that had also vanished; and now an argument was drawn from them for the imperfection of the biblical theology. But in the most recent times, more favourable views have been taken. Not merely TWESTEN (*Dogm. Th.* ii. 131), and OLSHAUSEN (*Comm. z. d. Br. an die Römer*, p. 323), have given up the notion of bare permission, but DE WETTE also (*Br. a. d. R.* p. 109) has acknowledged it to be unsatisfactory. The idea of permission is as little the growth of Christian experience as of holy writ. It belongs merely to dogmatics, and is for that very reason of no dogmatic value. It is one of those unfortunate fractions of thought (*unseligen Halbheiten*), which must be completed by something added to the top or bottom. The difficulties, for removing which it was invented, it really does not remove. It only substitutes, so to speak, sins of omission for those of commission. *Quis enim*, BEZA justly remarks (*Quaest. et. resp. liber.*, in his *tract. theol.* p. 679), *magis in culpa est, quam qui malum imminens longissime prospiciat idque solo nutu impedire possit, et tamen illud non modo impediatur, verum etiam permittatur, id est ejus mali patrandi facultatem concedat?* On the other hand it involves the subject in a whole train of new difficulties and hazardous consequences. *First*, It is not adequate to explain the facts under consideration. How little does mere permission suffice in the case of Judas! Why was he taken by our Lord among the number of his apostles? Why was the bag (*John xii. 6*) committed to his care? People often speak of an insanity of crime. On the ground of such observations there has been a strong tendency in modern times to deny the accountability of many criminals. And it cannot be denied that, looking merely at individual outbreaks of sin, the transgressor often appears to be governed by a power foreign to himself, of which he is the sport, from which he would fain escape, but is unable to do so, in spite of all his efforts. It is his destiny (*Verhängniss*) that he has committed this or that sin. Let any one

only read some volumes of HITZIG'S *Criminalistischer Zeitschrift*, and he will be convinced of it. The aphorism, *Iratius ad poenam si quos trahit Deus, auferre mentem prius illis sanam solet*—has been confirmed by ample experience. An age that only knows *sins*, but misapprehends *SIN* (*das nur Sünden kennt, die Sünde verkennt*), must necessarily make mistakes respecting accountability, and it is altogether in vain to attempt to combat it on its own ground. On its own point-of-view it is quite right. It can appeal to the testimony of the apostle, who, in Romans i. 24, 26, refers sins, especially unnatural ones, to a Divine destiny (*διὰ τοῦτο παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς εἰς πάθη ἀτιμίας.*) *Secondly*, The idea of permission perverts the relation of God to his creatures, and consequently destroys the idea of God. It changes the one God into a mere Supreme Being. And in whose favour does it injure monotheism? *The wicked*—whom it places in a kind of independence by the side of God, and exalts them to a species of demi-gods. *Aequum fuerit scilicet*, BEZA remarks, *idcirco eximi istas conditoris dei imperio; quoniam in ipsum fuerint contumaces.* *Thirdly*, Where the idea of permission has become practical, it palsies trust in God, and leaves those who are exposed to the attacks of the wicked, a prey to despondency. This can only be conquered when that independence is taken away from the wicked, and God is acknowledged as the Being who lends them hands, and feet, and tongues. *Fourthly*, The doctrine of permission is not capable of suppressing the natural impulse to unallowable self-dependance and to revenge. Joseph's brethren feared his vengeance. He knew that he could give them no more certain pledge that this fear was groundless, than to declare that he considered them only as involuntary instruments in God's hand; compare Gen. xlv. 8, "*It was not you that sent me hither, but God;*" 1. 19, 20, "*Fear not; for am I in the place of God? As for you, ye thought evil against me; but God meant it unto good.*" God does not come, as it were, *ex post*, and turns evil to good, but from the first, God's thoughts move parallel with the thoughts of his brethren. With all their apparent independence, they are only blind instruments. Who would raise himself against the axe which struck him? How would it appear if David, when Shimei had insulted him, his sovereign, in the most offensive manner, instead of saying, as he does in 2 Sam. xvi. 10, &c. "Let him

curse, because the Lord hath said unto him, Curse David. Who shall then say, Wherefore hast thou done so? Let him alone, and let him curse, for the Lord hath *bidden* him"—if, instead of this, he had said, "The Lord hath *permitted* him." In that case, it would be no easy matter to show the logical correctness of the *for*. Let only a *minimum* of independence on the part of the opponent be left, and the struggle against vindictiveness is vain. *Fifthly*. The doctrine of permission is little suited to alarm the sinner. On the faith of it, he flatters himself with the notion of a certain independence. If, after all, he is obliged to give in, yet he has contested the matter with God; he may venture to boast that, for a while, he did what God did not intend him to do.

The difficulties which the doctrine of permission have raised, not less than those on the opposite side, are avoided by the following view. SIN belongs to man; he can at any moment become free from it by repentance. But if this does not take place, the *forms* in which sin makes itself known, are no longer in his power; they stand under God's dispensation, and God therefore determines as it pleases him, or, what comes to the same thing, as it suits the scheme of his moral government. He puts the sinner in situations in which exactly this or that temptation will meet him; he leads the thoughts to distinct objects of sinful desire, and effects that they adhere to them, and do not fly off to others. Potiphar's wife, for example, had the unchaste desire from herself; that she cast her eyes precisely on Joseph, came from God. She was obliged to do this; it was prepared for her. Malice belonged to Shimei's heart. But it was God's work that this malice should vent itself pre-eminently on David, and that it operated exactly in such a way. By his own fault David indulged in pride; the mode of manifesting this disposition was, as far as it regarded him, accidental; it belonged to God, who "*turns the hearts of kings as the water-brooks.*" "*And the anger of the Lord,*" it is said in 2 Sam. xxiv. 1, "*was kindled against Israel, and he moved David against them to say, Go number Israel and Judah*" But David was not, on this account, the less culpable. "*And David said to the Lord (v. 10), I have sinned greatly in that I have done; and now I beseech thee, O Lord, take away the iniquity of thy servant, for I have done very foolishly.*"

By this view, the rights of God are preserved, and, at the same

time, the accountability of man maintained. For what is properly sinful in sins is SIN, and, according to this view, its author is not God, but man, who, at any moment, is free to come forth from the state of bondage in which he finds himself. If he will not do this, it is his merited punishment that God makes use of him as an instrument for his designs.

If, after these general investigations, we turn our special attention to the Pentateuch, we cannot imagine that God, when the hardening of Pharaoh's heart is attributed to him, became the author of his sin. This would be contrary to the whole spirit of this book, which is so thoroughly moral, and, for that reason, is diametrically opposed to all Pantheists. The manner in which it represents how sin first came into the world, shows how very far the author was from placing its origin in God. Its whole legislation rests on the presupposition of accountability. Its decided "Thou *shalt*"—the awarding justice of God which it proclaims—the blessing and the curse which it every where announces—all this is unintelligible on any other supposition. Especially in reference to Pharaoh, how could Moses always treat him as laden with guilt, if his sin belonged not to himself, but to God? How else could the heavy woe which came upon him be always regarded as merited punishment? "*Certe,*" GERHARD justly remarks, "*deus illius rei non est auctor, cujus est ultor.*" In all systems which refer sin to God, punishment is out of the question.

Pharaoh might have been an equally bad man, and yet have let the Israelites go. That he did not do this—that he refused to listen to the voice of prudence, and regarded neither his own priests, who, after the third plague, declared, "*This is the finger of God,*" nor his courtiers, who, without being better than himself, said to him (Exod. x. 7), "*How long shall this man be a snare unto us? let the men go that they may serve the Lord their God: knowest thou not yet that Egypt is destroyed?*"—that he could not be free from this *form* of the manifestation of sin, although he saw before his eyes that it would lead to his destruction—was the work of God.

The reasons for which this side of the transactions is presented in so strong a light, may be easily gathered from the narrative itself. It must obviate the offence which might have been justly taken if Pharaoh, though at last conquered, had been able so long to

withstand the will of the Almighty. A counteraction was required against the despondency of Israel and the pride of Pharaoh. From this point-of-view, Pharaoh's opposition, not less than his destruction, served to glorify God. He *must* harden his heart, in order that God might display his almightiness, justice, and grace, in the whole succession of events. Ch. vii. 4, 5; ix. 15, 16. From this position we also gain an elevated view of the history of the world. We see God everywhere; and *there*, most of all, where, to natural reason, he is least visible, in the fury of a God-forgetting tyrant—in a case of the most decided moral hardening.

## THE MUTABILITY OF GOD—NUM. XXII.

“God the unchangeable,” HARTMANN remarks (p. 499), “to-day forbids Balaam to go with the messengers, ver. 12; and the next day, as if he had altered his mind, he commands him to undertake the journey in their company, ver. 20. And when he was now upon the road, according to ver. 22, the anger of Jehovah was kindled against him. When now Balaam, confounded by this inexplicable appearance, is disposed to return (*“now, therefore, if it displease thee, I will get me back again”*) he all at once receives the order, *‘Go with the men,’* ver. 35.”

We may feel assured that this statement is founded on a misunderstanding. The name JEHOVAH is a pledge that it could never enter the thoughts of any Israelite to attribute such childish fickleness to God. And, moreover, Balaam himself says,

GOD is not a man, that he should lie;  
Neither the son of man, that he should repent:  
Hath he said it, and shall he not do it?  
Or hath he spoken, and shall he not make it good?

NUM. xxiii. 15.

He, and the author who introduces him speaking thus, had therefore the clearest knowledge of the unchangeableness of God.

In ver. 6–17, the mention of the journey is always in close connection with the cursing. Ver. 6, “*Come now, therefore, curse me this people;*” ver. 11, “*Come now, curse me them;*” ver. 12, “*And God said unto Balaam, Thou shalt not go with them; thou shalt not curse the people.*” *To go* is here so absolutely tanta-

mount to *curse*, that the *copula* is omitted; ver. 14, 16, 17. How could this be otherwise? Neither Balak nor Balaam would have gained anything by the mere going of the latter. Neither Balak's striving for the destruction of the Israelites, nor Balaam's avarice and ambition, would have found their account in that.

In ver. 20 this connection is removed by a limiting clause—*“And God came unto Balaam at night, and said unto him, If the men come to call thee, rise up and go with them; but yet the word that I shall say unto thee, that shalt thou do.”* The former injunction had been given against the going *in concreto*, with a specific design, but here only the going *in abstracto* is permitted; so that nothing is here permitted to Balaam which was before forbidden him. On the contrary, the former prohibition is expressly repeated in the clause that is appended to the permission.

The words, *“Rise up and go with them,”* can be considered only as permissive on account of the clause, *“but yet the word that I shall say unto thee,”* which is also evident from the words, *“if the men come to call thee.”* If thou thinkest that thou canst not absolutely refuse the invitation, why, so let it be! thou mayst go.

As we have already remarked, the prohibition against the going *in concreto* was directed at the same time against the going altogether, since, apart from what was forbidden, it would have no rational object. That the two are here separated from one another—that the one is forbidden and the other permitted—takes place only in reference to Balaam's sinful inclination. It was from the beginning agreeable to God's will that Balaam should go. God meant to employ him as an instrument for *his* purpose. But this could not happen, till Balaam's inclination had prompted him to make God an instrument for his own purpose. At first, therefore, his welfare is consulted, by simply forbidding the going which would lead him to destruction; afterwards, as a punishment for his sinful inclination, the going is permitted.

There is no necessity, with DE GEER (*de Bileamo*, Utrecht, 1816, p. 39) and others, to torture the twenty-second verse by forced interpretations. The meaning of the clause, *“And God's anger was kindled because he went,”* is evident from the preceding remarks. It was unnecessary to add, “in order to curse Israel,” or something of the kind, as the Arabic translation correctly

translates, according to the matter of fact, *ideo quod lucri cupiditate ductus abierat*. For if Balaam had not had an evil design, running counter to God's command, he would not have gone. He thought to himself, I have (to begin with) got leave to go, every thing else will be sure to follow.

Since God's anger was directed against Balaam's going *with a definite intention*, it involves no contradiction when afterwards his going was permitted. The 𐤁𐤏𐤃 in ver. 32, *because thy way is perverse before me*, was erroneously interpreted by Balaam of the journey *in abstracto*; and very naturally, for he was going only in order to do what he ought not to do. In ver. 35 he is taught that the journey *in concreto* was intended.

#### THE RIGHT OF THE ISRAELITES TO PALESTINE.

That the proceedings of the Israelites against the Canaanites were not merely permitted but commanded by God, has served, from ancient times, the opponents of the Old Testament, and especially of the Pentateuch, as a foundation for their attacks. The heathen were the first to make use of it, (see the passages quoted by SERARIUS on Josh. vi. *proœm.*) The Manicheans grounded upon it their argument that the God of the Old Testament could not be the God of the New Testament, as appears from the earnest refutation of it by AUGUSTIN in several passages, especially *c. Faustum*, B. 22, C. 73, &c. The English Deists inferred from it, that the God of the professed Revelation could not be the true God, laying down the correct principle, that no action could proceed from the true God which contradicted the law of nature implanted by him, and resulting from his own character—a principle which, resting on the necessary relation of God's law to his own character, of which it is the expression and mirror, is sanctioned by the Scriptures themselves, in numerous passages—“*Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?*” Gen. xviii. 25; “*Doth God prevent judgment? or doth the Almighty prevent justice?*” Job. viii. 3. This attack is made by TINDAL at length, and with much acuteness, in his *Christianity as old as the Creation* (p. 454 of the German translation). Others, as MORGAN and CHUBB, &c., are noticed in LILIENTHAL, iii. 891. In Germany it was renewed by the earliest forerunners of modern

illumination ; see EDELMANN'S *Moses mit aufgedecktem Angesichte*, i. 107. It is repeated so regularly in the writings of the Rationalists who have any opportunity of touching on the subject, that it would not be worth while to quote individual writers. But how deeply this opinion is rooted may be learnt from the following passage in VON AMMON (*Handl. der Sittentehre*, III. ii. p. 61) —“Morality rejects every war of extermination. That passages are found in the Old Testament which favour such atrocities, cannot excuse this kind of warfare, since such principles are never approved in the New Testament ; and a truly religious morality can only acknowledge that command as truly Divine which will abide the test of justice and morality.”

Before we proceed to examine the various solutions of our problem, we have to consider some attempts that have been made to take away a part of the odium by a different view of the facts themselves. The chief attempt of this kind is the following. It has been falsely assumed (so some writers assert) that the Israelites were commanded to exterminate the Canaanites without exception. On the contrary they were commanded, previously to offer terms of peace to all the Canaanitish cities, and only in the event of the rejection of this offer, were the inhabitants to be destroyed. Whatever city received this offer, its inhabitants were to become the vassals of Israel, a lot which, according to the mild laws of servitude, was very tolerable. This opinion has been very widely spread ; it is found in the writings of the philosopher MAIMONIDES ; and likewise (which is not suited to awaken a prejudice in favour of its correctness) almost in all writers who, since the rise of Deism, have treated the subject apologetically. Thus in SHUCKFORD'S *Connection*, in LILIENTHAL, BACHIESE, HESS (*Geschichte Josua*, p. 46), and others.

The chief proof of its correctness is founded on Deut. xx. 10, &c. “*When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it. And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be, that all the people that is found therein shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee.*” But we need only look at this, to be assured that the sentiment we are considering has its foundation somewhere else than here,—in the impression of the argumentation of the opposite side, which could not be altogether withstood, since they were not in possession



of the only correct solution of the problem,—or where this *was* the case, in the endeavour to make the matter less repulsive to the opponents, even from their own point-of-view,—resting on which rather than on the knowledge of a living God, the correct solution was unattainable. It is no doubt expressly stated in this passage, that when about to besiege a city, the Israelites were bound to offer, in the first place, terms of peace, which, if accepted, the lives of the inhabitants were to be spared, but they were to become vassals. But in ver. 15, it is stated with equal explicitness, that this regulation applied only to foreign enemies; (“*Thus shalt thou do unto all the cities which are very far off from thee, which are not of the cities of these nations;*”) in ver. 16–18, its false application to the Canaanites is expressly disallowed, and their total extermination commanded. “*But of the cities of these people, which the Lord thy God doth give thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth. But thou shalt utterly destroy them; the Hittites, and the Amorites, the Canaanites and the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the Jebusites, as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee: that they teach you not to do after all their abominations, which they have done unto their gods; so should ye sin against the Lord your God.*” This passage proves exactly the contrary to what it is brought to prove. Besides, an appeal is made to Joshua xi. 19, 20; where it is said, that it was of the Lord that the hearts of the Canaanites were hardened to “*come against Israel in battle, that he might destroy them utterly* (כִּי־יִמָּחֵם), and that they might have no favour, but that he might destroy them as the Lord commanded Moses;” on which CUNAEUS, (*de republ. Hebr.* ii. 20), makes this remark: “Hence it appears that these nations were destroyed because they preferred trying the fortune of war, rather than accept the conditions of peace with the Israelites; had they listened to the message of peace, their safety would have been secured.” Even STEUDEL (*Blicke in die alt. Test. Offenb. Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1835. p. 165), infers from this passage, that the extermination of the Canaanites would not have been effected, if the inhabitants had not hazarded a conflict. But that this explanation cannot be correct, is very evident, for in the passage itself, the total extermination of the Canaanites is represented as unconditionally commanded by God to Moses. It has been correctly observed by

MICHAELIS (*Mos. Recht.* i. § 62), the author meant only to say that the Israelites would have been kinder than the law, if the Canaanites had sought for peace, and the Israelites had granted what Moses had forbidden them to grant. By God's providence they were preserved from this temptation. But even granting that, according to this passage, the preservation of the Canaanites, in the event of their submission, was legitimate, still this will not avail. For, according to this same passage, God had so ordered, that such an event neither should nor could happen. A condition, the realising of which is made impossible by him who appointed it, may be regarded as a nonentity. Still it is urged, that David and Solomon never rooted out the Canaanites that were left in the land, but merely made use of them, without being ever blamed for so doing; 1 Kings ix. 20, 21, "*And all the people that were left of the Amorites, Hittites, Perizzites, Hivites, and Jebusites, which were not of the children of Israel; their children that were left after them in the land, whom the children of Israel also were not able utterly to destroy, upon these did Solomon levy a tribute of bond-service unto this day.*" But we see, at the same time, that the circumstances were then quite altered. The order for extermination was only given to the Israelites on their first entrance into Canaan; when, by the miracles of the Divine Omnipotence, they were sanctioned as the ministers and instruments of the Divine justice, what they neglected could never be done by other hands; every attempt of this kind would have been murder, and so much more criminal, because these Canaanites who were left in the land, entered, in the course of time, into manifold connections with the Israelites. What prince, indeed, would believe that he was obliged to make up for the misplaced lenity of one of his predecessors; that he must execute the posterity of a malefactor whose life had been spared contrary to the law? Lastly, it is argued that the history shows that a great, perhaps by far the greater part of the Canaanites, saved themselves by flight. But let this be admitted, what does it prove? No more than that the Israelites were not in a condition to carry into effect that Divine command which is precisely the gist of the objection. And even as it regards the Israelites, is not every one judged according to the design, not the consequences of his actions?

But futile as the arguments are in favour of this attempted mitigation, equally irrefragable are the arguments against it. It has been thought sufficient to prove that the Israelites held themselves strictly bound to exterminate the Canaanites, to quote the narrative of the submission of the Gibeonites, in Josh. ix. But why should the Gibeonites have thought it necessary to secure for themselves, by artifice, a result which, according to that view, lay open to all the Canaanites? Several critics indeed, as LE CLERC and BUDEUS, who likewise advocate the mitigated view, have supposed this artifice of the Gibeonites was quite unnecessary, and was only prompted by their erroneous apprehensions; and that nothing more was required than their voluntary submission to the Israelites; their lives would then be spared without any scruple. But this view is decidedly erroneous. For how then could it be mentioned in ver. 14, by way of censure, that Joshua, deceived by the artifice of the Gibeonites, had hastily granted them their lives? How could the people murmur against Joshua and the princes of the congregation? Ver. 18.

But every doubt is excluded by the clear passages in Exod. xxiii. 32, 33: xxxiv. 12-16; Deut. vii. 1-5; xx. 15-18, in which the Israelites are expressly forbidden to receive the Canaanites by agreement, either as subjects or vassals. This prohibition is included in the term  $\text{בְּרִית}$ , which constantly occurs in reference to the Canaanites. For this always implies total extermination. And that this was intended in the Mosaic injunctions, and that they could not be otherwise understood by the people, is evident from the circumstance that the neglect of the entire extermination is severely censured by the angel of the Lord, Judges ii. 1-4;\* and in the Book of Judges all the misery of the people during the period of the Judges, is deduced from their disobedience to this Divine command.

---

\* 1. "And an angel of the Lord came up from Gilgal to Bochim, and said, I made you to go up out of Egypt, and have brought you into the land which I swore unto your fathers; and I said, I will never break my covenant with you. 2. And ye shall make no league with the inhabitants of this land; ye shall throw down their altars; but ye have not obeyed my voice—why have ye done this? 3. Wherefore I also said, I will not drive them out from before you; but they shall be as thorns in your sides, and their gods shall be a snare unto you. 4. And it came to pass, when the angel of the Lord spake these words unto all the children of Israel, that the people lifted up their voice and wept."

But yet it cannot be overlooked, that this opinion only increases the difficulties of the whole matter which it is designed to lessen, indeed renders their removal utterly impossible. It will afterwards appear, that this object can be attained only by admitting that the Israelites were the instruments of the Divine justice, which had devoted the Canaanites to destruction. If this were the case, it would make little difference whether they voluntarily surrendered or offered resistance; and if their safety or destruction were connected with this circumstance, this whole justification must appear as very suspicious. To this must be added, that, as a concurrent cause for the Divine determination respecting the Canaanites, it is constantly stated that they were likely to infect the Israelites with their detestable vices and their idolatry. This cause must perplex those who hold the opinion we are controverting; for the danger to the Israelites would arise as much from those who voluntarily submitted themselves, as from those who were subdued by force.

No better success has attended another attempt at a mitigated view—the supposition that the Israelites had caused their invasion of the land to be preceded by a formal declaration of war. That not a syllable respecting such an occurrence is found in the Scriptures, shows at least that it can form no very important item in the justification of the Israelites. But for the only admissible justification, it is not only unnecessary but unsuitable, and can at most be of very small service for any other pleas which have been set up.

While we are now reviewing these various attempts, we would not trespass on the patience of our readers, by occupying their time with those that are palpably absurd. Of this class is the assumption that the right of the Israelites was founded on the division of the whole earth among Noah's three sons, by which Palestine fell to the descendants of Shem—probably a Jewish figment originally, which, by the authority of EPIPHANIUS, acquired extensive currency, especially among theologians of the Romish Church, and so late as the year 1755, was defended by a Dr NONNE of Bremen in a special essay, so that J. D. MICHAELIS, in his *Mos. Recht.* 1, § 29, thought it worthy of a full refutation. Such also is the notion that, without the Divine appointment, it was allowable to declare war on an exceedingly wicked people,

without any previous provocation, since in dishonouring human nature by its vices, it offered an insult to the whole human race. Such, lastly, is the hypothesis, that the Canaanites, by wrongs inflicted on the Israelites, had given them occasion to make war, and had been themselves the aggressors, which, as MICHAELIS observes, reminds one of the fable of the wolf and the lamb.

After deducting these attempts at justifying the war on the Canaanites, the following remain which have a claim to our attentive consideration.

I. We begin with that which has acquired a certain value from the authority of J. D. MICHAELIS (*Mos. Recht.* § 31), though very weighty objections were raised against it even by his contemporaries, particularly by the learned and acute FABER (*Archæol.* p. 79, &c). MICHAELIS himself states it briefly in the following words :—“ Palestine was from time immemorial a land of Hebrew shepherds, and the Israelites, who had never surrendered their rights, required it again from the Canaanites as unlawful possessors.” The Phœnicians (thus he endeavours to support his view), were not the original occupiers of this country, but dwelt at first (according to the best authorities) near the Red Sea. When they began to extend their traffic, they made their way into Palestine, which was very advantageously situated for this purpose. At first they merely built commercial towns and factories; but by degrees they spread over the country, and finally expelled the ancient inhabitants. Even in Abraham’s time, it was a matter of complaint that the Canaanites dwelt in the land, and had rendered the space too narrow for the flocks and herds of the patriarchs. But their encroachments advanced, and when the Israelites had been for some time in Egypt, the Canaanites had appropriated the whole of the country. This land of their ancestors the Israelites had never resigned to the Canaanites; they had rather asserted their own rights very significantly, by the solemn interment of Jacob in Palestine. That they intended to return thither at some future time was generally known, even in Egypt. “ But should they not at least have left to the Canaanites their commercial towns, which were erected without the opposition of their forefathers? The question is easily decided. When a foreign nation, whom we have not prevented from erecting factories and commercial towns in our country, so abuse our

kindness in order to oppress us, and gradually appropriate the whole of the land,—if this people, when we wish to occupy again our ancient land, meet us sword in hand,—when, lastly, they are vicious to such a degree that we cannot inhabit the same country with them, without destroying our own morals, are we then bound to leave them in possession of their factories and towns, and to expose ourselves to the danger of new ones ?”

This reasoning rests on the assumption, that Canaan was originally the possession of the progenitors of the Israelites, which the Canaanites afterwards invaded. But this view is decidedly objectionable. Even if we attributed to the Canaanites a different earlier residence, it must be admitted that their settlement preceded that of Abraham. For even then the land bore the name of Canaan, and, in Gen. xii. 6 and xiii. 7, it is expressly mentioned that the Canaanites were then in the land, and that Abraham was obliged to separate from Lot, because the pasture lands not occupied by the Canaanites were not sufficient for the herds of both ; all accounts give us the idea of a long-cultivated country fixedly and regularly divided amongst its inhabitants. But the whole assumption that the Phœnicians or Canaanites originally resided elsewhere, is to be rejected without hesitation, as I have more fully proved in the essay *de rebus Tyrriorum*, Berlin, 1832, p. 93.

But though this point is disposed of, the whole hypothesis is not entirely set aside. A new turn has been given to it, to enable it again to enter the lists. The Canaanites, it is allowed, were the original inhabitants of Palestine. But they had not taken possession of the whole. The pasture lands lay open for those who wish to appropriate them. This was done by the ancestors of the Israelites. During their sojourn in Egypt, the Canaanites unlawfully occupied them. After leaving Egypt, the Israelites again asserted their claims, and, since the Canaanites would not acknowledge them, the Israelites took possession over part of the country in virtue of their ancient occupancy of it, and the other by right of conquest.

With this new modification the hypothesis has so much greater claims to consideration, since EWALD (*über die Composition der Genesis*, p. 276), has endeavoured to show, that the author of Genesis constantly aims to establish such a human claim of the Israelites to Palestine. He directs attention to the facts, that Lot

at first went eastward—that his posterity were separated from Canaan—that Isaac is always represented as the successor and heir of Abraham in Canaan—that Esau his first-born, and, at first, much-loved son, removed from Canaan, which was connected only with the patriarch Israel—that everywhere it appears that Abraham and his posterity dwelt in Palestine at peace, and undisturbed and independent of the other inhabitants. But this aim of the author is most distinctly seen in the narrative of Abraham's purchase of a burial-place, Gen. xxiii. How much importance the historian attaches to this transaction appears from the extreme care with which he always describes the site of the field, and the peculiar prominence he gives to the circumstances that Abraham purchased it with pure gold. With land so formally purchased, the claims of his descendants are most strictly connected. Hence, the narrator always returns to this subject, mentions at Abraham's death the same place as the burial-ground, and represents Israel, when sojourning in Egypt, as earnestly charging his sons to bury him there, and Joseph as wishing his bones to be laid in the same spot.

But, on closer examination, the hypothesis, even thus modified, appears quite untenable. Who ever doubted, that, to a people who first take possession of a country, even those parts belong, which, for a time, are not brought into cultivation, and that the usufruct of them, which other persons enjoy by permission, does not justify them in assuming a right of possession? That in the Scriptures the relation of the patriarchs to the Cannanites is regarded as of this kind—that no possessions are attributed to them beyond and except their moveable property, may be proved by numerous passages of Scripture. In Genesis, the standing designation of the patriarchs is that of *strangers*, and their state is represented as a pilgrimage. But this phraseology implies an exactly contrary state of things to that which, according to the hypothesis, must have existed. MICHAELIS himself, in another passage, (M. R. ii. § 138), lays down as the characteristic of the condition of a *stranger*, the total want of all landed property. The same term is used to designate their relation to the land of the Philistines, whose king, without scruple and without objection on Isaac's part, refused him the further usufruct of the pasture land situate in his territories, when it no longer suited his convenience; compare,

for instance, Gen. xxi., xxiii., xxxiv. Everywhere present circumstances are contrasted with the future ; hope with possession. The Divine promises always speak of *giving*, never of *restoring*. The principal passages are the following : xvii. 8, “ *And I will give unto thee and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger* (אֶרֶץ נָכְרִית the land of thy sojournings, *Eng. Marg. Read.*) *all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession.*” xxiii. 4, Abraham says to the sons of Heth, “ *I am a stranger and a sojourner with you, give me a possession of a burying-place with you.*” xxvi. 3, “ *Sojourn in this land, and I will be with thee, and I will bless thee ; for unto thee and unto thy seed I will give all these countries, and I will perform the oath which I sware unto Abraham thy father.*” Compare xxviii. 4 ; xxxvii. 1 ; and vol i. 407. If the pasture-lands were the property of the Hebrews, what need had Abraham to purchase a burial-ground of the Canaanites ? Why should Jacob, when he wished to build a house (Gen. xxxiii.), secure a right to the ground by the purchase of a parcel of a field belonging to the Shechemites ? After such plain proofs from the same book, of which the statements are perfectly decisive, we need scarcely appeal on this subject to Psalm cv. 12, where it is said of the patriarchs that “ *they were strangers in the land,*” and to the discourse of Stephen, Acts vii. 5, καὶ οὐκ ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ κληρονομίαν ἐν αὐτῇ οὐδὲ βῆμα ποδός, καὶ ἐπηγγέιλαιτο αὐτῷ δοῦναι εἰς κατάσχεσιν αὐτὴν καὶ τῷ σπέρματι αὐτοῦ μετ’ αὐτον, οὐκ ὄντος αὐτῷ τέκνου. Nor need we urge, that, in the Scriptures themselves, the typical relation of the sojourn of the patriarchs in Canaan to the course of believers on earth is founded on the view we are advocating.

By what has been already said, we may be certain that the whole argumentation of EWALD must be founded on an error. How could the same author who so directly repudiates all human right on the part of the Israelites to Palestine, seek earnestly to establish it ? On closer examination, the error appears to arise principally from confounding the right of the Israelites, in reference to the possessors of the land, the Canaanites, with their right in reference to their own blood relations. To prove the latter, to show how Israel alone, by the Divine providence, became the heir of the land of Canaan, is certainly an object which is pursued



through Genesis with a consequentness that alone is sufficient to refute the hypothesis of the formation of this book from unconnected fragments of various authors. What EWALD has here confounded has been well distinguished by an earlier writer, WITTER, *Jura Israelitarum in Palaestinam*, from whom also much is to be learned on other points. He deduces the right of the Israelites from the Divine promise alone. A second source of error is, that, in quoting passages which speak of Abraham's power and unshackled freedom, he has confounded the ideas of independence and the right of possession. The former certainly belonged to Abraham; he was a free shepherd-chief, standing on a perfect equality with the Canaanitish kings; he conducted wars, and concluded treaties. But if the Canaanites had refused him the further use of the pasture-lands, and he had nevertheless remained in the land, he would have been obliged, just as his descendants were afterwards in Egypt, to sacrifice a portion of his independence. But no one could prevent his maintaining it by changing the place of his residence. A third source of error lies in the false view of the narrative of the purchase of the burial-ground. We have already seen how little this could prove the right of the Israelites to Palestine. All history, abounding as it does with so many unjust wars, can hardly furnish an example in which the right of conquest would be based on so exceedingly pitiful a reason. It appears so much the more in this light, because the possession of this burial-place by the Israelites was never disputed by the Canaanites. But we cannot better express the true object which the historian had before him in this full and minute delineation, than in the words of CALVIN, "He was not anxious to have a foot of land for erecting a tent; he cared only for a sepulchre; but he particularly wished to have a family grave in the land which was promised to him for an inheritance, by which he testified to posterity, that, neither by his own death nor that of his nearest kindred, was the promise rendered void; on the contrary, it would not be fulfilled till their decease, and those who were deprived of the light of the sun, and of the common air, would nevertheless remain partakers of the promised inheritance. For if they were silent and dumb, yet the grave would be a silent witness, so that even death could not rob them of their inheritance." That purchase was important for Israel as a witness of Abraham's

living faith ; important also, since then a single spot of the promised land acquired a marked importance, which is also noticed in the narratives of Genesis, so that the Israelites were accompanied by outward mementoes of those in whose believing footsteps they were to follow.

We could bring forward many other considerations against the whole view of MICHAELIS, if those already adduced were not sufficient. We might ask, whether, even admitting that the Israelites originally had a right to the pasture-lands of Canaan, this right would not become null and void in the lapse of several centuries? This question could only be answered in the negative, on the supposition that the Israelites had reserved their rights. But if no trace is found of that, it is also certain that among the Israelites themselves, the remembrance of the Divine promise relative to the land of Canaan was never lost. The narrative of Jacob's burial in Canaan proves the contrary. For had the Canaanites conceived of this transaction in its true sense, as a practical declaration that the living would one day possess the land, where for the present the dead were resting, they would hardly have regarded the matter in so peaceable and friendly a spirit. Moreover, the more natural it was for the Canaanites to make themselves masters of the alleged possession of Israel, which had been so long forsaken, so much the more necessary was it, at all events, that first the way of kindness towards them should be tried. But of this we find not the least trace. From the first, the Israelites made known their design of occupying the whole land. Then, apart from all these objections, the question would still remain, Whether it would be just for those who abstained from making their title to the less important to rest on God's command, to use it as a plea for seizing on the infinitely more important lawful possession. A people who should act in a similar manner from their own suggestion, we should never consider noble and magnanimous. But lastly, which is the principal point, MICHAELIS himself is obliged to admit that of the rights of the Israelites to Canaan, which he professes to have discovered, not a trace is found in Scripture. But this is indeed far more suspicious than he will allow it to be. If this deduction is requisite for justifying the Divine command, how could God have left it to human ingenuity to find it out? How comes it to pass,

that in such numerous passages, there is no reference to it, though it would have been of real importance to remove the suspicion, that God commanded what was unrighteous, and thus violated himself that holy law which he had prescribed to his people, as an unchangeable rule of conduct? If we glance at the originating principle of this hypothesis, it will appear to us as the spirit of an age, in which even in those who had not entirely apostatized from the faith, God had been pushed back into the other world, and the living sentiment respecting the living God had vanished. Since, therefore, the alone true right of the Israelites, which had its root in God, could not be discerned and acknowledged, either the justification of the Israelites on this ground, and along with it the Pentateuch, must be given up, or, for those who have too much faith, or too little boldness to do this, a fictitious right must be sought for on earth.

II. Another method of justification has been attempted by FABER; but it is of a kind that one might almost believe that it was designed for an opposite purpose, if its repetition by the worthy HESS did not show that it could be proposed in earnestness and with an honest design; it shows also to what risk of error the Christian writer is exposed, when, in an unbelieving age, he directs his attention principally outwards, and like JUSTI in his essay *über die den Aegyptern von den Israeliten abgeforderten Gerathe*. p. 76, longs to bring it about, "that even a fool must say, there is nothing to blame therein," an endeavour which, if we look at the peculiar nature of Divine revelation, involves an absurdity. In nature and in history, the perplexity and the difficulty can only be explained for those whom God himself has furnished with the true key for the whole, for which no false key can be substituted. In the account of this hypothesis we follow HESS, who has endeavoured more than FABER to hide its nakedness. We must, he says, in deciding on the right of the Israelites, transport ourselves completely into the state at that time of the world's concerns, and the ideas then prevalent of right and wrong, and the relations in which the nations stood to one another. The right of possession was then in respect of certain species of property, not by any means so definite as at the present day. The *meum* and *tuum* prevailed chiefly respecting moveable articles, such as cattle, household furniture, &c. Lands were not

called nor considered as property, since persons for a long time might make use of them alone and unmolested. The *right* of possession rested simply on the *might*. Whoever had the latter, without scruple expelled the original possessors. Lands became property gradually by mutual compact, in virtue of which two or more neighbours gave reciprocal pledges, that they would not disturb one another in the possession of lands that they had cultivated or built upon. "Hence it follows, to deprive any one without a special reason of his moveable property, was unjust; but to extend into the neighbouring lands, as far as one required room, was not unjust (even though accomplished by force), where no treaty respecting the boundaries had determined the exact *meum* and *tuum*." What every tribe, if not in covenant with their neighbours, allowed themselves in doing, as soon as their necessities required it, *that* a people would allow themselves much sooner who had no land of their own. Must they remain nomades, from a dread of a fixed residence? Or must they betake themselves to the ocean, in order to discover some uninhabited country? They had the same right to Canaan as the possessors themselves. Equally they might have ventured to make themselves masters of Egypt, had they been able. Hence, in the justification of the conduct of the Israelites, God may be left entirely out of the question. "The God of Abraham did not, by the arrangements of his providence, cause it (the occupation of Palestine) to cease to be unjust, but it was not so in itself." Truly, if they are right who believe that such a small country as Palestine could never have contained so numerous a people as Israel was under David and Solomon, they ought not to find fault with the Israelites, if they had also conquered the Syrians."

Considered as a mere *argumentum ad hominem*, it must be admitted, that this is tolerably well managed. It relies entirely on the ideas of right peculiar to the age, as a mere human invention; it assumes not that right makes the terms, but that the terms make the right. Yet it may make an impression on those who do homage to the spirit of the age in this respect. But conscience is so powerful, that men in practice do not equally approve what theory sanctions, or, carried out consequentially, must sanction, and if it makes, on other grounds, a struggle against acknowledging a war of conquest as lawful, how much more here, where

the whole matter is referred to God. Besides, it would be urged, that the whole relation of the patriarchs to the Canaanites—the purchase of parcels of ground from them—their ready satisfaction with the portions of land which they granted them—their own declaration that they were only *strangers* in the land, that the Canaanites were the possessors—all this amounts to a practical recognition of the rights of the latter. It would be thought *unjust* that they should invade the country, without any declaration of war; detestable, that they should avow the intention of putting to death all the inhabitants; horrible, that they should refer this design to God.

But, far stronger are the scruples which arise in the mind of a Christian critic. He must, in the first place, protest against the often repeated attempt of HESS to justify transactions which, according to our idea of right and wrong, are to be repudiated, on the ground that these ideas were not in existence at that time. The law of God is written in the human heart, and the knowledge of it can never be so obliterated, not merely in the life of whole nations, but also in the individual, that its violation should be no longer sin; and even should it be obliterated, yet the ignorance would still be sinful, as a man who commits murder when intoxicated is not thereby guiltless. This view is confirmed, if we go through the most remarkable ancient narratives in the Scriptures with a scrutinizing eye. We there find not a few violations of law and right; but never that they were committed with a good conscience—never that God measured them by a different standard than in later times; in these cases, it is evident that the narrator commonly lets the judgment be expressed by the facts themselves, as in the instance of Jacob, by the striking retributions which go parallel with all his individual transgressions; in the instance of Abraham, by the perplexities into which he was thrown by his violation of veracity in Egypt. Yet the inventors of the hypothesis have expressed themselves as if, even in our days, property in land was morally secured only by compacts, so that, by their boldness, the counter-argument first urged, does not affect them here so forcibly as elsewhere. But the difficulties, on other accounts, are only so much the greater. They must blush for their theory, when they see it carried out in practice. Yet, so many worthless solutions of the difficulties in sacred history have

been propounded, that persons have abandoned too much the position of the present times and of active life—they have not considered whether they would pass the same judgment, if the events passed before our own eyes, which is always a good touchstone for the correctness of a moral judgment. Who would be willing to undertake to justify the conduct of the Spainards in America, which, according to this theory, was perfectly innocent? Or the conduct, much less stained by cruelty, of the European settlers in North America? The man who would do this, would have witnesses rise up against him from among his own clients. The first colonists who left their native land on account of religion, and were animated by a living Christian spirit, took no land against the will of the aborigines, though the smallest part only was used by them, and there was much more plausibility in questioning their right of possession to huge uncultivated forests, than that of the Canaanites, in a well tilled, regularly divided country, like Palestine, in a state of general cultivation. And, when the multitudes who in later times have emigrated, animated by a different spirit (in part the transported scum of the English nation), pursued a different course, a prohibition was sent out from the English sovereigns. Every Englishman who penetrated further into the forests, and wished to bring them to a state of cultivation, was obliged to purchase a place from the natives, or otherwise make terms with them. To consider the subject more closely, what reason is there for distinguishing the relations of whole nations to one another, in this respect, from those of individuals? If, in the latter case, he who forcibly takes possession of another man's property, without noticing whether he has formally recognised it as his own, or not, is called a robber or a thief—why not in the former instance? What reason is there for distinguishing in the case of nations, between moveable and fixed property? Moreover, the trivial reason, that in the former there was the labour of acquisition, is here not applicable. For the Canaanites had really applied themselves most industriously to the improvement of the soil, which, more than many others, as its present state sufficiently indicates, required culture to make it what the Scriptures testify it once was, “*a land flowing with milk and honey.*” It is founded in the arrangements of Providence, of which the recog-

tion is implanted in every human breast, that every land, that, in short, every thing which hitherto has had no owner, from the instant that a nation takes possession of it, becomes their lawful property. From that instant it is to be regarded as a gift of the Divine Providence, so that, who ever seeks to deprive them of it, fights against God. This view is expressed in many parts of Scripture.

When the Most High divided to the nations their inheritance,  
 When he separated the sons of Adam—  
 He set the bounds of the people,  
 According to the number of the children of Israel.

DEUT. xxxii. 8.

*“ God hath made of one blood all nations of men, for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation.”* Acts xvii. 26.

After it has been shown, therefore, that the Israelites, considered from this point-of-view, had no right to take possession of Canaan, the whole argument that they did not seek to gain possession of the country from the love of conquest, but from necessity, loses all its importance. For this plea could only serve to place the Israelites on a level with those who rob or murder, not from wanton cruelty, but from necessity; and even this plea is not perfectly applicable to their case, since *necessity* would only in a very imperfect sense be predicated of them—about as much so as of a man of title, who has quite enough for his daily sustenance, but not enough to keep up the style and splendour of his rank. The way back to Egypt was not closed against them; those who so unwillingly let them go, would gladly have received them again on the same conditions as before, or probably not quite so severe. What morality, that of the heathens not excepted, permits us to purchase freedom from our own hard lot by inflicting far heavier sufferings on others? The Arabian desert served them as a dwelling-place for forty years; could it not have done so for a longer period? And must not their Almighty leader have known ways and means to prepare an abode for them, which they could have occupied without perpetrating injustice?

III. We come now to a solution which demands peculiar attention, since it is not peculiar to a few of the learned, but may be

considered as that of the Church. We meet with it almost universally from the times of AUGUSTIN until it was exchanged for others altogether untenable, in the period of unbelief, not on account of its objective inadequacy, but from causes grounded in persons which have been already noticed. Its ablest advocates are SERARIUS, STAFFER, (*Polemik*, p. 1003), LILIENTHAL, LOWMAN, and BACHIENE, (*Geogr* I. ii., p. 184.) It is as follows:—The Israelites had no human right whatever to Canaan. Their right rested entirely on God's gift. By this no injustice was done to the Canaanites. By their great depravity they had rendered themselves unworthy of being any longer possessors of the land, which God, as in the case of all other nations, only gave them conditionally. The Israelites were sent against them as ministers of the Divine justice; so that their destruction only differed in *form* from that of Sodom and Gomorrah. God's giving Canaan to the Israelites was at once an act of grace and of justice.

We begin with what is of the most importance—the proof that this solution has its firm foundation in the Scriptures.

The possession of Canaan by the Israelites is constantly represented as the free gift of the Divine grace, by which all human right is completely excluded; thus, for example, Gen. xii. 7, xiii. 14–17, where God says to Abraham, “*Unto thy seed will I give this land;*” “*Lift up now thine eyes, and look from the place where thou art northward, and southward, and eastward, and westward; for all the land which thou seest, to thee will I give it, and to thy seed for ever. . . . Arise, walk through the land, in the length of it, and in the breadth of it: for I will give it unto thee.*” The latter act was symbolical, denoting the future possession by his descendants of the present land of his pilgrimage, by which Abraham at the same time expressed his firm faith in the Divine promise.

Against this statement MICHAELIS objects (*Mos. Recht.* ii. § 28), that this cannot be considered as a token of the right of the Israelites to invade Canaan. All countries which a people take by force of arms, are given to it by Providence, and victories themselves are his gift. But if a Divine gift of this sort were not intended, which makes those to whom it is imparted lawful possessors, but rather one of those by which they are only installed in their rightful possession, how comes it to pass that this right



is not mentioned in any of the numerous passages referring to the subject? that in the Scriptures nothing appears in reference to this right, but only what proves that it never existed. But if such a human right did not exist, then the right of possession must be given in that promise. For a good which is purchased at the cost of heavy transgression, God will not promise as a gift of his grace; so much the less when this promise appears as an enticement to this transgression; and here it would be simply such since it plainly includes the exhortation to get possession of the promised good when the time appointed by God should arrive.

But the conquest of Canaan is distinguished equally as an act of God's justice against the Canaanites, as an act of his grace towards Israel. The principal passage is Gen. xv. 13-16—“*And God said unto Abraham, Know of a surety that thy seed shall be a stranger in a land that is not theirs, and shall serve them; and they shall afflict them four hundred years: And also that nation, whom they shall serve, will I judge; and afterward shall they come out with great substance. And thou shalt go to thy fathers in peace; thou shalt be buried in a good old age. But in the fourth generation they shall come hither again: for the iniquity of the Amorites is not yet full.*” These last words are important in more than one respect. (i.) They exclude all human right of the Israelites to Palestine. For had such a right existed, why for its being enforced should the filling up of the iniquity of the Amorites be required, *i.e.*, of the Canaanites generally; for a single division of them is named in order to avoid the long enumeration already given, since it would be understood that the same remark would apply to all the other tribes that stood under the same relations. (ii.) If the cause why Abraham's descendants were not now, but after a long interval, to obtain possession of the promised land, was, that the iniquity of the Amorites was not yet full, had not reached its culminating point (at which the carcass calls the eagles together), it is by that equally intimated that this filling up of iniquity would justify the Divine act, which, under existing circumstances, would have been unjust—exactly as God, before he destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah by his immediate judgment, first of all permitted the abandoned depravity of their inhabitants most notoriously to manifest itself.

We derive another proof of this representation from the fact, that the conduct which the Israelites were commanded to observe, and actually observed towards the Canaanites, is constantly designated as  $\text{חַר־אֵשׁ}$ . This designation shows that the highest object of the war of extermination against the Canaanites was the vindication of the Divine glory which had been dishonoured by them. The idea of  $\text{חַר־אֵשׁ}$  is that of the forcible dedication of those persons to God, who had obstinately refused to dedicate themselves voluntarily to him—the manifestation of the Divine glory in the destruction of those who, during their lifetime, never served as a mirror for it, and, therefore, would not realize God's end in the creation of the world. God will sanctify himself *on*, or *by means of*, all those *in* whom he is not sanctified. The destruction of any thing which serves him not, publishes his praise. This idea of  $\text{חַר־אֵשׁ}$  which J. D. MICHAELIS (*Mos. Recht.* § 145) explains in a highly characteristic manner as “*a master-stroke of legislative policy*,” is prominent in the command, Deut. xiii. 16–18, to destroy every Israelitish city which should be seduced into idolatry; see particularly ver 17, “*And there shall cleave nought of the cursed thing  $\text{חַר־אֵשׁ}$  to thine hand, that the Lord may turn from the fierceness of his anger.*” So in the narrative, Num. xxi. 1–3, the Canaanitish king of Arad came out against Israel, “*And Israel vowed a vow unto the Lord, and said, If thou wilt indeed deliver this people into my hand, then I will utterly destroy  $\text{חַר־אֵשׁ}$  their cities. And the Lord hearkened unto the voice of Israel, and delivered up the Canaanites; and they utterly destroyed  $\text{חַר־אֵשׁ}$  them and their cities: and he called the name of the place Hormah,  $\text{חַר־אֵשׁ}$  (i.e. utter destruction, Eng. Marg. R.)* Here the  $\text{חַר־אֵשׁ}$  plainly appears, not as something proceeding from human wilfulness, and serving human ends, but a sacred act commanded by God, which Israel required as a sacrifice made for God. Exactly thus in the narrative, 1 Kings xx., where the king of Israel, not having carried into effect the ban pronounced by God on Benhadad, the king of Syria, the bold despiser of God—was himself devoted to destruction. The ban against the Canaanites was in general directed only against their persons, which alone were the proper objects of it. Their cities and their property was divided among the Israelites. But in, order to show that their former owners were exterminated, not by human wilfulness,

but by the vengeance of God—that their land and property was not to be considered as booty, but as a fief held of God, which he had only committed to other vassals if they would faithfully perform the service to which, by accepting it, they were pledged—on the *first* city that was taken, Jericho, the  $\text{זֶרַח}$  was laid and on all the property in it.

A third reason, lastly, is contained in the passages in which God declares to the new inhabitants of the land, that their apostasy from him would deprive them of the possession of it. That this it was, which led to the destruction of the earlier inhabitants, would be probable from analogy, even if it had not been many times expressly said. The principal passages are the following. Lev. xviii. 24, 28, “*Defile not ye yourselves in any of these things*” (the various cases of unchastity and impiety of the grossest kind enumerated in the context), “*for in all these things the nations are defiled which I cast out before you. And the land is defiled; therefore I do visit the iniquity thereof upon it, and the land itself vomiteth out her inhabitants. Ye shall therefore keep my statutes and my judgments, and shall not commit any of these abominations, neither any of your own nation, nor any stranger that sojourneth among you. (For all these abominations have the men of the land done, which were before you, and the land is defiled.) That the land spue not you out also, when ye defile it, as it spued out the nations that were before you.*” Deut. xii. 29, “*When the Lord thy God shall cut off the nations from before thee, whither thou goest to possess them, and thou succeedest them, and dwellest in their land; ver. 30, Take heed to thyself, that thou be not snared by following them, . . . ver. 31, Thou shalt not do so unto the Lord thy God; for every abomination to the Lord which he hateth have they done unto their gods; for even their sons and their daughters they have burnt in the fire to their gods;” xxviii. 63, 64, “*And as the Lord rejoiced over you to do you good and to multiply you: so the Lord will rejoice over you to destroy you and to bring you to nought; and ye shall be plucked from off the land whither thou goest to possess it. And the Lord shall scatter thee among all people from the one end of the earth even unto the other.*” Compare also Deut. vii. 28; viii. 19, 20.*

After having shown that the right of the Israelites to Palestine,

as we have stated it, is the only one sanctioned by the Scriptures, we have still to refute numerous objections that have been made against it.

We begin with that which we regard as the source of all the rest, although most of the opponents of our view have not openly advocated it, or even, like J. D. MICHAELIS, have actually spoken of it as untenable. It is the assertion that it is not God's method to punish idolatry and wickedness by extermination; which we find for example expressed in the posthumous works of the Wolfenbüttler Fragmentist, edited by SCHMIDT, p. 160. This sentiment is indeed rejected by many in theory;\* but they manifest the strongest aversion to admit the opposite into actual life, especially on so large a scale as would here be the case. And quite naturally; for their God is an abstraction, confined to heaven; they would prefer anything rather than that he should be known on earth; they are not sensible of the abominable nature of sin and the depths of human depravity, nor of God's holiness and righteousness; hence, to their feelings, a judgment so stern appears an act of barbarity. Such persons cannot be effectually confuted, since their aversion is rooted in the inmost depths of their disposition, and they could only relinquish it with their being; yet it may not be superfluous, if we make some counter-remarks for the sake of those who are partially infected with this aversion.

It would be superfluous if, in proof of the punitive justice of God affecting the destiny of nations as well as of individuals, we wished to appeal to the numerous passages relating to the subject in the Old Testament. But we must call attention to the fact, that in the New Testament also, the same strict idea of God's punitive justice is maintained—that even there, “*God is a consuming fire.*” Only notice what the Saviour said to those who

---

\* Yet, even in the present day, this is not unfrequently avoided in express terms, as it is with remarkable distinctness by VON CÖLLN (Bibl. Theol. i. 262). “If God destroyed all men (eight excepted) by a flood, because they lived in sin; if he exterminated the inhabitants of Sodom for their vices, by fire from heaven; if he annihilated nations who worshipped him not—such representations are at variance with the pure conception of the Divine justice, according to which it employs punishment as a means of moral education and culture.” But all history, not less than those representations, is at variance with this “pure conception of the Divine righteousness.” It remains only to choose either to acknowledge that this conception is not pure, or to admit a dualism that is destructive of the true theistic principle.

told him of "the Galileans whose blood Pilate had mingled with their sacrifices. " *Suppose ye that these Galileans were sinners above all the Galileans, because they suffered such things? I tell you, Nay; but except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish. Or these eighteen upon whom the tower of Siloam fell, and slew them, think ye that they were sinners above all men that dwell in Jerusalem? I tell you, Nay; but except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish,*" Luke xiii. 1-5. According to the theology of natural reason, Christ ought here to have struck at the root of the Jewish superstition, which saw in what had occurred a Divine judgment. But instead of that, he assumes that it was such, and only warns them against the Pelagian delusion of limiting the Divine punitive justice, which one day would be manifested in a far more comprehensive manner. On that strict idea of the Divine justice rests all that our Lord said of the impending destruction of Jerusalem, and his whole announcement of its most perfect manifestation in the judgment of the world, which was only future in its absolute completion. It is our Lord himself who expresses the general principle, of which the distinction of the Canaanites was only a special application; " *Where the carcase is, there will the eagles be gathered together;*" where sin has become rank, there will the Divine punishment fall. If all who stood on this same point-of-view were as open and consequential as the author of the works *Christüs und der Vernunft* (*Christ and Reason*), who from the expression, "Woe unto thee Chorazin," &c., infers that the religious ideas of Christ were very unrefined! (" *dass die religiösen Einsichten Christi höchst ungeläutert gewesen!*") But even those who have courage enough to present this offering to their fancy, by which they bring God down to their own level, would not thereby get rid of the matter. After they have once begun to give way, they can never find a firm footing till they have reached the dreary region of Atheism. Let us set revelation aside, and merely maintain that there is a God, and, consequently, a Providence; for one without the other is inconceivable. Then let us pass on to the ground of history. What do we behold? Everywhere destruction; a multitude of nations sunk in ruins, almost every leaf stained with blood; destruction by the ravages of disease; destruction by the fury of the elements! If God be not the original author of all—He whom every na-

tural cause must serve, must know and will them, or else what is Providence? But if he be the original author, how can every strict idea of his punitive justice be denied? O what a totally different aspect would history present, if Man and God were such as they are in your fancies!

To this leading objection we may add another, which, while this is directed against the right itself, is directed against the way and manner in which God, in this case, must assert his rights. "That God had this right," observes J. D. MICHAELIS, "does not admit of a doubt, but would he determine thus to act, and, by enforcing this right, dishonour religion? He had equally the right to commission each individual to put a villain to death. But does he use this right? Does he, by immediate inspiration, abolish for his favourites the commandments, Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not steal, &c.? If he did so, true religion would appear on the earth in a most hateful and suspicious form; and at the sight of a regenerate person, we should have the same sensations as on being stopped by a highwayman. But if God does not give such commands to the individual objects of his favour, how could a whole nation plead his commission for making war on a people by whom they had never been injured? True and false religion have equal rights against one another; for every man considers his own religion the true one; as soon therefore as I attribute a certain right to religion, every man may require it for his own religion. . . . In fact, the neighbours of such a nation could never feel secure, if it thought itself justified on the mere command of God to go to war; they must fear that sooner or later it would imagine or invent such a command to make war upon them; for whether the command really comes from God or not, the aggressive party constitutes itself the judge. Nothing would be left for other nations but to unite in crushing such a fanatical monster."

How pitiful such a mode of arguing is, appears from the fact, that its author, who borrowed it from the English Deists, saw himself obliged to affect ignorance of the unanimous answer that is given by its opponents, since he felt that by this, which was so obvious, the whole force of the argument would be lost. Who does not see that it can only be urged, supposing that the Israelites had invaded Canaan without any visible co-operation of Providence? But the same Being who gave the command for the

invasion of the country, and the extermination of the Canaanites, gave also to the Israelites and the rest of mankind the pledge that they had not mistaken a fancy of their own for a Divine communication.

We have heard with our ears, O God,  
 Our fathers have told us,  
 What work thou didst in their days ;  
 In the times of old.  
 How thou didst drive out the heathen with thy hand,  
 And plantedst them ;  
 How thou didst afflict the people,  
 And cast them out.  
 For they got not the land in possession by their own sword,  
 Neither did their own arm save them ;  
 But thy right hand, and thine arm, and the light of thy countenance,  
 Because thou hadst a favour unto them.

Ps. xliv. 1 3.

The miraculous passage through the Red Sea, and through the Jordan, the overthrow of the walls of the first city in Palestine to which they laid siege—the hail-storm at Gibeon which, without touching the Israelites, slew more enemies than the sword—all these events, which prove that Israel could here be regarded only as an instrument in God's hand, sufficiently distinguish these transactions from the fanatical proceedings of those who, while following the lusts of their own hearts, pretend that they are acting at the command, and in the service, of God. We may confidently concede to any individual or any collective body of men, the right of doing the like, when legitimated in a similar manner. For example, could SAND have given the same proofs of a Divine commission, he would not have been branded as a criminal. The declaration, "*Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed,*" would have been as little applicable to his case as to those who condemned him to death as a just punishment, and a warning to deter others. So far from these transactions serving to excuse hypocritical impiety, they rather tend to its complete exposure. For they shew how God legitimates a people when he wishes to employ them as his guiltless instruments for the punishment of others. They place an impassable gulf between Israel and those nations whom God employs unconsciously to themselves, and contrary to their intentions, as the instruments of his justice, in order, when they have fulfilled their destiny, to arm other

instruments of his justice in their turn against them, and so on continually.

If we have now shown that the way and manner in which God gave the Israelites possession of their promised inheritance has nothing in it objectionable, it still remains to give the reasons which determined the Divine wisdom to select precisely this, and not that desired by our opponents, the extinction of the former inhabitants by an immediate judgment from heaven, like that on the old world, and on Sodom and Gomorrah, by a flood, or fire, or plague. The principal reason here is, that for which also under the New Covenant God does not receive believers at once to glory, and change immediately the Church militant into the Church triumphant.

“Israel behält den Sieg  
Nach geführtem Kampf und Krieg  
Canaan wird nicht gefunden  
Wo man nicht hät überwunden.”

“Israel gains the victory after conflict and war; no man reaches Canaan without struggling for it.” Faith acquires strength only by conflict; trust in God is confirmed by trial. The more frequent opportunities a man has to be made sensible of his own weakness, so much the more deeply does he learn to acknowledge that it is God’s power which works in us to will and to do. The secret abysses of doubt and unbelief are disclosed, and then God takes occasion to fill them up; then the valleys are exalted, and the mountains are made low. By manifold difficulties in the narrow way, a thorny path by the side of precipices, men learn to look up for the hand from the clouds, and, when it is stretched forth, to grasp it with love and thankfulness. Such a school of faith was the conflict with the Canaanites for Israel. Had God led them into a land already emptied of inhabitants, they would soon have forgotten that he had made it so; they would have ascribed the whole operation to natural causes. But from this indolent forgetfulness, which proceeds from the disposition of the natural man, estranged from God, who keeps God before his eyes only as long as the spectacle is forced upon him—they were constantly aroused. Let us only consider what happened at Ai. How strictly God dealt with his people, was shown in his making the whole nation answerable for the transgression of an individual.



That nothing can stand in the way of his grace, that *sin* is the only wall of separation between him and his people, was shewn by the success of their arms, as soon as the ban resting on Israel was atoned for by the death of the transgressor. Moreover, since God did not destroy the Canaanites at once, but made their conquest dependent on the faith of Israel, he thus provided himself with an instrument by which to chastise their unbelief, and the disobedience which was its fruit, and thus gave a practical proof that his partiality for Israel was not carnal, but that they must share the lot of the heathen if they resembled them in apostatizing from Him—a procedure in the Divine administration which is still maintained. He who places himself on a level with the world, will be punished by the world. This truth was plainly announced to Israel, “*But if ye will not drive out the inhabitants of the land from before you, then it shall come to pass that those which ye let remain of them shall be pricks in your eyes, and thorns in your sides, and shall vex you in the land wherein ye dwell,*” Num. xxxiii. 55. Lastly, the Israelites, in undertaking the execution of the sentence on the enemies of God, and announcing themselves as the instruments of the Divine justice, by that act formally and solemnly declared, that they would merit the same punishment if they incurred similar guilt, and thus justified beforehand the Divine judgments which in that case it was declared would fall upon them; they acknowledged the land was only held as a fief of God, and that he could demand it back again, whenever the conditions he had affixed were not fulfilled. How must this have increased the dread of forfeiting the favour of the Most Holy by unholy conduct! What a sanction would thereby be given to the holy men of God for chastising them when this really happened!

After fully meeting the two principal objections, we can more quickly dispose of the rest. A somewhat plausible objection may be taken against us, which we shall examine in the next section—*On borrowing the vessels of the Egyptians.*

If God’s commands can never be at variance with his law, which is the expression of his character, and the rule for those who are to represent his holiness on earth, if he can never legitimate falsehood, how could he give order for the violation of his commandment—*Thou shalt not kill!* But the solution here is not diffi-

cult. Falsehood, under all circumstances, is inadmissible, as may be inferred from the fact that God, under no circumstance, utters falsehood. But, to take away life is, under certain circumstances, not only allowable, but a duty. Falsehood, therefore, stands parallel, not with taking away life, but with murder, which alone is forbidden in the law of God. "*Thou shalt not kill,*" *i.e.*, thou shalt not with malignant wilfulness assume rights which belong alone to God and his servants. If God takes away life by means of his dumb and unconscious servants, why should he not also give commission and authority for that purpose to his rational creatures, the servants who "*know their Lord's will,*" provided that they can legitimate their commission in the manner that has been already described?

The Israelites, TINDAL remarks, were not less wicked than the Canaanites. How strange, therefore, that God should commission them to punish their companions in sin! There would be certainly force in this objection, if the assumption on which it rests were correct. We should perhaps not venture to urge that God, as history teaches, commonly makes use of the greatest sinners as the instruments of retribution. There is here an essential difference between those who, like the Assyrians and Chaldeans, unconsciously, and without being thereby at all justified, were ministers of the Divine justice, and those who received a clear and distinct commission from God. To maintain that, in reference to the latter, no account was to be taken of their moral fitness, would be just the same as to assert that a government might appoint a notorious cut-throat to the office of executioner, or make a thief overseer of a house of correction. If the Israelites, in the time of Joshua, had been in the same moral condition as they were in the greater part of the times of the kings, such a commission would not have been given them; nor could it have been granted them in the state of their dispositions when they left Egypt. At that time the ban was denounced on Israel itself, Num. xiv. 29, &c. But the state of Israel under Joshua was very different from this. The old corrupt generation had been worn away by God's judgment in the wilderness. The new generation that had grown up was animated with the best spirit. They were powerfully actuated by a conviction of their calling, and the feeling that the war they had

undertaken was a holy war. This is shown in a twofold respect, by their undergoing the rite of circumcision at Joshua's command, after passing through the Jordan. It had been omitted during their march through the desert, since the people, after being inwardly desecrated by their apostacy from the Lord, were to be outwardly desecrated by not receiving this sign of the Covenant. What, therefore, could be the ground for renewing that sacrament but this, that the people, by once more returning to the Lord, had fitted themselves for receiving the sign of their election? But, as the command of God bore witness to the altered disposition of the people, so also did the ready obedience with which the whole people submitted to that command. This could only be considered as the product of a living faith, strengthened by their fresh experience of the miraculous power of the Lord, which caused them to turn their eyes from the risk they encountered from performing this rite in the sight of their enemies (of which Gen. xxxiv. 25 furnishes an example). If we look further into the Book of Joshua, we shall nowhere find that stiff-necked and rebellious people, which we meet with in the Books of Moses. It would lead us too far from our main subject, if we were to follow the traces of a living piety in Israel through the whole book. We shall only quote the general testimony which is given to that generation in the Book of Judges. "*The people,*" it is said in ch. ii. 7, "*served the Lord all the days of Joshua, and all the days of the elders that outlived Joshua, who had seen all the great works of the Lord, that he did for Israel.*" This applies, it will be at once understood, to the people generally, and in the gross. It would be contrary to all experience, and to the scriptural idea of human nature, to assume that every individual was free from idolatry, and its immoral influences. But this is not necessary for our object. It is sufficient that the predominant disposition of the people was worthy of their high calling. Those members of the community who, without sharing in this disposition, took part in the execution of the Divine command, could not nullify the right of the Israelites to Palestine, but only their own claims. Personally, though not so as to affect the whole body, they became changed from servants of the Lord into robbers and murderers; they passed sentence of death on themselves, in aiding the execution of it on the Canaanites; this was brought

home to Israel by the example of Achan, who himself was subjected to the *Cherem*, because he had regarded it, if we may judge by his actions, “*as a mere master-piece of legislative ingenuity.*”

The Canaanites, TINDAL again objects to us, were not more wicked than other heathen nations. Why should they *alone* be visited with so fearful a punishment? Here, first of all, a doubt arises as to their not being more wicked. If we consult the only historical documents which are within our reach for those times, it will appear that the common depravity had attained, among no nation of the known world, so fearful a maturity, had never so loudly called for the Divine justice, as among the Canaanites. The moral degeneracy of the Phœnicians, and of their descendants, the Carthaginians, was proverbial, even in all heathen antiquity. “The advance of civilization,” says MUNTER (*die Religion der Carthager*, p. 152), “had almost entirely put an end among other nations to the abomination of human sacrifices; but nothing could induce the Carthaginians to abolish it, although it made them the object of abhorrence to all men of good morals.” Better would it have been, says PLUTARCH, to have had a Critias or a Diogoras, avowed athiests, for their law-givers, than have retained a religion so detestable for its human sacrifices. The Typhons and the Giants, those enemies of the gods, if they had prevailed, could have instituted nothing worse. It is lamentable to pass so disadvantageous a judgment on a whole nation. But how can it be otherwise, where so many facts speak for themselves, and such men as POLYBUS, CICERO, and PLUTARCH, express themselves so decidedly. The Carthaginians were morose, austere, severe towards their tributaries, and dreadfully cruel in their anger. This inhuman spirit of the nation, not sparing their own people, and showing no pity towards their conquered enemies, was tempered by no fear of benevolent gods, and the commercial spirit which pervaded the whole people must, as it met here with no counterbalance, have operated still more injuriously on their morals, than in other mercantile states, in which a milder religion was received.”

But this “*alone*” must not be allowed to pass without further notice. As if (what indeed the very heathens perceived) the whole history of the world were not a judgment of the world!

Have not almost all the nations of antiquity disappeared, even to their very names? And by what is the judgment on the Canaanites distinguished, as far as this is concerned, above every other nation? The difference that the Divine decree in this case was fulfilled by those who knew it, and were appointed by it, was of importance only for the Israelites. Moses places another nation by the side of the Canaanites, who would meet with similar awful destruction from the Lord, and this is no other than Israel itself, the people of the Lord.

We believe that our task is now finished, and we only add the wish, that our representation may call forth, not merely the acknowledgment on the part of our readers, that the Scripture can justify itself, if required, but that they may not leave unemployed the rich treasures of edification which that command of God contains in itself, but obtain, by means of it, a deep insight into God's holiness and justice, and be awakened to renewed efforts, that God may be sanctified *in* them, and, as much as depends on them, *in* their people, that he need not be (which otherwise is an unavoidable consequence) glorified *on* them and *on* their people.

THE ALLEGED PURLOINING OF THE VESSELS OF THE EGYPTIANS  
BY THE ISRAELITES.

GEN. xv. 13, 14—"And God said unto Abram, Know of a surety that thy seed shall be a stranger in a land that is not theirs, and shall serve them; and they shall afflict them four hundred years. And also that nation whom they shall serve will I judge; and afterward shall they come out with great substance, יִצְחָק יֵצֵא בְרֵאשִׁית גְּדוּלָה."

EXOD. iii. 20-22—"And I will stretch out my hand, and smite Egypt with all my wonders which I will do in the midst thereof; and after that he will let you go. And I will give this people favour in the sight of the Egyptians; and it shall come to pass, that when ye go, ye shall not go empty. But every woman shall desire of her neighbour, and of her that sojourneth in her house, vessels of silver, and vessels of gold; and ye shall put them upon your sons and your daughters, and ye shall spoil the Egyptians," (others translate it, "steal or purloin from the Egyptians.")

EXOD. xi. 1-3—"And the Lord said unto Moses, Yet will I

bring one plague more upon Pharoah and upon Egypt; afterwards he will let you go hence; when he shall let you go, he shall surely thrust you out hence altogether. Speak now in the ears of the people, and let every man ask of his neighbour, and every woman of her neighbour, jewels of silver and jewels of gold. And the Lord gave the people favour in the sight of the Egyptians. Moreover, the man Moses was very great in the land of Egypt, in the sight of Pharoah's servants, and in the sight of the people."

EXOD. xii. 35, 36—"And the children of Israel did according to the word of Moses; and they asked of the Egyptians jewels of silver and jewels of gold, and raiment. And the Lord gave the people favour in the sight of the Egyptians, so that they gave them gladly (*lent them*, other Transl.) And they spoiled the Egyptians, (*purloined from the Egyptians*, other Transl.)"

This narrative has, from ancient times, served the enemies of Revelation as a principal object of their attacks. That the heathen knew how to make use of it for this purpose, is shown by the earnest endeavour to remove their objections by PHILO in his *Life of Moses*, as well as by the Jewish fable, handed down to us by TERTULLIAN, of a lawsuit between the Egyptians and the Jews before Alexander the Great, about the gold and silver vessels, in which the Egyptians were altogether repulsed in their accusations. That the Gnostics, particularly MARCION, availed themselves of it, in order to justify their depreciation of the Old Testament, appears from IRENAEUS, iv. 49, and TERTULLIAN, *c. Marcionem*, ii. 20; in reference to the Manicheans also, AUGUSTIN, *c. Faustum*, ii. 71. The English Deists took occasion from it to cast ridicule on a religion which sanctified falsehood, deceit, and theft, (see TINDAL'S *Christianity as old as the Creation*.) That the French Atheists and Freethinkers did not neglect it, need scarcely be said, and that from them it passed over to our rationalists, might be expected, from the general contents of their store-house, in which every thing which wears only the appearance of an objection against the Scriptures is laid up, however miserable and worn out it may be. The editor of the posthumous works of the Wolfenbüttel Fragmentist, Berlin, 1787, remarks (p. 53), that if the transaction be considered in itself, every one must say that it was nothing but falsehood, deceit, and theft. But if the words, "The

Lord hath said or commanded," be added, will they change untruth and dissimulation into a Divine Revelation? If so, it will not cost much to make a Revelation out of falsehood, or virtue and piety out of wickedness; all the marks of what is divine or undivine are obliterated—religion and worship are distinguished from the most shocking lies and knavery by the magic of an empty phrase—" *God hath said it.*" And down to the present day, similar sounds are heard from all quarters, from the studies of the learned, up to the Hegelian Philosophers (DAUMER's expressions are not a whit behind those of the Fragmentist in bitterness and violence), and from pot-house critics.

The defenders of Holy Writ cannot, alas, be free from the reproach of having played into their adversaries' hands. If the narrative could not be justified otherwise than it has been by most of them, the attacks would be successful. This will appear, if we here enumerate the principal of these objectionable vindications. Common to all of them is the concession to our opponents, that the statement in the text involves lending on the part of the Egyptians, and purloining on the part of the Israelites. From this point of view, which admits of no justification, the following vindications have been attempted.

I. The right of the Israelites to the vessels has been founded on God's unlimited right, as Lord of the whole creation, to transfer the earthly goods of one possessor to another. This view of the matter has been most extensively adopted. It occurs in some of the ancient Jewish expositors, as, for instance, in ABEN EZRA, who says, " God, as he created all things, so he bestows them according to his free pleasure on whomsoever he will ;" he takes from one and gives to another ; and in all this no guilt is incurred, because all is God's." In the Lutheran Church, it was quite the traditional vindication ; compare PFEIFER, (*dub. rer.*, p. 226) ; CALOV, (*bibl. illustr.*, Ex. iii. 21) ; BUDDEUS (*hist. Eccles.*, v. 7), and others. CALVIN thus states it, " Those to whom this method of enriching the people appears to be little agreeable to God's justice, little consider how far that justice, of which they speak, extends. I grant that it belongs to it, to ensure to every one his rights, to prevent theft, to condemn deceit and robbery. But let us see what belongs to every one. Who can pretend to have any property but what is the gift of God? and therefore

individuals possess as a loan what God pleases, who is at liberty to take away at any moment what he has given. The Hebrews spoiled the Egyptians. Were they allowed to contend with God, that he had transferred his benefits from them to others? Does this complaint deserve to be heard, that God, in whose hands are the boundaries of the earth, who, according to his pleasure, appoints their bounds to the nations, and reduces kings to poverty, had deprived a few men of their household furniture and their jewels? Another vindication has been proposed by several writers, that the Hebrews really took away nothing that did not belong to them, but only received their due wages, since they had been unjustly reduced to a state of servitude, in which they had lived on a poor pittance. And certainly it was fair that they should receive a compensation for their labour. But it is not necessary to estimate God's judgment according to the common laws, since we have already seen, that his are all the goods of the world, which he distributes to individuals as it may best please him. Yet I do not place him in this way beyond the law; for though his power is exalted above all laws, yet, since his will forms the most certain rule of the most perfect equity, everything which he does is most righteous, and, on that account, he is free of the law, since he is a law to himself and to all. I do not absolutely say with AUGUSTIN, that there may be a command of God respecting which we are not to judge, but to which we must listen, since he knows how justly he commands, but it is incumbent on his servants to do all things obediently which he commands. This is, indeed, true; but we must hold fast that higher principle, since, of God's free bounty alone, individuals possess what they call their own, so that there cannot be a juster title to possession than his gift. We shall therefore say, the Hebrew women had seized that which God commanded them to take, and what he intended to give them; but since he only gave what was his own, no one could charge him with injustice."

It is scarcely conceivable that a man of so much acuteness did not perceive that this whole argumentation only proves what needed no proof; and, on the other hand, leaves quite untouched the point in which the difficulty peculiarly lies. That God is the Lord and Proprietor of his whole creation—that hence he is at liberty to make a fresh distribution of the goods of this world—



that he to whom he gives what before was possessed by another, may consider what is so given as his lawful property—who will deny? A stream floats to one place what it tore away from another—a man finds a treasure whose owner he cannot discover—a vessel is wrecked whose proprietor is unknown—who would maintain that it would be unjust to receive the advantages accruing from these events as a gift from the hand of God, or that God has not a right to bestow them? To maintain this would be to attack the universal government of God. For the position, that he is the proprietor of his whole creation—that, according to his free choice, he raises up and puts down, gives and takes away, enriches and impoverishes, lies at its very foundation. A limited monarchy (*eine constitutionelle Regierung*) has not yet been introduced into heaven. To come nearer to the case in hand: there could be no doubt, that the vessels of the Egyptians would have been the lawful property of the Israelites, if they, as nation against nation, had been engaged in a lawful war against the Egyptians, and God had granted success to their arms, and had thus given up to them the booty of their enemies. Who would ever assert that Hezekiah, when the host of Assyria had been destroyed by the angel of God before the walls of Jerusalem, was bound to send back the treasures found in the camp, carefully collected and packed, to Assyria? But the relation of the Israelites to the Egyptians was totally different. On their coming down to Egypt, they became Pharaoh's subjects, although invested with more privileges than the rest. Their relation was essentially different from their former one in Canaan, where they found the ground and soil which they settled upon still free, and were invested with it by no one—where their progenitors were acknowledged as independent chiefs, whose right no one disputed of exercising within their own circle the supreme authority, and out of it to form treaties and carry on wars. In Egypt, on the contrary, Jacob was formally invested by Pharaoh with the land of Goshen; his whole bearing towards him shows that he considered himself as his vassal, not as a chief standing in an independent position towards him. Had Pharaoh afterwards not fulfilled his duties as a sovereign towards them, it was God's concern to punish him for it; they would not thereby have been freed from their duties as subjects, any more than a son would be released

from his filial obligations by the unjust conduct of his father. Justice is not a relative duty, one which ceases as soon as another violates it; or, which comes to the same thing, as soon as we think he has violated it. To assert this would be to separate human justice from its source and rule, the divine, and thus to abolish it altogether. Hence a war between the Israelites and the Egyptians could not take place as long as the former remained in the country, but only a rebellion, and whatever they might have gained in this way would not have been a just possession. This view of the relation of the Israelites is confirmed by God's whole conduct towards them at their deliverance. As God generally makes natural causes and human means a substratum on which he manifests his supernatural power and grace, so he commonly assists his people in the same way, by arming them with strength against their enemies. But here he takes quite a different course. He alone acts; his people must be still. This course is not continued, when the Israelites had reached the extreme borders of the land, not as before, in separate groups, but in military order (Exod. xiii. 18), infinitely surpassing their enemies in numbers, and merely wanting in martial energy, which the Lord, the possessor of the spirit of power, could impart to them in an instant, as he often did in later times. "*The Lord shall fight for you,*" said Moses to Israel, xiv. 14, "*and ye shall hold your peace.*" But if the possession of the vessels could not be justified as lawful—if Israel had taken them from the Egyptians in open war, and therefore not by a Divine command, how much less here? The Israelites had not to do with a hostile king, nor with a collective people, who, as such, shared in his guilt, but only with individuals, with such whom (as the often-repeated expression, "*The Lord gave them favour,*" &c. shows) their misery had filled with sympathy and love towards them, who, according to Exod. iii. 20–22, had lived on neighbourly and friendly terms with them. To these they applied, abusing the confidence which their former habits of intercourse had produced, spoke only of a short absence, and then, making sport of their good-natured credulity, take the borrowed articles as a rich booty. What can lying, deceit, and theft be, if this be not? Who would not blush to maintain that such things are allowable, even between nations that are at open war?

But several writers have maintained that the act of the Israelites was certainly against natural law, but that God, as the supreme lawgiver, has the right, in particular cases, to abolish natural law, and to grant a dispensation from it. But this is a very bad defence of a bad cause. It is to degrade at once God and his law to the utmost, when the latter is regarded as a mere arbitrary enactment. The law is the efflux and expression of God's moral being. As God cannot be other than what he is, so also he cannot desire of his creatures that they should be other than like himself. His language is, "*Be ye holy, for I am holy.*" To assert that he could sometimes command an unholy act, is tantamount to uttering the blasphemy, that in his own being holiness and unholiness are blended together. The expedient which AUGUSTIN seems to apply to the passages we have quoted, that the command may be justified by a reference to the carnality and hardheartedness of Israel, is also inadmissible. "That people," he says, "were still carnal, and captivated by the desire of earthly things. But the Egyptians were impious and unjust. For as to the first, they made a vile use of that gold, *i.e.* of a creature of God, and insulting their Creator, served idols; and as to the second point, they had afflicted strangers unjustly and sorely with unrequited labour. The one was worthy to receive such a command, and the other to suffer its consequences." Here it is overlooked that the moral law is the same for all stages of revelation, and since it is founded in the very being of God, must necessarily be the same. The Divine condescension moves only in a sphere where the moral law exerts no influence. God can veil his almightiness and majesty, in order to render himself comprehensible to weak mortals; but his holiness and justice never. For then true religion would be placed in the same category as false religions. A good human father and instructor will never command any thing in itself unjust, on account of the lower moral standing of those whom he has to educate. God can be patient and forbearing in this respect, of which the whole history of Israel is a proof; but that is not the point to be considered here, but a command, and one, too, which was given by God without any inducement on the part of the people. What a glaring contradiction between this command and these that were shortly after uttered from Sinai, "*Thou shalt not steal,*" and "*Thou shalt not covet!*"

II. Still weaker is another attempt at a vindication—the assertion that the Israelites had done nothing more than obtain payment of a small part of the wages unjustly withheld from them for their hard labour. This attempt appears to be the earliest. It is found in PHILO and the Fathers; besides TERTULLIAN and IRENAEUS, it is proposed with great confidence and approbation by CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS (*Stromata* i.), and THEODORET; GROTIUS (*de jure b. et. p.* ii. 7, § 2) has endeavoured to set it off. Admitting that the transaction is narrated merely as belonging to the Israelites without any Divine intervention, yet this argument would prove nothing more than that they had as greatly transgressed, as would have been the case with Jacob and his sons, had they done the like. As a vindication it is not fit to be offered. The notion of making reprisals is not here admissible. For we have already shown that the Israelites did not stand to the Egyptians in the relation of one independent power to another. And even where this relation exists, and the two powers are at open war with one another, natural morality requires that the property of private persons should, as much as possible, be spared. But here we have before us a pure relation of one individual to another. Individual Israelites laid claim to the property of individual Egyptians with whom they were nearly connected. They pretended to be friends and acted as enemies. The man who would not return a loan to an individual belonging to a hostile nation—a merchant who should refuse to pay his debts—would not be shielded by the hostile relation of the two nations from the just reproach of knavery. How much more would this reproach be merited here, where, under the same relations, articles were borrowed and not returned! And now the command for this misdeed proceeds from God, with whom every excuse is of no avail—of whom every act is unworthy which is not in the most perfect harmony with his own holy law! Could not he, who by so many miracles had broken Pharaoh's obdurate disposition, procure for his people a number of vessels without their being led to employ a miserable falsehood?

III. Some assume that the request to lend on the part of the Israelites, was only a kind of refined expression for *giving*, and that it was thus understood by the Egyptians, who were aware that the Israelites were about to quit the country for ever, so that

a return of the articles was out of the question. This is the view JOSEPHUS appears to have taken when he says,\* “ They also presented gifts to the Hebrews ; some in order to hasten their departure, and others on account of having been on neighbourly terms with them.” For that he, as is commonly thought, understood the narrative as intending gifts, without qualification on the part of the Egyptians, is not probable, since the Greek version, which, owing to his very defective acquaintance with Hebrew he was accustomed to follow, speaks only of *lending*. LE CLERC also has defended this view. We cannot deny that it is less objectionable than the preceding. But it is not suited to remove all difficulties. How far every individual Egyptian took the requisition according to its literal terms, or attached to it another sense, the Israelites could not tell. Hence they could not receive the vessels with a good conscience if the requisition proceeded from themselves. But if the remaining quantum of wrong is too much for them, how infinitely more for God !

IV. J. D. MICHAELIS, not satisfied with the explanations hitherto given, invented a new one, or rather he endeavoured to put on a firmer footing and embellish one that had been already proposed.† It is as follows :—The Israelites were directed to borrow gold and silver articles, but not a word was said beforehand that they were to keep what was borrowed ; for what was said long before on this subject (Exod. iii. 22) was not known to the Israelites, it appears only in an address of God to Moses. They, therefore, borrowed with the intention of returning what was borrowed without knowing the secret intentions of Providence. Suddenly they were gone, on the very night of their feast, and driven out of Egypt ; no time was allowed them to think of any thing but instantly to withdraw. This Pharaoh and the Egyptians desired, for in every house there was a corpse. Now, let any one imagine how we ourselves should do in such a case with borrowed things. We should not leave them lying about, for so they would never reach their right owners, but fall

---

\* Δάρους τε τοὺς Ἑβραίους ἐτίμων, οἱ μὲν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τάχϊον ἐξελάθειν, οἱ δὲ καὶ κατὰ γειτνιακὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς συνήθειαν. Antq. Jud. II. 14. § 6.

† One that in essential points agrees with his own, had been already examined and refuted by LILIENTHAL *gute Sache d. göttl. Offenb.* iv. 930.

into the hands of the first person that met with them. We should take them with us, but with the intention of returning them on the first opportunity to their proprietors. Thus the Israelites acted. They took the things with them, that they might restore them on the first opportunity to their proprietors. But in a few days the state of their affairs was quite changed. The Egyptians pursued Israel with a great host. This was a breach of promise between the two nations, and on the part of the Egyptians an unjust offensive war. *Now* the Israelites could keep the vessels of the Egyptians, and regard them as booty. Providence so ordered it that Pharaoh broke his promise, and thereby gave them a right to reimburse themselves with the goods of his subjects. But this view, on closer inspection, appears to be untenable. It is of the same character as most of the vindications of its acute author. They recommend themselves at the first glance, but almost always some difficulty comes out to view which had been concealed by deceptive argumentation. As to the principal point, it only forms an apology, not a perfect justification of the conduct of the Israelites. In order to compass the latter, the author changes the Israelites into a people of equal rank with the Egyptians, which they were not till the moment that they left the Egyptian territory; and what is still worse, he lays down the principle already refuted, that the private relations between individuals belonging to hostile nations need not be held sacred; and if this nevertheless were the case in common practice, its only motive would be private advantage. That Pharaoh acted unjustly to the Israelites would be no sort of justification for breaking their word to their friends. But how improbable is the whole course of proceedings according to this supposition! Can it be assumed that the Israelites borrowed with the intention of returning the loan? And who would think it probable that the Israelites would take the articles they had borrowed, with conscientious care, to Canaan, that they might not be lost to their original proprietors? How should we scout a thief who should have the effrontery to offer such an excuse! The proprietors were, in truth, for the greater part, close at hand. It is said expressly, that the Israelites borrowed of their neighbours and lodgers. And even allowing all the suppositions of MICHAELIS (which have been shown to be false) to stand, yet the whole affair is so much like a fraud, that no Egyptian could be

blamed for considering it to be so ; and certainly to many an Israelite it would have been difficult to get clear of the moral embarrassments of this interpretation, as has been felt by all the Jewish and Christian expositors before MICHAELIS. But would that God who enjoins us to “*avoid all appearance of evil*” act himself so little in accordance with that injunction ? Would he, without cause, keep it so entirely out of sight ? We have hitherto shown that all the views which presuppose lending on the part of the Egyptians, and purloining on the part of the Israelites, are beset with insuperable difficulties. On the other hand, several of the earlier expositors and apologists have advocated the idea of a gift by which every difficulty is naturally obviated. Thus, for example, HARENBURG, in an essay on the subject in the *Bibliotheca Bremensis*, vii. 625. LILIENTHAL, ROSENMÜLLER, WINER, (*Lex. s. v.* לָקַח), and THOLUCK, in his critique on DAUMER’S work in his *Litt. Anzeiger*. Even supposing that both interpretations are equally consistent with the words of the text, yet for the latter the following reasons may be urged.

*First*, the circumstances under which the Israelites made their request to the Egyptians were such as are only consistent with the idea of a gift. It occurred immediately before their departure. At such a time how could borrowing be thought of ? It could only be admitted on the supposition that the Egyptians expected the Israelites to return after they had celebrated a feast in the wilderness. But this supposition is certainly false. It cannot be maintained on the ground that Moses requested nothing more of Pharaoh. This moderate request was made only at the period of the earlier plagues. It served to put Pharaoh to the proof. God did not come forth with his whole plan and desire at first, that his obduracy might appear so much the more glaring, and not find an excuse in the greatness of the requirement. Had Pharaoh granted this request, Israel would not have gone beyond it ; but had not God foreseen what he repeatedly says (compare, for instance, ch. iii. 18), that he would not comply with it, he would not thus have presented it—he would from the beginning have revealed his whole design. Thus AUGUSTIN (*quaest. 13 in Ex.*) remarks, “*Although God knew what he intended to do, yet he spoke thus, since he beforehand knew that Pharaoh would not consent to let the people go : at first only what would have happened originally*

had Pharaoh let them go,—but afterwards Pharaoh's obduracy, caused all things to happen as the Scriptures testified." By this contrivance the furtherance of the object was attained, to make Pharaoh more suited for his destiny, which was, to represent in his own person a living image of a hardened sinner, who rejects all, even the most moderate requirements of God, and advances from one step of hardening to another, until at last the Divine judgment crushes him; a point-of-view from which alone the whole conduct of God towards Pharaoh appears in its just light, which breathes into the dry bones of history the breath of life, and causes it to appear as a doctrine clothed in flesh and blood, and makes us behold the Pharaoh in our own hearts. But as to the Egyptians, they from the first regarded Moses' request as what it was not, a mere pretext. So much relating to the promises made to the Patriarchs had been circulated among them, that before Moses was born they had been moved with the apprehension that the people would remove out of the land. Exod. i. 10. After Pharaoh had been severely punished on account of his total denial of the request, he desired first to keep back the children, and afterwards the cattle, as pledges; and when the Israelites would not consent, he regarded it as a practical admission that they designed something quite different from what they alleged. But after the last and heaviest judgment, how could a thought be entertained of the return of the Israelites? This was no longer promised by Moses, and the Egyptians desired it so little that they rather wished to be free for ever from their dangerous guests at any price. Ch. xii. 32. They took all their substance with them, and therefore had nothing more to recal them to Egypt. That Pharaoh afterwards pursued the Israelites, shows that when he could not keep them back, he thought them lost for ever; and the remark in ch. xiv. 5, that after their departure, "*the heart of Pharaoh and of his servants was turned against the people,*" leads us to conclude that, before this change in their disposition, they were disposed to let Israel depart for ever from their borders.

*Secondly,* In all the three passages relating to this subject, it is emphatically represented that the consent of the Egyptians to the requisition of the Israelites was a work of Divine omnipotence, which filled the hearts of the Egyptians, that naturally were



averse from the Israelites, with compassion and love towards them : on which CALVIN remarks, “ God does not always form men to mildness by the spirit of regeneration, so that from wolves they become changed to sheep, but sometimes softens them without their knowing it, by a secret impulse, in a short time.” In one passage (ch. x. 7) a second cause is added to that secret inward influence for which superficial observation would substitute the natural sympathy of the Egyptians (which had been aroused to such a degree by the proud hardness of the king, that it had overcome their aversion from the Israelites)—namely, the awe with which Moses was regarded both among high and low, arising from the mighty proofs he had given that a higher hand was with him. If there was nothing more than a loan, we cannot perceive why so much ado should be made about so insignificant an affair. It required no such powerfully operating causes. In that case the chief agency was not in God, but in the Israelites themselves, who appropriated what had been lent to them.

*Thirdly*, Only on the supposition of a gift can this transaction appear in its true light. It could certainly not have been its only object, no matter in what way, to place in the hands of the Israelites a certain number of valuables. This would be very little in harmony with the whole assemblage of Divine operations, from which we cannot forcibly dissever a single one. The object everywhere is, to represent in real life, how God’s miraculous power exerts retribution on the enemies of his Church, and overcomes them ; and that the exercise of this Divine *jus talionis*, which in later times forms the soul of the prophetic announcements, may be so much more plainly recognised, there is an analogy between the *form* of the punishment and the transgression. Let the following particulars be noticed. The staff with which Moses brought the plagues over the land of Egypt has an obvious reference to the staff with which the Egyptian taskmasters corrected the Israelites. This is confirmed by comparing Is. x. 24, with ver. 26—

24. Therefore thus saith the Lord God of Hosts,  
 O my people that dwellest in Zion,  
 Be not afraid of the Assyrian :  
*He shall smite thee with a rod,*  
*And shall lift up his staff against thee after the manner of Egypt.*

25. And yet a very little while, and the indignation shall cease,  
And mine anger, in their destruction.
26. And the Lord of Hosts shall stir up a scourge for him,  
According to the slaughter of Midian at the rock of Oreb;  
*And as his rod was upon the sea,*  
*So shall he lift it up after the manner of Egypt.*

The dying of the first-born throughout Egypt points to Pharaoh's detention of God's first-born Israel. Pharaoh declared that he would not let the cattle of the Israelites go; Moses, on the other hand, declared that as a punishment for this obstinacy, he should give sacrifices and burnt-offerings from his own cattle, Ex. x. 25, and we cannot doubt that this was done. That very element which the Egyptians wished to employ for the destruction of Israel (though they failed in their design, since the people, as the Church of the Lord has always done, by a secret blessing granted under the cross, the more they were afflicted (Exod. i. 12) the more they multiplied)—afterwards swallowed up Pharaoh and all his host. If here a *giving* and not *lending* is intended, it is admirably suited to the whole connection. The Egyptians had robbed the Israelites, and enriched themselves with their property and their labour; now, for satisfaction, Israel carries off the spoil from Egypt, and the powerless people is enriched by its mighty oppressor. The triumph of God, whom the Egyptians, according to the notions of the idolatrous world, thought to degrade by the humiliation of his people (compare for instance Exod. v. 2), was so much more complete, since he did not wrest their property from the Egyptians by any outward means, but, what is infinitely greater, conquered by a secret influence on their hearts, so that without any outward compulsion, they did homage to him and his people by their gifts. On the contrary, if a loan be admitted, the occurrence loses all its importance, it is altogether without an idea, an act of God which, separated from his nature, does not contain in it the germ and pledge of a succession of similar events. The quintessence—God's omnipotence operating in the service of his justice for the good of his Church—is altogether lost. Not God, but Israel, deserves honour, if any such thing can be found.

We have hitherto argued on the supposition, that the words in the Hebrew text may be used with equal propriety of a *loan* or of a *gift*. But this supposition is manifestly erroneous. The idea of a *gift* is the only one which the language admits. (i.) It

is quite arbitrary to give to the verb לְשַׁאל in ch. xii. 35, 36, the meaning of *lending*. This it cannot have in and for itself. The verb שָׁאַל, *to ask*, can in Hiphil only mean *to induce another to ask*. This is used only for voluntary and spontaneous gifts, in opposition to those which are only imparted from compulsion, or on account of shameless importunity. Whoever gives voluntarily, requires, as it were, another person to ask him—he cannot ask too often or too much.

The meaning is confirmed by the *usus loquendi* in the only passage besides where the Hiphil of the verb שָׁאַל occurs, 1 Sam. i. 28, where Hannah says of Samuel הִשָּׂאֵלְתִּיהוּ לַיהוָה, the translation, *I have willingly and freely presented him to the Lord*, is the only admissible one—*I have lent him to the Lord*, is perfectly absurd. Such is the meaning required by the context in the passage under consideration. “They (the Egyptians) made or caused them (the Israelites) to ask,” stands in evident reference to the preceding—“They (the Israelites) asked,” and this reference leads to a contest of *asking* and *giving*, in which the latter gains the upper hand. It is immediately connected with “The Lord gave to the people favour in the sight of the Egyptians,” and is marked as a consequence of it. The liberal giving of the Egyptians proceeded from the love and good-will which the Lord awakened in their hearts towards Israel.

(ii.) The meaning to *purloin*, *steal*, has been given to the verb גָּזַל in ch. iii. and xii. But this it can never have. It has, without exception, the meaning of a taking away which is effected by force, never such as is effected by fraud. And yet only the latter could be applicable to *borrowing*; but if we admit that the Israelites received *gifts* from the Egyptians, the former sense is quite suitable. The author represents the Israelites as going forth, laden as it were with the spoils of their formidable enemy, trophies of the victory which God’s power had bestowed on their weakness. While he represents the gifts of the Egyptians as spoils which God had distributed to his host (as Israel is called in ch. xii. 41), he leads us to observe that the bestowment of these gifts which outwardly appears to be the effect of the good-will of the Egyptians, if viewed more deeply, proceeded from another Giver—that the outwardly free act of the Egyptians was effected by an inward Divine constraint which they could not

withstand. At the same time the expression is chosen with a reference to the previous conduct of the Egyptians, for which they were obliged to make satisfaction to God and his people. They had spoiled Israel; now Israel carries away the spoil of Egypt.

The question still presents itself to us, with such clear counter-arguments, how could that unfortunate interpretation originate, which yet has met with general acceptance? Apparently a circumstance in itself quite insignificant, an error in the very faulty Alexandrian Version, which substitutes *lending* for *giving*. JEROME, who commonly follows it, was led by it into a similar mistake, and, through him, LUTHER, who adheres mostly to his translation, the Vulgate. The fathers and theologians of the middle ages could not restore the true meaning, since, from their unacquaintance with Hebrew, they were confined to the use of the Greek or Latin translations. On the meaning as expressed in these versions, in an innocent presumption of its correctness, they founded their vindications, and the longer these continued, and their difficulties were concealed by custom, the less was thought, even in the times after the Reformation, of examining the soundness of the foundation on which they were built. The individuals who denied this were repulsed; since it was feared that an attempt which should give up the established interpretation, might, in the event of its failure, be regarded as a practical confession of the insufficiency of the vindications that had already been given, and this fear had more influence, because the insufficiency was really felt, as it could not be otherwise. From the rationalistic expositors no correction of this error could be expected, since they had an interest in not noticing it. Excepting on account of this interest, it is scarcely explicable how such men as GESENIUS and DE WETTE could act as if this false interpretation were the only existing and possible one.

#### ON THE UNHOLINESS OF SACRED PERSONS.

What influence this point has had on the investigations respecting the genuineness of the Pentateuch, we have already shown in vol. i. p. 45.

It is striking to observe how the friends of the Pentateuch have here played into the hands of its enemies. A two-fold reason—on the one side, a non-perception of the religious point-of-view which the author of the Pentateuch always occupies—on the other, a want of insight into the nature of justification, of imputed righteousness, has been the cause, that the theology based on the Scriptures, in many of its advocates and in all ages, has been pressed by many perplexities; and through the inadmissible expedients which it has adopted to get rid of them, has exposed its weakest points to opponents, and given them the feeling of superiority which they have always possessed in opposition to such perversities.

It is a necessary consequence of the attempt to establish a righteousness by works of the law which prevails in later Judaism, that the Rabbies do their utmost to wipe away every stain from the characters and lives of the most eminent persons under the ancient economy. The *faith* of their fathers was of no value to them, since they themselves were not in the faith. They know no God who justifies sinners, but only one who rewards saints. Now, in order to transform the recipients of Divine revelation into saints according to their notion, they proceeded not unfrequently to absurdities. Compare the account of their vain attempts to free Jacob and Rebecca from all blame in reference to their fraudulently obtaining the blessing, in HEIDEGGER, *hist. Patr.* ii. 265. JARCHI, for example, gives as his opinion, that Jacob did not utter a falsehood, but only availed himself of an allowable ambiguity. "I am he who brings the meat—Esau is thy first-born son." It is very characteristic, that here, and in the conversations between Abraham and Pharaoh, they regard the moral fault, the falsehood, as the stone of offence which must be removed out of the way; on the other hand, the religious culpability, the want of living godliness from which the falsehood proceeded, is not taken into account. Besides this legal righteousness, their national vanity is very conspicuous. They keep in mind the maxim, that he who cuts off his nose disfigures his own face. The object which the author of the Pentateuch *alone* pursued and attained, that the God of Israel might be glorified, was not enough for them. For "*unto thee, O Lord, belongeth the glory, but to us shame and confusion of face,*" they would substitute, "*To thee, O Lord, and unto us, belongeth glory.*"

We see the Fathers of the Church, like the Jews, employed here in rolling the stone of Sisyphus. In them also, the deepest ground of error is the want of a clear insight into the nature of justification. But even those, who stood in this respect higher than the rest, could not free themselves from the shackles of an error to which they had become habituated. Not only a CHRYSOSTOM, but an AUGUSTIN, endeavours at any rate, and by the application of the most artful sophisms, to free Abraham from the charge of falsehood, and to show that the act was not only without blame, but even praiseworthy. Compare HEIDEGGER ii. 98. For the vindication of the ancient saints, maxims are often made use of, which, if attempted to be applied to men and things in the present day, would be rejected with horror. Thus ORIGEN, CHRYSOSTOM, and JEROME, attempted to rescue Jacob from the charge of deceit by remarking, “ *quod fraudes illae atque mendacia non processerint a studio nocendi, sed maximo bono promovendo servierint* ; a view against which AUGUSTIN earnestly protests, but yet tries to justify Jacob in a very artificial and even absurd manner, (HEIDEGGER 266, 267). And not content with vindicating the principal personages, they expend a large amount of useless labour on the subordinate characters, however remotely connected. How fond they are of attempting to wash an Aethiop white, is shown in reference to Lot’s wife and daughters. It is a sufficient apology for the latter, that they fancied that there was not another man left on the earth, and that they wished to become the ancestors of the Messiah !

The Catholic Theologians follow in the footsteps of the Fathers. NICOLAUS ABRAHAM, for instance, asserts, in vindication of Abraham, that, under the circumstances, he might lawfully utter falsehood. Others, who are not so lax, say that it was inspired by God.

As to the antideistical apologists, the ground on which alone the correct judgment of the facts in question can be formed, is mostly lost sight of. We may see this partly in LILIENTHAL, who, in Part 6, enters very fully into the attacks on sacred persons. He has, indeed a correct knowledge of the object of the author, and of the nature of the righteousness of the saints, but this knowledge, for the most part, wants vitality. He continually sinks down again to the position of his moralising and carping opponents. To quote a few specimens,—The drunkenness of Noah, he thinks

(p. 498), was probably a mere sin of ignorance, "Even if wine had been known before the flood, still the circumstances might have been such as to lessen Noah's guilt. One year produces stronger wine than another. Is it not possible, that just when the earth had been manured by the rich soil of the deluge, and by so many dead bodies, such generous wine might be produced, that a quantity which Noah would, at another time, have taken with impunity, now intoxicated him?" To excuse Lot, in reference to the choice of his sons-in-law, it is remarked (p. 519)—"Perhaps these men were not so wicked as the other inhabitants of Sodom." "He knew not how to make a better match for his daughters."

Where a clear and vital knowledge of righteousness by faith exists, we see these difficulties and forced expedients immediately vanish. If in LUTHER we do not see this result, when, for instance, he says of Abraham—"he formed this design from a very strong faith, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit;" (*Werke*, i. 1188, ed. Walch.) this must be regarded only as an inconsequence, and an inability to free himself at once from deeply rooted prejudices. In the later genuine Lutheran theology we find this inconsequence almost completely removed. Compare, for example, in reference to Abraham's conduct in Egypt, the perplexed assertions of the Fathers, with the luminous remarks of RAMBACH (*Kirchengesch*, d. A. Test. i. 273)—"Since he directed the eyes of his reason far too much to the danger, so the promise of God was lost to his view, and his faith began to waver. But, as Christ reached forth his hand to Peter, when he began to sink, at the sight of the mighty billows, so here God reached forth his hand to Abraham, that he might not utterly sink in this peril." But still more decided than among the Lutherans was the principle applied in the Reformed Church to the present subject. We meet with some valuable examples in CALVIN. How far he was from forcing a legal righteousness, instead of the righteousness by faith, on the saints of the Old Testament, is shown by his remark on Gen. xxv. 28—*Eant nunc Judaei et in carne gloriantur; quum Isaac pluris cibum faciens, quam destinatam filio haereditatem gratuitum dei foedus, quantum in se erat, perverterit.* It in general gives him satisfaction to point out the infirmities of the elect, in order that

glory may be given to God alone. That the later reformed theology continued in the direction it had received from him, may be learned from some expressions of HEIDEGGER. He says (ii. 245), in reference to the transactions on account of the birth-right, between Jacob and Esau: *quodsi in re procuranda infirmitas Jacobi admixta fuit, eo major fuit gratia dei, quod indulserit tam benigne, ut ostenderet totum id ab electione pendere, non ab operibus, quod unus alii praeferretur*; and in p. 268, in reference to the fraudulent obtaining of the blessing by Jacob, he says—“*Proinde Jacobus a peccato minime immunis fuit, quippe qui contra rei veritatem et animi sui sensum se et facto et verbis Esavum professus est. Haec sententia tum divinam sapientiam, tum potentiam, tum humanam et ingenitam omnibus infirmitatem demonstrat. Ostendit enim non obstante infirmitate humana deum opus suum potenter et sapienter exsequi.* But one thing is wanting even here. The reason was not yet understood, why the sacred historian did not expressly censure the objectionable transactions, supposing that he really disapproved of them. A clear knowledge of his object had not yet been attained, and thus it could not be seen that the expression of an opinion on the morality of actions was not in harmony with it. Had this point been clearly understood, there would not have been so much said backwards and forwards on the transactions recorded in Scripture, and the argumentation respecting them would have been cut short. Still, there would be a weak side left open to opponents, and a point of connection for their attacks.

The crudest form of the attack is that which proceeds on the assumption that all the actions of the Old Testament believers, which the sacred historian reports, and does not expressly censure, were approved by him, and considered as worthy of imitation; a view which is openly expressed by VON BOHLEN, p. 259, 293, 364. In opposition to it we make the following remarks—

*First*, The one great theme of the Pentateuch, is the glorification of Jehovah, the God of Israel. This is the point of view from which the author always proceeds. He writes as a theologian, and not as a moralist, and carping censor. If this be allowed, it is evident that no inference respecting his approval of certain persons or their actions, can be drawn from his silence.



Approval and disapproval are equally out of the question. In our time, this object attracts little notice. At least, it is thought that to the object of glorifying the God of Israel, the glorification of Israel itself ought to be appended. The attention to human doings and aims, so very much outweighs, in men's hearts, the attention to God's ways, that, even when the object of a writer is, on the whole, correctly appreciated, they always lend him their own subjective point-of-view, so that they are incapable of perceiving the marked difference between a Moses and a Herodotus, who, at the beginning of his work, describes his object to be *ὡς μήτε τὰ γινόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γίνηται, μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τὲ καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἑλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροισι αποδεχθέντα ἀκλεᾶ γίνηται*. Without a clear perception of this difference, no deep insight into the nature of the Pentateuch is possible. We would show here, by a series of examples, how the one object of glorifying God regulates the whole of its representations. In Gen. xii. 10–20, the main design of the narrative is to manifest God's watchful care of his chosen servant, how he delivered him from a perplexity that was humanly inextricable, in which he had been involved by his own fault; how, while Abraham, by his carnal policy, did his utmost to make the promise of none effect, Jehovah took care that the chastity of the mother of the chosen race should be preserved inviolably; how the most powerful monarch of that day was made to bow before the defenceless Abraham, and render back his prey. If we keep in mind this point-of-view, it will appear, that moral reflections on Abraham's conduct, whether he told a lie or not, &c., have no more to do with this section of sacred history, than the prolix discussion on the natural history of the ass, on the difference between the oriental and occidental breeds, in HENDEWERK'S Commentary, has to do with Is. i. 3—*"The ass knoweth his master's crib."* The world has still in store falsehoods and ambiguities enow on which such reflections may be much more properly bestowed. In the narrative of Abraham's parting from Lot, in Gen. xiii. 5, &c., the tenderness of God's grace towards the chosen race, and the Divine guidance are shown, for which reason circumstances are introduced, which otherwise would have no connection with this race. Under this guidance, he spontaneously surrendered to Lot all his pretensions

to the land of promise, to which the vale of Jordan no more belonged. That the whole significance of the transaction depends, in the historian's opinion, on this point, is plain, from ch. xiii. 14, where the renewal of the promise of the land of Canaan to Abraham is introduced with the words—" *And the Lord said to Abraham, after that Lot was separated from him.*" Reflections on Abraham's generosity, peaceableness, and love of his kindred, which are commonly founded on this narrative, are quite out of place. The leading idea of the narrative in ch. xiv. is God's grace towards his chosen servant, by which he enabled him to wage war with kings, and gave him the victory over them; and, even on his return from battle, kings came out to meet him, one with respectful hospitality, and another as a humble vassal. If this main object be not perceived, there will be ample room for descanting on Abraham's honour, magnanimity, humility, and disinterestedness.

*Secondly,* That the historian's design could not be to glorify Israel and his ancestors we have proved, in showing that the only object he pursued was the glorification of the Lord. But we arrive at the same result in another way. The author contradicts, as distinctly as possible, the fancy of the moral perfection of the Old Testament believers. At first he might appear to grant this to Abraham, and yet of him it is said, in Gen. xv. 6, "*And he believed in the Lord, and he counted it to him for righteousness.*" Here, as Paul has proved in Rom. iii. 1-5, it is presupposed that Abraham was a poor sinner. If faith was reckoned to him for righteousness, it follows that he wanted righteousness of life, for he who has that, to him it will be imputed. The Song of Moses in Deut. xxxii. could never be in a more unsuitable position than in a work of which the object was the glorification of Israel. Only compare the striking contrast between the faithfulness of the Lord and the unfaithfulness of the people in ver. 4 and 5. The whole section, Deut. ix. 10, is pervaded by the sentiment, that to the Lord alone belonged glory, but to Israel shame and confusion. How little spotless purity is attributed to the Lawgiver is shown by what we have adduced in p. 143.

*Thirdly,* Though the author refrains from passing a direct judgment on the morality of the actions of God's chosen servants, since it would have been foreign to his object, yet this

judgment is almost always contained in the facts themselves. Abraham, for instance, by Sarah's advice, forms a connection with Hagar. This is not expressly blamed by the author, but the disapproval is contained in the consequences that are told of it. This violation of the Divine arrangements soon punishes itself. The unnatural relation in which the bondwoman was placed to him, at the instigation of her mistress, prepared for her the severest mortification. But this judgment resulting directly from the facts, is peculiarly apparent in the history of Jacob. If the author approved his proceedings, what are we to think of the striking retribution that followed them? The over-reaching Jacob is shamefully deceived by his father-in-law and his own sons. The heaviest cross he had to bear was prepared by deceit and guile. Moreover, he performed penance by twenty years service, and by the dread of his brother on his return. Jacob's aversion to Leah, who had been forced upon him, to which the author makes a pointed allusion in Gen. xxix. 31, was first punished by Rachel's barrenness for several years, and then by her early death. Rebecca was severely punished by the removal of her darling son, who was, in consequence, to her as if dead. These facts will appear more important when contemplated from the Israelitish point-of-view, which, in all the vicissitudes of the present world, regarded the retributive hand of God. But not merely by facts, but in another way, is a disapproving judgment expressed on facts which the author has narrated without interposing his opinion. The most striking example is the following. The atrocious action which the sons of Jacob perpetrated on the Shechemites is simply reported by the author. He gives, it is true, the censure which Jacob passed on his sons, but this censure does not relate to the immorality of the act, but to its probable injurious consequences; and we might feel tempted to conclude from that, that Jacob and the author did not cherish a detestation like our own of the deed, if from ch. xxxv. 5 light had not been cast on the subject, which shows why precisely these words of Jacob are recorded. The representation therein contained, of his very dangerous situation, serves as a foundation for the statement respecting the providential care of God, by which he escaped all evil consequences. Still we remain in uncertainty as to the judgment of the author on the narrative. In

ch. xlix. he records the last address of Jacob to his sons. Here, after a lapse of years, the deepest abhorrence of the deed is expressed. A similar remark applies to Reuben's incest. It is simply told in ch. xxxv. 22. We first obtain a judgment upon it in ch. xlix. 3, 4, from the lips of the dying Patriarch. These facts alone are sufficient to refute the views of our opponents.

*Fourthly*, The untenability of this view is rendered very conspicuous when the chosen race is divided into two parties. According to it, Isaac, and Jacob, and Rebecca, must be acquitted of all blame, since the author pronounces no censure on either of them; and yet it is impossible to justify one side without criminating the other. Moreover, in reference to the non-elect as well as the elect, the author generally abstains from passing any direct judgment on their blameable actions. The slight allusion to Esau's profane disposition in Gen. xxvii. 34 is almost insulated in this connection. In the narrative of Lot and his daughters, there is not a syllable expressive of disapproval. If from this silence we do not infer approval, but only conclude that the author's point-of-view was not in these cases that of a moral censor, why should not this hold good in reference to his account of the actions of the elect?

The ideal of historical composition is objectivity. This end was not attained by all the profane historians of antiquity. (Compare ULRICH *Charakteristik der antiken Historiographie*, p. 5.) The historians stood in the midst of the confusion and turmoil of human affairs—the human was to them the highest; they could not free themselves from partialities and aversions—it was impossible that their feelings and biasses should not affect their representations—that they should preserve historic impartiality, and abstract themselves from their own time and its relations. It was totally different in sacred history. The human here formed a very subordinate element. Its attention is directed incessantly to the great acts of the Lord. It was above all temptation to distort, or to act the part of the moralist, the politician, or rhetorician.

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that no injurious inference can be drawn from the author's recording the reprehensible actions of God's people, without expressly disapproving them. But the attack thus repelled soon returns in another form. Whether the

author, it is said, approved of these actions or not, thus much is certain, that the men who committed them were not worthy to be the bearers of a Divine Revelation. In this form the objection appears in HARTMANN, p. 429, "With the idea of God as a holy being, the distinction conferred on Jacob ill accords, whom the Scripture history itself charges with so many immoral actions. A man whom Jehovah, as consecrated to himself, would esteem worthy of his most secret revelations, ought to stand forth in the highest moral purity." In this attack, even the defenders of Revelation have played into the hands of its enemies. LESS, for instance (*Ueber du Religion*, i. p. 261), represents Jacob in the darkest colours. The incapacity to discern the bright side of his character, goes hand and hand with an extreme exaggeration of his defects. He makes it even a crime that he saw an angel, and whole hosts of angels collected around him! When he exclaims, "Who of my readers would not rather be Esau than Jacob?" and yet would justify the Divine choice of Jacob, by appealing to the fact, that among so many thousands of better men at Rome, God constituted, as masters of the world, a stupid Claudius, an insane Caligula, a satanic Tiberius and Nero, who does not see the crying contradiction, and recognise a justification of the attack on such miserable defenders? In reply we make the following remarks:—

*First*, It is of the utmost importance, that before we direct our attention to individual actions of God's chosen people, we should cast a glance at the interior of their hearts. If this be neglected, we shall be unable to recognize the faith which was the animating principle of their lives; the saying, "the spirit is vanished, the *caput mortuum* remains," will here hold good; we shall have no more to do with men of God, but merely be dragging about their corpses. Such a method of viewing history has been constantly practised in all other departments—he who has no other standard for forming a judgment of Luther than his abusive language, or of Calvin than the part he took in the burning of Servetus, must bitterly repent. Only in this department has this most absurd mode of judging been retained. Let any one, for instance, before proceeding to examine the charges brought against Jacob, read his prayer in Gen. xxx. 10–13. He will probably be indisposed to indulge a carping humour, and rather

reproach himself, and pray to God for the like faith and the like humility. But spirit is only recognised by spirit, and faith by faith; yet the most abandoned wretch can cant and cavil about morality, and thus we cannot expect that the requirement we have made will be universally agreed to. How can those persons correctly comprehend and appreciate the religious element in the Patriarchs, whose own religious views are so crude, that with HARTMANN (p. 431), they explain the account of the ladder in Jacob's vision, (which our Lord himself, in John i. 52, marks as a prophecy fulfilled in his appearance), and the wrestling of Jacob, as inventions of human conceit, which are founded on absurd conceptions of the Divine nature! But whoever possesses a capacity for deeper apprehension, such a man will never imagine that, for instance, Esau was better fitted to be an organ of Divine Revelation than Jacob. Esau is the representative of natural good nature and generosity, combined with a rudeness and unsusceptibility for spiritual objects. He was a man without aspirations and anxieties of a higher order, who found his satisfaction in visible things; in short, a *βέβηλος*, Heb. xii. 16. His character is stamped in the choice of his calling. He is the type of "the worldly-minded Esaus, who delight in tumult, and never guard against an enemy." The name Edom most distinctly marks the whole complexion of his life. Gen. xxv. 30, "*Feed me with that red, that red!*" *אֵן נִזְרָה אֶת־הָאֵדָם הַהִוא* expresses his whole character. Such natures, even when grace softens the heart (which was not the case with Esau), are not suited to be placed at the head of a religious development. For this purpose not merely that faith belongs to which every individual may attain, but faith as a *χάρισμα*, which presupposes a natural substratum not found in such characters. Jacob's natural constitution was much more complicated than Esau's. He had a far greater number of folds and chambers in his heart, more difficult for himself and others to see through, while such a man as Esau might be known tolerably well in an hour. He was gentle and tender, sensitive, susceptible of every impression from the higher world, perfectly fitted to see the heavens open and the angels of God ascending and descending, but withal, like all characters in which imagination predominates, subject to greater self-deception, stronger temptation to impurity, disposed to cunning and

guile, and wanting in openness. This man God took into his school, in order to free him from many shades which always are found where there are many lights, but a school in which alone anything can be learnt thoroughly, and in which Jacob became Israel, while the unteachable Esau remained always Esau.

*Secondly*, Viewing the facts of the case as they are presented to us, it appears that the errors of God's chosen, where they really exist, and are not falsely imputed to them, are sins of infirmity, which are not incompatible with a state of grace, but only prove the necessity of further purification. John xv. 2, "*Every branch that beareth fruit, he purgeth it, that it may bring forth more fruit.*" It may be proper here to dispose of what has been unjustly laid on the Patriarchs, or has had the worst construction put upon it; but we must satisfy ourselves with a few hints. The sentence passed on Jacob's conduct towards Esau in reference to the birth-right, will be less severe, if it be recollected, (i) That it relates only to future good things belonging to faith—spiritual blessings. Jacob never attempted to appropriate the inferior, the temporal prerogatives of the birth-right. On the contrary, on his return from Mesopotamia, he behaved with almost excessive deference towards Esau, as if to obviate every suspicion of having such an object in view; (ii.) Jacob knew that he was destined by God to the birth-right; and (iii.) He perceived how little suited his brother was to be an organ of Divine Revelation. It is not in the remotest degree our intention, by these remarks, to justify him; but yet they will make it appear that his offence stands altogether on a different footing from what it is commonly placed upon. But it deserves special notice, that throughout this aberration, the better element in Jacob's character was conspicuous. He still had faith in God's word, and a sense of God's grace. Probably the same will hold good of Jacob's fraudulently obtaining the blessing. That Jacob and Rebecca placed so high a value on it, shows that the root of the matter was in them, while the faulty means they took for attaining their object, shows how much they needed purifying. Jacob wished not to seize on a good in itself totally foreign to him, but to prevent one that befitted him from falling into wrong hands, and for this good object he made use of unlawful means. That Isaac took this view of the matter, is shown by his conduct after the discovery of the fraud. Although

he regarded it as a fraud—compare בְּמִרְמָה in Genesis xxvii. 35, which ONKELOS and JONATHAN very characteristically translate by בְּהוֹרְמָה *per sapientiam*—yet he acknowledges God's hand in the event. To point to this is the historian's sole concern. What would those human means have effected without it? The fraud was so easy to be discovered. That it was not so—that the blessing became Jacob's contrary to the will of him who uttered it, shows plainly that God intended to give it him. Isaac's blameworthiness was, notwithstanding all appearance to the contrary, greater than that of Jacob and Rebecca. He failed to bear in mind that the transaction related to the inheritance which he possessed as Isaac the son of the promise. His carnal conduct led Rebecca astray to the employment of carnal means; her sin proceeded from his sin, without becoming thereby less a sin. What made it peculiarly a sin, was the want of vital piety which seduced her into the vain notion that she must lend a helping hand to God; the deceit was only derived and secondary. ROOS takes a very correct view of the transaction—"Isaac erred in wishing to bless only Esau. Rebecca erred in not trusting God that he would order matters aright. Jacob sinned in uttering falsehoods according to his brother's advice, when he ought rather to have obeyed God. But since they sinned not from wickedness, but from ignorance (infirmity), and their faith did not cease to exist, so they were still preserved. Their faults were, after all, better than the virtues of Esau, and all the children of this world." It is characteristic of the age, that in the *Stunden der Andacht*, so much importance is attached to Esau's tears (which the Scriptures know better how to estimate, see Heb. xii. 17), as on that ground to make him half a saint, and thus altogether to leave out of the account his design of murdering his brother, which indicates the extremely rude state of his moral feelings. LESS regards it as praiseworthy that he openly expressed his intention of killing Jacob!

Jacob's conduct towards Laban must not be justified. Here, as in the case of the birthright and the blessing, the wily Jacob would, forsooth, help out the Almighty. But the reasons for moderating the censure on his conduct are so obvious, that we need not state them at length. But we must show, that the means which Jacob employed were by no means referred by him and the



narrator to God. Only by a misunderstanding can this be deduced from Gen. xxxi. 11. Jacob is not there commended to do any thing; it is only foretold what would happen, and which would have taken place, without the means he employed, and which belonged solely to him. But it was not here the author's concern particularly to mark his criminality. Only God's part in the affair required to be noticed—God's grace in the fulfilment of his promises to Jacob, which drew from him the confession, "*I am not worthy of the least of all the mercies, and of all the truth, which thou hast showed unto thy servant; for with my staff I passed over this Jordan, and now I am become two bands,* Gen. xxxii. 10. Human means would have had a very trifling effect, if God had not added his blessing.

On Jacob's conduct towards Esau on his return from Mesopotamia, a charge has been founded of servility and mean-spirited suspicion. But, as to the first, let it be considered, that it was Jacob's business to remove all suspicion from his brother of wishing to maintain a temporal superiority over him; and, in reference to the latter, we remark, that Jacob was a better psychologist than those persons who have cast this reproach upon him. Jacob knew too well Esau's rude disposition, shown in the cruel jest he practised in giving no reply to his messengers of peace, and his passionate temper, not to avoid too near an approach which might affect the good feeling that was now restored between them. Great stress is laid on Jacob's promising to meet his brother in Seir, while it was not his intention to do so. If this was really the case, we have here an instance in which the old Jacob was manifested instead of the new Israel. Yet, since the historian has quite a different object in view, and no certain data are furnished, we can arrive at no positive conclusion, but neither can this greatly concern us, since the history was given us for a totally different object.

Against Joseph the charge has been made, that he subjected a people to despotism and introduced slavery. (VON BOHLEN, p. 423.) We do not mean to enter here upon a full examination of this charge; but the following extract from the *Essay de la propriété foncière en Egypte* in the *Correspondance d'Orient par Michaud et Poujoulat*, viii. 60, Brüss., will suffice to show, that it is not to be urged so confidently: "*En examinant avec attention*

*à quoi tient la fertilité ou la sterilité du sol, on conçoit d'abord que la propriété des terres n'a pas dû être soumise aux mêmes conditions et aux mêmes lois que dans d'autres contrées ; partout ailleurs la propriété territoriale reçoit sa valeur de la nature et de l'exposition des terrains, de l'influence et des pluies du ciel, du travail et de l'industrie de l'homme ; ici tout vient du Nil, et les terres avec leurs riches productions, pour nous servir d'une expression d'Hérodote, sont un véritable présent du fleuve. Toutefois, pour répandre ses bienfaits sur L'Egypte, Le Nil avait besoin d'une main puissante qui lui creusât des canaux et qui pût diriger ses eaux fécondantes : la distribution des eaux du fleuve exigeait le concours de la puissance publique et de l'autorité souveraine ; il fallait que le pouvoir des gouvernemens intervint, et la nécessité de cette intervention dut changer en quelque sorte, et modifier les droits de la propriété foncière."*

Whatever actions in the lives of the Patriarchs appear to be morally objectionable, are infirmities, which cannot be considered as incompatible with a state of grace, (especially if we observe, that most of them occurred at the commencement of the relation of the individuals to God), without destroying all possibility of the connection of God with man. It is quite different with Jacob's sons. Among them there are certainly actions which are inconsistent with a state of grace. But, be it recollected, that the election of a family, or of a whole nation, is essentially different from that of an individual. Reuben, Simeon, and Levi stand in a very different relation to God from Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. As soon as a family or a nation is the object of election, it is sufficient, if, in the mass, an *ἐκλογή* be found. In Jacob's family, this was represented by Joseph. Even among the twelve apostles of Christ, was there not at least one Judas !

#### VISITING THE SINS OF THE FATHERS ON THE CHILDREN.

A charge has been extensively brought against the Pentateuch for containing the doctrine, that the sins of the fathers would be visited on the children. Thus KANT, treading in the steps of the English Deists, remarks, that all the consequences arising from the fulfilment or transgression of the law were limited to those

which every man might share in the present world, "and even these were not at all according to moral considerations, since both reward and punishment would affect the descendants who had taken no practical part either by what they did, or by what they omitted to do, which, in a political constitution, might be a prudent contrivance to secure obedience, but, in an ethical one, would be against all equity." And VON BOHLEN says, "Exod xxxiv. 7 expresses the united representation of the prophets, that Jehovah forgives iniquity, and yet is not free from the contradiction, that he takes vengeance on the children and children's children even to the third and fourth generation—a Levitical dogma (compare Exod. xx. 5, Num. xiv. 18), which Ezekiel occupies a whole chapter in combating."

It must be confessed that here also the opponents of Revelation have borrowed aid from many of its advocates, who have set out with them on the assumption, that the law threatens harm to the children on account of sins of the fathers with which they had nothing to do. That with this assumption, the law is completely indefensible, their very justifications of it may suffice to show. GROTIUS (*De jure belli et pacis*, ii. 593, ed. Barbeyrac), says, *Deus quidem in lege Hebraeae data paternam impietatem in posterose vindicaturum minatur; sed ipse jus domini plenissimum habet, ut in res nostras, ita in vitam nostram*. But this passage confounds the freedom of God in reference to human claims with the freedom from the laws of his own nature. God is not bound to us, but he is to himself, to punish only the guilty. Arbitrariness is only the semblance of freedom. The highest freedom is the most complete obligation to goodness. WARBURTON, who has expressed himself very fully on this regulation (*Divine Legation of Moses*, iii. 135), adopts the crude representation that it was not contrary to equity, because it was inserted in the compact. He regards it merely as temporary, as the surrogate of the doctrine of a future life, and considers that Jeremiah, in ch. xxxi. 29–33, and Ezekiel, in ch. xviii., announce its abolition. MICHAELIS (*Mosaisches Recht*, v. § 229, and in his *Annotations* on Exod. xx. 5), imagines that he can dispose of all difficulties by the remark, that only temporal evil is spoken of. In what happens to children, on whom God visits the iniquities of their fathers, no injustice is done, and yet there is an infliction on their fathers. For

temporal evil or good is dealt out by Providence not always according to desert, and if the children of God are put on their guard, then the evil with which they are visited becomes a salutary instrument for their welfare, but if they follow the evil courses of their fathers, it will be a merited punishment." But against this view the simple remark is sufficient, that, in the passages in question, not suffering, but punishment is spoken of; whether temporal or not temporal makes no difference. A God who can suspend temporal punishment over the innocent, can also inflict what is eternal. Equally untenable is the solution adopted by FLATT (*Magazin*, iii. 116), that only the natural consequences of sin are intended. This distinction is not indicated in these passages, nor would any thing be gained by it; for natural consequences must always be regarded as punishments, and therefore stand on the same footing with positive punishments.

The correct view in which all difficulties vanish (which is found in the Chaldee Paraphrast ONKELOS, who adds, *quando pergunt filii peccando pone parentes*, and in JONATHAN, and is defended by GERHARD, (*Loc. th.* v. 298), STEUDEL (*Glaubensl.* 159, and many others), is this, that the threatening is directed against those children who tread in their fathers' footsteps. This is supported by the following reasons.

(i.) That among the heathens, the custom of extending the punishment to the children of transgressors was widely spread, is shown by an expression of CICERO'S (*ad Brutum*, ep. xv). *In qua videtur illud esse crudele, quod ad liberos qui nihil meruerunt, poena pervenit, sed id et antiquum est et omnium civitatum.* But here the sentiment is certainly false, that the guilt of the fathers, in the sight of those who imposed the punishment, was merely nominal for the children. The following words of PLUTARCH (*De sera num. vind.*) point to the ultimate ground of the custom. "To the children of wicked parents the principal and most important part is innate, which never remains at rest and inactive, but through which they not only live and grow, but also are governed in their disposition. It is consequently neither cruel nor absurd, if, as their offspring, they also have part in their reward." "The apple falls not far from the stem," a maxim which holds good in reference to heathenism, the less it possessed a living principle of regeneration, was the foundation of this custom, and it is certainly

not in the spirit of antiquity, when CICERO (*ad Brutum ep. xii.*) states as its design and the ground of its existence; *ut caritas liberorum amiciores parentes reipublicae redderet.*

(ii.) It is said in Deut. xxiv. 16, "*The fathers shall not be put to death for the children; neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin.*" We find a remarkable instance in which this regulation was put in force in 2 Kings xiv. 6, and 2 Chron. xxv. 4. This would be inexplicable if Exod. xx. 5, "*Visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children, even to the third and fourth generation,*" related simply and universally to children. For then no reason would exist why the magistracy, God's "*minister to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil,*" should not take God's procedure for his rule and pattern. But if the sons are to be taken in a spiritual, as well as corporal sense, the ground of the distinction is clear. Only God looketh on the heart. This passage at the same time plainly shows, that the ground of punishing the children with the fathers, is not to be explained by the assertion, that subjectivity was not sufficiently recognised; though something might be said in favour of this explanation; the individuals were regarded not merely as members of the whole.

(iii.) The passages themselves loudly demand this interpretation. In Ex. xxxiv. 6, 7, it is said, "*And the Lord passed by before him, and proclaimed, the Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin, and will not destroy,\** (יְיָ יְיָ רַחוּם וְיִשְׁמְרֵנוּ) visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's children, to the third and to the fourth generation. The current interpretation is irreconcilable with the character of God which is here exhibited. How could—"God is love!" be more strongly expressed than in this passage! Such a God punishes only where he must; he has no pleasure in the death of a sinner, but rather that he should turn and live. If in Exod. xx. 5, 6, the threatening is to be taken so externally numerical, so also must the announcement of the blessing, in which case Israel would

---

\* v. Zech. v. 3.—[Tr.]

be quite safe, at least for a thousand generations after Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But that this cannot be the meaning, appears from a multitude of the clearest expressions. STEUDEL justly remarks, that the expression, "*them that hate me,*" shows that the children were to be considered as resembling the parents. That the term אֲבוֹתָי must not be limited to the fathers, is evident from the corresponding phrase, "*them that love me and keep my commandments*" in the annunciation of the blessing. Two great classes are set in contrast with one another, that of the ungodly, in whom the curse is perpetuated, and that of the godly, to whom the blessing appertained. In Num. xiv. 17, where God is likewise described as the Being who visits the sins of the fathers on the children, we have a case in which the punishment was stopped in its course. The present generation (the fathers) lie under the punishment, but the new generation then rising up (the sons) are objects of God's favour. This is inconceivable, if the mere external sonship of itself involved them in the participation of punishment; if the curse rested as an inevitable fate on the children of ungodly parents.

(iv.) The current interpretation is irreconcilable with other expressions of the Pentateuch, in reference to imputation. Abraham, in Gen. xviii. 25, says, "*That be far from thee, to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked: and that the righteous should be as the wicked, that be far from thee! Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?*" But as the best comment on the passage before us, Lev. xxvi. 39, deserves special attention; "and they that are left of you shall pine away in *their* iniquity in your enemies' lands; and *also* in the iniquities of their fathers shall they pine away with them," (the אֲנִי and the אֲבוֹתָי are not to be overlooked) ver. 40, "If they shall confess *their* iniquity, and the iniquity of their fathers. . . . ver. 42, Then will I remember my covenant with Jacob," &c. According to this passage the blessing was not inalienable, nor the curse inevitable. The blessing was not imparted to the mere natural descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; but to those who were also their spiritual descendants; the curse likewise did not rest on the mere natural descendants of sinners.

(v.) It is a doctrine that pervades the other books of Holy Writ, that no one is punished unless he is personally culpable; that only the ungodly sons are involved in the punishment of their fathers.

Jeremiah, in ch. xxxii. 18 (“*Thou showest loving-kindness unto thousands, and recompensest the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children after them*”), speaks like the law, and with a verbal reference to it, of the punishment of the fathers’ guilt falling on the children; but that those children are intended to whom the spirit of their fathers was transmitted, in whom their disposition continued to flourish, is evident from ver. 19, in which the doctrine of personal responsibility is expressed as distinctly as possible; “*thine eyes are open upon all the ways of the sons of men, to give every one according to his ways, and according to the fruit of his doings.*” The sons to whom Jeremiah alludes, were themselves guilty; compare ver. 30, “*for they have only done evil before me from their youth;*” ver. 31, “*from the day that they built it even unto this day.*” JONATHAN very properly adds after the words “*their sons,*” *quando complent peccando post illos.* In Jerem. xxxi. 29, 30, “*In those days they shall say no more, the fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children’s teeth are set on edge, but* (therefore thus shall they say, or it shall be universally known) *every man shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eateth the sour grape, his teeth shall be set on edge*—the current exposition of the passages in the law respecting visiting the sins of the fathers on the children, is marked as a gross misunderstanding, of which any one must be ashamed who traces the superabundant manifestation of God’s grace. Ezek. ch. xviii. forms a commentary on this passage, in which the misunderstanding of the language of the law, touched upon by Jeremiah, on the ground of which the impenitent charged God with being the author of their misfortunes, is fully and *ex professo* refuted. It is a gross misapprehension of the relation in which Ezekiel stands to the Pentateuch to suppose that this prophet here intended to improve upon the law. First of all, in ver. 1–3, he declares that the impious proverb and its application should no more be used in Israel. Then, in ver. 4, he lays down the position which must destroy the misapprehension, since it establishes personal accountability. “*Behold all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine; the soul that sinneth it shall die.*” This principle is then applied to particulars. According to ver. 5, and the following verses, in three generations, the relation alters three times—to the

righteous father will be awarded, life; to the unrighteous sons, death; to the righteous son of the unrighteous father, life. In ver. 20, all is summed up in the words, "*The soul that sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son; the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him. But if the wicked will turn from all his sins that he hath committed . . . he shall surely live, he shall not die . . . Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die, and not that he should return from his ways and live?*" After dissipating the illusion, that their sufferings were a punishment for the crimes of others, and therefore rested as an inevitable fate upon the people, they are admonished in ver. 30, by true conversion to save themselves from death, and live. The same doctrine is found in the New Testament; compare especially Matt. xxiii. 29, and following verses. In ver. 31, (*ὥστε μαρτυρεῖτε ἑαυτοῖς, ὅτι υἱοὶ ἐστε τῶν φονευσάντων τοὺς προφῆτας*) Christ lays a stress on the circumstance that the Pharisees distinguished the murderers of the prophets as their *fathers*. Had they been altogether separated from them in disposition, the natural descent from them would not have been made a prominent object. Therefore, here, as in Exodus, the more spiritual notion of sonship is kept in view, such as lies at the basis of the language of God to Abraham, "*In Isaac shall thy seed be called;*" and it is confirmed by our Lord against the Jews in John viii. 39, *ἀπεκρίθησαν καὶ εἶπον αὐτῷ ὁ πατήρ ἡμῶν Ἀβραάμ ἐστι. Λεγεί αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς· εἰ τέκνα τοῦ Ἀβραάμ ἐστε, τὰ ἔργα τοῦ Ἀβραάμ ἐποιεῖτε . . . ὑμεῖς ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστέ.* The *ἐφονεύσατε* in ver. 35, shows that the sons were only involved in their fathers' punishment as being partakers of their criminality. According to ver. 37, the curse would have been taken off, if Jerusalem had repented, for which the Lord presented all the inducements; "*but ye would not!*"

#### THE PARTIALITY OF THE PENTATEUCH.

One of the objections against the Pentateuch, which has been most pertinaciously urged, is founded on its partiality (*Particu-*



*larismus*). It was brought into notice by the English Deists (see BOLINGBROKE in LELAND, *View of Deistical Writers*, vol. ii., Letters 11, 12. London, 1755.) From them it was borrowed by KANT, who presents it in its crudest form. "So far," he says, "from Judaism forming an epoch belonging to the universal Church, or being itself this universal Church, it rather excluded the whole human race from its fellowship, as a peculiar people chosen by Jehovah for himself, which bore ill-will to all other nations, and was regarded with ill-will by them in return." That HEGEL has appropriated this sentiment, will be only thought to be in keeping with his total misapprehension of the Old Testament, and his position in reference to religion generally. But that even a SCHLEIERMACHER should express it so unreservedly (he says, in his *Glaubensl.* i. 52, "Judaism shews by the restriction of Jehovah's love to the race of Abraham a relationship to Fetichism)," proves how deeply the prejudice has taken root in the present age, and how difficult it is even for the more enlightened to free themselves from it, when general intelligence is not supported by special knowledge resting on personal examination. Originally the outcry against Jewish Particularism proceeded from those who, destitute themselves of all intimate relation to God, could not bear that others should enjoy such a blessing. They had nothing to lose; and this made them so zealous in the proclamation of equality. It would have been self-accusation if they had allowed others to stand in a nearer relation to God. But they were so consequent as to be not less zealous against Christian, than Jewish Particularism. The base coinage from their mint was innocently taken by many who, in their own religious experience, possessed the key for understanding the Old Testament Particularism, but knew not how to make use of it. Thus piety has not unfrequently joined in the clamour of impiety.

We begin with observing, that in regard to the charge of Particularism, it is not allowable to separate the New Testament from the Old; the charge must be entirely given up, or applied to both. That the formation of opinions is so dependent on the bias of the mind, that the wish is so often father of the thought, is the only adequate explanation of the fact that men have been led to exalt the New Testament in this respect at the expense of the Old. The New Testament teaches, in reference to the times

of the New Covenant, that a special providence of God watches over the Church—it teaches an election in reference to nations and individuals; it declares that those who have not the Son have not the Father; it limits the command of brotherly love to the disciples of Christ. And more than this, the Old Testament Particularism is decidedly and frequently acknowledged in the New Testament. The heathen, before the coming of Christ, were regarded as excluded from communion with God, as ἄθροι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ; only within the pale of the congregation of Israel was there a participation in the blessings of salvation. Compare our Lord's language, quoted in vol. i., p. 82, and take as the representation of the Apostles, the great Apostle of the Gentiles in Eph. ii. 11–22, Rom. ix. 4, and other passages.

The best apology for the Particularism of the Old Testament, and of the Pentateuch especially, lies in a simple representation of facts.

At the opening of the Pentateuch we are met by two truths, which, in their connection, entirely exclude absolute Particularism. (i.) The God of the author of the Pentateuch is God in the fullest sense—is the Godhead, the Creator, and Lord of heaven and earth; and (ii.) this God, in the first human pair, created all men in his own image. Absolute Particularism must necessarily set aside both or one of these truths. Monotheism, in distinction from Monolatry, is at the same time Universalism. "In all times and places," SCHLEIERMACHER observes (i 50), "this faith has pre-eminently striven to extend itself further, and to gain access to the hearts of men." How *one* God must necessarily be the God of *all*, for Gentiles not less than for Jews, the Apostle has pointed out in Rom. iii. 29, 30. ἡ Ἰουδαίων ὁ θεὸς μόνον; οὐχὶ καὶ ἔθνῶν; ναὶ καὶ ἔθνῶν ἐπέειπερ εἰς ὁ θεὸς ὁ δὲ δικαιοῦσαι περιτομῆν ἐκ πίστεως καὶ ἀκροβυστιαν διὰ τῆς πίστεως. The only means by which Monotheism can withdraw itself from Universalism, is by denying the original equality of men, and maintaining that from their creation an original difference existed among them, as has been done by the advocates of slavery, who would represent the negro as half-man half-brute. But this method the Israelitish Monotheism has from the first excluded itself from adopting.

In the Mosaic history, from the creation to Abraham, the *whole*

human race is the object of God's guidance and government. His love and his justice are exhibited towards collective humanity. How could a God who for centuries had embraced the whole, suddenly contract himself to a particular race and people, unless with the design of making the temporary contraction (*Beschränkung*) the means of a future expansion (*Entschränkung*). In Gen. ix. 7, the blessing is pronounced on all the descendants of Noah.

With the call of Abraham, Particularism makes its first appearance, but Universalism not only preceded, but accompanies it. Through the whole of Genesis, the blessing that would be on all nations is specified as the final end of the election of Abraham and his posterity. The separation of God to be the God of Israel, so far from being to the injury of other nations, had, on the contrary, their salvation for its ultimate object. Israel was separated *in order* that *all* nations might be blessed.

That the temporary withdrawal of God from the heathen originated, not in God, but in themselves, in their apostacy, which rendered a nearer relation to God impossible; that, therefore, it cannot be available as evidence against Universalism, is evident from the fact that the line of demarcation between Abraham and his posterity, and the Gentile world, was at first very slight. Melchisedec was acknowledged by Abraham as priest of the true God; and centuries later, Moses was united with Jethro in the bonds of religious fellowship. There was still a Gentile piety (*eine heidnische Religiösität*) יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵימָם. See vol. i. p. 344. In Gen. xviii. 23, it is expressly given as the reason why, at that time, principally the punitive justice of God was manifested to the heathen, that they had put themselves out of communication with other attributes of the Divine Being. Ten righteous men, if such had existed, could have averted entirely the doom of Sodom.

On the eve of the total eclipse of Divine knowledge, Abraham was called, that light might be preserved among his posterity for enlightening the heathen. Will any one contend with God because the temporary preference belonged precisely to him and his posterity? This also may be vindicated on good grounds, which we cannot express better than in the words of LANGE, (*Ueber den geschichtl. Char. d. Evangel.* in answer to STRAUSS, p. 9), "It was not without weighty reasons that Abraham was chosen and

not Lot; and afterwards Isaac and not Ishmael; Jacob and not Esau. Though Israel was chosen not on account of merit, yet neither was it in consequence of a blind Divine arbitrariness, taking them at random from the mass of nations. It was arranged that they should be chosen; the choice proves itself to be according to an arrangement; for from the womb, in the primary elements of his character, he was predisposed for living within the sphere of revelation; he had a susceptibility for true religion as the gift of God, which now had to be ethically developed, and actually unfolded under the Divine leadings. The history justified God's choice. As a people, Israel, through thousands of years, preserved the true religion as a dead stock; the *ἐκλογή* who were never wanting to it in the darkest times, served as a nursery for the kingdom of Christ, and realised the office of Israel, to be God's messenger to the heathen. If it be objected that Israel did not fulfil this office, and therefore stands self-condemned, we reply, that this self-condemnation is a witness to the contrary.

In the four last books of the Pentateuch, Universalism retires; the attention is principally directed to God's special relation to Israel, and its pre-eminence before the heathen. Who can censure this? It was most important that gratitude, and intense love to God, should be called forth in Israel. On the declaration, "*This I have done for thee,*" is founded the interrogation, "*What wilt thou do for me?*" But what the Lord had done for Israel required to be clearly set forth, that it might be compared with what he had *not* done for the heathen. In this way a ground of hope would be at the same time laid for the heathen, which could originate in no other way among the people. The living consciousness of what God had done for Israel, excited the hope and anticipation of what he would do in later ages for the heathen. DE WETTE (*Bibl. Dogm.* § 119), and VON CÖLLN (i. 283), have advocated the view, that the Particularism of the law was symbolical—that the limitation of God's government to a single nation is to be considered as a *sign*, and Universalism, on the other hand, as *the thing signified*, as the very reality. An important truth is at the basis of this view. The proofs of love towards a particular people, proceeding from that God who was called, and was indeed Jehovah, must always be likewise practical prophecies, and so many pledges of what he would do for other

nations, as soon as the fit time for their partaking of his grace should arrive. Yet something more than a mere sign was intended. For the present the peculiar relation to Israel is regarded throughout the law as perfectly real, and the notion that God was then no more Israel's God, than he was the God of all other nations, would have utterly shocked Moses. Yet a more vital Universalism took its rise always from the ground of Particularism. Every man hopes exactly as much for those who are yet at a distance from Christ, as he himself has experienced of his love.

But how little an absolute Particularism is favoured by the four last books of the Pentateuch, will appear from the following remarks:—

(i.) It has been maintained that these books do not admit the universal providence of God; that when providence is spoken of in reference to the heathen, it is only so far as they are connected with Israel. Compare RUST (*Phil. u. Christenth*, 175), and VON COLLN (p. 186.) But the contrary is shown by Deut. ii. 21, according to which Jehovah drove out the Rephaim, and gave their land to the Ammonites, and (ver. 22), exterminated the Horites before the Edomites. That the general providence of God is less prominent, finds its explanation and justification in the special design of these books.

(ii.) The *neighbour*, the *brother*, in these books (as only prejudice can fail to perceive), is constantly not a *fellow-man* but the member τῆς πολιτείας τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ. This has often been considered to favour the notion of absolute Particularism. But the warm exhortations to kindness towards strangers, oppose such a conclusion, “*And thou shalt not oppress a stranger*”—it is said in Exod. xxiii. 9—“*For ye know the heart of a stranger, seeing ye were strangers in the land of Egypt.*” In Deut. xxvii. 19, a curse is pronounced, as for a capital offence, on him who perverteth the judgment of the stranger. In Lev. xix. 33, 34, it is said, “*If a stranger sojourn with you in your land, ye shall not vex him. The stranger that dwelleth with you, shall be unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself, for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt.*” Compare also Exod. xxii. 20; Deut. x. 19; xxiv. 17. These passages shew that the brotherly love commanded to the Israelites, did not exclude the love of their fellow-men, but rather that the grounding of their

duties towards neighbours on the Israelitish brotherly love, was only occasioned by the circumstance that in general the Israelite had only to do with Israelites, so that the strongest motive was selected. They likewise show the falsehood of the assertion, that the God of the Pentateuch conducted himself towards the heathen solely in the way of exclusion and repulsion. How could such a God command his people to love those whom he himself did not love? How could he whom the Israelite was bound to love, be an object of indifference or hatred to God? There is good reason for asserting that those passages not standing isolated, but occurring throughout the Pentateuch, contain an indirect Messianic prophecy. In order rightly to estimate the significance of these passages, let it be observed how repulsive was the national spirit of ancient times. This is impressed on their language. *Hostis* was originally = *peregrinus*; see FORCELLINI. But of all the nations of antiquity, the hatred of strangers was most violent among the Egyptians. Strangers, who before the times of Psammeticus, came to Egypt, were either put to death, or made slaves of; compare DIODORUS SICULUS, i. 78; STRABO, xvii. p. 1142. From the Egyptians, whose hatred of strangers was most closely connected with their religion, we may learn the nature of Particularism, and how the Pentateuch would have been constructed, if Moses had introduced into Israelitish life what he had been taught in this school. These regulations in reference to individual members of foreign nations, shew, at the same time, that the attitude which was commanded to the Israelites towards all these people, the separation from them that was prescribed, could only be founded on the reason assigned in the law—the danger of pollution—the moral weakness of the Israelites. To have placed them in a different position towards heathen nations would not merely have been unkindness to Israel, but to the heathen themselves. Israel could render no help to them, partly on account of its own weakness, partly because the time was not yet fulfilled; and when it received injury, and fell into heathenish practices, the heathen were likewise injured, who were to be blessed through the seed of Abraham. How little it was the design of the law to cherish that *odium humani generis* with which the Jews were reproached, besides the passages already quoted, those also show in which a tender regard to the ties of blood, love to the nation

descended from the same stock, is inculcated on Israel. It is also to be noted, that only intermarriages which involved the adoption of heathenish religions were forbidden, and that Moses himself married a Cushite.

(iii.) That the exclusion of the nations, as such, from the kingdom of God, was not founded on an absolute Particularism, is evident, also, from the fact that the entrance into it stood open for individuals. Even Egyptians, members of the nation from whom the Israelites had suffered so much, could be received into the theocracy in the third generation, Deut. xxiii. 8, 9. (Compare, on the reception of the heathen among the people of God, *Christologie*, iii. 51.) Thus, it was evinced that the heathen were capable of grace, and, if they were so then, in future that might be imparted to all nations, which was now vouchsafed to individuals, as is emphatically expressed, in the prediction that Japhet would dwell in the tents of Shem, Gen ix. 27. (*Christologie*, i. 46.)

(iv.) Deut. xxxii. 43, is a remarkable passage.

“ Rejoice, O ye nations, with his people,  
For he will avenge the blood of his servants.”

This passage, like many others in the Psalms, contains an indirect announcement of the call of the Gentiles, as the deep discernment of the apostle perceived in Rom. xv. 10. The glorious attributes which God unfolded in the guidance of his people, could only be the subject of triumphant joy to the Gentiles, when, in what happened to Israel, they beheld a prophecy of what would one day be their own lot. If God, through all time, was merely to be the God of the Jews, this call upon the “nations” to “rejoice” would be unmeaning.

(v.) An infallible mark of absolute Particularism, is the externality of the conditions with which the reception of the blessings of the Divine favour were connected, for the members of the favoured people. But, who does not perceive that the exact opposite to this mark is found in the Pentateuch? Those who did not serve the Lord from the heart, were not merely excluded from his blessing, but a curse also lighted on them, the greatness of which corresponded exactly to that of the grace offered to them. Let any one only read Lev. xxvi., Deut. xxviii. xxxii., and judge whether, on a soil which produced such threatenings

against the mere carnal descendants of Abraham, a carnal Particularism could flourish.

ON THE SILENCE OF THE PENTATEUCH RESPECTING THE  
DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY.

KANT (*Rel. d. Veon.* 177, 178), remarks, that “all the consequences arising from the transgression or observance of the Divine commands, are limited to those which every man may experience in the present world. And since we cannot conceive of a religion without faith in a future life, Judaism contains no religious belief.”

This objection is a very old one. The Mohammedans inferred that, since the Pentateuch contained no reference to a future life, it must have been falsified by the Jews. Thus a Mohammedan writer, quoted by MARACCI, *Prodr. ad Alcor.* p. 13), says—“*Pentateuchus, quem nunc habemus, indignus est qui habeat deum auctorem. Nihil enim in eo legitur, quod pertinent ad res aeternos, ut ad Paradisum, ad Gehennam, ad judicium extremum, sed omnia, quae sunt in eo, res terrenas ac temporales respiciunt.*” See also HERBELOT (s. v. *Taourat*). The Deists attach great weight to this argument against the Divine character of the Mosaic economy. BOLINGBROKE (in LELAND, vol. ii., letter xiii., p. 491, London, 1755), does this, although he himself does not believe in future rewards and punishments. German Rationalism, at first, followed on this topic in the footsteps of English Deism. It has often been asserted, that by the omission of the doctrine of immortality, the Mosaic religion was degraded below Heathenism. But here DE WETTE has taken some steps back in the right direction. He thinks (*Bibl. Theolog.* § 113), that Moses gained the knowledge of this doctrine from the Egyptians, but did not introduce it into his code, because it could not be given without a mythology, and might have led to the worship of the dead. Yet he makes a distinction in reference to the doctrine of immortality; it is acknowledged that an entire silence respecting the doctrine of immortality may belong to a higher point-of-view than the belief in immortality in a crude form. “Of a happy life with God,” it is said in § 114,



“there is an intimation in the myth of Enoch’s translation.” VÖN COLLN, as usual, agrees with DE WETTE (*Bibl. Theol.* i. 204.) VATKE also acknowledges (p. 697), that the Mosaic religion was too good for the Egyptian doctrine of immortality. But, from the principles of the Old Testament, to which it was not adapted, a higher doctrine of immortality could be developed subsequently, “which was based on subjective infinity or spirit.”

Several advocates of the divinity of the Mosaic religion have sought very anxiously to rebut the attacks which have been founded on the absence of the doctrine of immortality, and have done more injury to the cause they wished to serve, by their defence, than the attacks. Thus WARBURTON pre-eminently, who has discussed this position in his “*Divine Legislation of Moses*,” of which the fundamental character, with all his zeal against Deism, is deistical. He concedes to his opponents, that in the law, no use is made of the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, but thinks that he can not merely frame an apology for the omission, but even convert it into a positive argument for the Divine origin of the Mosaic religion. The substance of his very long dissertation has been thus expressed—“As various Deists have asserted, the religion of Moses contains no promises of a future life, consequently it is not the true religion. WARBURTON reverses the position, and concludes that a religion which was not founded on the doctrine of immortality, and the promise of eternal life, must have been supported by the extraordinary providence of God. And WARBURTON himself says—“We have shown at large, in the first three books, that under a common or unequal providence, civil government could not be supported without a religion teaching a future state of reward and punishment. And it is the great purpose of this work to prove, that the Mosaic religion wanting that doctrine, the Jews must *really* have enjoyed that equal providence, under which Holy Scripture represents them to have lived; and then, no transgressor escaping punishment, nor any observer of the law missing his reward, human affairs might be kept in good order, without the doctrine of a future state.”\* Three remarks will suffice to expose the unsoundness of this reasoning—(i.) WARBURTON considers tem-

\* *The Divine Legislation of Moses demonstrated*, book v., sec. 5, vol. ii., p. 326, ed. Lond. 1837.

poral and eternal rewards as simply incompatible with one another; and maintains, that it might be assumed, *a priori*, that "future rewards and punishments could not be the sanction of the Mosaic dispensation." Thus there is a disruption and opposition between two things, one of which cannot exist without the other. How little one excludes the other, is evident from the simple fact, that in later Judaism, and in Christianity, both are intimately connected. (ii.) WARBURTON always expresses himself, as if *now*, everything was reserved for a future life, and generally takes no account of the whole foundation of the theocracy. The mere formal difference between the Old and New Testament, in reference to retribution in the present life, which consists in this, that, under the latter it is more refined, and less palpable, he converts into a material and total difference. His view of the universe borders closely on impiety. He denies, in truth, all Providence. The present life, according to him, is destitute, under the New Testament dispensation, of the traces of a retributive God. But what is Providence if retribution be denied? He regards such passages as JER. xxxii. 18, and Hos. iv. 6—("Seeing thou hast forgotten the law of thy God, I will also forget thy children")—as belonging only to the Old Testament economy. He explains 1 Tim. iv. 8, ἡ εὐσέβεια πρὸς πάντα ὠφέλιμος ἐστίν, ἐπαγγελίαν ἔχουσα ζωῆς τῆς νῦν καὶ τῆς μελλούσης, as meaning that moral duties, under both religions, find their proper reward; namely, under Judaism, the rewards of the present life, and, under Christianity, those of the life to come. If this were the true state of the case, that Christianity announces *only* a retribution beyond the grave, Judaism would stand higher than Christianity. A house only one story high, is better than a castle-in-the-air. Mere future retribution is like a tree sawn off above the root. It retains its verdure only as long as the sap remains in it, which it has received from the root. On the other hand, faith in present retribution must necessarily, from the motive force that dwells in it, in time produce faith in future retribution. (iii.) What WARBURTON takes away from the New Testament, in reference to present retribution, he gives too liberally to the Old Testament. It seems, according to him, as if retribution, under the Old Testament always palpably followed; as if it was not at all a matter of faith.

J. D. MICHAELIS stands on the same ground with WARBURTON. In his *Diss. argumenta immortal. ex Mose, synt.* i. p. 80, he speaks as if there were no traces of retribution in this life under the New Testament, but that every thing was transferred to the future. The chief ground on which he justifies the omission of the doctrine of future rewards and punishments is, that the whole Mosaic law was merely a civil institution, to which, of course, no rewards or punishments after death belong; thus in his *Mos. Recht.* § 14, he says, "I am not surprised at the omission, but merely at the short-sightedness and forgetfulness of those persons who could look for such sanctions in civil legislation." . . . "Hence, even now, no lawgiver is so simple as to threaten the punishment of hell to a murderer, an adulterer, or a thief; we rather, before the execution of a capital punishment, grant the criminal time and preparatory means for making his peace with God." Here the champion of the Old Testament holds out his hand to his opponents. If the law of Moses is merely a civil institution, then it is all over with his Divine legation. Only concede this point, and our opponents have gained all they want.

The unsoundness of such vindications has been more or less apparent to later apologists. FLATT, for example (p. 117), lays great stress on the argument, that the people were not yet ripe for this doctrine; that it could make no impression on men devoted to objects of sense, and could be of no advantage for religious and moral culture, since the future life was only considered as a continuation of the present. STEUDEL (*Glaubens*, p. 448) remarks, "The Old Testament had first to plant firmly in men's minds, in the way of experience, the ideas of the holiness and justice of God, until faith in immortality could take root for any salutary purpose."

In our times, he who undertakes the vindication of the Pentateuch on this subject finds himself in a peculiarly favourable position. The period in which immortality was the general watchword, the one religious or pseudo-religious sentiment which was held with a strong interest, is past. Even the abuse to which this doctrine was subjected, has led men into the opposite extreme. Some have gone so far as to assert, that the absence of the doctrine of future rewards and punishments is a striking instance of the high superiority of the Old Testament, and the later change

in opinion has been described as a change for the worse. Compare RICHTER (*Die letzten Dinge*, Bres. 1833, i. p. 170.) But however great and serious is the error in which the philosophy of the present times is involved, yet there lies undeniably a great truth at the bottom of it, and this truth, ignorance of which rendered the attack on the Old Testament, in reference to this point, so evident, is now more and more generally acknowledged, and has gained a more favourable hearing for the vindication. Even those who do not do homage to the philosophy of the present life, acknowledge that the doctrine of immortality has that of regeneration for its necessary presupposition, and that our endeavours should primarily aim to affect the latter. WEISSE, by the title of his work, "*Die philosophische Geheimslehre von der Unsterblichkeit*," intimates that Being must be prior to believing and thinking.

Belief in immortality has in itself no religious character and no ethical importance. It obtains both from the sum total of the system to which it belongs, and the person in whom it exists. There are nations which believe in no God, and yet believe in immortality, (see PAREAU, *de immortal. notit. in libro Jobi*, p. 14) ; and others, to whom the notion of a future retribution is wholly alien, and whose future existence is nothing else than the present with a removal of sufferings and more exalted pleasures ; (see PAREAU, and KNAPP, *super origine opinionis de immortalitate anim. ap. barb. gentes. opusc. i. 86.*) Among others, where there is a notion of retribution, it has no true moral character. The conceptions of it are as imperfect as those of virtue and vice. *Qui in ferocia et fortitudine*, KNAPP remarks, *summæ virtutis laudem ponunt et præter ignaviam ac timiditatem nihil habent, quod turpe judicent atque in vitiis numerent, ii fortibus tantum viris præmia, ignavis vero supplicia apud inferos decernunt.* Those who are farther advanced only consider gross crime as an object of future punishment, not sin in general, with the nature of which they are totally unacquainted.

Among the Egyptians, the belief in immortality excited a great influence on life, but even among them, this faith had throughout no truly religious and moral character, and therefore no salutary influence. The principal passage on this subject is in HERO-

DOTUS, ii. 123, "The Egyptians are the first who have asserted this doctrine, that the soul of man is immortal, but that when the body perishes, it enters into another animal; and, when it has completed the circuit of all land and marine animals, and birds, it again enters a human body; and that this circuit occupies three thousand years."\* On this passage, ZOECA (*de obeliseis*, p. 294) has given the best commentary. As long as the body was not decayed, the soul existed in and with it, and since this miserable mode of continued existence was the noblest they knew of, so they used every means to make the body as indestructible as possible by embalming. But if this was not embalmed, or by any accident was destroyed, then began the transmigration of the soul. In this manner, ZOECA reconciles the two assertions of Herodotus, that, according to the doctrine of the Egyptians, the souls of the deceased came into Amenthes, and that souls migrated through all kinds of animals in a definite cycle. It tends to confute HEEREN'S opinion, that, according to the popular belief, the continuance of the soul was connected with that of the body, but that the doctrine of transmigration belonged to the priests—that HERODOTUS and DIODORUS knew of only one Egyptian immortality, and that the priests also were embalmed. CREUZER (*Comm. Herod.* p. 307), whom BAHR, *on Herod.* i. 764, follows, labours, indeed, to prove that the priests held a more refined esoteric doctrine, but without foundation or success. Where such degrading conceptions of the soul were entertained as those of the Egyptians, to whom the body was more than the soul, and a human soul was not distinguished characteristically from that of a brute, a moral significance cannot be attributed to their doctrine of immortality. In more ancient times, the doctrine of retribution after death was wholly unknown to the Egyptians. Compare ZOECA (p. 311), PAREAU (p. 50), HEEREN (II. ii. p. 201.) At a later period, a rude notion of rewards and punishments prevailed. On the injurious influence of the doctrine of immortality among the Egyptians, and its abuse in favour of the priests, see SCHLOSSER, (*Übersicht*, &c. I. i. p. 86).

\* πρώτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοί εἰσι οἱ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἄθάνατος ἐστὶ, τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθίνοντος, εἰς ἄλλο ζῶον ἀεὶ γινόμενον ἐσθύεται ἑπεὶ ἂν δὲ περιέλθῃ πάντα τὰ χερσαῖα καὶ τὰ θαλάσσια καὶ τὰ πετεινὰ, αὐτὴ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα γινόμενον ἐσθύνειν. Τὴν περιήλυσιν δὲ αὐτῇ γίνεσθαι ἐν τρισχιλίοισι ἔτεσι.

In the religion of the Persians, the doctrine of immortality had certainly nobler elements ; but every thing leads us to conclude that these were not native productions, but had been obtained from the people who possessed Divine Revelation. In modern times, it has been attempted to reverse the relations, and to show that the Persians did not borrow from the Jews, but the Jews from the Persians. The refutation of this view we have given elsewhere (*die Authentie des Daniel*, 155) ; and it has since been undertaken by HÄVERNICK (*Commentar über das buch Daniel*. Hamb. 1832. p. 509.) VATKE indeed asserts that it has been proved against HÄVERNICK by J. G. MÜLLER, that the Jews were the party who borrowed. (*Ist die Lehre von der Auferstehung des Leibes wirklich nicht eine altpersische Lehre*, in the *Stud. und Krit.* 1835.) But MÜLLER has at most only proved against HÄVERNICK that the doctrine of the resurrection among the Persians is not to be accounted for by *Christian* influence. He allows (p. 478) that he himself cannot determine the relation of Isaiah, Ezekiel, and Daniel to the Persian doctrine. Whence, indeed, could proof be brought of their not borrowing from the Jews ? Among the Jews we have in Ezekiel a certain fixed point not touched by criticism. From him we can prove that the doctrine of the resurrection existed among the Jews before they came into close contact with the Persians. On the other hand, the oldest witness for the doctrine of the resurrection among the Persians is THEOPOMPUS, a contemporary of Alexander, and who, therefore, lived long after the close connection had been formed between the two nations. The Persian doctrine of the resurrection is first completely developed in the *Bundehesh*. If it be undeniable that this book has drawn on this and other subjects from the sources of revelation, including the Christian, we shall not be disposed to invert the relation in reference to the less developed doctrine. After it had been in olden times the prevalent aim to prove that heathenism was a corrupted Judaism, a notion that was carried beyond all bounds, modern critics have fallen into the other extreme. They have endeavoured to exclude the influence of Judaism at all points from heathenism, although previously to any examination we cannot but suppose that the firm and solid would impress the weak in many ways ; that what is clear and definite would influence the obscure and undetermined ; the composite character

of heathenism in relation to the doctrine of revelation is of weight. Where undeniably one side had borrowed from the other, there has always been a readiness to charge it on the Jews. Men have been so inconsiderate to transfer the outward relation of greatness and strength without hesitation to the spiritual world, and to that part of it for which Israel was most distinguished, that of religion. But in reference to the relation of the Persian religion to the Israelitish, there appears now an inclination to move in the right direction. According to STUHR (*die Religionssysteme des Orientes*, p. 339), the books of the *Zendavesta*, of which the first mention occurs in Mahommedan writers of the 10th and 11th centuries, were of very late formation. No critical value, he asserts, can be attributed to the *Bundehesh*. The whole is a perplexed tissue of obscure representations. In the preceding age, a complicated and perplexing syncretism had prevailed. He places the first rise of the religion of Zerdusht in the time of Darius, and, therefore, in a period when it is notorious that the Israelites were in possession of their doctrine of the resurrection. As in the Persian religion, views originally foreign to it were received from India, so the ethical elements which we find in it were borrowed from Judaism, and transferred to the forms of a religious sentiment that displayed itself in the worship of spirits and nature (p. 373.) Its formation from heterogeneous elements is betrayed by the obscurity and perplexity of the religious representations of the Persians, and even these are easily made the depositories of new elements. In this state of the case we are perfectly justified in rejecting the evidence which some persons would adduce from the religion of the Persians for the existence of a more exalted belief in immortality beyond the bounds of revelation. Where, in other quarters, more elevated views are met with, they are evidently borrowed. In reference to Mahommedanism this is universally admitted. That the Jewish doctrine of immortality exerted an important influence on the Arabians before the time of Mahomet, is shown by a poem in SCHULTENS (*Monument. vetust.* p. 68.) Wherever, in heathen nations of America or Asia, better elements are found, their derivation from Christians or Mahommedans is equally evident. Compare KNAPP, p. 103.

Thus much is proved by the foregoing remarks ; if the Penta-

tench does not teach the doctrine of immortality, it does not on that account sink below the standard of heathenism ; for what heathenism possessed in this respect was not worth the name.

But we must now proceed further. If the Pentateuch did not introduce the doctrine of the resurrection directly into the national life, yet it prepared the ground and sowed the seed from which this doctrine might, or rather *must*, spring. That such was the case there is the strongest presumption. If we see what importance the doctrine of the resurrection had acquired among the Israelites—how all the true faith in immortality that exists in the world has its origin from them—that the fountain-head of the doctrine of a future life is to be sought peculiarly among this people, it cannot be otherwise than that in their first beginning, in the original records of their religion, the foundations of it should be laid.

On a closer examination of the subject, the following were probably the principal ways in which the doctrines of the Pentateuch led to a belief in immortality and retribution.

*First*, “ An elevated position is assigned to MAN in the Pentateuch.” He was created last, and stands at the head of the creation ; all other creatures exist for his sake. According to Gen. i. 26, 27, he was created in the image of God ; therefore the whole Divine glory shines forth from him in miniature. For it is very evident that this likeness to God is not confined to one particular, since the text speaks of the image of God in general, and in its widest extent ; and against those who, with SCHOTT (*Opuse*. ii. 93), take this particular to be the bodily form of man, CALVIN justly exclaims *sepultum maneat illud delirium!* Such an absurd opinion merits no serious refutation. Since man bears the image of God, he is endowed with the mastery over nature. If the likeness consisted in the form, the second position would not follow from the first. And how could the prohibition of image worship consist with the doctrine of the corporeity of God, which is here manifestly implied ? According to Gen. ii. 7, two elements are combined in man—one earthly, the other divine—which no other creature besides himself possesses. Here even SCHOTT feels himself compelled to remark, “ That which is peculiarly living in man is therefore the breath of God in an earthly organization ; there lives in man something divine.” We have



here the anthropological foundation for the doctrine of immortality. As in the earthly element of man lies the possibility of death, or rather, as far as it is not spiritualized and glorified, the necessity for it; so in the fact that man is partaker of the Divine image, of life from God, lies the possibility, the necessity, in truth, not merely of immortality in general, but of a blessed or miserable immortality of eternal life or of damnation. The soul which bears the Divine image is not merely rescued by it from the control of the transitory, but also from the state of mere vegetative existence.

*Secondly*, The doctrine of the Pentateuch respecting God, on whatever side we view it, points to the doctrine of immortality. The almightiness of God forms its first condition on this subject. That the Sadducees did not recognise this, our Lord marks as the root of their unbelief in the resurrection. In the theology of the Pentateuch, this hindrance is fully overcome. He who created the world out of nothing—for whom nothing is too wonderful—death cannot obstruct *Him* if he wills to preserve the soul. But in the theology of the Pentateuch his will is pledged equally with his power. The God of the Pentateuch is love; he who reveals himself so full of grace to his people, and enters into the most intimate communion with them, in doing so declares that he will preserve them to eternal life. To this foundation of the doctrine of the resurrection in the Pentateuch, our Lord himself refers in Matt. xxii. 31, 32—*περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀναστάσεως τῶν νεκρῶν οὐκ ἀνέγνωτε τὸ ῥηθὲν ὑμῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, λέγοντος· ἐγὼ εἶμι ὁ θεὸς Ἀβραὰμ καὶ ὁ θεὸς Ἰσαὰκ καὶ ὁ θεὸς Ἰακώβ· οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς θεὸς νεκρῶν, ἀλλὰ ζωντων.* To the same purport GLÖCKLER remarks—“What sort of God would he be, who took delight only in fragile playthings, and expended the whole riches of his love on transitory and perishable objects.” The whole of Genesis is as certainly a continued reference, not to a naked immortality, but to an everlasting life of blessedness, as the grace of God towards his chosen forms its central point. Whenever God calls himself the God of any one, or appears as the God of any one, he also declares that he will make such an one a partaker of eternal life. How intimately these two things are connected, is apparent from the fact, that in the whole succession of deniers of immortality in the last century, we see not one who believed in

a heart-felt relation between a personal God and his people in the present life.

*Thirdly*, The doctrine of temporal retribution in the Pentateuch, forms the most direct preparation for the doctrine of immortality. When RICHTER says, "But how in all the world was it possible that, *notwithstanding* this (although the Hebrews attributed to Jehovah so much justice, that he would reward the good upon earth and punish the bad), not only the dogma of immortality, but the whole doctrine of the last day, and its concomitants, found acceptance and cultivation in Judaism; nay more, that next to the Arabians, the Jews are exactly the people who have formed images of immortality, the resurrection, the judgment, heaven, and hell, which in fulness and exactness, in plan and representation, leaved nothing to be wished for;"—so we maintain that such a consequence was not merely possible but necessary exactly on this account; because the doctrine of temporal retribution was insisted upon so constantly and industriously in the Pentateuch, and had struck root so deeply among the Jews. Where this foundation is not laid, the structure of faith in immortality is built upon the sand, and will give way at the first blast. He who does not acknowledge temporal retribution, must necessarily find in his heart a response to VANINI'S scoff (in WARBURTON, Book V. appendix. Note Y. vol. ii. p. 369), on revelation (by him totally misunderstood)—*quae bonarum et malarum actionum repromissiones polliceatur in futura tamen vita, ne fraus detegi possit*, although he may not allow it to be so. A rich collection of passages from heathen authors, which express a despair of future retribution, on the ground of unbelief in present retribution, may be found in BARTH on CLAUDIAN (1078.) And have we not in the development of our own times, a clear proof how closely these two are connected? Doubt was at first directed against retribution in the present life, and it appeared as if faith in immortality, from a misapprehension of the former, attained to higher significance and greater firmness. Even supernaturalist theologians found a leading argument for future retribution in the defects of the present; compare, for instance, KNAPP (p. 100)—*nec erit amplius, cur offendamur ac perturbemur fortuna et sorte hominum in hac vita; cujus si morte intereunt animi tanta est iniquitas, sive secundas res spectemus, sive adversas,*

*ut qui cum justitia et acq̄itate divina componere tentet, operam perdere videatur.* STEUDEL (*Glaubensl.* 445) and others. But soon the real consequence came to light. Retribution, driven from the lower region, could not maintain itself in the higher. It shows that the hope of immortality was nourished with its heart-blood. The dialogue in LUCIAN'S *Ζεὺς ἐλεγχόμενος* (*Opera* ii. p. 639, ed. Reiz.), was acted over again, where Jupiter being driven hard by the questions with which he was assailed, relative to retribution in the present life, replies, "Do you not know, Cyniscus, what great punishments the wicked endure after this life, or in what happiness the good pass their time?" But the scoffer replies, "You talk to me of Hades, and the Tityuses, and the Tantaluses. But as for me, if there be any such thing, I shall know the truth when I am dead; but as things are now, having passed happily the time present, whether longer or shorter, I should be willing when I die, for my liver to be devoured by sixteen vultures, but not to thirst here like Tantalus, that in the isles of the blessed I may drink with heroes, and repose in the fields of Elysium." The same thought which appears here cloathed in the garb of wit, meets us in SCHILLER'S poem "*Resignation*," in the garb of earnestness and sorrow. "If such a retribution does not rejoice you on earth"—says RICHTER, p. 232, rightly, according to the prejudices of the age—"then God is by no means truly just, and you will find yourself to be acting contrary to your own doctrine. Where the adage, "the world's history is a world's judgment," is received by the heart in a true, biblical sense, the advance to faith in *the* world's judgment is necessary and certain.

But why, it will be asked, has the Pentateuch contented itself with the mere foundation for the doctrine of immortality? Why has it not delivered this doctrine itself?

Here, it is first of all to be remarked, that the question ought to be put rather differently. Instead of saying, Why has it not delivered this doctrine? we should say, Why has it not delivered it clearly, explicitly, repeatedly? For intimations of it are not wanting in the Pentateuch. A large number of passages point to simple immortality, which we may take for granted as known. But one passage goes further. It contains a very distinct allusion to everlasting life. It is the account of Enoch's translation,

in which the point of importance is, that his *walking with God* is placed so designedly and emphatically in causal connection with his *translation to God*. That for the pious there is an everlasting life of happiness, is thus determined. The only question is, whether it is designed for *all*, and weighty reasons present themselves for answering this in the affirmative. In a religion, whose God is Jehovah, there can be nothing arbitrary; what God has done for one, is, at the same time, a prediction of what he will do for all who stand in the same position towards him, and if any difference be made, it can only be formal, not essential.

The question, in its corrected form, has been stirred afresh by this account. Undeniably, the veil of mystery is spread over it. This was long ago remarked. LE CLERC, for example, says on Gen. v. 24, *Mirum est, Mosem rem tantam si modo Henochum immortalem factum credidit, tam obiter tamque obscure quasi eam latere vellet perstrinxisse*. Why has not Moses described the event more fully and plainly? Why has he not expressed the doctrine to be drawn from it? Why, moreover, has he entirely neglected to make use of this doctrine in his legislation?

We answer, even the New Testament does not communicate formal information respecting the life after death; and, in a certain sense, we might say, that the doctrine of immortality is not taught in any part of Scripture, as STEUDEL has remarked (p. 446). It is always presupposed. This cannot have been accidental. It is rather the necessary result of the thing itself. Life and death belong not first to the other world, but begin already *here*. *There* nothing is begun, but only continued and completed. The believer "*is*" already "*passed from death unto life*;" μεταβέβηκεν ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου εἰς τὴν ζωὴν. John v. 24; the water which our Lord gives springs up to everlasting life; John iv. 14, "*the powers of the world to come*" are already "*tasted*" here. Heb. vi. 5. Accordingly, the great matter is, that every man should be a partaker of life from God. No sooner does this take place than he *has* eternal life, and with it, a certainty of it in his own feelings. It needed only a slight support in revelation in order to be impressed in the form of intelligible conviction. For the believer, the formal doctrine is not necessary; for the unbeliever, the most immediate concern is the preaching of repentance. The Ten Commandments are more important for him than a long

discourse on immortality. Instead of asking whether the Pentateuch teaches immortality, it should be rather asked, whether its doctrine leads thither to taste the powers of the world to come.

Now, it must certainly be admitted, that the support which is given in the Pentateuch to the hope of the believer in eternal life is rather weak—that the reference (altogether wanting in it) to the eternal consequences of sin, as the experience of the Christian æra shows, is suited powerfully to support the preaching of repentance—and that the intimation of eternal happiness is no unimportant means of conversion. It cannot, therefore, be denied, that the revelation contained in the Pentateuch, in reference to the doctrine of immortality, is still imperfect. But what appears, if the absolute measure be applied, as imperfection—if the law be viewed in reference to the historical relations, under which it was first divulged, can represent itself as perfection. Here much may be said for its justification. It may be shown, how a consideration of the Egyptian superstition, in which a false doctrine of immortality occupies so conspicuous a place, was first of all a motive to leave this field uncultivated, on which the best doctrine was exposed to be grossly misunderstood, and to be satisfied with laying a foundation for the true faith in immortality. It may be shown, that, for the present, the whole and undivided attention of the people was to be directed to temporal retribution, in order that, when this had taken root, the faith in future retribution might spontaneously spring up. But we need not here enter on this point, since it has been put beyond all doubt, that the deficiencies of the Pentateuch in reference to the doctrine of immortality, are not of a kind to endanger its character as a record of Divine Revelation.

## DOCTRINE OF RETRIBUTION.

One of the principal charges brought against the Pentateuch is founded on its doctrine of retribution. BOLINGBROKE (in his *Essays and Fragments*, iii. 291, 292) quoted by LELAND, *View, &c.*, ii. letter 13, p. 497, remarks on this subject: “Moses, on the renewal of the covenant between God and the people, employs no argument to induce the latter to a strict observation of it than promises of immediate good, and threatenings of immediate evil.

They are exhorted to keep the law, not for the sake of the law, nor for the sake of God, but for considerations of another kind, and where not only their wants were to be supplied, but all their appetites and passions to be gratified—their avarice and all their other appetites and passions—God purchased, as it were, their obedience with this mercenary bargain.”

In later times, DE WETTE has so given currency to the false coin, that one is surprised to see it taken and passed by persons of whom we might have hoped better things. He has treated this subject *ex professo* in his essay, *Beitrag zur Charakteristik des Hebraismus*, in DAUB and CREUZER'S *Studien*, 1807, No. ii. p. 241. He here treats the belief, that “the outward must correspond to the inward, prosperity to virtue, misfortune to vice,” as entirely a mere delusion; and no people of antiquity were more given than the Israelitish to this delusion, for their whole view of the world was grounded upon it. He considers self-interest and worldliness as the sources of the whole doctrine of temporal retribution. “Genuine religious instinct,” he remarks, “impels those who are dissatisfied with the world to God, to confidence in his guidance; but yet an earthly disposition and love of the world drawn downwards too much. Faith, which is the hope of what a man sees not, was not the portion of the Hebrews; it was needful for the justice of God to show itself, and that visibly, as now, and only the promise of that certain retribution could console them. Unfortunate consolation! wavering faith which every gust of accident could cast down! Vain undertaking to adjust the outward by the inward, to wish to measure the one by the other! For where is the measure for this comparison? Where the point of contact in things so heterogeneous?” He praises (p. 306) the Sadducees for their rejection of all retribution, to whom, he thinks, “the noble and free relations of life gave more liberality and freedom of spirit, in order to maintain such a doctrine of resignation.” He regards it as the chief distinction of Christianity, that it has eradicated this error. Christ, he asserts (p. 312), had consolation for misfortune, but only of a spiritual kind for what was spiritual. The expression in Matt. v. 6 he paraphrases thus: “Happy are those that are hungry and thirsty in spirit; for your spiritual hunger shall find satisfaction in me; to appease any other kind I am not come.” On the clause,

“ *they shall inherit the earth,*” he remarks, “ Of course, Jesus understands it spiritually.” To these views, DE WETTE has remained faithful in his later writings. Compare, for instance, *Die Bibl. Theol.* § 134, and his *Commentary on the Psalms* in numerous passages. He feels so sure of them, that he never thinks of defending them against such as are diametrically opposite. Out of a great number of those who profess to coincide with him, we name only VON COLLN, *Bibl. Theol.* i. 288 ; compare ii. 113, where he places the Old Testament, with its doctrine of earthly retribution, in direct opposition to the New Testament, with its reference to the future state. EWALD, *on Job*, p. 10, does his utmost to save his client from all taint of faith in retribution, and to transform him into a herald of his own views, according to which, “ Evil ought to be regarded as something outward, visible, and bodily, in no intimate and true relation to the internal worth of man.” HEGEL, *Religionsphil.* i. 74.

We wish first of all to examine with what right an opposition is asserted to exist on this point between the New Testament and the Old. The result will be, that the New Testament, not less than the Old, teaches a temporal retribution ; that therefore the attack must be extended to the former—must be directed against the whole of Divine Revelation.

A closer examination of the beatitudes in the sermon on the Mount, shows us, that not one of them exclusively relates to future retribution, or to spiritual blessings. This is particularly evident in ver. 4, *μακάριοι οἱ πενθοῦντες ὅτι αὐτοὶ παρακληθήσονται*, in which, arbitrarily and in contradiction to the passage on which it is founded in Is. lxi. 1-3, the sorrow has been restricted to the anguish for sin, and the comfort to spiritual consolations ; ver. 5, *μακάριοι οἱ πραεῖς ὅτι αὐτοὶ κληρονομήσουσι τὴν γῆν*, and ver. 6, *μακάριοι οἱ πεινῶντες καὶ διψῶντες τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅτι αὐτοὶ χορτασθήσονται*, where *δικαιοσύνη* is not to be taken *sensu morali*, but denotes the blessings of the Messiah's kingdom in their full extent, as the parallel passages in the Old Testament show, particularly Is. lv. 1, and also Luke vi. 21, *μακάριοι οἱ πεινῶντες νῦν, ὅτι χορτασθήσεσθε*.

In our Lord's declaration, Matt. xix. 29, *καὶ πᾶς ὅστις ἀφήκεν οἰκίαν ἢ ἀδελφούς, ἢ ἀδελφάς, ἢ πατέρα, ἢ μητέρα ἢ γυναῖκα ἢ τέκνα, ἢ ἀγροὺς ἕνεκεν τοῦ ὀνόματός μου ἑκατονταπλασίονα λήψε-*

ται καὶ ζωὴν αἰώνιον κληρονομήσει, although the individualising character of the expression cannot be mistaken, yet the promise of a temporal retribution can so much the less be denied, since the promise of one in the world to come is placed by the side of it; as, according to the apostle's language in 1 Tim. iv. 8, "*Godliness has the promise,*" not merely of "*the life to come,*" but of "*that which now is.*"

That bodily disease is to be regarded as a punishment of sin, our Lord teaches very distinctly in John v. 14, *μηκέτι ἀμάρτανε, ἵνα μὴ χεῖρόν τί σοι γένηται;* and in Luke v. 20, *καὶ ἰδὼν τὴν πίστιν αὐτῶν εἶπεν ἄνθρωπε, ἀφέωνταί σοι αἱ ἀμαρτίαι σου.* In the first passage bodily disease is denounced, in the second it is taken away; and in both cases as the punishment of sin.

Nor will it do to refer both expressions merely to individual cases. For (i.) If such a reference were intended, it must have been distinctly pointed out. Since the opinion that every disease was a punishment of sin was generally current, no one would understand these expressions otherwise than as general, and since our Lord did not set aside this construction, it cannot rest on a misunderstanding. (ii.) If the expressions had simply an individual reference, Jesus must have given a proof of his omniscience, which yet is not signified. For no one will maintain that palsy is always a consequence of definite sins. (iii.) The restriction to individual cases is inadmissible on account of the symbolical character of the healing of diseases in general. Compare Matt. viii. 17, "*That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Esaias the prophet, saying, Himself took our infirmities, and bare our sicknesses.*" Had we also no express declaration of Christ respecting the connection of disease and sin, yet the mere fact of his healing the sick, would suffice to establish this connection. A sick man whom Christ (not a mere magnified Hippocrates, but a Saviour) heals, is by the very fact declared to be a sinner. Let the connection between disease and sin be broken, then the connection between the possessed and the diseased is destroyed, and what is common to both is taken away. Then also the connection is dissolved between healing the sick and raising the dead, of which the foundation is, that death is the wages of sin.

The vindication of the individual references in the two passages



we have just quoted, is founded on John ix. 2, 3, *καὶ ἠρώτησαν αὐτὸν οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ λέγοντες· ῥα ββὶ τίς ἤμαρτεν, οὗτος ἢ οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ, ἵνα τυφλὸς γεννηθῆι;* Ἀπεκρίθη Ἰησοῦς· οὔτε οὗτος ἤμαρτεν οὔτε οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἵνα φανερωθῆι τὰ ἔργα τοῦ, θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ—in which the Jewish view of the universal connection of disease and sin is decidedly rejected by our Lord, who could not contradict himself. Evidently the assumption of STRAUSS that Jesus spoke only of the precise case then before him, is inadmissible. In making this assumption, he loses all right to accuse those of being arbitrary who explain John v. 14, of the individual case, which yet he does with the utmost confidence. That Jesus did not partake in the vulgar Jewish belief is incontrovertibly evident from this passage. But this does not justify us, in considering him as opposed absolutely and entirely to the idea of a necessary connection between disease and sin. That not all severe diseases and infirmities are the consequences of transgression, is the general position, which forms the basis of the special expression, a position which in the Old Testament is often and emphatically, in the book of Job especially, opposed to the vulgar misunderstanding of the doctrine of retribution. The reproach cast on the man who was restored to sight, in ver. 34, *ἐν ἀμαρτίαις σὺ ἐγεννήθης ὄλος*, was perfectly correct if understood (which it was not) according to Ps. li. 7, to which there is an allusion. That Christ healed the blind man, was a practical declaration that his disease stood in a relation to sin.

Besides John ix., Luke xiii. 1, and following verses, is commonly adduced to prove that our Lord, rejecting the Old Testament doctrine of retribution *παρήσαν δέ τινες ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ καιρῷ ἀπαγγέλλοντες αὐτῷ περὶ τῶν Γαλιλαίων, ὧν τὸ αἷμα Πιλάτος ἔμιξε μετὰ τῶν θυσιῶν αὐτῶν· Καὶ ἀποκριθεὶς ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· δοκεῖτε ὅτι οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι οὗτοι ἀμαρτωλοὶ παρὰ πάντας τοὺς Γαλιλαίους ἐγένοντο, ὅτι τοιαῦτα πεπόνθασιν; οὐχι, λέγω ὑμῖν· ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὴ μετανοήτε, πάντες ὡσαύτως ἀπολείσθε.* But here strange blunders have been made, and it is really astonishing that so palpable a mistake could have gained such credit. Christ here combats, not the Old Testament doctrine of retribution, but only the vulgar misconception of it. He does not deny that the persons who lost their lives were sinners; their death was the punishment of their sins; but he only denies

the inference drawn by the self-justifying informants, that they were greater sinners than other Galileans. He forewarns all these of the same destruction unless they repented, and explains, at the same time, that the catastrophe which had been already permitted was always to be considered as the punishment of sin; and therefore confirms, in the most decided manner, the Old Testament doctrine of retribution. This doctrine also lies at the basis of all the threatenings respecting the destruction of Jerusalem, which, if God had acted according to the rule that in these days had been laid down for his conduct, would still have been standing.

We have proved, then, that in reference to the doctrine of temporal retribution, no contradiction exists between the Old Testament and the New. The *argumentum e consensu gentium*, also, in a remarkable manner, speaks in favour of this doctrine, and is equally important, whether this *consensus* be deduced from experience or from the idea of God. The proverb, "*male parta male dilabuntur*," MAISTRE remarks, in his *Abendstunden* (I 193, of the German translation), which abounds in admirable observations on this subject, is found in all languages. Wherever in antiquity a doubt existed on this subject, the whole fabric of religion was shaken at the same time. Where this doubt is refuted by fact, the whole fabric also is rendered firm again. Thus CLAUDIAN, in his poem against Rufinus, depicts the tormenting doubt into which he was thrown by the good fortune of this impious consul. Then in ver. 20-23 he continues—

Abstulit hunc tandem Rufini poena tumultum  
Absolvitque deos. Jam non ad culmina rerum  
Injustos crevisse queror. Tolluntur in altum  
Ut lapsu graviore ruant.

And how can it be otherwise? He who from the heart believes in a living, loving, and righteous God, must necessarily admit that he manifests himself in this life by blessing and punishing. The opposite view, whatever plausibility it may assume, is nothing else than practical atheism. "I have," says MAISTRE (p. 318), "given this singular disease a name—*Theophoby*. Persons affected with it do not plainly say 'There is no God,' but 'God is not here. He thinks not about you; he has done nothing specially for you; he takes no vengeance on you.'"

The consequences of the denial of present retribution are as lamentable as their origin. (i.) We have already shown that if present retribution be given up, the future falls with it. The nobler minds among the heathen acknowledged this. PLUTARCH says,\* “there is one and the same reason on which the providence of God as well as the immortality of the soul rests, and it is impossible that he who denies the one can hold the other to be true.” It is certain that what God does not do *here*, he will not do *there*. If God be really the Loving and the Righteous One, he cannot give mere promissory notes of happiness, nor merely alarm with threatenings of future evil. The assertion almost universally adopted, and even expressed, by STEUDEL, that the problem of which the book of Job treats falls to the ground as soon as the idea of an immortality, attended by retribution, is divulged, rests on a gross misunderstanding, which has been detected by PAREAU alone of all the moderns, who remarks, “*Nec scimus profecto an consueta ista in hoc argumento provocatio ad vitam futuram non habenda sit potius pro ultimo quodam mortalium refugio, quam pro justo atque omnino probabili ratiocinio, in quo plane acquiescere deceat.*” It must be possible to solve the difficulties which oppose belief in retribution, from experience in the present world, without the aid of the doctrine of immortality, as has been done in the Book of Job, in a way that is suited to all ages. Also temporal injustice remains injustice, and takes away the idea of a holy and righteous God. A God who has to make corrections in his works is no God. The New Testament is very far from countenancing the modern error, according to which eternal retribution is not so much founded on design as on the deficiency of temporal retribution. STEUDEL (p. 445) appeals to Luke xvi. 19, &c. (the parable of the rich man and Lazarus.) But that parable has a totally different object in view. It did not belong to the scope of the parable to exhibit the fact, that according to deeper views, the rich man was even in this life unhappy, and the poor man happy, since his sufferings were only blessings in disguise. If

---

\* εἰς οὖν ἐστίν, ἔφην, λόγος ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἅμα καὶ τὴν διαμονὴν τῆς ἀνθρώπινης ψυχῆς βεβαίων· καὶ ζάτερον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπολιπεῖν ἀναιρούντα ζάτερον, PLUT. *De sera numinis vindicta*, xviii. (p. 40, Professor HACKETT'S ed. Andover, U.S., 1844.

persons will not attend to the real design of the parable, they may infer from it that the rich, as such, will be damned; and the poor, as such, be saved. One other passage which apparently yields support to the opinion we are opposing, is 1 Cor. xv. 19, εἰ ἐν τῇ ζωῇ ταύτῃ ἡλπικότες ἐσμὲν ἐν χριστῷ μόνον, ἔλλειψιότεροι πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐσμέν. But only let that be supplied which evidently must be supplied—"For what has made believers happy in this life, what has made them consider all outward suffering as nothing, would then be a mere illusion," and this apparent support at once gives way.

(ii.) The denial of present retribution cripples the power to withstand sin, and weakens moral energy. Man would not be man, if the maxim, *to do good for its own sake*, were sufficient for him. This maxim requires the support which is given by a reference to the consequences of "*walking after the flesh*," or "*after the spirit*." Man is so weak that, according to the testimony of experience, he seldom attains to sincere repentance for sins committed, if he has not been previously led to repentance by the consequences of these sins, in which he recognizes the retributive hand of God. His love to righteousness and his hatred of sin must be strengthened by the contemplation of the practical proof of God's love to righteousness, and his hatred against sin. That the doctrine of mere future retribution is not suited to supersede the doctrine of temporal retribution for this purpose, has been acknowledged by PLUTARCH.\* "All the rewards and punishments," says he, "which the soul will receive there, on account of the life it has led here, do not affect us while we are alive, partly because they are not believed, partly because they are unknown; those, on the contrary, which are awarded in this world to their children and families, strike the eyes of men, and withhold and deter many from evil." And MAISTRE remarks (p. 16), "Unbelievers, to whom the world is all, do not desire it better; and the multitude must be placed in the same rank; man is so dissipated, so dependent on circumstances, which operate upon him, so governed by his passions, that we every day

\* Ἄλλὰ ὡς μὲν ἐκεῖ κατ' ἐαυτὴν οὐσα κομιζεται τῶν προβεβιωμένων χάριτας ἢ τινας κολάσεις, οὐδ' ἐν εἰσι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ζῶντας, ἀλλ' ἀπιστοῦνται καὶ λανθάνουσιν· αἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν παίδων ἰοῦσαι καὶ διὰ γένους, ἐμφανεῖς τοῖς δεῦρο γενόμεναι, πολλοὺς ἀποτρέπουσι καὶ συστέλλουσι τῶν πονηρῶν. *De sera Nupt. titid. xviii.* p. 40.

see the humblest believers willing to brave the torments of the future life for the most pitiful pleasure. But how will it be with him who does *not* believe, or only feebly?" Let not men deceive themselves! a flood of immorality is the necessary consequence, where the denial of temporal retribution has penetrated the heart of a nation's life. Let it not be imagined that a morality which rests upon this support, is not true and in itself of no worth. It is not a mere mercenary reward which is in question. The consequences of righteousness and of sin come into consideration, not merely as to their matter, but also as *signs*. Only a God who makes himself known as such, is man bound to obey and to love. The righteousness which is not followed by well-being (salvation) is not righteousness; and the sin which is not followed by ill-being (misery) is not sin.

(iii.) The denial of retribution withers religion, and deadens religious sensibility, which ought to manifest itself at every gift of Providence, and at every loss. But by this scheme the whole great department of earthly things is placed out of the Divine jurisdiction, is emptied, so to speak, of God. "*The Lord is my shepherd,*" is no longer uttered. There is no gratitude, and no humbling oneself under the mighty hand of God.

(iv.) The denial of retribution is the parent of despair. In suffering it has no other consolation to give, than that the mind must raise itself above the profitless alternation of joy and sorrow—a consolation good enough for a painted sorrow, but assuredly not for a real one. How different where the soul in every suffering recognises a Divine appointment—deserved punishment, and at the same time concealed grace! When reason and design are visible in affliction, it becomes a ladder whose top reaches to heaven, or is transformed into a cross which we bear with willingness.

(v.) The denial of retribution leads to earthly anxieties and strivings. It places earthly things out of connection with God—it forbids to pray to him for daily bread, maintaining that it comes to his people just as it does to his enemies (compare EWALD *on Job*, p. 10); it explains our Lord's expression in Matt. vi. 33, that "*to those who seek first the kingdom of God, earthly things shall be added,*" as proceeding from a measure of Jewish prejudice. Let men talk as much as they please of the nothingness of

earthly things, till we fancy we are listening to Diogenes in his tub, still they are not in themselves matters of indifference, (the God of Christians knows that we “*have need of all these things,*” Matt. vi. 32), and are far more important than is imagined by the depraved human heart. As long as earthly things are sought in connection with God, a limit is set to our striving after them, to an excessive valuation, and to extravagant pretensions. On the other hand, if God be excluded, this limit is transgressed; anxiety, toil, and coveting begin. Of the goods of this world thus looked upon as having no proprietor, every man seeks to make what he can his own. In no age have material interests been more powerful than in ours, in which it has been deemed unworthy of God to make himself known by rewarding and punishing in external things.

(vi.) A consequence of the denial of Divine retribution is confusion in the administration of justice. If God does not retribute, then the magistracy cannot punish by way of retribution, but only in order to make the transgressor harmless to human society, a view, of which the necessary as well as destructive consequence is, the relaxation of the administration of justice, connected in the closest manner with the increase of crime.

The truth of the doctrine of retribution is supported, not only by the idea of God, but by the weighty testimony of experience. It speaks so loudly that it forces itself even on those who would gladly shut their ears against it—who would rejoice if it were otherwise. That “*sin is the destruction of the people,*” is the theme (forced upon the author as it were) of GOETHE’S “*Wahlverwandtschaften,*” (*Elective affinities*). There is no denier of Divine retribution, who is not on many particular occasions false to his own system, to whom the hand from the clouds is not oftentimes made visible. Where faith in retribution appears to have lost all footing in the popular life, still times will also recur, in which, called forth by great events, it again becomes national. Only think of the War of Freedom among ourselves. How were all lying lips struck dumb, which now again speak so impudently! The principal merit of the work by MAISTRE above-quoted, consists in this, that the author, as an experienced observer of the world and of man, points out the operation of Divine retribution in all the departments of life. We cannot but refer to this work

on this topic. Though it requires to be read with caution, yet a person can hardly lay it down without having received valuable instruction and improvement.

The difficulties which appear to beset the doctrine of temporal retribution will be removed by the following considerations.

*First*, The principal enemy of the doctrine of retribution is Pelagianism. Whoever adheres to it, must, if he be consequential, deny retribution, Providence, and the Divine excellence. The *Biography* of CHARLES VON HOHENHAUSEN (Braunsch, 1837), is particularly important, on account of its exhibiting this consequence so distinctly. He who knows no other righteousness than that of human society, will be unable, in numberless cases, to discover reason in the sufferings which strike him and others; to him all over the world there will be presented the spectacle of suffering innocence. On this rock the heathen, who were destitute of a deeper knowledge of sin, suffered shipwreck. Here we have one of the chief reasons why, in our day, faith in the Divine retribution is almost extinct. If the depth of human depravity were known, this difficulty would vanish, which staggered JOB, and from which ELIHU rescued him. No suffering that afflicts us and others is then so great that it cannot be regarded as punishment. On this point, Maistre has expressed himself admirably, in p. 212—"I admit it without hesitation; I can never reflect on this fearful subject, without being tempted to throw myself on the earth, as a transgressor who prays for mercy; or previously to receive all the evils which could come upon my head, as a light retribution for unmeasurable guilt, which I have incurred against the Eternal Righteousness; notwithstanding, you cannot believe how many men have said to me in my lifetime, that I was a very upright man."

*Secondly*, In order not to make mistakes respecting the Divine retribution, men must understand what is good fortune and misfortune (*Gluck und Ungluck*.) If men, on this subject, involve themselves in a carnal estimate of things, it will be impossible for them to walk in God's ways. The punishment of transgressors may even consist in what the world calls good fortune, or, at least, begin with it. "They will not," says PLUTARCH,\* "be

\* οὐδὲ γηράσαντες ἐκολάσθησαν ἀλλ' ἐγήρησαν κολαζόμενοι, κ.τ.λ. De Sera Num. Vind., ix. p. 25, x. p. 26.

punished first in old age, but will become old under punishment. To maintain that punishment will not come till late in life, would be just as if one should say, that a fish that had swallowed the hook, could not be said to be taken till we saw it cooked or cut up. For every evil-doer is seized by punishment as soon as he has tasted the sweetness of his transgression, like a bait." Equally may a blessing be concealed under the veil of apparent misfortune. "Thou hast put gladness in my heart," says the Psalmist, "more than (*their* joy) in the time that their corn and wine increased."

*Thirdly*, In regard to the sufferings with which God threatens his people, we should not fix our eye only on the punitive Divine justice, which always, and without exception, is therein revealed, but, at the same time, should keep in view the disciplining Divine love, and recognise the fact, that the manifest justice is, at the same time, concealed grace. Then we shall not feel tempted to draw conclusions with Job's friends, in spite of all experience, respecting the relative greatness of guilt, from the relative greatness of sufferings. Exactly those who are, relatively, the best persons, may be visited by the greatest sufferings, in order to make them worthier of the Divine love, and thus more fitted to receive manifest grace. The knowledge of the blessing, and the necessity of the cross, is clearly and distinctly shewn in the Pentateuch; compare, for instance, Deut. viii. 2, and following verses, particularly ver. 5—"Thou shalt also consider in thy heart, that as a man chasteneth his son, so the Lord thy God chasteneth thee." The same thought which is expressed in Heb. xii. 5, 6. But Pelagianism must here be stumbled. In heavy trials it cannot discern God's concealed grace, since its superficial apprehension of sin prevents its perceiving the ground why manifest grace is not imparted; or, at least, it can only explain the application of lighter means of correction.

After all that has been remarked, it is a gratifying testimony which DE WETTE gives to the Old Testament (*Bibl. Theol.* § 134)—"Among the Hebrews this view attained the highest degree of systematic cultivation." The Israelitish consequentness, in this respect, rested chiefly on a twofold ground. *First*, on its decided Monotheism. Where only God and man stand in contrast, and no third party can interpose between the two—



where the lot of man is fixed simply and alone by God—there the doctrine must have a decided character. Men cannot diminish it in the smallest degree, without at the same time trenching on their Monotheism ; and, *secondly*, to the people under the Old Covenant, means were given to overcome the difficulties which stood in the way of this doctrine. Here, the depth of the knowledge of sin which the law every where inculcates, is of special importance. Among the heathen, since they wanted this key to the mystery of the Cross—Matter—Chance—Fate—Typhon—Ahri-man, acted each a conspicuous part ; doctrines which, like that of the envy of the Gods, flourished on this soil, and of which analogies even now reappear, as soon as the key presented by God is broken. Severe conflicts and manifold doubts have necessarily arisen from this quarter also, among the possessors of Divine Revelation. For Pelagianism is so natural to man, that, even with the clearest knowledge, if sufferings come upon him with fearful violence, he easily imagines that he is suffering unjustly, as is very plainly shown in the instance of Job. For obviating that difficulty which arises from an erroneous estimate of what is good, the way was paved in the law. The possession of the favour of God, which indeed must show itself by his Providence in outward things, appears everywhere as the highest good. The danger of worldly riches is recognised ; see, for instance, Deut. viii. 12 ; xxxii. 15—

But Jeshurun waxed fat, and kicked :  
Thou art waxen fat, thou art grown thick,  
Thou art covered with fatness :  
Then he forsook God which made him,  
And lightly esteemed the Rock of his salvation.

Jacob, according to Gen. xxviii. 20, declared that he would be satisfied if God gave him bread to eat, and raiment to put on, (see vol. i. p. 358) ; so that he serves as a pattern for those who are disposed to lay to heart the Apostle's exhortation—“ *Having food and raiment, let us be therewith content,*” 1 Tim. vi. 8.

VATKE (p. 618, compare pp. 572, 639) does not direct his attack entirely against the Old Testament doctrine of retribution. He acknowledges that it must be a fundamental principle in the moral world, that the morally good will should have also an external existence ; the contrary, he says, would be a mere ab-

straction. But the fault lies here, that the Hebrew representation made the external evidence of happiness the chief aim of individual man, and reduced the conformity of the will to the Divine law to a mere means, instead of, inversely, making for man existence the means to an absolute object, as Jehovah would form the covenant not for a finite object, but combine with it the absolute reality.

We may excuse ourselves from the full discussion of this assertion by referring to the essay of J. F. FLATT, *Remarks on the motives relating to our well-being, which are contained in the discourses of Jesus*; of which the mere title shows, that the objection, if it be well founded, concerns the New Testament not less than the Old. According to VATKE, our Lord made use of an immoral motive, when, in John v. 14, he said to the man who was cured, *μηκέτι ἀμάρτανε ἵνα μὴ χεῖρόν τί σοι γένηται*; also when, in Matt. vii. 1, he enjoined, *μὴ κρίνετε, ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε*. We will here only bring forward three points.

(i.) It is totally false, when it is asserted, that the motives for the observation of the law were merely taken from the consequences. "*Thou shalt love,*" it is said in Deut. vi. 8 (5), "*the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might.*" Thou shalt love God because He is God; because He is thy God. Nothing higher and purer can be desired. In Deut. iv. 6-8, the intrinsic excellence of the law is given as a motive for its observance. In ver. 20, it is said, "*But the Lord hath taken you, and brought you forth out of the iron furnace, even out of Egypt, to be unto him a people of inheritance:*" ver. 32, and in the whole of ch. viii., the appeal is made to gratitude.

(ii.) As *one* motive to the fulfilment of duty, we not merely dare, but must make use of a reference to the consequences of our actions. The desire after happiness implanted in us by God himself must be attracted by the satisfaction (declared by Him to be legitimate) in the interest and service of morality, otherwise it would be indulged in a sphere where its satisfaction is sinful. Human weakness requires such a support, and exactly so much the more, the less it believes it to be requisite.

(iii.) The salvation which is hoped for, as the gracious reward of piety—the misery which is dreaded as the punishment of sin—has altogether a different character from that good fortune and

misfortune which man seeks and shuns without regard to God. The attractiveness of salvation, and the terrific quality of misery, consist principally in this, that they are the signs—the one of the love, the other of the wrath of God. The opposition between the pursuit of happiness and purely moral aims lies without the department of Scripture, and first arises where happiness is sought elsewhere than in God.

Only one charge can, in reference to the doctrine of retribution, be brought against the law with a certain equity—this namely, that in it, the outward consequences of righteousness and sin are more prominent than the inward, the joys of a good and the agonies of an evil conscience. But here the national reference of such passages as Levit. xxvi. and Deut. xxviii. must be taken into account, and, at the same time, it must be noticed, that the outward retribution was necessarily introduced first into the national life, as the foundation of the inward. With faith in the outward retribution, faith in the inward also vanishes; while, where the outward is believed, faith also in the inward is necessarily awakened, which, where the outward does not correspond to it, is easily argued away as an illusion.

#### ON THE ALLEGED OUTWARDNESS OF THE MOSAIC LEGISLATION.

One of the gravest and at the same time widely-spread charges against the Pentateuch, is the outwardness, the purely external character of its legislation. This is expressed in the most unqualified terms by KANT in his *Religion innerhalb*, &c., p. 177. “All the commands are of such a kind, as to have also a political construction, and can be enforced by compulsory methods, since they relate to outward acts; and though the Ten Commandments, besides being given outwardly, have an ethical importance in the eye of reason, yet as parts of that legislation, a moral disposition in obeying them is not required (to which Christianity afterwards attached the chief importance), but simply an outward compliance.

That view of the law, on which so grave a charge is founded, and with which, if true, the genuineness of the Pentateuch is absolutely incompatible, was, strange to say, earnestly contended for by those who professed to be warm friends of the Old Testa-

ment, and in part behaved as such, so that we need not wonder at the confidence with which Kant proposed it.

J. D. MICHAELIS openly and decidedly avowed his adherence to it, without suspecting what consequences would result from it ; and here it will be seen very plainly how much reason we had for asserting (vol. i. p. 12), that this zealous defender of the genuineness of the Pentateuch inflicted deeper wounds upon it than its most zealous opponents. In his essay, "*Argumenta immortal. animarum ex Mose coll.*" § 3, in the *Syntagma*, p. 83, he says, "*Neque illae leges formam praeipientis philosophiae aut theologiae habent, sed corpus aliquod juris sunt, quo forum et judicia Israelitarum in judicandis litibus puniendisque sceleribus omnis generis uti debebant. Totam legem Mosaicam quatenus lex est et ex praeceptis absolvitur, civilem esse eaque de causa praemiis poenisque hujus vitae, sanciri ac confirmari debuisse, egregie et copiose demonstrat Pradius.*" He here makes an apologetic use of this view ; by its aid he triumphs over those who would argue against the Divine origin of the Mosaic law from its wants of the sanctions of a future life, and does not perceive that he loses a dollar to win a farthing. In his essay on the Mosaic law of marriage, § 104, 105, he protests, on this ground, against every ideal or theological exposition of the law, to which, as its basis, individual expressions might be traced back, so that under these every thing might be ranged which was comprehended in the same idea. "I do not believe," he says, "that we are authorized to extend the acts forbidden in the law to other acts which only have a certain resemblance to them, and might be brought under the same genus." He argues that no jurist would treat civil law in this way, which stands entirely on a par with the Mosaic law. In the *Mos. Recht.* ii. § 72, he tries to explain away the passages which are too palpably in opposition to his view. The commandment, "*Thou shalt not covet,*" he maintains, was a moral principle of the Lawgiver, marking what is just and unjust ; whoever transgressed it, and could be convicted of doing so by outward acts, merited also censure at a civil tribunal. The principle was laid down, not for the disposition, but only in reference to these outward acts. The words in Leviticus xix. 18, "*Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,*" are certainly difficult if taken as the language of a civil lawgiver.

“ If I do not in my heart love my neighbour, it is no crime to be proved or punished before the magistrate.” He therefore determines the meaning to be, “ The law does not permit thee to hate any one, and does not excuse offences committed against him, on the ground that thou art his enemy, and that he has aforetime offended thee,” without noticing that nothing is said in the context about offences.

MICHAELIS appeals to the Abbé DE PRADES as his worthy and able precursor. In this writer's *Apologie*, the sources of many fundamental principles of MICHAELIS are laid open. Also in part ii. p. 161, he expresses himself as if he considered this view to be of real service in Apologetics. He piques himself very much upon the notion that from this point-of-view, the absence of the doctrine of future rewards and punishments could no longer be a stumbling-block. But he does not appear to go wrong in such a *bonâ fide* manner as MICHAELIS. He shows signs of dishonesty, and the Deist is seen through the slight veil that he wears. That he was disposed to push matters to the extreme like KANT, is proved by the following expressions. “ The law was not the same thing as the religion of the Jews, but only a civil constitution, superadded to their religion. It did not point out to men their sovereign good, nor indicate any means for its attainment; it furnished no remedy, I do not say for enormous sins, but even for the most trivial. Everything terminated in an outward purity and a legal righteousness.”\*

We have so much more reason for subjecting this view of the law to a severe scrutiny, since, notwithstanding all that has been said against it, especially by FLATT and STEUDEL, it has been continually revived down to the latest times. HEGEL, for instance, in his lectures on the philosophy of religion, expresses the objection almost as broadly as KANT; and VATKE (p. 241) says, that Kant's assertions, on the supposition that the Pentateuch formed the original basis of the Old Testament religion, are not altogether untrue; that in the Pentateuch, the internal side is presented to

---

\* “ La loi n'étoit point la même chose, que la religion des Juifs, mais seulement une constitution civile, sur-ajoutée à leur religion. Elle ne faisoit point envisager aux hommes leur souverain bien, ne leur indiquoit aucuns moyens pour l'obtenir, ne leur fournissoit aucun remède, je ne dis pas contre les péchés considérables, mais meme contre les plus légers. Tout se terminoit à une pureté extérieure, et à une justice légale.”

view only in some special points, where a more ancient cyclus of the law is revised, as in Deut. (p. 637); that admitting the Pentateuch to have been the original foundation of the Hebrew religion and morality, "there were certainly more weighty and indispensable objects which the people must have laid to heart, than the greatest part of its contents. How deeply rooted this view is, is shown by the approximation to it of those persons with whose method (independently formed) of contemplating the Old Testament, it was at direct variance; compare, for instance, ZULLIG'S essay on the Calvinistic division of the decalogue (*Stud. und Krit.* 1837, i.), especially p. 90 with pp. 92, 93.\*

The first and most important question is, what relation does the Decalogue bear to the view of the whole law? If it is not refuted by *that*, then a refutation must be altogether despaired of, for it contains the perfect quintessence of the whole law. This is implied by the decimal number of the commandments, on which stress is laid even in the law itself; Exod. xxxiv. 28; Deut. iv. 43; x. 4. That in this way the Decalogue is distinguished as the perfect and comprehensive sum of the Divine commands has been long ago acknowledged. BEDE, for instance, on Exod. xx. remarks—" *nullus numerus cresci amplius usque' ad decem, ac per hoc in plenitudine numeri plenitudinem mandatorum constituit.*" On the significance of the number *Ten*, see BÄHR *Symb. des Mos. Cultus*, i. 175. The designation of the Decalogue as the words of the Covenant, Exod. xxxiv. 28, leads to the same conclusion; also the fact that *only* the Decalogue was laid up in the Ark of the Covenant, while the Book of the Law was placed only as an appendix by its side; Christ and his Apostles, too, when they speak of the Law, always intend primarily the Decalogue. Hence, if the Decalogue has no internal character, then the reference to the internal in the Law can be only accidental, though single expressions may be found in which it cannot be denied. But, on the other hand, if it appears that the Decalogue has a pervading internal tendency, it cannot countervail if, in the remaining portions of the Book of the Law, the reference to what is outward should predominate. For, since all the rest is only a commentary and an amplification of particular points in the Deca-

---

\* KITTO'S Biblical Cyclopædia, vol. i. 540, *Art.* DECALOGUE.—TR.

logue, so nothing farther can be concluded than that what was internal presented few materials for commentary and amplification. What is wanting in *extent* to the moral part is made up in *authority*. The Decalogue, uttered by God—promulgated before all the other enactments, and engraven on tables of stone—stands distinguished above the rest beyond all comparison, so that the notion of a mechanical measurement by the yard must be scouted as utterly absurd.

That the Decalogue has an ethical character—that it appeals to the moral constitution of man—is apparent on the following grounds.

(i.) The common designation of the Decalogue, עֲדוּתֵי הַבְּרִית *Testimony*, leads to this conclusion. We shall afterwards prove, in the section on the Ceremonial Law, that this appellation stands in close connection with that of the covering of the Ark of the Covenant כְּסוּתֵי הַבְּרִית. The Decalogue bore the name of *Testimony*, because it revealed to man God's judgment against sin, which was indeed written in his heart, but has been obliterated by sin. "*Data*," says AUGUSTIN, "*est scripta lex, non quia in cordibus scripta non erat, sed quia tu fugitivus eras cordis tui.*" The Law accuses before God, and God assures forgiveness to the penitent, reconciles them to himself. Now, if the essential nature of the Law is expressed by this term, it cannot in its immediate application be merely civil, but most essentially and primarily religious. In close connection with the nature of the Law, as denoted by the term עֲדוּתֵי, stands the preponderating negative structure of the Commandments, which has been frequently adduced to prove the inferiority of the Law's moral point-of-view. It has for its basis the sinfulness of man, to which the Law relates. In every prohibition the words, "to which thy corrupt heart is inclined," are to be understood; as in a positive commandment the "*remember*" relates to the inclination to forget. That the negative form of most of the Commandments is not to be explained in the way to which our opponents are so partial, appears from the positive form of some, as "*honour thy father and mother.*" The positive form of this Commandment shows that in the rest the negative is founded on the positive.

(ii.) CALVIN, in his excellent remarks on the exposition of the Decalogue, in his *Institution*, ii. ch. 8, refers those who maintain

the externality of the Law, and especially of the Decalogue, to the character of the Lawgiver—*Id fit, quia in legislatorem non respiciunt a cujus ingenio natura quoque legis aestimanda est.* If merely *justitia civilis* were all that it required, then also the holiness of God must be confined to the overt act.

(iii.) If the law were not spiritual, atonement would not be so absolutely necessary; the עֲוֹנוֹת would not be so inseparately connected with the צַדִּיקִים. That any one could keep the law, and thereby merit the favour of God, never entered the thoughts of the Lawgiver. Its immediate purpose was only to excite a sense of the need of redemption. In his view, the law was in effect only παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν. For the צַדִּיק bore the same relation to Christ as the shadow to the body.

(iv.) The rewards and punishments of the Decalogue are only divine. Not a syllable is said respecting the civil power.

(v.) That the outward act is always to be considered not as what is alone sinful, but as the highest point, the consummation of sin,\* is taught by the commandment, "*thou shalt not covet.*" The futility of the attempt to withdraw the commandment from the sphere of the internal, will be very apparent if we notice the trilogy of thought, word, and deed, which so evidently lies at the basis of the commandment in reference to our neighbour. Thou shalt not injure thy neighbour, (i.) by deed; either in (a) his life; (b) his dearest possession, his wife; (c) or in his property generally. (ii.) By word, ("*Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour,*") (iii.) by thought. The same trilogy not unfrequently occurs in the Old Testament, Ps. xv; xxv. 4. This division, which, as the author of the present work has lately discovered, is to be found essentially in THOMAS AQUINAS,† fully justifies itself. That adultery is not (as it is

---

\* Quia peccatorum foeditatem, nisi ubi palpabilis est, diluere et speciosis praetextibus inducere semper caro molitur, quod erat in unoquoque transgressionis genere deterrimum et scelestissimum exemplaris loco proposuit, cujus ad auditum sensus quoque exhorresceret, quo majorem peccati cujuslibet detestationem animis nostris imprimeret. CALVIN *l. c.* No. 10. Appellatione crassioris delicti minora prohibentur, ut magnitudinem et gravitatem eorum coram dei judicio vere agnoscamus.

GERHARD, *Loci. v. p.* 251.

+ Generaliter homo nulli proximo nocere debet nec opere, nec ore, nec corde. Contingit autem opere tripliciter nocere proximo, scilicet vel in persona propria ipsum occidendo, vel in persona conjuncta, praesertim quantum ad prolis procreationem, vel



frequently taken in reference to practical interests) here considered\* as a species of unchastity, is plain from Exod. xx. 17, where the wife is enumerated among the possessions of one's neighbour. The writer who, in modern times, has most carefully investigated the arrangement of the Decalogue, ZULLIG, assumes that in the commandments that refer to one's neighbour, as generally in the whole Decalogue, there is a progression from what is objectively more weighty to what is lighter. There is in this an indistinct perception of the right arrangement, but taken altogether the view is untenable and must give way to ours. According to ZULLIG, the arrangement would be:—Thou shalt not injure thy neighbour. (i.) In his life; (ii.) in his wife; (iii.) in his property; (iv.) in his good name. That this division is inadmissible will appear if we consider that, according to it, the general crime implied in, "*Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour,*" must be supposed to be the injury of one's neighbour in his honour. As if all testimonies were given in actions for defamation! But if this arbitrary limitation be admitted, it can no longer be maintained that the legislation proceeds from the graver to the lighter offence. For bearing a false witness may be, under certain circumstances, a far graver offence against one's neighbour than theft. Moreover, according to ZULLIG's view in the command, "*Thou shalt not covet,*" the objective ground of the division would at once give place to the subjective, while, according to our view, the same principle regulates all the commands of the second table. Our assumptions that a trilogy regulates the second table, is confirmed by the re-appearance of the same number, where one of the three members is in several parts, and not merely simple like the second. While the whole is regulated by the subjective principle in a triple division, and so that an advance is made *a majori ad minus* (deed—thought), the individual members in which generally a division occurs are again divided into three parts, in like manner proceeding *a majori ad minus*, yet accord-

---

in bonis fortunæ, in rebus exterioribus. Ore inferitur nocumentum per detractionem. Nocumentum cordis fit per illicitam concupiscentiam carnis et oculorum. *Summa* i. 2. 9. 100. *art.* 5.

\* These practical interests are also provided for, by our method of interpretation. For according to it, impurity generally is included in the commandment, "*Thou shalt not commit adultery,*" since all unchastity is a preparatory step to adultery; he who has once trodden this path, can no longer arbitrarily set any limits to it himself.

ing to the objects ; in the prohibition against injuring by deeds, (i.) life, (ii.) wife, (iii.) property ; in the prohibition against injuring by coveting, (i.) wife, (ii.) man-servant, and maid-servant, (iii.) ox and ass ; at the beginning and end, the individual is enclosed by the universal, thy neighbour's house—" *all that is thy neighbour's,*" showing that it is only given by way of example.

If after this induction of proofs, it must be admitted that the prohibition of coveting has an internal character, still it might be maintained with some plausibility that it follows, that the preceding commandments are to be understood outwardly ; that, in reference to them, we are not to go beyond word and deed ; that, for example, the prohibition of murder stands in no relation to anger ; that the prohibition of adultery only relates to the outward act, and not to the adultery of the heart ; so that a man without a sanctified disposition might comply with the first four commands of the second table, and would need it only to enable him to keep the last. This statement involves, we allow, some truth. That a special prohibition of evil desire (or coveting) is afterwards given, shows that what is said in reference to word and deed relates primarily only to these. Yet, on the other hand, it must not be overlooked, that by the very consecutiveness of deed, word, and desire, the two former are divested of their merely external character, and, traced to their root in the disposition ; they are regarded merely as the termination of a process, the beginning of which is to be sought for in the heart. If this be considered, it will appear, that what immediately applies only to word and deed, indirectly relates at the same time to the disposition. The only means, for example, to fulfil the command, "*Thou shalt not kill,*" is for a man to eradicate from his heart the disposition from which murder proceeds. Where this is not done, the command is not fulfilled, even if outwardly no murder is committed. For it must then depend on causes which lie beyond human jurisdiction.

(vi.) In the commandments of the first table, the same trilogy of heart, word, and deed, may also be traced, with much probability, though not with the same certainty, as in those of the second. The command, "*Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain,*" relates to *words*—forbids the direct injury of God by words, as the command, "*Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour,*" forbids the indirect injury

of God in the person of our neighbour; that the commandment, "*Remember the Sabbath-day to keep it holy.*" refers to the deed, is evident. Since in this manner we have two elements of the ascertained trilogy of the second table, we shall be inclined to recognize in the commands, "*Thou shalt have no gods beside me,*" and "*thou shalt make no image or likeness of anything,*" the reference to the heart. Image-worship always proceeds from emptiness of heart; it is a product of a want of spirituality, of an incapacity for satisfying the requirement, "*God is a Spirit, and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth;*" so that these commands, freed from their negativeness, and expressed positively, are equivalent to, "Thou shalt have me for thy God, and that too in thy heart." It is only owing to the negative form, that the reference to the heart does not immediately strike us. There will be less hesitation in recognizing it, if it be considered that the positive, corresponding to the negation, occurs in the Pentateuch itself, "*Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength.*" If these remarks are correct, it is evident that the arrangement of the whole is antistrophic. In the first table, the progression is from the heart to the deed; in the second, from the deed to the heart. Thus the end corresponds with the beginning. The heart is distinguished as the Alpha and Omega, as that from which everything proceeds, and to which everything tends. In the commandment, "*Honour thy father and mother,*" which forms the transition from the first table to the second, a general expression is chosen which comprehends all three, and obtains its full meaning from what precedes and what follows, *Honour them with thy heart, mouth, and hand.*

(vii.) The spiritual and internal character of the Decalogue appears also from this, that the fear and love of God are considered in it as the foundation of the whole fulfilling of the law, so that LUTHER justly repeated at each of the commandments, We must fear and love God. It is scarcely conceivable how VATKE can maintain (p. 639), that love towards Jehovah appears in the Old Testament, not as a fundamental principle, nor placed in connection with love to our neighbour. The inscription on the portals of the Old Testament—the Decalogue—refutes this assertion. On the relation to the Lord is grounded, in the introduc-

tion, (ver. 2), the obligation of all the commandments. In ver. 6, *love* to God (if the law were external this could have no place here), is expressly marked as the fulfilling of the law (“*them that love me and keep my commandments*”);\* as in ver. 6 the ground of the transgression of God’s commands is placed in *hatred* to him. That the commandments of the second table do not stand unconnected by the side of those of the first, is evident from the *ratio legi adjecta*, as it is contained in the  $\overline{\text{עבד}}$ . This appellation indicates their common relation to the Lord. “*Ye are children of the Lord your God,*” therefore brethren and friends. All enmity is unnatural. Only by admitting the principle we have noticed, can we explain the position of the command to honour parents; by means of it we obtain a very easy and suitable arrangement. “Thou shalt honour and love God (i.) in himself, ver. 3–11; (ii.) in those who represent him on earth, ver. 12.† (iii.) In all who bear his image, ver. 13, 14.

---

\* To this passage our Lord refers in John xiv. 15, *ἐὰν ἀγαπᾷτε με, τὰς ἐντολάς τὰς ἐμὰς τηρήσατε*; and ver. 23, *ἐὰν τις ἀγαπᾷ με, τον λόγον μου τηρήσει*. Compare also 1 John v. 3. *αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἵνα τὰς ἐντολάς αὐτοῦ τηρῶμεν*. The law of the Old Testament says what this reference indicates, that love to God is not a pathological, but a holy and sanctifying love.

+ According to the current opinion, the commandment, *Honour thy father and mother*, belongs to the second table. We, on the contrary, maintain, that it belongs to the first, and for the following reasons. (i.) If the Ten Commandments filled two tables, it is antecedently probable that each table would contain five. As ten is the number of perfection, so is five the number of imperfection, and points to a necessary complement (compare Bähr, p. 183.) “*If a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?*” If the number of the whole be important, so also the number of the parts cannot be unimportant. That each table contained five commandments was admitted by the ancient Jews; compare the passages from JOSEPHUS and PHILO IN GERHARD, p. 239, who, from a bias to the Lutheran division of the Decalogue, cannot be favourable to this view. By this division there is no way of assigning five commandments to the first table. But this argues against its correctness. (ii.) It is beyond all doubt that the second table contains the commandments in reference to our neighbour. This is shewn by  $\overline{\text{עבד}}$ . Our Lord’s language also in Matt. xxii. 37, 39, leads to the same conclusion, provided the first commandment (which we can scarcely doubt) is here = the quintessence of commandments of the first table, and the second = the quintessence of those of the second table. As the second command is, that “*Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,*” which is here described as the second commandment, had been already given verbally as the sum of the second table in Leviticus xix. 18. But we do not see how the command, “*Honour thy father and mother,*” can be deduced from this, “*Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,*” and hence might belong to the second table, since parents do not belong to the class of neighbours. The term *neighbour* conveys a notion of equality. On the other hand,

(viii.) The internal quality and spirituality of the Mosaic law rests generally and pre-eminently on the testimony of our Lord and his apostles. How could our Lord, if the law had not been spiritual, attribute to it, in Matt. v. 17, an eternal validity; and say (ver. 18) that not an *ἰῶτα* or *κεράμια* should fail—that the violation of the least command was detrimental to salvation, and explained it as Divine from head to foot? BAUMGARTEN (in his *doctrina Christi de lege Mosaica in orat. mont.* Berl. 1838. p. 35), adduces evidence in a striking manner, that in ver. 21 and following verses, the law is not perfected, but only its true sense evolved in opposition to the glosses of the Pharisees. The simple remark of AUGUSTIN is a sufficient answer to those who maintain the opposite—“*Si praecepta illa egeant additamentis et perfectionibus, non eum, qui illis simpliciter obtemperet eaque doceat magnum dici posse in regno coelorum.*” In Matt. xv. 3–6, Jesus maintains the Mosaic law against the Pharisees; he introduces Moses as their accuser, John v. 45; in Matt. xix. in reply to the young man who asked him, *τί ἀγαθὸν ποιήσω ἵνα ἔχω ζωὴν αἰώνιον*, he says, *εἰ θέλεις εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ζωὴν, τήρησον τὰς ἐντολάς*; he declares, therefore, that if any one could fulfil the commands of the Decalogue, he would require nothing more for eternal happiness; whereas the law, if it were not spiritual, could have nothing to do with salvation. Paul, in Rom. vii. 14, attributes to the law, in very direct terms, exactly the opposite of that quality which modern opponents impose upon it, *οἶδαμεν γὰρ ὅτι ὁ νόμος πνευματικός ἐστι*; compare ver. 12, *ὥστε ὁ μὲν νόμος ἅγιος καὶ ἡ ἐντολὴ ἀγία καὶ δικαία καὶ ἀγαθή*. According to him it is not through any defect in the law that it cannot bring

---

that the command to honour parents finds its most suitable position in the second table is shown in Exod. xxii. 27 (28), a passage by which the apparent abruptness of the transition from ver. 11 to 12 is obviated. “Thou shalt not revile God, nor curse the ruler of thy people.” In this passage (see vol. i. p. 173) the ruler, here spoken of individually just as parents in the Decalogue, appears as the representative of all *ὑπερέχοντες*—as a visible deputy of God—as the person in whom God is honoured or dishonoured. A second passage is Lev. xix. 32, where reverence for the aged is regarded as the immediate effect of reverence for God. “*Hunc ergo modum (says CALVIN) optimum fore censeo, si ad praecepti rationem dirigatur; nempe ut in unoquoque praecepto expendatur, cur datum nobis fuerit. Ut praecepti quinti finis est, honorem esse iis reddendum, quibus eum attribuit deus. Haec igitur praecepti summa, rectum esse Deoque placere, ut eos honoremus, quibus aliquid excellentiae largitus est.*”

men to perfection and salvation, but because man in his natural state is incapable of realizing its exalted requirements.

But let us turn now from the Decalogue\* to the other parts of the Mosaic legislation. It is correct, that after care has been taken of morality, civil customs and regulations are considered; after the rule for the internal has been given, the external is also regulated. But who can find fault with this? It must have been so, if the Mosaic law was to take firm root among the people. If civil customs and regulations had been left in their natural form, the moral legislation, soaring above the popular life, would soon have become a dead letter; bad customs and regulations would have destroyed the power of good morals. But that the remaining legislation still presented sufficient means to repel the objection of gross outwardness, the following observations may shew; in which we shall leave untouched the ceremonial law, which we intend to make the subject of special consideration.

*First*, It is a gross error, though often repeated, that the Pentateuch embraces the whole civil law of the Israelites. In that portion of the Scriptures there is shown the greatest aversion from all untimely interference with the course of historical development. Only those points are determined which must be so, and in no other way, according to the fundamental maxims of the theocracy; the civil relations are only so far settled for all ages, as they stand in immediate connection with morals and religion, or when the present furnished pressing occasions for their settlement; so that assertions like those of VATER (p. 219), that many casuistical and outwardly positive determinations of the law are unworthy of such a wise lawgiver as Moses must have been, that such an one could not and durst not predetermine such laws, since they were dependant on accidental circumstances, and would be the product of longer practice and continued regulation, and spontaneously, so that a prophetic revelation of them was superfluous, as checking their occurrence in the natural course of development—are merely beating the air, since the state of things they suppose did

---

\* That the relation in which the Decalogue stood to the rest of the legislation was correctly perceived in all periods of the Old Covenant, is shown particularly in the writings of the Prophets and the Psalms. Let any one compare the descriptions given in the latter (Ps. l. for example, particularly ver. 18–20) of the עֲרֵבֶיךָ and the רֵשֶׁע.

not exist. Let us consider only the regulations respecting the right of inheritance. On the most important questions we here find no answer, for example, whether the sons of a maid-servant are to inherit with the other children; how a daughter is to be maintained if she remains unmarried, and her father dies. In reference to this important and perplexed part of civil rights, there occur only three isolated regulations. The regulation in Deut. xxi. 15, &c., is worthy of special notice, for settling the whole character of the Mosaic civil legislation. In reference to it MICHAELIS remarks, (*Mos. Recht.* § 79), "Before the times of Moses, others who practised polygamy exercised the right of regarding the first son of the favourite wife as the first-born, although he might not be so in point of years. This right, which must actually have given rise in families to much secret vexation, anxiety, and ill-will—this right, so full of annoyance, Moses took away from fathers by an express law, and commanded that without any reference to partiality for the mother, that son who came first into the world should be acknowledged as the first-born, and receive a double share of the inheritance." The law here simply confined itself to expunging what was unjust in the regulation. It is only by accident we learn on this occasion, as a matter not coming within the department of the legislation, that the first-born received a double portion of the inheritance. A second regulation occurs in Num. xxvii. It was settled on a special occasion, and on the score of fairness, that daughters might inherit, if there were no sons. That otherwise only sons inherited, we learn purely by accident. The third regulation was also made on a special occasion, that heiresses should only marry in their own tribe.

In relation to another important branch of civil rights—*buying* and *selling*—we find nothing at all in the Mosaic laws (MICHAELIS, § 81.) The criminal code is given with the greatest fulness, since its regulations have at least the character of statutes—here also there was most need for reformation in natural development, and what was erroneous would be most injurious to morals and religion. Compare, for instance, the regulations respecting murder and manslaughter (MICHAELIS vi. § 273–280), with those on the rights of inheritance. In strict propriety it is only in reference to offences that we can speak of a Mosaic law.

*Secondly*, There are a great number of injunctions which have a moral and religious, but no judicial, value. Whoever committed sin in Israel, it was certainly not owing to the want of moral precepts. We would adduce a few as specimens. The injunction in favour of strangers, widows, and orphans, had, without doubt, only a moral and religious validity. Exod. xxii. 21-23, "*Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, nor oppress him; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt. Ye shall not afflict any widow, or fatherless child. If thou afflict them in any wise, and they cry at all unto me, I will surely hear their cry. And my wrath shall wax hot, and I will kill you with the sword; and your wives shall be widows, and your children fatherless.*" A civil law would not speak in general terms of oppression, but enumerate specific acts—it would not aim to excite sympathy by an allusion to Egypt, nor threaten with punishment from God, but define the punishment that was to be awarded by the magistrate. Compare Exod. xxiii. 9, "*Also thou shalt not oppress a stranger, for ye know the heart of a stranger, seeing ye were strangers in the land of Egypt.*" Also Lev. xix. 34; xxi. 33, 34, according to which an Israelite was to "*love a stranger as himself,*" a matter perfectly beyond the control of the magistrate. Deut. x. 18, 19, MICHAELIS ii. § 138. In Exod. xxiii. 4, 5, it is said, "*If thou meet thy enemy's ox or his ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again. If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee lying under his burden, take care to give it up to him; thou shalt leave thy hatred.*" Certainly no one would, on the ground of this injunction, make a complaint before a magistrate. In a civil code such a thing would be ridiculous. The whole nineteenth chapter of Leviticus, in which the command, "*Be ye holy, for I am holy,*" is developed in special instances, is in a preponderating degree of a purely moral character. Compare, for example, ver. 17, 18, "*Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart, . . . thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.*" Ver. 32, "*Thou shalt rise up before the hoary head, and honour the face of the old man, and fear thy God.*" Regulations of this class are found in Deut. xxii. 1-4, that a man should bring back whatever was lost belonging to his brother, which could not be an object of judicial cognizance—and respect-



ing birds'-nesting ; ver. 6, 7, that in building a new house, a battlement was to be placed round the roof, "*that thou bring not blood upon thine house, if any man fall from thence,*" ver 8 ; the inculcation of kindness and equity towards the poor, xxiv. 15 ; xv. 7, &c.

Some have asserted, that, although it cannot be denied that the law contains pure moral elements, yet, at all events, the indiscriminate blending of merely judicial with moral regulations is to be censured. But we deny that there is in the law anything merely judicial ; every thing judicial is much more moral ; and the moral which is also judicial is connected with that which is not heard at the tribunal of a human judge, so that the judicial retains no mere statute-like character.

*Thirdly,* That the law, with all the apparent outwardness which it wears in many parts, has yet a religious, moral, internal, spiritual character throughout, is plain from the fact, that the two internal commands of the love of God and the love of our neighbour appear in it, as comprehensive of all the rest, from which the fulfilment of each individual command is deduced, and without which obedience is impossible. The command, "*Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,*" is expressed in Lev. xix. 18, and the command to love God is reiterated in Deuteronomy in conformity with its designs, to form a bridge between the law and the heart ; and is expressly distinguished as the *ἐν καὶ πᾶν*, as "*the one thing needful,*" as the fulfilling of the whole law. Compare Deut. vi. 4, "*Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might ;*" x. 12, "*And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but to fear the Lord thy God, to walk in all his ways, and to love him, and to serve the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul ;*" xi. 13, "*And it shall come to pass, if ye shall hearken diligently to my commandments, which I command you this day, to love the Lord your God, and to serve him with all your heart, and with all your soul ;*" xi. 1, xiii. 3, xxx. 16, 20. If every thing in the law is referred back to love, it is self-evident, that a dead outward service cannot comport with its spirit. The violation of the commandments is described in Lev. xxvi. 41 as the necessary product of "*an uncircumcised heart ;*" and in Deut. x. 16, we read the remarkable words,

“*Circumcise therefore the foreskin of your hearts, and be no more stiff-necked,*” which condemn all Pharisaism that expects good fruits from a bad tree, that would gather grapes from thorns, and figs from thistles. It may be easily proved from innumerable passages, that this internal and spiritual tendency of the law was, from the first, recognised by those *homines bonae voluntatis*, who lived under it. At the head of these passages stand the language of Joshua in Josh. xxii. 5, “*Take diligent heed to do the commandment, and the law, which Moses, the servant of the Lord, charged you, to love the Lord your God, and to walk in all his ways, and to keep his commandments, and to cleave unto him, and to serve him with all your heart, and with all your soul.*” xxiii. 11, “*Take good heed therefore unto your souls, that ye love the Lord your God.*”

We add here the explanation of another contradiction, which has been supposed to exist between the character of the law and its Mosaic authorship.

The reflective systematic quality of the law, VATKE maintains (p. 226), is irreconcilable with the opinion, that Moses was its author. But this assertion, resting on arbitrary presuppositions, stands in glaring contradiction with the express acknowledgment (p. 299) of the Mosaic origin of the Ten Commandments. We have already pointed out, that if in any part of the law, it is exactly in this, that this reflective systematic quality is apparent. Everything is calculated, numbered, weighed. The fact is of so much greater importance, since here the question is not about a single part, but the ground-plan and prototype of the whole law, so that here, if anywhere, the saying holds good, *ex ungue leonem*. This contradiction would not have been inexplicable even to VATKE himself, if, in the examination of the Decalogue, he had not been extremely superficial. This is shown all along. How otherwise could he think (p. 239) of dividing single parts from a whole so organised and strictly linked together? How could he maintain that the command, “*Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour,*” is superfluous, since it is already contained in “*Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain!*” or the command, “*Thou shalt not covet,*” because it is contained in “*Thou shalt not steal!*”

## THE CEREMONIAL LAW.

Deistical writers have taken great offence at the Ceremonial Law, and on this ground have disputed the Divine mission of Moses; (compare, for instance, MORGAN in LILIENTHAL, vi. 724.) In modern times, these attacks have been renewed with great ardour by DE WETTE (*Beitr.* ii. p. 274.) He can find out no rational basis for it; its spiritual meaning is hidden altogether from his eyes. He can form no other notion of these "pedantic regulations" (*diese "Pedantereien"*), this "gnat-straining" (*diese "Mückenseigerei"*), than as the product of a later priestcraft. A few only may have a sanitary reason, such as the law respecting leprosy and the prohibition of swine's flesh; and these he allows (though from his point-of-view with an excess of candour) may be sufficiently justified. Soon after DE WETTE's *Beiträge* appeared the first edition of CREUZER's *Symbolik*; and the elucidations which this work gave in general of the symbolic spirit of antiquity could not but shed a healthful influence on the interpretation of the symbolic of the Old Testament, and aid in dispelling the thick darkness which, since the days of SPENCER, especially by means of the writings of J. D. MICHAELIS, had settled on this department. The beneficial influence of this work we see at once in DE WETTE's *Biblischer Dogmatik*. Here we read, § 54, "The existence of symbols and myths, as such, no person familiar with antiquity can deny. They are necessary for the clothing of supersensual truth in sensible objects, to people who are incapable of freedom of thought." He even explains the symbolic of the Mosaic ritual, as an intelligible one according to the idea of the founder, who had freely chosen and made the signs, only the vulgar had taken the sign for the reality. (Compare § 126-128.) Like DE WETTE, VON CÖLLN also acknowledges the symbolic character of the Ceremonial Law, and considers the Pentateuch in this respect as unobjectionable. "Without symbolic," he says (*Bibl. Theol.* i. 64), "a public religion, which must always have regard to a wide circle of uneducated persons, cannot be rendered permanent."

We should think it less probable that DE WETTE's cast-off clothes would find persons eager to wear them, since the knowledge

of the symbolic of the ancient world is making great progress every year. And yet persons have come before the public who fancy that they can appear to advantage in these habiliments. VON BOHLEN (*Einkl.* p. 175) has repeated almost word for word what DE WETTE has said in his *Beiträge*, without recollecting that, since that publication, the times, and, along with them, the views of his leader, have changed. VATKE also (p. 218) appropriates DE WETTE'S juvenile speculations with great confidence, and takes no notice of his riper ideas.

The best apology of the Ceremonial Law lies in pointing out its objects, and these, therefore, we present, to refute the charges brought against it.

*First*, The Ceremonial Law served to cherish the religious sentiment. The Israelite was reminded by it in all his relations, even the most insignificant and external, of God; the thought of God was introduced into the very midst of the popular life.

*Secondly*, The Ceremonial Law required the recognition of sin, and thus called forth the first thing essential for the reception of redemption, a sense of the need of redemption. The people must be burdened and heavy laden, in order that the Lord might say to them, "*Come unto me all ye that are weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest.*" The law was, and was intended to be, a heavy yoke, and, therefore, would awaken a longing after the Redeemer. Everywhere it proclaimed, "*Touch not, taste not, handle not!*" and thus was a perpetual remembrancer of sin.

*Thirdly*, The Ceremonial Law served to separate Israel from the Heathen; it erected between the two a wall of separation, by which communication was prevented. Compare Eph. ii. 14. Not yet strong enough to conquer Heathenism, the people were, so to speak, shut up, to be withdrawn from the influence of Heathenism, to preserve them for the time in which, armed with power from on high, they might commence an offensive war against Heathenism. The preliminary limitation effected by the Ceremonial Law served as the means of the future illimitedness.

*Fourthly*, Many things in the Ceremonial Law served, by impressions on the senses, to awaken reverence for holy things among a sensual people. This object (certainly a subordinate one) has been totally but unjustly denied by BÄHR, *Symbolik des Mos. Cultus*, i. 8, &c. It cannot be more distinctly expressed

than in Exod. xxviii. 2—" *And thou shalt make holy garments for Aaron, thy brother, for glory and for beauty.*" The bad consequence of denying it, as is shown very plainly in BAHR, is that it will then be necessary to impose a symbolic meaning on institutions, in which evidently nothing of the kind is to be found.

*Fifthly*, One principal object of the Ceremonial Law lay in its symbolic meaning. The people, enthralled in visible objects, were not yet capable of vitally appropriating supersensual truth, in words, the form most suited to their nature. It was needful for the truth to condescend, to come down to their power of apprehension, to prepare itself a body from visible things, in order to free the people from the bondage of the visible. This form was common to the Israelitish religion with that of the Heathens, and therein lies its best apology. Would we rather not speak at all to the dumb than make use of signs? The Ceremonial Law was not the opposite to the worship of God in spirit and in truth, but only an imperfect form of the same, a necessary preparation for it. The accommodation was only formal, one which did not alter the essence, but only presented it in large capital letters to children who could not yet read a small running hand.

But there is still one important point to be settled—CREUZER perceived in the Heathen symbolic, a clothing designedly assumed for the advantage of the ignorant by the philosophers, of a doctrine unsymbolically conceived before the clothing. This view has lately been seriously controverted. According to O. MÜLLER, *Prolog.* p. 110, &c., 119, 257, 262, 332, symbolic was the junction of the thought to the sign, not arbitrarily, but necessarily, and could not exist as soon as the thought had quitted its hold of the sign, and existed independently of it. STUHR (*die Religions systeme des Orientes*, p. 41, &c.), has indeed made it a part of the distinctive idea of symbol, that contents and form should indissolubly interpenetrate, as if perfectly grown together, in distinction from allegory, in which only a thought, already existing in the mind in a totally different form, is concealed by sensible signs. It has lately been attempted to apply this view to the Mosaic symbolic, which has been declared, with great confidence, to be a merely unconscious one. See particularly Licentiate BAUER. (*die Rel. d. A. Test.*, pp. 246, 255, 257, 314, 315.)

But, even with respect to the Heathen symbolic, this view, though much that is true lies at its basis, is certainly very one-sided. The contrast of *conscious* and *unconscious*, is strained from a relative to an absolute one, and represented with much greater sharpness than it ever appears. How O. MÜLLER can maintain that the symbol, like the mythics, *cannot* appear as clothing, but falls away of itself, where any one is capable of apprehending the pure thought, we can hardly understand. Whoever has apprehended the pure thought, can yet clothe it for the ignorant, in that form in which it is alone accessible to them; and (which is the principal thing) it is not enough for a person to have the pure thought generally, but it is of importance that he should make it vitally his own, gain a clear intuition of it, so that, even for those who profess the truth in its naked form, the clothing may be essentially needful. Yet our Lord designed his parables precisely and only for those who were capable of also apprehending the thought in its naked form! This is often more intelligible than the clothing, but not so efficacious. In this respect, STUHR has advanced somewhat in the right direction. He attributes (p. liv.) the perfectly unconscious symbolic to the primeval times, corresponding to the first formative steps in the development of the human mind, and remarks—“In later times, of a far higher cultivation of consciousness, such appearances may, and must indeed, come forth, according to which, one and the same internally consistent consciousness evinces itself to be capable of shaping and holding what it possesses in the two-fold form of scientific conception and poetical intuition.

But that the view has no application to the Mosaic symbolic, which is a real allegory, and is here not merely one-sided but false, is evident for the following reasons: (i.) The unconscious symbolic is ascribed by its advocates exclusively to the childhood of humanity, in which intuition was supreme and unchecked, and the understanding was subordinate, the ages anterior to history, in which no literature existed. But how can any one even fancy that the Pentateuch belongs to this stage of development! “The principle,” says BAUR (*Gnosis*, p. 732), “on which the action of the religious sentiment depends, is in Heathenism intuition, and in Judaism reflection, as the activity of the understanding;” and thus also RUST, (*PHILOS. UND CHRISTENTHUMS*, p. 161), as-

cribes to Judaism the element of the understanding. This is so far true, that in Judaism from the very beginning the unconditional supremacy of intuition appears to have been broken. How sharply even in the Pentateuch are "the various orders of being divided and distinguished," to do which is the peculiar office of the understanding; God, Nature, Man, everything has its strictly defined sphere. And how indeed could the peculiarities of the Pentateuch, considered as a literary production, consist with an unconscious symbolic! Sober historical description, and unconscious symbolic, do not flourish on the same soil, are products of totally different stages of development. The artistic composition of the Pentateuch, as it unveils itself the more closely we examine it; the care with which every expression is chosen and weighed; the intentionality for instance, that is shown in the use of the Divine names; the systematic spirit which is manifest in the Decalogue, of which the arrangement, rightly understood, is alone sufficient to refute the whole view under consideration; all this shows, that the symbolic can only be a conscious one.

(ii.) Unconscious symbolic, according to the unanimous opinion of its advocates, is only to be found where there is no naked doctrine. But in the Pentateuch, the naked doctrine is placed side by side with the symbolically clothed, or rather I should say, precedes it, since the Decalogue, which is entirely unsymbolic, stands at the head of the whole, and the naked doctrine relates to the same objects as the symbolically clothed; not a single doctrine appears *merely* in a symbolic dress.

(iii.) In the unconscious symbolic, the thought is so intimately combined with its sensible covering, that the interpretation of the symbol cannot appear. But in the Pentateuch, such interpretations are found in the case of individual symbols, and these prove that where they do not occur, we are not to suppose the reason to be that it was not in the power of the legislator to give them. How clearly and distinctly is the leading symbol, Circumcision, interpreted in Deut. x. 16, "*Circumcise, therefore, the foreskin of your heart, and be no more stiffnecked.*" And in Deut. xxx. 6, "*The Lord thy God will circumcise thy heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live.*" The circumcision of the flesh here typified the circumcision of the heart, first

as a promise, then as a requirement. And if any persons are disposed to separate Deuteronomy from the remaining books, and confine the concession merely to the former (the promise) yet Lev. xxvi. 46, immediately comes in the way, where the phrase לִבְכֶם הַיָּזָהֵל “*your uncircumcised heart,*” gives the meaning more briefly, but with equal distinctness, and shows by the mere allusion that the meaning was generally known. On closer examination it is evident that much more of explanation, or at least of allusion, is contained in the law than may appear at first sight. The name בְּיָזָהֵל, for example, makes any detailed information respecting the meaning of the covering of the Ark of the Covenant superfluous. When in Lev. xxvi. 31, it is said, in reference to the wicked, “*and I will not smell the savour of your sweet odours,*” when even in Gen. iv. 2, 3, with an outward equality in the sacrifices of Cain and Abel, the consequence with God was different, and this difference is traced to the distinction in their characters, it is equivalent to an express declaration, that the sacrifice was important only as a type of the inward state; and assertions which attack the very vitals of the Mosaic dispensation (like that of BAUER (p. 314), “When an individual brings an offering, this presentation is the form of the inner contents, and he obtains the consequence of the offering without being obliged to establish this result by his will”) fall to the ground at once.

(iv.) If the symbolic of the Mosaic law was unconscious, we should, as in the Heathen symbolic, find in the times of increased reflections a multitude of explanations would be given simultaneously. It is in the nature of unconscious symbolic, that it does not form *one* thought clearly and sharply, but embraces a multitude of heterogeneous references. Later interpreters, unable to unravel what, from the very first, was a mass of perplexities, fix their attention one on this side, the other on that. Every explanation of what was not plain to the first originator, must always, more or less, partake of the arbitrary. On the contrary, as regards the Mosaic symbolic, the *explanation* which everywhere appears only as *allusion* (which presupposes the sense to be certain and known), remains self-consistent through all the books of Scripture down to the Apocalypse, as we shall prove further on, by specific instances. He who does not recognise this meaning, who does not understand, for instance, the symbolic of sacrifice, is punished;



his ignorance is considered as culpable. If the symbolic were unconscious, we could not fix the meaning of the symbols with certainty, and must satisfy ourselves with a mere attempt at approximation. But here it is not so. The meaning of the leading symbol is clear and settled, and where we are still uncertain, the fault lies not in the obscurity of the symbol, but in our unacquaintance with the ancient symbolic language, our incapacity to realize the manner in which the ancients looked upon things.

(v.) Lastly, a mere unconscious symbolic is opposed by the analogy of the visions and symbolic acts of the prophets, to which the express meaning is generally added. This analogy is of so much more importance, since then visions and symbolic acts are based not unfrequently on the Mosaic symbolic; as, for instance, the vision of Zechariah (ch. iii.) is founded on the rite of the feast of atonement, and (ch. iv.) the symbol of the Mosaic candlestick. The analogy of the Anthropomorphisms of the Old Testament is also not to be lost sight of, in which, as we have shown, the thought, even in the Pentateuch, emancipated itself from its covering, which it recognised as subordinate, and no more than a covering.

If we survey the reasons *for* an unconscious symbolic, they will appear very inconsiderable compared with those that are *against* it.

(i.) It is said, "Why did the law prescribe sin-offerings for a mere image of impurity, if, in the image, it saw not the appearance of the thing itself?" But, in the image of impurity, a sense would be aroused not respecting one specific thing, but impurity generally, and, at the same time, the need of atonement; it served for *ἀνάμνησις ἁμαρτιῶν*. The bodily impurity belonged not to a being who was spiritually pure, but to a sinner; the image was never without its counterpart. But in the very cases of defilement, apart from general grounds, it is specially shown that they were only images of sin, not in themselves criminal acts. In a multitude of cases, it was a duty to become ceremonially unclean. The physician who should cure a man affected with an "*issue*" would become unclean by touching him, Lev. xv. 7; he who buried a dead person would be unclean seven days, and yet it was his duty to do this—a duty which even the priests themselves dare not decline, in the case of their nearest relatives. Also whoever, according to Moses' own command, slew and burnt the red heifer

appointed for purification, the priest himself, who was present at this act, whoever collected the ashes, whoever sprinkled "*the water of separation*," was unclean. Compare MICHAELIS, *Mos. Recht.* iv. § 207. How can these facts be explained if the uncleanness was itself sin? The ideas of duty and sin mutually exclude each other. The maxim, *facienda sunt mala, ut eveniant bona*, never makes its appearance on Scriptural ground, but is repudiated with the utmost aversion. That not merely the law-giver, but likewise the people themselves, were, at the utmost remove from confounding the typical representation of sin with sin itself, we see from Num. ix. 7, where those who had defiled themselves with the dead, and had thereby incurred the grossest kind of Levitical uncleanness, thought it strange and unreasonable that they should be debarred, by such a cause, from participating in the blessings of the Paschal Feast.

(ii.) It is asserted that, in the Pentateuch, religious ideas were not yet separated from their symbolic form, is evident, because *prayer* had not been introduced as "a practical contribution of the congregation to the worship." But, however the fact is to be explained, that in the Pentateuch no verbal prayers are presented for the congregation (yet compare Deut. xxvi. 13, &c.), yet *this* explanation is certainly incorrect. The Pentateuch speaks of the calling on God as beginning with Enos, Gen. iv. 26; the Patriarchs, on every solemn occasion, called upon God; there are recorded prayers of considerable length which they offered up, such as the admirable prayer of Jacob in Gen. xxxii. 10, the collective prayers of the Pentateuch (as, for instance, they are given by STAUDLIN, in his *Geschichte des Gebetes*), form a noble series. How, then, can it be possibly maintained that prayer was foreign to this state of development! Let a man only be able to pray, as Moses did, and his mind will soon be made up on this point.

After we have stated the positive justification of the Ceremonial Law, we would briefly review the accusations that have been brought against it.

I. "Moses durst not load with laws his rude people, as yet accustomed to no laws; he must have satisfied himself with the most necessary and important, and only urged compliance with these. At first, the laws on the two tables sufficed; by these

the points of greatest moment in civil life, and the national religion were secured. What more could Moses desire? How much it must have cost him to bring into regular practice the legislation of the two tables! How often did the lawless spirit of the people sin, and strive against himself!" We have, in a former part of this work, proved that the Israelites were not the "rude, unbridled, nomadic multitude, which they are here set forth as being; see vol. i. p. 406. They had been under the influence of Egyptian culture, and thus had been brought in contact with many points of the Egyptian Ceremonial Law, and, in many respects, under its influence. For the symbolic of the Egyptian religion (of which it is remarkably characteristic that the Egyptian temples are directed, not towards heaven, but only specially towards the Nile, to which they generally present their front), (RITTER *Africa*, p. 711) was elaborated in the highest degree. Compare JABLONSKY *Pantheon prol.* § 47. BECK, *Weltgeschichte*, i. 767. RITTER, pp. 685, 708, 716, 717, 745. The whole life of the Egyptians was under the control of a symbolic Ceremonial Law; it had penetrated deeply into all civil relations, and by means of it religion and legislation were indissolubly connected, (compare HEEREN, *Ideen Aeg.* p. 156.) In this state of things, if Moses had been favoured with the good advice which is now proffered to him, he could not have made use of it although he had had around him those sapient persons from whom it proceeds. He was placed in the alternative, either of adopting no legislation, or one which penetrated into all the folds and corners of real life, as did the pseudo-religious legislation of Egypt, which he wished to supplant. A law like that which has been desired from him would have floated in the air, and never come into real use; it would have been unable to withstand the reaction which would have proceeded from real life. Moses had not to do with children, but with degenerate men; he had not a *rasa tabula* to write upon, but a *codex rescriptus* to deliver. The superfine scheme of our modern critics proceeds from an incapacity to transport themselves into the historical relations in which Moses was placed.

II. "A wise legislator cannot and does not predetermine such laws, since they are dependant on accidental circumstances, and must be the product of longer practice, and continued reflection,

and, indeed, altogether spontaneous, so that a prophetic revelation of them would be superfluous, and only clog the course of natural development." Here, in the first place, it is erroneously taken for granted that, in the Mosaic age, no foundation existed for the Ceremonial Law, that Moses, if the Ceremonial Law was to proceed from him, must have entirely "invented" it. The very contrary has been self-evident, and is proved especially by these symbols of the Mosaic ritual, which have their outward analogy in the Egyptian religion, as is, for instance, undeniably the case in the rites on the Day of Atonement. It proceeds from confounding the Old Testament Revelation with that of the New, if it is demanded of the former that it should not exert a retarding influence on the national course of development. This is the very thing which it had to effect, since under the Old Testament no internal operative principle existed, sufficiently powerful to sanctify the natural course of development. But it was otherwise in the Church of the New Testament. In dependance on the spirit of Christ, which animated and governed, it was left much more to itself.

The way and manner in which, in the Old Testament, the natural development is anticipated, is a sign of the weakness of this economy, and its provisional character is a practical pointing to a more perfect one, but it was justified even by this weakness. Lastly, the opponents of the Ceremonial Law speak of "the many casuistical and extremely positive enactments," just as if they had to do with the later Judaism. But only compare, in reference to a single point, for example, the rites on the day of Atonement, the Mosaic regulations, and those of the Rabbies, and the extravagance of such an assertion will be immediately seen. The special cases of which the law takes account are always those which must at once present themselves. All matters more remote are left unnoticed. Even in the Mosaic age cases which were not provided against occurred, for which it was needful to give supplementary directions, as, for example, respecting the eating of the Passover by the ceremonially unclean. But the extreme of casuistry which we find in later Judaism, cannot be historically derived from the modern view of the agency of Moses. A thing of this sort never springs up suddenly; in its first beginnings we may trace the primary basis of its origin.

The hedge round the Mosaic law requires, for its historical explanation, the existence of the Mosaic law in its present form.

III. "For what end were ordinances of sin and trespass offerings, if the lively consciousness of human sinfulness had not been awakened? For what end were a multitude of symbolical usages, if their higher meaning was not at the same time revealed?" To the first interrogatory we answer, they were ordained in order to awaken the consciousness of sinfulness. The second question arises from such an incapacity to transfer the mind into the spirit of antiquity, as really in our time ought no more to be expected. To the earliest antiquity the language of symbols was as intelligible as to us that of words. "In the early ages of the human race," says O. Müller, "men lived more in impressions on the senses, and must have had a far more exquisite perception of them; we might say, that to them all nature presented a physiognomy, a countenance of which every feature and lineament was full of meaning." For understanding the Mosaic symbolic it was essentially necessary that those primary religious intuitions should exist which belonged to that stage of humanity. Where this was the case, they were recognised at once in the symbols which were then the natural expressions for them. Where these did not exist, an explanation would have been of little service.

IV. Against the Divine origin of the Mosaic Ceremonial Law, is urged its agreement with heathen symbols. Just as when it is objected against the Divine origin of the doctrine of the New Testament, that it is delivered to us in the same language and writing as a multitude of profane writers; or that, for a multitude of single expressions in the New Testament, very similar parallel passages may be brought from heathen authors. Only a want of spirituality which, unable to comprehend the spiritual, cannot penetrate below the surface, could raise this objection.

V. The prophets, in several passages, deny to the Ceremonial Law a Divine origin, and all value. This absurd assertion has already been abundantly refuted by DRECHSLER (*die Unwissen-schaftlichkeit im Geb. der alttest. Crit.* p. 170) and by KÜPER (*Jeremias librorum sacr. interpres atque vindex*, Berl. 1837, p. 49.)

All the grounds of justification which we have adduced for the Ceremonial Law, plead only for its *relative* value, and, therefore,

contain an intimation that, under certain circumstances, it might be, nay, *must* be abolished, but only of course as to its peculiar form, not its essence, which is, like its Author, eternal. As a means of keeping God in remembrance, the Ceremonial Law was only a poor substitute for the personality of Christ, and the internal operation of the Holy Spirit. A far deeper consciousness of sin was produced by the exhibition of Christ crucified, and by the spirit which inwardly testified of him; the separation from the Heathen world contradicted the idea of the Church of God, and hence could only be a good for a certain time, and must necessarily in time become an evil; external pomp was a concession to the weakness of the people and the feebleness of their spirituality; lastly, as a doctrine clothed in symbols, the Ceremonial Law occupied only a lower ground. The most suitable expression and impression of the Spirit is the Word, and this could and must predominate as soon as the Spirit was come with power of full development, an event which did not, and could not, happen till after the atoning death of Christ. The want of an intuitive perception of religious ideas received in the person of Christ a satisfaction far more true and complete, and not so exposed to the danger of abuse. On all sides, therefore, the designation of the Ceremonial Law by the Apostle as *ἀσθενῆ καὶ πτωχὰ στοιχεῖα* is justified without its ceasing to have even for us a truly edifying character. We admire in it the condescension of God, who placed within reach of his Church that essential truth which they could not yet receive in a pure state, in a vehicle adapted to their power of apprehension.

We would now attempt, by the explanation of an entire group of symbols, to bring our readers to a clearer understanding of the Ceremonial Law. The Tabernacle offers itself to us as the most suitable subject for a specimen of the mode of conducting such an investigation.

For ascertaining the meaning of the Tabernacle in general, we must first take notice of its names. Of these, two only are used to express it generally, *אֶהְיֶה לְעֵדוּת*, *Tabernacle of Witness*, and *אֶהְיֶה לְקִוְיָה* *Tabernacle of the Congregation*; and of these, the first is not peculiar to the Tent itself, but distinguishes it only by one part of its contents, of which the great importance is certainly

shown by its being employed for this purpose ; so that our chief attention is turned to the second. That this name does not refer to the fact that the Israelites assembled there, but that it distinguishes the Holy Tent as the place where God met with his people, and maintained communion with them, requires no proof, as it rests on the plain statements of the Pentateuch, which are almost universally admitted.

The declarations of Jehovah at the first consecration of the Tabernacle respecting its erection and design, will serve as a commentary on its title. In Exod. xxv. 8, it is said, "*And let them make me a sanctuary, that I may dwell among them.*" In Exod. xxix. 45, 46, "*And I will dwell among the children of Israel and be their God. And they shall know that I am the Lord their God, that brought them forth out of the land of Egypt, that I may dwell among them ; I am the Lord their God.*"

What was essential in the relation of God to Israel was the covenant, the strict fellowship, into which God entered with his people, the connection which he formed with it, which had in, reference to both parties, the character of exclusiveness. This relation was in its nature purely spiritual ; it was formed before the erection of the Tabernacle, and, considered in and for itself, might have existed for ever without the erection of a sanctuary. God's people could by faith raise their hearts to heaven, and God in love could come down to their hearts. But the conceivable was not practicable, owing to the weakness of the people. Since they were borne down by the visible, God became to them a mere abstraction, as long as the spiritual relation to them was not outwardly manifested and embodied, and the danger was so much greater, since the heathen idols promised this and much more to the sensual disposition of their worshippers. Therefore God condescended, and came in aid of the weakness of his chosen. He gave the people, by means of the Tabernacle, a pledge of his spiritual communion with them. Here he dwelt. here the faithful dwelt with him. What the bodily eye saw tended to develop the spiritual intuition.

That the erection of the Tabernacle proceeded from the Divine condescension, was acknowledged even by SPENCER, but how crude were his conceptions of this condescension ! He asserts, that the gross notions of the age, and the deeply rooted superstition of the

Heathen, formed the origin of the Tabernacle, *Quum enim Aegyptiis aliisque gentibus in more fuerit etc, quumque morem illum tollere non ita promptum esset, hinc deo visum fuit ad seculi morem et modulum se demittere, in tabernaculo habitare, tabernaculum etiam ministris suis circumferendum tradere.* He altogether overlooks the fact that the Tabernacle had a spiritual interior, that it was the outward manifestation of a spiritual relation. In his view, the service of God in the Tabernacle was not a preparatory, imperfect form of worshipping God in spirit and in truth, but its direct opposite. God's condescension had not, for him, the positive object of developing the religious principle in the most efficacious manner under the given circumstances, but only the negative one of preventing the people from seeking to gratify their passion for temples in the heathen religions. The weakness of the people which called forth this condescension on the part of God, appeared to him not as something founded in human nature generally, which, on account of the indwelling sin that evaporates God to a mere abstraction, cannot promptly answer to the call *Sursum Corda!*—but as a mere *seculi ruditas*. He considers progressive illumination of the understanding as the counteractive of this weakness, instead of perceiving, that it continued to exist, and that the incipient means of satisfying a want that was founded in the nature of fallen man, can only be accomplished by that infinitely more real one which was imparted by God,—*the incarnation of the Son of God*. He has no suspicion that the point-of-view, for which the Tabernacle was adopted, was above his own. The pious Israelite raised himself by means of the visible to the invisible, and entered into a real connection with it; dry Deists, like SPENCER, cannot, at the best, go beyond a dry devotion.

The holy Tabernacle, or the Temple, according to the preceding observations, was the symbol of the kingdom of God in Israel. This meaning, which many of the older theologians have acknowledged,\* presents itself throughout the Old Testament; compare for example Amos ix. 1, and the remarks on it in the

---

\* *Generalissimum omnium, quod significare tabernaculum potuit, est gratiosa inhabitatio et praesentia dei in Israele.* WITSIUS, *De Tabern. Levit. mysterris.* Misc. i. 414.



*Christologie* iii. 207; Dan. ix. 24, *Christol.* ii. 447; Zech. vi. 12, *Christol.* ii. 76; Ps. xv. 1; xxii. 6; xxvii. 4, in which the Tabernacle and the Temple appear as the place where believers dwell with the Lord. From Lev. xvi. 16, it follows that the Israelites, “*in all their sins,*” dwelt with God in the Tabernacle, and on this was founded the necessity of a purification. In the New Testament the temple is spoken of as the spiritual residence of the whole nation, ἰδοὺ ἀφίεται ὑμῖν ὁ οἶκος ὑμῶν ἔρημος Matt. xxiii 38, and the meaning of Christ’s purification of the Temple by the expulsion of the buyers and sellers, cannot be understood unless we regard the Temple as the material representation of the kingdom of God in Israel. From this mode of considering it, we see at once why the sanctuary at first had the form of a tent. If the question related merely to the *portability* of the sanctuary, it would be inadmissible, to seek for an internal ground of explanation; for this would be given by the outward circumstances of the Israelites at the time of erecting the sanctuary. But that the form of a tent was prescribed so definitely for the portable sanctuary (compare Exod. xxvi. 7, “*And thou shalt make curtains of goats’ hair to be a covering upon the Tabernacle*”), can be explained on no outward grounds, since the curtains of goats’ hair serve neither for ornament, which was effected by the curtains of Byssus, nor for protection, which was secured much more effectually by the curtains of leather. God wished to resemble in all things the people among whom he dwelt. The form of the Tabernacle was retained for a considerable time after the Israelites had obtained a permanent dwelling-place, but only because it was still provisional. Had the sanctuary not been erected till their residence in Canaan, it would not have had the form of a tent. Its having this form, shows incontrovertibly that it was first erected during the march through the wilderness.

On that which the Israelitish sanctuary signified, is founded what it pre-signified. The establishment of the symbolic meaning must furnish us with the key for understanding the allusions of the New Testament in reference to the typical meaning; and again, what we learn from the New Testament in reference to the typical meaning must serve to confirm the determination of the symbolic meaning.

If the union of God with his people formed the essential signi-

ficance of the sanctuary, then must the appearance of Christ be related to it as the body to the shadow. By the Incarnation, God truly and really dwelt among his people; taking flesh and blood among them, and of them. The typical relation which the Tabernacle bears to the appearance of Christ is indicated by John in ch. i. 14, ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν. An allusion to the  $\text{יְהוָה}$  and a reference to the Tabernacle are both contained in the word *σκηνοῦν*. "In the Hellenistic language," LAMPE remarks, *σκηνοῦν* is "*talis habitatio-qualem olim deus habuit in tabernaculo et sanctuario V. T. Quater tantum in N. T. et non nisi a nostro Evangelista hoc verbum usurpatur. Apoc. vii. 15; xii. 12; xiii. 6; xxi. 3; sed semper huc respicitur. Eodem sensu pro  $\text{יְהוָה}$  de presentia Jehovah in tabernaculo *σκηνοῦν* usurpavit Ag. Symm. Theodot. Exod. xxiv. 16; xxv. 8. A similar allusion occurs in Col. ii. 9, ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ κατοικεῖ παντὸς πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς, where Christ is pointed out as the true  $\text{יְהוָה}$ . So also Col. i. 19, ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ εὐδόκησε πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα κατοικῆσαι, on which STEIGER remarks, "Not without reason we may compare with this, the  $\text{יְהוָה}$  which once was used by Him who condescended to inhabit the Shekinah in the Temple on the Ark of the Covenant." As all the types are practical prophecies, so also the lower form of God's communion with his people, as it existed under the Old Covenant, points to a higher and more perfect one to be expected in the future, as it was realised in and with the appearance of Christ.*

If the sanctuary was the symbol of the kingdom of God under the Old Covenant, it must be prefigurative of the indwelling of God through Christ in the congregation of the New Covenant, the Christian Church, in which henceforward the union of divinity and humanity is completed. The passages of the New Testament are numerous, in which the Church is contemplated as the antitype of the Tabernacle and the Temple, so that it may truly be said that it is one of the leading representations of the New Testament. When Christ in Matt. xxviii. 20, says καὶ ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ μεθ' ὑμῶν εἰμι πάσας τὰς τὰς ἡμέρας ἕως τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος, he in fact declares his CHURCH is a spiritual "*Tabernacle of the Congregation.*" But the Church is expressly stated to be the antitype of the Old Testament sanctuary, in 1 Tim. iii. 15; ἵνα εἰδῆς πῶς δεῖ ἐν οἴκῳ θεοῦ ἀναστρέφεσθαι, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἐκκλησία

θεοῦ ζώντος; and in 2 Cor. vi. 16, *τίς δὲ συγκατάθεσις ναφ̄ θεοῦ μετὰ εἰδώλων; ὑμεῖς γὰρ ναὸς θεοῦ ἐστε ζώντος· καθὼς εἶπεν ὁ θεός· ὅτι ἐνοικήσω ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐμπεριπατήσω καὶ ἔσομαι αὐτῶν θεός καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔσονται μοι λαός.* (Levit. xxvi. 11, 12), compare Eph. ii. 21, 22. Individual believers also are considered as antitypes of the Old Testament sanctuary, since God dwells in them by his Spirit; compare 1 Cor. vi. 19; *ἢ οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι τὸ σῶμα ὑμῶν ναὸς τοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν ἁγίου πνευματός ἐστιν;* iii. 9; Ephes. iii. 17. Since in the Church militant the presence of God is not yet perfectly realized, so in some passages the Church triumphant is contemplated as the only full antitype of the Old Testament type. Thus Revel. xxi. 3, *Καὶ ἤκουσα φωνῆς μεγάλης ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ λεγούσης· ἴδου ἡ σκηνὴ τοῦ θεοῦ μετὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ σκηνώσει μετ' αὐτῶν, καὶ αὐτοὶ λαὸς αὐτοῦ ἔσονται, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ἔσται μετ' αὐτῶν, θεὸς αὐτῶν.* Compare ver. 22.

From the preceding remarks we obtain the solution of the sacred enigma which the Saviour propounded to the Jews in John ii. 19; *λύσατε τὸν ναὸν τούτου καὶ ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραμ ἐγερῶ αὐτόν,* on which labour is bestowed in vain, as long as the essential identity of the Temple—the appearance of Christ in the flesh—and the Church of the New Testament, is not acknowledged. “If ye hereafter (what you *wish* to do, that you *are to* do) destroy the temple of my body, and in and with it this outward temple, the symbol and pledge of the kingdom of God among you, I will within three days raise up again the temple of my body, and in and with it what is essential of the outward temple (that which the outward temple symbolised), the kingdom of God. To do what I am now doing, may be to you a sign of my being authorized. He with whom the kingdom of God is most intimately blended, with whom it falls and rises, is thereby legitimated as a Reformer.”

That John admitted a close connection between the appearance of Christ and the Temple, is evident from John i. 14. That even to the crude Jewish understanding, the identity of the material temple and of the kingdom of God, was not altogether strange, is shown in Mark xiv. 58, where the witnesses repeat the words of Christ, *ὅτι ἐγὼ καταλύσω τὸν ναὸν τούτου τὸν χειροποίητον καὶ διὰ τριῶν ἡμερῶν ἄλλον ἀχειροποίητον οἰκοδομήσω.* This mode of apprehending the facts (apart from the malicious misrepresentation of substituting *ἐγὼ καταλύσω* for *λύσατε*) is correct,

only not complete. Of the three references, only two are noticed; the third, that of the body of Christ, is overlooked. This is brought forward by John in his allusive manner, as the most obscure, and only a misapprehension of his common method in such cases could lead to the mistake that he wished to deny the two others. The reference brought forward by John, can never be set aside, on account of the phrase, "*three days*," which, in spite of every attempt, must remain as a proof of the reference to the resurrection.

As the sacred tent was the place where God and his people met, it was necessarily divided into two principal parts, according to its occupants; since an undivided occupancy would not have corresponded to the stage, at that period, of the dispensation of salvation. The Most Holy Place belonged to God; the Holy Place to the people. But since the coming into immediate contact with God's seat, might have weakened the reverence of the people in his presence, and the *res sacræ* that were performed in the holy place might have lost their importance by constant intercourse, and have been desecrated, since it was not yet the time for the people to converse immediately with God, but it was needful to restrain them outwardly by a mediatorial arrangement, within bounds which they knew not yet how to keep internally;—the people entered the part which was peculiarly theirs, through the medium of their representatives and mediators, the priests, and it was necessary to provide a *real* place of meeting for the people besides the *ideal*. This was the court of the Tabernacle.

The various articles of furniture belonging to the Tabernacle were so distributed, that those in the most holy place typified the relation of God to the people—those in the place set apart for the people, the relation of the people to God, and therefore the utensils, in reference to which the priests acted for the people, stood in the holy place; and the apparatus, in which the immediate agency of the people was employed (the altar of burnt-offerings) in the court of the Tabernacle.

Before we proceed to the explanation of individual articles, we must set aside an erroneous explanation of the whole of the Tabernacle, which would supplant the correct one that we have just given; and then make some remarks on the materials of which the Tabernacle was composed.

As to what concerns the former, BÄHR (*Symb. des Mös. Cultus*)

has tried his utmost to establish the opinion, that the Mosaic place of worship was a representation of God's creation, and that his peculiar dwelling, the most holy, and the holy place, represented heaven, and the court the earth. It is, in the first place, unfavourable to this theory, that it is not supported by a single passage of Scripture. The older theologians distinguished between the *typi innati*, those of which the explanation is given in Scripture, and *typi illati*, the meaning of which philosophy, bereft of the aid of Scripture, endeavours to establish by its own efforts, with always more or less of uncertainty. If we transfer this distinction to the symbols, we have here to do, in the strictest sense, with a *symbolum illatum*. This reason is of so much greater force, in proportion to the importance of the Mosaic sanctuary. It cannot be supposed, that a meaning which really belongs to it should not be brought forward in Scripture strongly and repeatedly. Moreover, as we have already pointed out, this is actually the case in reference to another meaning. This is of more importance, since, in symbols, as well as in the written word, the signification can only be one, although the analogies, things which, in some one respect, present a *tertium comparationis*, may be very manifold, so that all the passages which are in favour of the signification maintained by us bear testimony, at the same time, against that proposed by BÄHR. BÄHR thinks, indeed, that he can adduce one passage of Scripture in support of his views. "That the part in which God dwelt," he says, "was a type of heaven, the Holy Scripture asserts in express terms, Heb. ix. 2 ; xi. 24." But this testimony, at all events, lends no countenance to the peculiar characteristic of his views—the assertion that the holy place in relation to the court, = heaven in relation to earth. Likewise the indirect evidence, which BÄHR tries to adduce for his theory, on closer examination, appears invalid. He remarks, p. 78, "According to a representation common to all nations, but of peculiar frequency among the Hebrews, the creation of heaven and earth is the building erected by God, the house wherein he dwells ;" and p. 79, "We have, indeed, no passage of Scripture which, in so many words, speaks of the Mosaic place of worship as a typical representation of God's creation ; but of this there is no need, since the passages quoted respecting the creation as the building and habitation of

God are sufficient for the purpose." We maintain, on the contrary, and a glance at the passages quoted will justify our assertion, that, in the Old Testament, the creative agency of God is, indeed, often presented under the image of building; heaven and earth appear as a building framed by God; but in all Scripture not a single passage can be found in which the universe is designated as the building, the habitation of God. BÄHR'S view is therefore entirely without foundation. BÄHR tries, indeed, to find a support for his view in the "very ancient Jewish tradition, that the sacred structure represented the creation of the heavens and the earth." But the earliest vouchers for this "*very ancient tradition*" are PHILO and JOSEPHUS, and whatever is found first in these is, in general, not "*very ancient*," but newly coined. If we look at the further exposition of this meaning in their writings, we can be in no doubt as to its origin. It was not the growth of the pure Israelitish soil, but a product of Hellenistic Syncretism—an attempt of those who partially stood on heathen ground, to conceal, with some fragments stolen from natural religion, the pure ethical character of the Israelitish religion, which was so distasteful to the heathen. These remarks may suffice. We have only further to notice, that BÄHR gives no satisfactory reason for the separation of the Most Holy and the Holy Place, and particularly, that, to favour his hypothesis, he must force an erroneous meaning on all the sacred utensils. On this account, it is so important to be convinced of the groundlessness of this hypothesis, since, till it is relinquished, no correct explanation can be given of the individual utensils.

As to what concerns the materials of the Tabernacle, we deny, in opposition to BÄHR, that any symbolical tendency regulated their choice. Such *wood* was taken as was at command; the most splendid and choice *colours*, and the most precious *metals* in which there is a slight beginning of a symbolical tendency, in their natural rank, so that the noblest parts were made of the noblest metals. It would not be difficult for us to dispose of everything by which BÄHR has endeavoured to establish the symbolic meaning of the materials. But we would here confine ourselves to a single point. The wood used in the Tabernacle was throughout Shittim or Acacia wood. "It is very remarkable," says BÄHR, "that the Scriptural records not only mention this wood as em-

ployed for the building itself, but for all the utensils." According to him, the Shittim wood, as being undecaying, was considered as a tree of life, and thus gave to the structure the character of a place of life. We would not insist any further upon this meaning as being so farfetched, but confine ourselves to two remarks, which may here suffice. (i.) We should only be justified in attempting to fix a symbolic meaning on the Shittim wood, if there had existed a choice between different kinds of wood. But since the Acacia wood is the only wood to be found in the Arabian desert, from which planks or rafters would be cut, how can it be remarkable that this wood, and only this, was taken? We may observe, by the way, that the choice of the Acacia wood, not only for the Tabernacle, but for the utensils, can only be accounted for on the supposition of the Tabernacle's being constructed during the march through the wilderness. The vain attempts of many expositors to change the Acacia wood into cedar, show what must be expected if we keep out of sight the place where the Tabernacle was originated. (ii.) Had the Shittim wood been significant, it would have been found again in the Temple. That there its place was taken by the cedar, shows that the choice of it was not determined by internal reasons, but by outward circumstances. In general, it may be laid down as a rule, that everything in the Temple which differed from the Tabernacle must have been accidental and external. Had BÄHR kept this in view, he would more frequently have made comparisons with the Temple. The colours, according to BÄHR, must denote the names of God. But how could this be, since the colours do not occur in a direct relation to God, and since the qualities alleged to be indicated by these colours would be naturally attributed to the person who wore them. It is a totally different thing when heathen idols are adorned with colours. Further, the meaning of the names is determined in part erroneously; for example, that of ELOHIM, which is to designate God as King of Israel, and to which the purple must correspond, of which one name, The Living One, never appears in the Pentateuch *as such*; the connection between names and colours is, in general, arbitrarily taken, &c.

We now pass on to the explanation of particular utensils; first of all, those in the Most Holy Place, which, as we have already remarked, typified the relation of God to his people. Here only

one article of furniture is found, *the Ark of the Covenant*, but composed of several parts and including various other articles. First of all, we have to notice the ark in the stricter sense, but which owes all its importance to its contents; it is merely to be considered as the repository of the tables of the law. What signification is attached to these is clear from the name which they invariably bear, when spoken of as a component part of the Ark of the Covenant. They are called עֲדוּתֵי, *testimonies*. But this name of all others needs to be guarded against those erroneous explanations which have acquired an absolute predominance.

According to the current opinion עֲדוּתֵי denotes the law as a testimony of the Divine will. BÄHR goes a step further; according to him עֲדוּתֵי means *revelation* generally, and the law is not as such called עֲדוּתֵי, but only as Divine revelation. We maintain, on the contrary, that the law generally, and its quintessence the Decalogue, is so called only with a special reference, only so far a *testimony* as it is a testimony against sin and sinners; ἐλέγχει τὸν κόσμον περὶ ἁμαρτίας. Our reasons are the following—(i.) In Deut. xxxi. 26, 27, the purpose of testifying against Israel is attributed to the whole law, “*Take this book of the law, and put it in the side of the Ark of the Covenant of the Lord your God, that it may be there for a witness עֲדוּתֵי against thee; for I know thy rebellion.*” What is here said in reference to the use of the commentary or paraphrase, must apply also to the text, the original outline. Externally and internally the book of the law was supplementary to the tables of the law. Deut. xxxi. 19, is also to be regarded as an explanation of עֲדוּתֵי, “*Now therefore write ye this song for you, . . . that this song may be a witness for me against the children of Israel.*” (ii.) The *form* of the law leads us to consider it as a *witness against sinners*, as ἀνάμνησις ἁμαρτιῶν. Only in this way can its thoroughly preponderating negative character be accounted for. It assumes that in those persons to whom the law was given, there was an inclination adverse to the law. With every “*Thou shalt not,*” an invisible clause is to be supplied—“*as thy corrupt heart is inclined.*” (iii.) But (which alone is an adequate reason), עֲדוּתֵי stands everywhere in a precise relation to עֲוֹנוֹתֵי, and this relation, as it serves to confirm the view which is otherwise supported by irrefragable arguments, that KAPPORETH means



covering in a spiritual sense, *expiation* (compare BAHR, p. 381, a very successful demonstration) so also it requires for וְעָדָה the meaning of *witness* in the sense we have stated. As outwardly the *Kapporeth* covered the *Eduth*, so also inwardly and spiritually. By the forgiveness of sins, the accusation and condemnation of the law are for the penitent reduced to silence. Only compare Exod. xxv. 17, “*And thou shalt make a Kapporeth* (mercy-seat, Eng. A. V.) of pure gold; 21, *And thou shalt put the Kapporeth above, upon the ark; and in the ark thou shalt put the Eduth that I shall give thee; 22, And there I will meet with thee, and I will commune with thee from above the Kapporeth, from between the two cherubims, which are on the ark of the Eduth.*” Lev. xvi. 13, “*And he shall put the incense upon the fire before the Lord, that the cloud of the incense may cover the Kapporeth, which is above the Eduth, that he die not.*”

After this investigation, the meaning of the ark with the *testimony* (or *witness*) can be no longer doubtful. That aspect of the Divine character which first of all presents itself, when the holy God enters into connection with sinful men, is his holiness and justice. Accusation, punishment, condemnation, are the first sounds that are uttered. Were God merely just, no further progress could be made; for in that case no union of God with man could be formed. In God's declaration that he was willing to enter into such an union with Israel, it was implied that if the *Eduth* fulfilled its design in his people, if it lead them to a true knowledge of their sins and to repentance, he would secure them from all alarm on account of it.

The indispensable condition of every connection of God with men, the foundation of his dwelling among them, is his reconciling Divine compassion. This, as we have already intimated, was typified by the *Kapporeth*. As, outwardly, the *Kapporeth* covered the Ark with the *Eduth*, so, spiritually, the Divine compassion covered the multitude of sins. The כַּפֹּרֶת was to serve as an encouragement to Israel to approach heartily to God. Its language was—*προσερχόμεθα μετα παρρησίας τῷ θρόνῳ τῆς χάριτος, ἵνα λάβωμεν ἔλεον καὶ χάριν εὐρωμεν εἰς ἑνκαιρον βοήθειαν*. It was outwardly, and inwardly, more distinguished than the Ark strictly so called; outwardly, for it was altogether of

pure gold—the Ark was only overlaid with gold ; inwardly, for in Exod. xxv. 22, it is marked as that which made the Tabernacle אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד ; “ *And there I will meet thee, and I will commune with thee from above the mercy seat, from between the two cherubims which are upon the ark of the testimony, of all things which I will give thee in commandment unto the children of Israel.*” By means of it atonement is pointed out as fundamental in the relation of God to his people. The words in which God describes his character in relation to Israel (Exod. xxxiv. 6) form a commentary on its name. “ *Jehovah, Jehovah, God, merciful and gracious, long suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, and transgression, and sin, and he will not destroy* יִנְקֶה לֹא יִנְקֶה. To the *Kapporeth* all the sin-offerings and trespass-offerings stood in the closest relation. It formed their objective foundation, and served to invite and justify their presentation. What externally was performed only once every year, on the occasion of the great sin offerings, on the Day of Atonement, the sprinkling of blood before the *Kapporeth*, spiritually took place with all sin-offerings. No exegetical arts can do away the idea that the Law, as accusatory and condemnatory, was covered and abolished by the *Kapporeth*. The temptation to apply such tortuous methods can only be felt when persons (like BÄHR) affixing an erroneous meaning to מוֹעֵד, refer to the Law in general, what is true of it only in a particular quality—(here the Apostle’s language applies, νόμον οὖν καταργούμεν διὰ τῆς πίστεως ; μὴ γένοιτο ἀλλὰ νόμον ἰστώμεν. Rom. iii. 31)—and when, through fear that grace should lead to licentiousness, one loses sight of the real nature of grace. Forgiveness, which belongs only to those to whom the law has done its office as witness, is the only means by which hatred of sin, the fear and love of God, can be called forth deeply and abidingly. Man loves unforgiven sin, he hates forgiven sin. “ *There is forgiveness with thee, that thou mayest be feared.*” Ps. cxxx. 4.

On the *Kapporeth* God was enthroned as Israel’s God between the two cherubs. BÄHR has very well developed the significance of the cherubim ; indeed this is perhaps the most successful effort in his whole work. The cherub is the creature in idea, the creation personified, and, therefore, a witness of the glory of God which

beams forth in the creation. The enthroning of God between the cherubim hence expresses in an image the same thing as in words, the name of God, THE LORD OF HOSTS; Israel's God is the God of the Universe, the Almighty. "*Toward the Kap-poreth shall the faces of the cherubim be.*" Exod. xxv. 20. The explanation of this arrangement is ascertained for us in 1 Peter i. 12, where it is said of the mystery of redemption, *εἰς ἂ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄγγελοι παρακνῆαι*. That the personified creation fixed a constant gaze on the mercy-seat, indicated that Grace is the most adorable mystery, the most glorious unfolding of the Divine perfections.

Thus, therefore, the furniture of the Most Holy Place represented those perfections of God which are unfolded most fully in his revelation—his omnipotence, holiness, and grace. The Almighty God is exhibited as the enemy of sin—the second part of the description of his character in Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7, "*visiting the iniquities of the fathers on the children, and upon the children's children, unto the third and fourth generation,*" forms a commentary on the כִּנְיָ, which remains in full force against those who have slighted the testimony of the law—and as the pardoner of sin, which is closely connected with the former, for from the hatred of God against sin proceeds the expiation of sin.

We now turn from the Most Holy to the Holy Place. We have already remarked, that as the furniture of the Most Holy Place denotes God's character in his relation to Israel, so the furniture of the Holy Place denotes Israel's character in relation to God. We have here to speak of the altar of incense, the sacred candlestick, and the table with the shew-bread.

Not a doubt can exist as to the meaning of *the Altar of Incense*. It distinguishes the people of the Covenant as a people of prayer; it cries aloud to Israel, "*Pray without ceasing!*" The burning of the sweet-smelling Incense is, in Scripture, the standing symbol of the prayers of believers, which is pleasing before God. This meaning appears in the law itself, in Lev. xvi. 13, where it is said of the entrance of the High Priest into the Holy of Holies on the great day of Atonement—"*And he shall put the incense on the fire before the Lord, that the cloud of the incense may cover the mercy-seat that is upon the testimony,*

that he die not"—words which, according to a simple explanation, mean—Prayer, founded on the atoning and sin-covering grace of God, is the only means of escaping the destruction which the law, testifying against transgression, brings upon the sinner. In Psalm cxli. 2, the  $\text{פָּרַחֵן}$ , *prayer*, is called  $\text{קָדְשֵׁךָ}$ , *incense*. In Is. vi. 4, the clause, "*the house was filled with smoke,*" corresponds to the preceding words, "*And the posts of the door moved at the voice of him that cried;*" which can only be explained by admitting that to the prophet prayer and praise = incense. In Luke i. 10, it is said, "*καὶ πᾶν τὸ πλῆθος ἦν τοῦ λαοῦ προσευχόμενον ἔξω τῆ ὥρα τοῦ θυμιάματος,*" on which OUTRAM (*de Sacrif.* p. 89) correctly remarks, "*cum suffimenta sacra ita populi preces adumbrarent, ut sacerdos altera deo adolens, alteras etiam ritu symbolico illi commendare censeretur par erat, ut eodem tempore utraque illa sacra fierent.*" In Revel. v. 8, it is said, (*ἔχοντες ἕκαστος*) *φιάλας χρυσᾶς γεμούσας θυμιαμάτων, αἷ εἰσιν αἱ προσευχαὶ τῶν ἁγίων,* and an equally distinct explanation is found in ch. viii. 3, 4.

In reference to the *candlestick*, we have a certain clue to the meaning in the oil. Few symbols of Scripture are so often explained in it as this. Oil is constantly, both in the Old and New Testament, a symbol of the Spirit of God. We need not quote the passages here; they are given at length in the *Christologie*, ii. 44.<sup>7</sup> If the meaning of the oil be determined, so must be that of the lamps. As recipients of the Spirit of God, they can only denote the Church of God, the people of the Covenant. So also the Light—it can only signify the operations of the Spirit of God; the spiritual light which the Church, filled with the Spirit, sheds abroad on the surrounding darkness. The symbol expresses, first of all, what the Church of God *is*, in case it corresponds to its idea; but also, at the same time, what it *ought* to be. The description contains in itself an admonition. This appears most distinctly in the explanation of this symbol which is given by our Lord himself. The description in Matt. v. 14, *ὑμεῖς ἐστε τὸ φῶς τοῦ κόσμου* is followed in ver. 16 by the admonition *οὕτω λαμψάτω τὸ φῶς ὑμῶν ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅπως ἴδωσιν ὑμῶν τὰ καλὰ ἔργα καὶ δοξάσωσι τὸν πατέρα ὑμῶν τὸν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς.* The phrase *ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων* contains specially the interpretation of the words in

the description of the lamps, Exod. xxv. 37, "that they may give light over against it,"  $\text{וְהָיוּ לְנֹרָאֵי זָהָב טָהוֹר}$ . The Saviour, moreover, avails himself of the symbol of the Lamp in Luke xii. 35, *ἔστωσαν ὑμῶν αἱ ὀσφύες περιεζωσμέναι καὶ οἱ λύχνοι καίόμενοι*, where the first clause explains the rite at the Pascal feast; so, likewise, in the parable of the Ten Virgins. Paul, in Phil. ii. 15, exhorts believers to be *τέκνα θεοῦ ἀμόμητα ἐν μέσω γενεᾶς σκολιᾶς καὶ διεστραμμένης ἐν οἷς φαίνεσθε ὡς φωστῆρες ἐν κόσμῳ*, and John, in the Apocalypse, distinctly explains the symbol of the Candlestick to mean the Church; *αἱ ἑπτὰ λυχνίαὶ ἑπτὰ ἐκκλησίαι εἰσὶ*; on which VITRINGA remarks, *Septem illae lampades tam candelabri Mosaici typici, quam mystici illius candelabri, quod Zachariae in visione exhibitum est, haud dubie respiciunt ecclesiam Catholicam, a verbo et spiritu dei illuminandam.*

As to the subordinate particulars, the *seven-fold* number of the Lamps alludes to the Covenant relation, and the *twelve* loaves of Shew-bread to the tribes of the people of the Covenant. Seven is in Scripture (and is also impressed on the language as such) the number of an oath, and, therefore, of the Covenant. The Lamps were entirely of pure gold, to denote the glory of the Church of God. The blossoms and the fruits which were added as ornaments, refer to the prosperous and thriving state of the Church. The Rod of Aaron, that blossomed, and such passages as Psalm i. 3,

" And he shall be like a tree planted by the rivers of water,  
That bringeth forth his fruit in his season :  
His leaf also shall not wither."

serve, in this respect, as illustrations.

The Lamps, besides their hortatory, have likewise a promissory meaning, and this is strikingly exhibited in Zechariah's vision of the Candlestick (ch. iv., on which see the *Christologie*, ii. 55), founded on the symbol of the Candlestick. It pledges to the Church the impartation of the Holy Spirit, with his gifts and operations. But in this connection the promissory meaning could not be the original, but only a secondary one. The two other articles belonging to the Holy Place, the Altar of Incense, and the Shew-bread, have not a promissory, but only a hortatory

meaning. If the promissory meaning were taken as the primary reference, the Oil would be particularly noticed as is really the case in Zechariah. But so far from this being done, the Oil itself is not even mentioned in the description of the Candlestick.

The meaning of the articles in the sanctuary has been already correctly determined by the older theologians, and almost a perfect unanimity exists on the subject. But it is not so in reference to *the Table with the Shew-bread*. The following points in reference to it must be regarded as previously fixed, to serve as criteria for the correctness of the exposition. (i.) This symbol cannot have a promissory, but only a hortatory meaning; it does not typify what God will grant to the Church, but only what the Church ought to present to God. The name of the loaves, the *bread of the presence*, לֶחֶם הַפְּרִיָה supports this idea, which it will be more difficult to present or explain away (as BÄHR has done) since the text itself on which it first occurs, gives an authentic exposition of it. This bread, according to Exod. xxv. 30, is called *the bread of the presence*, because it was continually laid by the people in the presence of God לִפְנֵי יְהוָה. Moreover the bread is expressly described in Lev. xxiv. 8, as the gift of the children of Israel to God (not of God to Israel), “*Every Sabbath he shall set it in order before the Lord continually, being taken from the children of Israel by an everlasting covenant.*” Lastly, the bread was solemnly dedicated and presented to God by prayer, under its Old Testament symbol, incense; compare Lev. xxiv. 7, “*And thou shalt put pure frankincense upon each row, that it may be on the bread for a memorial, as an offering made by fire unto the Lord;*” even the bread itself was considered as an offering. That the bread was, as it were in a spiritual sense, burnt with the incense, is implied in ver. 9, where the bread is spoken of as one of the offerings made by fire. (ii.) Besides the bread, wine also was placed on the table. This, indeed, is not expressly said, but may be gathered from indirect hints. Among the utensils belonging to the table of shew-bread in Exod. xxv. 29, are enumerated the כַּדָּיִת (*bowls*, Eng. Auth. Vers.) to which the clause is added, “*to pour out withal*” (Eng. Marg. Read.) וְאֶשְׂרֵי זָבַח קִדְשֵׁי; thus also the קַשְׂוֹת which in Num. iv. 7 have the additional phrase הַזֵּבֶחַ. It follows that only that exposition can be the correct one, which attributes to the bread such a

meaning that the wine will appear to be its natural and inseparable companion, which will serve to explain the want of a direct mention of the wine, the mere implication of its being there. (iii.) Every explanation is manifestly false, which regards the table on which were placed the bread and wine, apart from any reference to that provision which subjects make for their sovereigns, which in the assertion of Dr PAULUS, that the bread was "the natural supply for the national king," recognises no correct element, no point of contact between the bread and wine which Israel set forth for their invisible king, and the passages referring to her visible representative.

"Out of Asher his bread shall be fat;  
And he shall yield royal dainties."

GEN. xlix. 20.

And 1 Kings iv. 7, "*And Solomon had twelve officers over all Israel, which provided victuals for the king and his household, each man, his month in a year, made provision.*"

(iv.) Every explanation is to be rejected, which supposes that the bread and wine, as their mere external aspect, could be presented as acceptable gifts to God—that they could be valued on their own account, and not for what they signified. To refute this absurdity the name of JEHOVAH is sufficient. Whoever could entertain such a thought, could have no perception of the nature of the Old Testament religion. But apart from this, and equally so from the circumstance, on which BAHR lays a stress, that *only* bread and wine were presented. "What kind," he remarks, "of royal banquet was that, on which nothing was placed but dry bread, as on the tables of the poorest of the people." How could any one, where every thing else is symbolic, and under a material envelope conceals a deep spiritual sense—here all at once sink into the most servile adherence to the letter? How could any one dis sever the table with the bread from all connection with the Altar of Incense and the Candlesticks?

The following view appears to us as the correct one. The cakes (the number of which, twelve, refers to the twelve tribes, corresponding to the twelve precious stones on the breast-plate of the High Priest) and the wine were really the provision which Israel presented to their king; but this king was spiritual and heavenly; therefore the provision presented to Him under a ma-

terial form, must also be spiritual. *Good works* we consider as the soul of the bread and wine. The prayer to God, "*Give us this day our daily bread,*" and the promise on which it rests and supports itself (as God never desires without giving, and also never gives without desiring), goes side by side with God's demand, "*Give me, to-day, my daily bread,*" and this demand is satisfied when the Church, abounding in good works, presents God with that for which he has given power, blessing, and success.

This explanation receives confirmation from a comparison with the unbloody offering, the  $\text{זֶבַח־הַלֶּחֶם}$ , which was undeniably related to the shew-bread. This has been understood by the older expositors, by OUTRAM, for example, who remarks, "*Sicut ara mensa dei, ita mensa dei ara quodam erat araeque plane vicem praestabat*" (p. 23.) The shew-bread was the standing  $\text{זֶבַח־הַלֶּחֶם}$  of the whole congregation; only in its being *constantly* before the Lord, it differed from the other  $\text{זֶבַח־הַלֶּחֶם}$  which were presented only on special occasions, and mostly in reference to the circumstances of individuals; but in its general nature and meaning it was the same. That it typified the food to be presented to God, is evident from its being connected with wine. But bread and wine, in the writings of the Old and New Testament, are the standing representatives and symbols of food. That good works are the spiritual food represented by them, appears from this, that on this ground and this only, the whole rite is explicable in all its individual distinctions. The  $\text{זֶבַח־הַלֶּחֶם}$  were always to be presented in connection with a sacrifice—*semper conjuganda cum aliquo victimarum genere, nunquam citra victimam danda*, OUTRAM, p. 80. The consecration of the whole person which was signified by the sacrifice, necessarily preceded the consecration of individual acts. The  $\text{זֶבַח־הַלֶּחֶם}$  could not be connected with all sacrifices, but only with the  $\text{זֶבַח־הַשְּׂלֵמִים}$  and  $\text{זֶבַח־הַשְּׂלֵמִים}$ ; they could never be connected with the sin-offerings and trespass-offerings. Expiation and reconciliation preceded the capability of performing good works; the unreconciled heart possesses not this capability; good works do not accompany reconciliation but proceed from it. He who was reconciled by sin-offerings, first of all consecrated himself, his whole personality, to the Lord, under the symbols of the burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, and then his works under the symbol



of the meat-offering. The meat-offering was to be without either *leaven* or *honey*. Compare Lev. ii. 11, “*No meat-offering* הַמִּנְחָה *which ye shall bring unto the Lord, shall be made with leaven, for ye shall burn no leaven, nor any honey, in any offering, of the Lord made by fire.* Leaven in the Scriptures is an emblem of corruption; the name of unleavened bread לֶחֶם מִצֵּיִת denotes *pure bread*; as spiritual correspondences Paul mentions *εἰλικρίνεια* and *ἀλήθεια*. Therefore the injunction against mixing leaven with the מִנְחָה intimates that good works are not to be disfigured by any mixture of unholy corruption, which would render the spiritual food unfit for use by a holy God; *omnem malitiam exuendam*, OUTRAM. The prohibition of *honey* which stands on the same footing as the grape-cakes, בְּשֵׂיִרִי וְנַבִּיִם (*flagons of wine*, E. A. Ver.) in Hos. iii. 1, (compare *Christologie* on the passage) indicates, that he who would perform good works, must not yield to sensuality, nor seek the *delicias carnis*, but exercise severity on himself. The prohibition of the mixing leaven and honey is accompanied by the command to mix salt (Lev. ii. 13) and oil. Salt denotes incorruptibility, freedom from moral defilement. Compare THEOPHYLACT on Luke xiv. 34 (in THOLUCK, *Bergpredigt*, p. 120), τὸ ἅλας ἄσηπτον μένον καὶ ἀβλαβὲς καὶ ἕτερα διαφυλάττει ἄσηπτα, οἷς ἂν μεταδῶ τῆς ποιότητος. Oil is here, as everywhere, a symbol of the spirit of God. It indicates that good works, as they rest on reconciliation, so they can only be accomplished by the grace of the Spirit.

Therefore the vessels and furniture of the holy place declare that the Lord's people are a people of prayer, of light, and of good works.

In the court stood the Altar of Burnt-offerings, and the Brazen Lavar. Of the former we do not mean to say anything, since it would lead to the discussion of the whole sacrificial system. In reference to the Lavar, it is said, in Exod. xxx. 9, 20, “*Aaron and his sons shall wash their hands and their feet thereat; when they go into the Tabernacle of the Congregation they shall wash with water that they die not: or when they come near to the altar to minister, to burn offering made by fire to the Lord!*” From these words, we learn the reason why their hands and feet were to be washed; their feet, because they entered into the holy place; their hands, because with them they performed the sacred

rites. The meaning of the rite is that it commanded and promised spiritual purity to the ministers of the church ; (and only these as such are here spoken of.) The counterpart, standing in undeniable reference to it, is the *feet-washing*, which Christ performed for his apostles, who stood in the same relation to the church of the New Covenant, as Aaron and his sons to that of the Old. The essential agreement of the two acts is strikingly shewn in John xiii. 8, λέγει αὐτῷ Πέτρος· οὐ μὴ νύψῃς τοὺς πόδας μου εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα. Ἀπεκρίθη αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς· ἐὰν μὴ νύψω σε, οὐχ ἔχεις μέρος μετ' ἐμοῦ. The “*not having a part,*” = “*dying.*” The punishment refers in both cases to what was signified by the symbolic act. LAMPE’S remark on the counterpart purification, applies also to the prefigurative ceremony ; *qui tale sigillum externum licet renuebat, ipsam animae lotionem eo obsignandam renuebat.*

#### THE ALLEGED LEVITICAL BIAS OF THE PENTATEUCH.

The English Deists, in their attacks on the Pentateuch, laid particular stress on the hierarchical spirit, which it was said to exhibit : (compare the quotations in LILIENTHAL vi. 690.) The direction which historical enquiries have taken in our day, has been less favourable to this objection. In Germany at least, so far from condemning the priestly order in the gross, there is rather a disposition to go too far the other way. HEEREN (in his *Ideen Aeg.* p. 134) speaks of the Egyptian priests, once so much decried, as “an honourable class of men, and active in the mental cultivation of their people.” GREGORY VII. has found in VOIGT a warm panegyrist ; RÜHS (*Gesch. des Mittelalters*, p. 368) says, “the insipid cavilling of a fashionable sophistry, and an unwarrantable application of ideas which are not applicable to his times, have only too often unjustly degraded and falsely estimated him,” and REHM (*Gesch. des Mittelalter*, iii. 6), expresses the same opinion.

And in reference to the Israelitish priesthood, this altered tone has already had an influence. No historian of note raises an objection on this score against the Old Testament. That individual

among them who is the most unfavourably disposed towards the priesthood—SCHLOSSER, in this respect expresses nothing but what is laudatory. “Moses’ object” he says (*Ubers*, I. i. 204), was a religion without dogmas, and without priests teaching and boasting of mysteries; this religion, as involving a ritual, was to be connected, in accordance with the cravings of oriental natures, with a hereditary priesthood and a theocracy. “It was great and noble,” he remarks, “that Moses would not destroy the popular freedom which might so easily have been done, neither for his own nor his brother’s advantage, though he granted to the highest spiritual honour as hereditary,” p. 222. And again, p. 224, “Since the Levites belonged half to the rank of country people, and half to the priestly order, they formed a link between the two, and the strictly defined contrast between the spiritual and secular classes, which we find in Egypt and India, never existed among the Jews.” He considers the number of ministers employed in the ritual as not at all excessive.

It might now seem, that, such being the state of the case, we might venture to pass over the whole subject in silence. But it is not in our power. The decision of theologians is not so favourable as that of historians; and, what is the principal point in the current mode of viewing facts, there are grounds for just complaints against the Pentateuch in this respect, which must necessarily be removed, if the favour of historians becomes permanent, and the disfavour of theologians either vanishes or becomes innoxious.

The grounds on which the charge of a Levitical bias (*Leviticus*) rests are the following :

I. The genuineness of the Pentateuch being assumed, it is suspicious that Moses should choose exactly his own tribe. Thus VATKE, p. 223. But that Moses did not choose his own tribe as such, but on account of the theocratic principle with which it was animated in a superior degree to the rest, we perceive from Ex. xxxii. 26, and Deut. xxxiii. 9. (See LE CLERC or ROSENMULLER on the passages.) That the reason was not a mere pretext, we have a striking proof in the fact, that Moses, with magnanimous self-denial, raised the family of Aaron to the priesthood, while he allowed his own family to sink into obscurity, undistinguished from the common mass of the Levites. Moses’ grandson, whom

we meet with in the lowest circumstances at the beginning of the time of the Judges, here appears as a witness to exculpate him. Compare STUDER on Judges xviii. 30.

II. According to the Mosaic arrangement, it is asserted, all the power in the state must have come into the exclusive possession of the priesthood. Thus VON CÖLLN, *Bibl. Theoi.* i. 66. This objection, as well as the following, had been prepared by J. D. MICHAELIS. The assertion, that the revenues of the Levites were disproportionately great, in case their calling was confined to the sphere of religion, necessarily made a deep impression on a mind so unspiritual. "If we saw in them," he says, (*Mos. Recht.* § 52), "nothing but the mere ministers of religion, their revenues must appear as very excessive." "Men might have cheaper guides to salvation, and might dispense with such a multitude." To avoid Scylla he rushes into Charybdis. To justify the revenues of the tribe of Levi, he enlarges their power. He assigns to it almost the whole power of the state. The refutation of this totally erroneous view has been given on another occasion. We have elsewhere shown, that the position of the priesthood in the Mosaic constitution is merely a religious one—that the civil constitution which existed before Moses was confirmed by him in its full extent—and particularly, that the judicial dignity was by no means assigned to the Levites. Here is only one point that needs to be cleared up. VON COLLN insists particularly on Num. xxviii. 21, "*And he (Joshua) shall stand before Eleazar the priest, who shall ask counsel for him after the judgment of Urim before the Lord: at his word shall they go out, and at his word shall they come in, he and all the children of Israel with him, even all the congregation.*" On the ground of this passage, he asserts, p. 279, "Moses himself transfers the deliberative and legislative powers to the high priest, who, by Urim and Thummim, enquired of Jehovah respecting his will, therefore must be the constant theocratic mediator instead of Moses." But that this cannot be the design of the passage to lower Joshua, and, in his person, the civil government generally, to represent his head as superfluous, and only his hands as necessary—is evident from the verse immediately preceding, according to which, "some of the honour" of Moses was put not on the high priest, but upon Joshua, and was, at the same, recognised as Moses' peculiar successor. It appears

also from Deut. xxxiv. 9, “ *And Joshua the son of Nun was full of the spirit of wisdom, for Moses had laid his hands upon him.*” It appears also from Joshua’s whole conduct after the death of Moses, which presents him in nowise as a priest’s servant, but as a servant who himself knew his Lord’s will, and acted according to his own knowledge. Yet VON COLLN himself knows not how to bring into harmony with this injunction as he construes it, the conduct of Joshua, who meditated in the law of the Lord given by Moses day and night, that he might do all that was written therein. The enquiring of God by Urim and Thummim in this passage is not commanded, or rather permitted at all, in relation to *all* affairs of state, but only for one particular class of them, if the circumstances were of a kind that Joshua, on whom it devolved to form a judgment respecting them, knew not how to decide. All instances of the use of Urim and Thummim show that its office was limited—that it was designed only for extraordinary cases, for pressing circumstances—for emergencies in which good counsel was invaluable, and human skill was not sufficient. CARPZOV (*Appar.* p. 81) correctly describes it as *remedium heroicum eruendi occulta, vel resciscendi futura, quo abuti non erat integrum.* We nowhere find a trace of an influence exercised by Urim and Thummim on legislation, or of judicial decisions proceeding from them. If we observe the department within which their use was confined, it will appear, that an abuse of them in favour of the hierarchy could scarcely exist. The high priest must give an answer in reference to consequences which, humanly speaking, were uncertain, and risk everything if this answer was found incorrect. The consequence was, that he only attempted to give an answer when he really was, what he ought to be, the organ of God. This is perfectly confirmed to us by the history of Urim and Thummim. When the spirit of God retired from the high priesthood, and passed over to the prophets, the Urim and Thummim were altogether silent; compare CARPZOV. In the whole history, not a single case occurs in which it was attempted to abuse the Urim and Thummim in the service of selfish interest and priestly pretensions. Whoever would have done this would have played a dangerous game.

III. According to the Mosaic arrangement, it is asserted, all the higher mental training must have fallen into the hands of the

priests exclusively. Compare, for example, VON CÖLLN, i. 66. But this again is entirely a gratuitous assertion. Moses never aimed at such a thing. He delivered the book of the law not merely to the priests, but also to the elders, Deut. xxxi. 9. He enjoined that the king should take a copy of it—read in it himself—and act according to his own understanding of it; Deut. xvii. 18, 19, he commanded that the law should be read to the people; Deut. xxxi. 10, he placed the prophets by the side of the priests as teachers of the people. According to the testimony of the history, the priests were never the sole depositories of the formation of the national mind. Only look at the collection of the writings of the Old Testament, what a small portion of them proceeded from priests! The Israelitish national culture reached its highest point in two of their kings, David and Solomon, and in their prophets. The arts, the practical branches of knowledge which the priestly caste in Egypt and India have exclusively appropriated, among the Israelites never stood under the influence of the priesthood.

IV. The revenues of the Levites were far too large. Thus DE WETTE (*Crit.* 334.) This assertion would have been expressed somewhat less confidently if he had read what RÜHS observes (p. 386) on the revenues of the priesthood in the Middle Ages. He says, “The narrow-minded, financial reference to perpetual acquisition and profit, by which the state was converted into one great counting-house, deteriorated men’s dispositions and morals; and at last the agency of the laziest monk might hold the scales in many occupations which are necessary in the modern relations of state, and, in truth, border on idleness.” We would not here repeat every thing which can, and has been, said in favour of the regulations in the Pentateuch respecting the revenues of the Levites; lately by WINER (*Realwörter.* II. 26.) We would only bring forward one point, which appears to be very weighty, and yet has hitherto been almost entirely overlooked. In Egypt the largest and most beautiful portion of the land was the property of the priests. (Compare HEEREN, p. 127, 130, &c., SCHLOSSER, p. 183.) Moses must have effected a similar arrangement if it had been his object that the Levites, under all circumstances, should be rich and powerful. But he did exactly the opposite. He took away from the Levites the portion in the promised land

which they would have been justified in claiming as one of the tribes of Israel, and gave them, as a compensation for it, and at the same time as a reward for their service, an income, of which he made the payment by no means certain, but left it dependent on the consciences of the people. The necessary consequence was, that the Levites, in times of religious lukewarmness and apostacy, were exposed to famine. It may be asserted that this consequence escaped Moses. But the contrary may be clearly proved. He shows throughout the clearest knowledge of the future apostacy of the people from the Lord, which would be accompanied by a falling away of the income due to his ministers. And what is still more, he proceeds in Deuteronomy on the supposition that the lot of the Levites, in spite of all the advantages which he had promised them, would be a straitened one; he places them with strangers, widows, and orphans, and exhorts the people to acts of benevolence towards them. But Gen. xlix. 7 is deserving of special notice. In that expression of dying Jacob, which could be reversed by no language of any succeeding prophet, the scattering of Levi in Israel is contemplated as a mournful lot. Let us admire the wisdom of the arrangement. If the tribe of Levi remained faithful to God and their vocation, and, by their instrumentality, piety flourished among the people, their temporal wants would be abundantly supplied; for it was equitable that those who had been partakers of their spiritual things, should render them service in temporal things. Compare Rom. xv. 27, 1 Cor. ix. 11. If, on the contrary, they became like their ungodly progenitor, then the curse denounced on *him* would be fulfilled in them. What would be the plight of our rationalist clergy if it depended on the piety of each of their parishioners whether he paid them tithes or not! If we take a glance at history, it is at once seen how unfounded is the objection. At no time do we find the Levites excessively rich; more frequently we find them in the most depressed poverty. At the separation of the two kingdoms, their revenues from all Israel were lost; compare the vindication (vol. i. 168) of the settlement of all the Levites in Juda, which has been called in question last of all by WINER (p. 327.) Under the numerous ungodly kings of Judah they were also meanly thought of by the citizens of that kingdom. According to Chron. xxxi. 4, it was a part of the reformation effected by Hezekiah,

that he commanded the people to give their due portion to the Priests and Levites; and in the times after the captivity, in which open apostacy from the Lord was less prevalent, the same disposition operated, from which the present theoretic niggardliness towardst he Levites proceeds, to cheat them of their own whenever it was possible. A lifeless orthodoxy, of which the Levites themselves were the chief promoters, had not the ability to overcome the living selfishness. Compare Mal. iii. 8–12, and Neh. xiii. 10, &c., according to which the Levites' dues were so badly paid that they were obliged to relinquish their ministrations.

V. A number of the laws, it is asserted, had more the interests of the priests than of the people in view, and thus betray their origin in Levitical party spirit. Thus DE WETTE (*Crit.* 279); GRAMBERG (i. 195); VATKE p. 219. This assertion, which rests upon a total misconception (more suited to the deistical age than our own), of the meaning and tendency of the Ceremonial Law, has already been refuted in the section on the Ceremonial Law.

Having thus disposed of the arguments in favour of the Levitical bias of the Pentateuch, we now proceed to add a few things to those positive considerations against it, which prove that the position which Moses assigns in the Pentateuch to the tribe of Levi, is worthy of a Divine messenger.

(i.) The language of dying Jacob, in Gen. xlix., which reflects disgrace on the progenitor of the Levites, appears as a witness against the Levitical bias of the Pentateuch, (see the development of that passage in reference to this point in CALVIN, on ver. 5); so also does the account of the part taken by Aaron in the worship of the Calf, and the Divine judgment passed upon his sons in Lev. x. 1, &c., in which (ver. 3), occurs that truly Divine aphorism of JEHOVAH—“*I will be sanctified in them that come nigh me;*” compare 1 Peter iv. 17; and, lastly, the account of the impiety of Korah, and its punishment, in Numb. xvi., on which compare HAVERNICK, p. 500.

(ii.) God says to Israel, in Ex. xix. 6—“*Ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests,*” מִמְּלִכְתָּהּ כֹּהֲנִים, a people consisting purely of kings, who are at the same time priests. This is not a mere transient, accidental expression, but a solemn declaration, uttered on a most solemn occasion. What a deep impression it made



upon the people we see from Numb. xvi. 3, according to which the faction of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram made use of it to vindicate their insurrection. "The meaning of this expression has been already developed in the *Christologie*, iii. 315. This language intimated, that the later instituted Levitical Priesthood could not have the same significance as the priesthood in other nations of antiquity, among whom priest and people stood in absolute contrast, where the priests alone were the persons who stood in immediate relation to God. It also intimated that the priests possessed only transferred rights, that they were the representatives of the people, that, therefore, the time might come when their mediation would entirely vanish." Could such language proceed from a hierarchal spirit? The priesthood of all believers, even where it is as an ideal possession, really to be entered upon only at a future period, gives the death-blow of hierarchy.

(iii.) The Pentateuch secures, by a special law, the authority of the prophetic order, and utters a severe threatening against those who will not obey the Prophets, Deut. xviii. 19. For those persons who impute a hierarchal tendency to the Pentateuch, this law must remain an inexplicable enigma. VON BOHLEN tries to free himself from his embarrassment by asserting that the prophetic order, who at a later period came into collision with the priesthood, were originally blended with it. But the proofs that he adduces are truly pitiable. He appeals to 1 Sam. ii. 35, compared with iii. 30. But the former passage does not apply to Samuel. He says that Nathan is called a priest in 1 Kings iv. 5. But Nathan is not there spoken of, but Nathan's son, and he was not Jehovah's priest, but the king's priest, that is, a mediator between him and the people. "*And Zabud the son of Nathan was priest* (principal officer, *Eng. A. Ver.*), *that is, the king's friend*—וְזָבֻד בֶּן־נָתָן כֹּהֵן הָרֶגֶץ הַמְּלִיכָה. What are we to say of such reasoning?

(iv.) The functions which the Pentateuch assigns to the priests, are altogether different from those which selfish aims have given to the priesthood among other nations. They were not like, for example, the Egyptian priests, who were in possession of all the offices of state, the best lands, and the most lucrative employments (compare HEEREN, 132), to rule over and impoverish the

people, but to train the people to piety, partly by the performance of sacred rites, partly by direct instruction. Observe the juxtaposition of the two duties in Lev. x. 10, 11, on which CALVIN remarks—*Colligimus ex h. l. quod dicit Malachias, sacerdotes fuisse legis interpretes et nuntios dei exercituum, non autem mutas larvas. Tametsi enim scripta lex erat, voluit tamen deus semper vivam vocem sonare in sua ecclesia, quemadmodum hodie scripturae conjuncta est praedicatio quasi individuo nexu.* Their office as teachers is supported by Deut. xxxiii. 10. The means by which the priesthood of other nations raised themselves to excessive influence, was from the first cut off from them. The Babylonish priestly caste, for instance, found the support of their reputation, and influence in the state, in astrology (HEEREN i. 194). In reference to the Indian, SCHLOSSER remarks (p. 123), “The priestly caste among the Indians was so much more firmly rooted, since they managed to connect art, literature, superstition, the whole routine of outward life, and even licentious indulgences, with themselves and their order.” The religion of Jehovah annihilated astrology and superstition generally, which in many cases was punished with death, it marked the impurity of sacred persons as an abomination before God, and deprived the priests of every means of gaining reputation, excepting the lawful one of piety. The best apology for the Levitical Priesthood, is the testimony which Malachi the prophet bears to their beneficial operation in past times. The importance of this testimony is heightened by the lamentation connected with it, of the corruption of his own times, and this lamentation must again, like similar language in the other prophets, redound to the honour of the Mosaic institute, under another point of view. It could not have been uttered, if the functions of the Israelitish priesthood had not been of a noble and exalted kind. MALACHI says (ch. ii. 5)—

5. My covenant was with him (Levi) of life and peace;  
And I gave them to him,  
For the fear wherewith he feared me,  
And was afraid before my name.
6. The law of truth was in his mouth,  
And iniquity was not found in his lips;  
He walked with me in peace and equity,  
And did turn many away from iniquity.

7. For the priest's lips should keep knowledge,  
And they should seek the law at his mouth,  
For he is the messenger of the Lord of Hosts.
8. But ye are departed out of the way,  
Ye have caused many to stumble at the law;  
Ye have corrupted the covenant of Levi, &c.

END OF VOL. II.





Date Due

FE 22 '52

FACULTY


FACULTY





BS1225.8 .H513 v.2  
Dissertations on the genuineness of the

Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer Library



1 1012 00041 3247